

**THE ADELANTAMIENTO OF FLORIDA:
1565-1568**

By

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To Dot

PREFACE

This study arose out of a long interest in the founding of Spanish Florida by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. The inspiration for its particular emphasis came from the Geografía universal de las Indias of Juan López de Velasco (Madrid 1893). The section about Florida is entitled "Description of the Provinces and Adelantamiento of Florida." Of special significance was the following:

This province is a government by itself, or an adelantamiento, subject until now to no Audiencia, even though through being so close to Hispaniola it is described together with its district.

This passage led to the decision to analyze the Florida government of 1565-1568 as an adelantamiento. The seminal article by Roscoe R. Hill, "The Office of Adelantado," also came to the attention of the writer. This led to an archival search for the asientos and capitulaciones of a number of Indies adelantados, and a comparison of these with the 1565 contract of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés.

Analysis of the extent and use of adelantamiento disclosed that a major element in sixteenth-century Spanish conquest was the support furnished by private enterprise. The expansion fostered by Isabella and Ferdinand, Charles V

and Philip II was largely carried out by entrepreneurs, including all the attempts to conquer Florida except the De Luna and Villafañe expeditions.

Once this unifying theme was identified, it was necessary to explore a number of secondary points. Among these were the personal motivations of a "contractor in conquest," his expectations of psychic and material gain, and the sources of his financial support. Also important were his relationships with the municipal, juridical, religious, and commercial institutions of Castile.

The research methodology chosen for the study was essentially to work from Spanish archival materials. In order best to utilize one academic year for study in Spain, and avoid duplication with existing materials in Florida, the writer consulted the Spanish materials at the University of Florida. Copies of the John B. Stetson Collection microfilm reels for the years 1559 to 1607 were taken to Spain, together with a copy of the William B. Griffen Index of that collection. The Jeannette Thurber Connor, Buckingham Smith, and Woodbury Lowery Collections were surveyed. The indices of the Connor and Smith collections prepared by Manuel Vazquez, Dr. Paul E. Hoffman and James Mulholland were most helpful.

At this point, the writer wishes to reaffirm the great and abiding value of the Spanish document collections at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. In this study, the

writer made especial use of the Stetson Collection. Citations from this collection have been made with the "new" legajo identification numbers, rather than with the "old" ones with which the Stetson Collection is marked, to conform with the numbering system in use in the Archive of the Indies since 1929. Dr. Paul E. Hoffman has created a conversion table from the "old" to "new" numbers which has been most useful for this purpose.

Coordination of the work in the Archive of the Indies with the Florida materials proceeded more rapidly once the writer began to understand the organization of the archive. He could then better appreciate how Miss Irene Wright, who sought out much of the documentation brought to Florida in this century, gathered her material. Aided substantially by Dr. Hoffman's conversion table, the writer could begin to see the areas of her greater and lesser concentration. The Patronato Real, Contratación, Indiferente General and Gobierno: Santo Domingo sections were generally well covered by Miss Wright. Additional work upon the interconnected correspondence of the Crown and the Casa de Contratación found in Contratación and Indiferente General was done in Seville. It was found that the Justicia, Escribanía de Cámara and Contraduría sections had been very little utilized by Miss Wright in her investigations. It happened that these sections, devoted to legal cases or audits

involving the Adelantado or his major lieutenants, were of particular utility in developing the "private" side of the conquest of Florida. After this determination was made, therefore, the major effort of the remaining months was expended in these areas of the A.G.I.

One legajo, Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, proved to be the corpus of the main legal case carried on by Pedro Menéndez and his heirs against the Crown over the conquest of Florida. Although incomplete, it is most rich in content, and appears to tie directly to the "family case" presented by the Solís de Merás, Barrientos, and Barcía works. It is also connected with the audits of Menéndez' fiscal affairs found in A.G.I. Contaduría 454 and 548.

A mere beginning was also made in a most promising archival area: The notaries' or protocolos records. The Archivos de Protocolos of Seville, Cádiz and Madrid contain much material on the financial network which backed Pedro Menéndez in Florida.

This has been a most absorbing study, and the writer feels privileged indeed to have been involved in it. He has come to feel a degree of kinship with the magnificent and yet very human figures who carried out the enterprise of Florida. He would like to give particular thanks and appreciation to Dr. Lyle McAlister, who has directed this research; his standards have been the most important single stimulus to carry out this work. His comments and suggestions have

invariably proven cogent and fruitful. He has continually steered the project into connection with the wider field of Latin-American History, and his encyclopaedic bibliographic knowledge continues to enrich this student, and all of his students.

The unfailing interest and encouragement of other professors at the University, notably Dr. John K. Mahon, Dr. Paul E. Smith, Dr. George D. Winus, and Dr. Cornelius Goslinga, has amplified the desire of the writer to become familiar with primary archival materials. Dr. Francis Hayes did much, in his instruction, to revive an earlier interest in the purity and beauty of the Spanish language. To Dr. Goslinga and Dr. Antonio Oliveira-Marques should go special appreciation for systematic and patient instruction in paleography, the key to sixteenth-century documentation.

With particular reference to Florida history, the writer is indebted to Mrs. Bessie DuBois of Jupiter, Florida, for her long and continual urging to work in that field. Over a period of twenty-five years, the writer has also been encouraged in countless ways by Dr. Samuel Proctor, who has been teacher and friend.

The P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History at the University of Florida is truly a place of wonders. For two years, the writer found an academic home there. Its Librarian, Miss Elizabeth Alexander, has been unfailingly helpful. The wealth and accessibility of the material and

the ordered but friendly atmosphere of the library owes much to her concern. Her assistant, Mrs. Ileene Durand, has also aided the writer many, many times.

The writer is indeed grateful to the Center for Latin-American Studies and to the Department of History for the support of a Title VI National Defense Educational Association scholarship, which helped greatly to meet financial needs during the three years of study and research. Dr. William E. Carter became Director of the Center during this period. He has, together with Mrs. Vivian Nolan and other members of his staff, aided in every possible way to solve problems of enrollment and financial support which arose.

At the Archive of the Indies in Seville, many people were of incomparable kindness and service. The Directora, Srta. Rosario Parra Cala, has been unfailingly kind. All of her staff, including the porteros, have shown real consideration. Dr. Louis-André Vigneras, Professor Emeritus of History at George Washington University, aided greatly in initiating the writer into the mysteries of the notaries' depositories. Srta. Maria Carmona de los Santos, the guardian of the Archive of Protocolos in Cádiz, was most helpful.

It is impossible to render due appreciation for the stimulating and fruitful association which this writer has had with Dr. Paul E. Hoffman of Louisiana State University. Where he could easily have chosen to retain his knowledge, Dr. Hoffman has been most generous in sharing the volume of useful materials unearthed in his own archival research.

His keen insights and thought-provoking comments on matters relating to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés have been and continue to be invaluable.

Finally, but not at all least worthy of mention, the writer would like to acknowledge his lasting obligation to his dear and patient wife, Dorothy, who has supported his every effort. Thanks also go to his daughter, Peggy, whose judgment of style he respects, and whose typing skill was most helpful, and to the whole family, who have cheerfully and thoughtfully met the absences and sacrifices which go with a study of this kind.

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
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The Florida conquest of 1565-1568 was accomplished by an entrepreneur titled Adelantado, in keeping with a Castilian tradition of expansion by Royal surrogate. Adelantados underwrote the pacification and settlement of new lands in return for license to exploit them and the granting of titles, monopolies, revenues and lands. The Hapsburg ruler Philip II, caught between urgent dynastic policies and limited resources, created many adelantamientos and promulgated Royal ordinances in 1563 which defined a place for private conquerors in Spanish expansion.

After Spanish-French negotiations over New World spheres of influence collapsed, Philip II attempted to counter a Huguenot settlement at Port Royal and appointed Lucas Vazquez Ayllón Adelantado in 1563. Both the Spanish and French attempts failed, but another French expedition built Fort Caroline in 1564. The capture of mutineers from its garrison eventually resulted in the dispatch of news of the fort to Spain.

Meanwhile, the Asturian seaman Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had become an Indies trader and Royal fleet official. After conflict with the House of Trade led to his jailing at Seville, Menéndez was freed and signed a contract with Philip II for the conquest and settlement of Florida at his own expense. Only later, after knowledge of Fort Caroline reached Spain, did the Crown add troops and supplies to Menéndez' own effort. Thereafter, the Florida conquest was a joint-venture, with the resources of the Adelantado proving the more telling.

Menéndez had recourse to a network of Asturian noble families to help staff and finance his enterprise. The Mayordomo of this network was Pedro del Castillo of Cádiz, who held a contract with Menéndez to supply and sustain his efforts in Florida. This network was built through the use of powers-of-attorney. The events of the conquest tested Menéndez' resources to the utmost. His decision to proceed directly to Florida in 1565 made victory over Jean Ribault possible but cost heavily in ships, lives, and money. Menéndez had great difficulty providing for his Florida garrisons after Royal aid promised failed to materialize, and he lost private income potential through the loss of many ships. The unruly contract soldiers' mutinies and rebellions cost Menéndez dear, and their treatment of the natives undermined his Indian policies.

In spite of obstacles, Pedro Menéndez and his norteño conquest group explored much of the adelantamiento of Florida, which extended from the Gulf Coast around the Keys to Newfoundland. They established forts and missions in the peninsula, to the north, and inland to the Appalachians, and founded the cities whose cabildos were to be the foci of local government and the means of land distribution. Menéndez set up a system of local government and promulgated ordinances to regulate it. In keeping with his dream for Florida development, Menéndez arranged to fund the coming of hundreds of settlers, and all shared in the hope for agricultural and commercial growth in an atmosphere of community. The Adelantado himself expected to obtain the title of Marquis, to be backed by his huge land-grant from the King. Jesuit missionaries labored diligently with the Indians, but made little headway.

At the end of the first phase of the Florida conquest in mid-1568, Pedro Menéndez had been personally rewarded by his King for his deeds in Florida, and Philip II had agreed to support a minimum garrison at Royal expense. Real penetration of the land and pacification of the Indians had not yet been accomplished, however.

CHAPTER I

CONTRACTORS IN CONQUEST

The sixteenth-century Castilian expansion into the Western Hemisphere proceeded in several waves. After the voyages of Columbus, Spaniards occupied the islands of Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba and Jamaica. The islands then served as advance bases to launch expeditions of exploration and conquest around the Caribbean basin. During these years, probing attempts had also been made to discover the North American coasts. By mid-century, the cultures of Spain had met and interacted with those of many native peoples in widely scattered areas.

The purposes and methods of the conquerors reflected much, if not all, of the diversity of the lands from which they came.¹ The motivation and organization of conquest was as complex as the make-up of the sixteenth-century Spanish Iberia. At any single entrada in the Indies Spaniards pursued many diverse personal, dynastic, and religious objectives. On this advancing frontier, elements of medievalism--in commerce, law, and the institutions of government--co-existed with more modern concepts of kingship and personal enterprise.

The very means of conquest itself was also a mixture of ancient tradition and newer practice. The rulers in whose names the seas, islands and mainlands of the Indies were appropriated represented an advancing absolutism. A preoccupation with the step-by-step increase of royal prerogatives can, however, obscure the extent to which limitations upon kingly power still existed. The fiscal and organizational weaknesses of the Castilian rulers through the whole first era of conquest insured that their reach would always exceed their grasp. From the time of Columbus through that of Balboa, Cortés, Pizarro, Alvarado, Montejó, Mendoza and De Soto, conquest was accomplished or recognized through contract by licensed entrepreneurs, many of whom carried the title of Adelantado.²

The institution of adelantamiento in Castile can be traced back at least to the twelfth century, and possibly further.³ The earlier officer, called adelantado mayor, functioned primarily as a surrogate of the King in hearing legal appeals, although he also bore responsibility for the maintenance of order in his district. The unification of Castile and Leon in the early thirteenth century led to a revival of the Reconquest from the Moslems. Under the leadership of Ferdinand III, the forces of Castile drove deeply into Andalusia, captured Cordova and Seville, and opened a path to the sea by 1241. The older office of adelantado was reconstituted, and given wider authority

under the title of adelantado menor. Now the peace-keeping functions of the adelantados were expanded to become those of the commanders of frontier military districts. Within his district, an adelantado had great juridical and governmental powers; these were outlined and limited by law.⁴ His services were rewarded by the grant of revenue-producing estates along the frontier. He could expect to profit from his lands, if he proved able to defend them. Thus was established the principle of the private defensor, aided by the grant of benefices from the Crown, so that he might more easily mount his private effort.

When the subjugation of new kingdoms began in the western world, the institution of private conquest was transmitted, without visible alteration, from Castile to the Indies.⁵ The expansion policies the Spanish Crown developed during its dealings with Christopher Columbus became a model for future outreach, in which adelantamiento had its proper part. Columbus received several titles as result of his contract with Ferdinand and Isabella, which made him the primary entrepreneur of the Indies which he was to discover. Among these was the title of Adelantado Mayor, which he proceeded to subdivide by naming his brother Bartolomé Adelantado of Hispaniola in 1497. The descendants of the Discoveror litigated for continuation of the title of Adelantado Mayor of the Indies, which exists today.⁶ Although Hernando Cortés began his conquest of Mexico under

the authority of the licensed Adelantado, Diego Velasquez, his success enabled him to deal directly with the Crown. The Royal "Instructions" and grants to Cortés constituted him as a major contractor in conquest, even though he did not become Adelantado of New Spain.⁷ Francisco Pizarro, the last of the three great conquistadores, also obtained his royal contract after he had begun his enterprise under the aegis of another official, the Governor of Panama. His asiento of 1529 was a standard one, which granted him the title of Adelantado of Peru as well as a number of other offices and benefits. Francisco Montejó accomplished the conquest of Yucatan as an Adelantado whose efforts and expenditures over many years overcame difficult obstacles.⁸

Adelantamiento in the Spanish Indies rested upon the juridical basis of personal royal title to the new lands. This ownership and overlordship, called señorio natural, had been confirmed by the donations of Pope Alexander VI.⁹ Although the papal bulls laid spiritual obligations upon the Castilian rulers in their new lands, their right to dispose of the territories was legally intact. The monarch, as Señor natural, was the sole suzerain who could license exploitation of his properties. The Indies adelantados were granted the privilege of discovering, populating and exploiting the royal lands. The Crown also granted certain incomes, exemptions and monopolies to its entrepreneurs. These were of varying duration; some were perpetual in

scope, while many were to endure for the lifetime of the grantee. The emoluments promised to an adelantado included inheritable estates and titles. For the ambitious sixteenth-century caballero, the benefits hoped for constituted high rewards, in both the material and the psychic sense.

In return for their license and privileges, the adelantados bore the essential burden of the cost and risk of their conquest. As the private instruments of their sovereign's will, they were required to agree to carry out royal policies of fortification for defense, the implanting of Castilian municipal institutions in desired areas, and the fair treatment of the Indians. The duration and extent of their effort was dictated in substantial detail.

Final sovereignty over its territories had not been surrendered by the Crown to its designated representative. The history of the royal disputes with Columbus and later conquerors demonstrates that the Spanish rulers always guarded their prerogatives with jealous zeal. The adelantados might receive enduring title to lands and lasting privileges, but their control over the government of the lands they had conquered was limited; within one or two lifetimes the monarch would recapture the governmental offices of Governor and Captain-General. During the life of the agreement, however, effective civil and military authority was in the hands of the adelantado. Within the boundaries of his district, the adelantado was supreme.

The viceroyalties founded in New Spain in 1535 and for Peru in 1544 had no territorial jurisdiction over adelantamientos established by royal fiat. Neither could the Audiencias appointed in the indies after 1511 interpose their judgments in the legal appeal channel for cases arising in the adelantamiento--these proceeded from local justices to the adelantado and from thence to the Council of the Indies. The King would also appoint Royal financial officials to assure that Crown revenues would be accounted for and forwarded to Spain. The ancient devices of visita and residencia could also help to check excesses in the use of granted powers.¹⁰

All of the mutual arrangements between the Castilian monarchs and their adelantados were formalized in their asientos y capitulaciones--a series of negotiated contracts. Examination of a number of these accords discloses that they were, in the main, alike. By the middle of the sixteenth century they had become largely standardized. The asientos are therefore good indices of the abiding aims and purposes of Crown and contractors alike.¹¹

In every case, the two-fold mission of the conquest--pacification and settlement--was impressed upon the contractor. He would receive the titles and properties promised, enjoy the short-run incomes, exemptions and more enduring privileges, if he complied with his obligation to fortify, populate, and provide an atmosphere in which evangelization of the natives could go forward. On both sides of the

contract--benefit as well as obligation--the promises and requirements were most specific.

As captains and explorers set forth in every direction in attempts to expand the dominions of Castile and their own fortunes, it was inevitable that the unknown northern continent should come within the expanding Spanish sphere of interest.

From Puerto Rico, Juan Ponce de Leon launched two expeditions to his licensed area of "Bimini" and made two voyages, the last of which culminated in his death. He carried out his ill-starred enterprise at his own cost as adelantado. When it was done, the general geographic outline of the lovely, deadly land he had named Florida had become somewhat clearer to the Spanish.¹²

The next systematic attempt to move northwestward to conquest arose out of Santo Domingo. Two men, Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón and the Licenciado Matienzo, oidores of Audiencia there, sent two caravels northward along the coast discovered by Ponce de Leon, and found fertile land lying in thirty-five to thirty-seven degrees of north latitude. Vazquez de Ayllón determined to attempt its settlement. His petition for an asiento was approved in 1523, but storm and shipwreck destroyed the expedition. The failure of this would-be adelantado left the field open again.¹³

In the meantime, Castile's claim to the Western Hemisphere lands west of the Line of Demarcation established by

the Tordesillas agreements came under challenge.

Castile-Aragon and its Mediterranean and overseas possessions were drawn into the Hapsburg orbit after King Ferdinand had begun the long struggle with the Valois rulers of France. After the beginning of the intense rivalry between Francis I and Emperor Charles V, the lands and waters of North America became a theater of contest. The French monarch sponsored Giovanni di Verrazano on a voyage of exploration and discovery along the eastern coasts of the continent during 1524.

At Granada, on December 11, 1526, yet another adelantado was licensed for an attempt upon Florida. A resident of Cuba who had been involved in the conquest of Mexico, Pánfilo de Narvaez, was given his asiento to pacify and populate an area between New Spain and the areas granted to Ponce de Leon and to Vazquez Ayllón--from the River of Palms to the Cape of Florida. Narvaez left Spain in mid-1527, and only reached Florida the next spring. As his dwindling forces traversed the Gulf Coast, the expedition lost touch with its sources of supply, and became a disaster. Only four men, including Cabeza de Vaca, reached New Spain eight years after their Florida landing.¹⁴

After the battle of Pavia and the capture of Francis I by Charles V, another short-lived peace prevailed. When Francis was released, however, war began again in Europe, and this time the first French commerce-raiders appeared in

the Spanish Indies. Ignoring the Spanish and Portuguese pretensions to exclusive title in the Americas, Francis I also sent Jacques Cartier in 1534 and 1535 to explore Newfoundland, seeking a passage westward to the Orient.

After Cabeza de Vaca returned to Spain to report in 1537, the Crown passed over his application to take up the contract of de Narvaez, and awarded it to Hernando de Soto. The asiento of de Soto required him to fortify and settle, and made him the usual concessions for profit and prestige. It was continental in scope; de Soto was given all of the areas previously promised to Vazquez Ayllón and to de Narvaez.¹⁵ The vast expanse of his territories swallowed up Hernando de Soto and his men; his expedition never passed beyond the exploration stage, and ended in death for its leader and many of his men.

In the meantime, preparation for the third voyage of Jacques Cartier was well advanced. Word of its arming reached and alarmed the Emperor and his councillors. It was to be a thoroughgoing colonization attempt. The Spanish viewed the coming voyage as an act of aggression in the rightful lands of the rulers of Castile. Charles V considered sending a war-fleet to intercept Cartier at sea; an armada was outfitted and later sent, but became primarily a protective fleet. In June of 1541, the Council of the Indies suggested to the King that he send scout vessels to follow the movements of Cartier, and practice defensive

settlement by giving another asiento to a Spanish nobleman to check the French in North America.¹⁶

When the Cartier voyage came to naught (as far as lasting settlement was concerned), no further Spanish contracts for the Florida conquest were issued for many years. In June, 1549, Father Luis Cáncer de Barbastro, a Dominican priest who had taken part in the peaceable evangelization of Verapaz, was killed with two of his fellows at Tampa Bay while attempting to convert the Florida Indians. After more than thirty-five years, the Spanish had still not made successful establishments on the southeastern mainland.

The year of Father Cáncer's sacrifice also represented a new peak in the intrusion of French vessels, which came in numbers to raid and trade in the Spanish Indies. By now, the distinction between peace and war had become blurred. Corsairs sailed continually to the "hot-spots" between Cuba and Hispaniola, where inter-island commerce and a plentiful supply of hides and sugar attracted the French.

By this time, Spanish trade with the Indies had grown until it represented something of immense value to protect. The commercial system called the Carrera de Indias was an almost-closed monopoly, in which the Crown license merchants to engage in commerce. During the first four or five decades of the Carrera, trade was diffused among many ports. In Spain, in 1529, the Emperor gave permission to

La Coruña and Bayona in Galicia, Avilés in Asturias, Laredo in Santander, Bilbao in Vizcaya, and San Sebastián in Guipúzcoa to load cargoes for the Indies. Permission was also extended to Cádiz and Seville in Andalusia.¹⁷

Many norteños engaged in the Atlantic commerce made commercial ties with Caribbean trade centers--Santo Domingo, La Yaguana, Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata and Puerto Real on the island of Hispaniola, Santiago in Cuba, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. The exchange of sugar, hides, placer gold and copper was made with the wines, iron goods, and cloth of Spain. As the century advanced, the agricultural products and bullion from New Spain and Peru began slowly to eclipse the island commerce. San Juan de Ulua, Nombre de Dios and Cartagena became the main ports for the ingress and egress of organized fleets. Across the Atlantic, except for limited separate privileges granted to Cádiz, all of this trade was funnelled through Seville.

As merchants from the north of Spain lost their one-time privileges in the Indies commerce, some of them gravitated to Cádiz, and continued their shipping from there. Considerable tension arose between them and the shippers' guild at Seville.

The Royal Casa de Contratación at Seville (founded 1503) and the guild of sea-merchants (Consulado de la Universidad de Mercaderes, established 1543) composed a symbiotic community of interests. The traders of Seville had

achieved monopoly through royal patronage--they became a strong and wealthy power-center. Through the Casa, the Crown insured the safe passage of its Indies revenues, including those taxes levied on the commerce itself. The functionaries of the Casa came to represent the merchants' guild as much as they did the King. An official at Cádiz insured that ships from that port conformed to the rules. Crown policies were also carried out through the Carrera regulation. The inspections of the Casa enforced controls over outgoing passengers, who had to conform to the Spanish laws of religious purity and moral fitness before they could sail.¹⁸

To protect the Spanish ships against Berber pirates and the commerce-raiders who swarmed in the waters west of Spain, the Emperor decided to tax the trade for its own defense. The Crown, operating through its officials in the Casa de Contratación, used the funds realized from the avería tax to lease ships, purchase cannon and ammunition, and pay soldiers and sailors to defend the fleets. By mid-century, the practice of joint sailing in fleet convoy for defense purposes had begun, but was not yet regularized. Coastal patrols also protected the Mediterranean shoreline and the other Spanish coasts.¹⁹

On the north coast of Spain, conditions were particularly favorable for the development of a vigorous culture based upon the sea. The very nature of the rugged coast,

cut by endless inlets alternating with rocky headlands, thrust men onto the oceans for livelihood. In addition to fishing, from an early date they engaged in trade with northern Europe and the Indies. To the east, in Vizcaya, the combination of rich iron ore deposits, ample supplies of wood, and a sea-oriented people produced a long and vital tradition of ship-building.

With excellent ships and fine seamen, the norteños made lasting reputations as mariners and the builders of fleets. The stimulus which activated the area was essentially that of war, and its more particular impetus was privateering. During the lengthy Italian wars, and the many Mediterranean campaigns mounted by Ferdinand and Emperor Charles V, the Crown freely gave letters-of-marque to Spanish ship-owners to prey upon enemy vessels in the Bay of Biscay, the near approaches to Europe, and the waters of the Indies.²⁰

The major incentive for privateering was the taking of enemy prizes. The wealth which accrued to the north coast from the corse was substantial. In 1542, Vizcayan privateers took thirty-one French prizes; another Basque group captured forty-two French vessels from the Newfoundland fishing trade. Juanot de Villaviciosa from Asturias captured more than sixty prizes during his wartime career. Other successful contra-corsario captains were Domingo de Villaviciosa, Bartolomé Carreño, and Álvaro Sánchez of Avilés. One memorial lists twenty-two Guipuzcoan captains who had made prize captures during war with France.²¹

In addition to independent adventuring, the captains and shipbuilders of the north coast early gained access to royal funds and favor through the furnishing of ships. They sailed on expeditions against the Berbers and Turks and took part in the Mediterranean sea-actions connected with the Italian wars. The Crown would pay a sueldo, or ship-charter fee, for the use of the vessel, and would also furnish supplies, artillery and munitions, and pay for the seamen. The entrepreneur who provided the ships would also be given a royal commission as Captain-General to lead them in battle. One of the most notable of the armador families was that of Bazán. Before the end of the fifteenth century, Sancho de Bazán was already known for the furnishing of vessels. Galleys and other fighting ships from the north coast were important contingents in the expeditions against Berbers and Turks in 1510, 1519, 1530, 1535, and 1540-41. In 1543, Álvaro de Bazán, who had served with distinction in the Mediterranean since the 1520s, was commissioned to form an armada to counter a large French fleet. His forty ships met the enemy off Galicia in the battle of Muros, and defeated them handily, taking twenty-three prizes and much other booty.

Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was very much a part of this sea-borne culture and of the anti-corsair milieu. Born in 1519 at Avilés, Menéndez was the descendant of minor Asturian hidalgos, and had blood and marriage connections with the

more important Valdés family as well as with other noble norteño families.²² After an early marriage to Dona Maria de Solís from nearby Merás, Menéndez went to sea and entered the world of privateering. He had before him the example of his elder brother Álvaro Sánchez, and such luminaries as Álvaro Bazán. It appears that he served in Bazán's fleet for two years beginning in 1543.²³ This experience led him to buy his own patache (a small, rapid-sailing craft) and become a privateer. Within a very few years he became well-known for his decisive, daring seamanship and for the number of prizes that he took. For Pedro Menéndez, this proved to be a path to preferment at the Court. He received two royal commissions to pursue corsairs, one granted by Maximilian in 1548, acting as regent for the Emperor, and another granted by Charles V himself. Manifestly, the Asturian's rise was aided by his exploits, but family influence may have also been a factor.

Pedro Menéndez armed a galleon at his own cost and went with a crew of relatives and friends to pursue French ships which had seized eleven Vizcayan prizes off Galicia. He tracked down the French near La Rochelle, captured three of the corsair's vessels, and mortally wounded the leader, Jean Alphonse.

Menéndez' second royal letter-of-marque, issued by the Emperor in 1550, granted a wider sphere of action to the young sea-captain. He could now pass to the Indies to seek

illegal intruders corsairing in time of peace.²⁵ With this instruction, he built two galleons and went to Seville, where the Casa de Contratación registered his two ships to Tierra Firme. With his royal privilege, Menéndez did not have to adhere to the convoy regulations of the Casa. In 1550, he left for the Indies, and returned in 1551.

During the next voyage made by Pedro Menéndez, war erupted again with France, and all-out incursions in force by French corsairs began. Under leaders such as Jacques LeClerc, called "Wooden-leg," and Jacques Sore, they prepared to assault shipping near Spain, in the Canary and Azores Islands and in the Caribbean. In the midst of this tense situation, the Asturian had an exciting journey. While carrying merchandise in the Caribbean in 1552, he was captured by a sizeable French galeass. For fifteen days, Menéndez was kept prisoner as he negotiated with the corsairs for his ransom and release. In Santiago de Cuba, he borrowed 1,098 gold pesos to ransom his person and his ship.²⁷

Menéndez had learned of French plans to raid the Indies on a large scale. After refitting his ship in Santiago, Menéndez carried some stranded sailors as paid passengers to Vera Cruz.

Once in New Spain, Pedro Menéndez went to the city of Mexico and reported personally to Viceroy Luis de Velasco, advising him of the danger of the coming French assault. Then he sailed to Havana, where he conferred with Juan de

Rojas, the most powerful man in that port, and with Juan de Lobera, Alcaide of the fort. Menéndez next went to Santo Domingo and appeared before the Audiencia. The thirty-four-year-old ship captain then returned to Spain, bearing signed testimony of the threat to the Indies from the highest authorities in the Spanish Caribbean.

To meet the danger, Menéndez had a plan. He appeared before the Council of the Indies as an expert seaman experienced in dealing summarily with the corsair menace. Drawing upon this reputation and his expertise, Menéndez proposed to counter the French and build four ships and four smaller zabras at his own cost. He urged the Crown to bear the expense of outfitting the ships and paying him a salary as Captain-General. With the pay of his officers and the men, the cost would be about 40,000 ducats a year. Clearly, the Asturian aspired to be another Álvaro Bazán.

Pedro Menéndez made his point. He received a commission as Captain-General for the Indies voyages, and prepared to sail. His appointment sparked conflict with strong influences within the Carrera de Indias. Menéndez was one of several Captains-General of the Azores and Indies fleets imposed upon the merchants of Seville by the Crown. Diego López de las Roelas and his brother Pedro, Gonzalo and Luis de Carvajal, Álvaro Bazán, Álvaro Sánchez de Avilés and Pedro Menéndez de Aviles were shipowners and expert mariners. They were also norteños. Menéndez represented a semi-

independent power, Asturian in origin, with a reputation and high-level connections. His appointment also implied a more direct intervention of the Crown in fleet defense. In the face of the burgeoning corsair threat, new ordinances had been promulgated for the arming of convoy ships.²⁸ The powers of fleet generals and Captains-General were now considerable, and touched the interests of merchants at vital points--his control of the seaworthiness of vessels, some aspects of cargo lading, and sailing times. Pierre and Huguette Chaunu have written a striking description of the Captain-General of this period:

with the economic force of a merchant, strong in his own military and naval puissance, at times an adelantado, almost always a ship-
armer, first provider of armadas for the King,
a grandee in his nepotism, defrauder of the
customs laws for his own account and for that
of others, carrying contraband aboard his own
vessels and favoring contraband, absolute
master in the ports of the Indies . . . such
was the Captain-General.²⁹

For its part, the merchant guild in Seville had enough influence upon the Casa officials to insure selective enforcement of the regulations against the generals. In measuring a vessel, bonding its master, and the approval of the outgoing and incoming registry, many delays and obstructions were possible. In contests between fleet general or Captain-General and the Casa, final appeal was to the Crown through the Council of the Indies. Thus each opposed power-center sought support from the throne to buttress its position in the polycentric organism of sixteenth-century Spain. All

three parties involved in the Carrera were inextricably bound together through the institution of the avería. Salaries and ship-charter fees paid to the generals came out of this tax levied by the Crown upon the trade. The administration of the avería was, however, often in the hands of the merchants themselves, through various asientos with the Crown, for which they acted as tax-farmers. The three-way relationship between the King, his trade officials, and semi-autonomous fleet Generals like Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was replete with opportunities for conflict. The antagonisms aroused by the assignment of Pedro Menéndez to the Indies fleets were not long in erupting.

Before he could take his office, however, Pedro Menéndez was recalled by Prince Philip. As Charles V neared the end of his long reign, it was decided that the Prince should marry Mary Tudor, the eldest daughter of the late Henry VIII, in the hopes that the union with England would bolster and support Philip's dominions in the Netherlands. Philip asked Menéndez to be one of the troupe which escorted him to England for the wedding, and when a fleet of 150 sails left La Coruña on July 12, 1554, the Asturian went along. After the royal marriage, Pedro Menéndez returned to Spain with dispatches to the Regents in Valladolid, and then resumed his interrupted preparations in Seville to sail. After much delay, his ships sailed in October, 1555.

Some of the Cádiz vessels were forced to return to port by stormy weather. A Casa representative from Seville inspected them in Cádiz and found many violations of shipping laws. His attempts to enforce the laws resulted in open fighting in the town and led to his being thrown into jail by the Cádiz magistrate. A young merchant named Pedro del Castillo was one of those involved in the illegal transactions. Pedro Menéndez had permitted Castillo, who was a distant relative, to send goods under his command in violation of the laws of the Casa de Contratación. Enmity against Cádiz, Pedro del Castillo and Pedro Menéndez de Avilés began to build in Seville.³⁰ Álvaro Sánchez, Menéndez' brother, went with the other ships as admiral of the fleet. The brothers and their convoy of eighty-one ships sailed directly into danger. A new urgency gripped the traders of the Carrera de Indias and the Spaniards in the Indies.

As the last of the Italian wars began in Europe, raids and attacks by Frenchmen upon towns and shipping in the Spanish overseas possessions hit a new peak. La Yaguana in Hispaniola, Santiago de Cuba, and Havana were seized by large, determined bands of corsairs. On July 10, 1555, Jacques Sores had landed, thoroughly sacked Havana and put many of its residents to the sword. Damage to the agricultural and mercantile productivity of the Caribbean Islands was severe and enduring.

The winter of 1554-55, beset with storms, had been even more disastrous for the Seville merchants than had the raids of pirates. Three ships from the New Spain fleet of that year had been lost off Padre Island, on the modern Texas coast, while two from the Tierra Firme contingent sank in the Bahama Channel. The Almiranta of Tierra Firme, rich in her own cargo and heavily laden with contraband, was shipwrecked on the Andalusian shore near Tarifa.³¹

Pedro Menéndez' first charge as Indies fleet Captain-General was, therefore, a heavy and responsible one. The manner in which he accomplished it was typical of the man--it aroused both acclaim and abuse. By all accounts, his return passage to Spain was rapid. The Captain-General had gone personally to Vera Cruz with the New Spain ships, while Álvaro Sánchez took charge of the section which discharged and collected goods and bullion at Nombre de Dios and Cartagena. Although his return was not anticipated until the following spring, Menéndez brought the ships back in September of 1556, richly laden with merchant goods and Crown revenues. After the ships had been inspected by the Casa, Pedro Menéndez and his brother were arrested and charged with having brought a half million ducats' worth of cochineal and sugar outside of legal registry. They were jailed, and litigation on their case began. After the brothers were fined and condemned by the Audiencia of the

Casa de Contratación, they won a reversal of the verdict on appeal to the Council of the Indies.³² Menéndez was then praised by the Crown for his diligence in the 1555-56 voyage, and directed to return as Captain-General of the next departing armada to the Indies.³³ Before this could take effect, however, events in Europe led to a change in plans. The military operations of the Spanish and their English allies in Flanders required heavy naval support across the Channel and from Iberian ports.

At first it was planned that Álvaro de Bázan divert his guard armada from Spanish waters and from the convoy of fleets between the Azores and Seville, and move to Flanders. Pursuant to this idea, Pedro Menéndez was named to take over his duties.³⁴ Then this idea was abandoned, and the Asturian entered a period of two years' busy service to the Courts and armies in England and Flanders. He was posted as subordinate to Luis de Carvajal of Guipúzcoa in the arduous task of protecting supply lines and transporting personnel across waters active with French privateers. In making up his squadron, Pedro Menéndez armed ten ships and two zabras, and operated on Crown charters while taking occasional prizes to bolster his income and that of his supporters. Now his brother Bartolomé Menéndez, Diego Flores Valdés, Pedro Menéndez Marqués (the son of Álvaro Sánchez), and Esteban de las Alas of Avilés had joined his service. Menéndez' family had grown: his son Juan was now a young man, who

served with his father. Of his three legitimate daughters, Ana and Catalina had not yet married, and Maria had become a nun. Pedro Menéndez also had fathered an illegitimate daughter, likewise named Maria.³⁵

As a result of his voyages in support of Spanish commitments in northern Europe, Pedro Menéndez came directly to the favorable notice of his sovereigns, and further enhanced his reputation. His successful escort of 1,200,000 ducats to Flanders was credited with having helped support the Spanish offensive which ended in the victory at St. Quentin in August, 1557. In blockade and convoy duty from Dover to Calais in company with Carvajal he aided the English allies so efficiently that he was commended by Queen Mary. In final culmination of his northern duties, Menéndez was selected for the signal honor of escorting Philip II to Spain from Flanders. The Prince had now become the King, and peace had been signed at Cateau-Cambrésis in April of 1559. The young Asturian brought his King to Laredo in safety, and a new era began for him and for Spain.³⁶

While Pedro Menéndez had been occupied in the last struggles of the war with France in Europe, the "corsair war" in Atlantic waters and in the Spanish Indies had reached a new high of bitterness. It had long been the practice that Frenchmen caught in the overseas dominions of Castile should be returned as prisoners for trial in Seville. Now,

Álvaro de Bazán decreed that French captives should be sentenced to serve at the oar in Spanish galleys, while their officers should be hung or thrown in the sea.³⁷

Continued concern about further French attempts to settle North America also led to another Crown venture in Florida. Philip II wished to evangelize the heathen Indians of the Gulf Coast, who had murdered Father Cáncer and harrassed the shipwreck survivors in the 1554 fleet disaster, and to protect other castaways. The King decided to undertake the Florida settlement, fund it from the royal treasury and administer it through the Viceroy of New Spain, the able Luis de Velasco.³⁸

After reconnaissance in the northeastern Gulf by Guido de Labazaris in 1558, Velasco launched two expeditions. The first, commanded by Tristán de Luna, left Vera Cruz in mid-summer of 1559, landed in Pensacola Bay and was still unloading when the fleet was scattered by a hurricane. The Viceroy also sent Angel de Villafañe, with a skilled Asturian pilot, Gonazlo de Gayón, to explore and take possession of the Santa Elena area of the east coast. By summer of 1561, both efforts had completely failed, and the forces had been withdrawn. The cost to the New Spain treasuries was substantial.³⁹

The costly failures in Florida were an outgrowth of the stimulus of the war upon royal spending. The realities of peace brought a realization that Castilian finances were

in parlous state. A state bankruptcy had occurred in 1557; the end of the war meant that substantial cut-backs in Crowns spending were imperative. The armada of Álvaro de Bazán was dismissed and some of its war material sold. The coming of peace, however, did little to relieve the most pressing problems of defense. When Philip announced the signature of the treaty at Cateau-Cambrésis to his Indies officials, he warned that it was no time to relax their vigilance against corsairs:

See that the said peace is observed on our part and because, as you know, in peacetime we are accustomed to having corsairs going to rob against the will of their prince, it is well that during this time, the ships which come from that area do not come unprepared.⁴⁰

In the diplomatic negotiations which had preceded the execution of the treaty the whole question of French intrusion in the domains claimed by Spain had been treated at length. After debating the matter for weeks, the parties reached no settlement on the issue of trespass. In 1560, when the discussions finally broke down for lack of agreement, both sides were left essentially where they had been. For their part, the Spanish maintained the integrity of the areas set aside for them by the Papal bulls and the Tordesillas treaty, while the French continued to insist that they might sail in and colonize any areas not actually occupied by the Spanish. In that uneasy and unsettled state, matters were left--a fertile field for future misunderstanding.⁴¹

NOTES

1. The writer is indebted to those anthropologists who have studied and written about acculturation theory, and especially to George M. Foster for his work Culture and Conquest: America's Spanish Heritage (New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1960). Professor Foster has demonstrated the origin of many elements of Spanish colonial culture in their Iberian agricultural, religious, social and governmental models, and stresses the totality of a culture-conquest.

2. Itemized listings of the Adelantados of the Indies exist. Two of these are incomplete but nonetheless helpful. The first is "Noticias extractadas de asientos y Capitulaciones que se hicieron para descubrir en Indias despves de Colón," from Cesareo Fernández Duro, Armada Española (9v., Madrid: Est. tipográfico "Sucesores de Rivadeneyra," 1895-1903), I, 452-459; Professor Roscoe R. Hill included a chart of Indies Adelantados in his article, "The Office of Adelantado," Political Science Quarterly, XXVLLL, No. 4 (December, 1913), 656.

3. An excellent summary of the history of Adelantamiento in medieval Spain has been prepared by Manuel Dánvila y Colado in Historia del poder civil en España (6 v., Madrid: Fontánét, 1885-1886), I, 77-83. The Iberian background of the institution is also examined thoroughly by Roscoe R. Hill in "The Office of Adelantado," op. cit., 646-651.

4. Royal laws and ordinances governing Adelantados were promulgated by the Castillian King Alfonso X in a special code entitled Leyes para los Adelantados Mayores. See Marcelo Martínez Alcubilla, Códigos Antiguos de España (2 vol., Madrid: J. López Camacho, 1885), I, 175-176. For jurisdiction of Adelantados, see Leyes XIX and XXII, Título IX, part II, in Las Siete Partidas. These have been reproduced in Códigos Antiguos de España, op. cit., I, 301-302. When the Cortes was held at Alcalá de Henares in 1348, Laws VII and XX of Título XX of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá was concerned with the authority of the Adelantado.

5. The precise identity of Castilian with Indies adelantamiento was discussed and affirmed in the consulta of the Council of the Indies, dealing with the successors in title to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. See Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter A.G.I.) Santo Domingo 231; the consulta is given at Madrid on November 28, 1671, and is found in the John B. Stetson Collection at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History (hereinafter Stetson Collection), University of Florida.

6. A good summary of the benefits, titles and legal cases related to Christopher Columbus is found in the work of Otto Schoenrich, The Legacy of Christopher Columbus (2 vol., Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1949-1950). Columbus' contract, the Capitulaciones de Santa Fe, was signed by Ferdinand and Isabella outside Granada on April 17, 1492, and has been reprinted in Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento . . . en América y Oceanía (42 vol., Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1864-1884) (hereinafter D.I.), XVII, 572-574.

7. Hernando Cortés' Instructions and ordinances of government have been reprinted in D.I., XII, 349, 355; XIII, 355 et seq.; XXVI, 19, 65, 135, 149, 160, 170, 185.

8. The Pizarro Capitulación was dated at Toledo on July 26, 1529, and has been reprinted in D.I., XXII, 271-285. A detailed account of the Montejo conquest is in Robert S. Chamberlain, The Conquest and Colonization of Yucatan (New York: Octagon Books, 1966).

9. A good summary of the Castilian title to the Indies is found in the packet of documents gathered by the Council of the Indies in preparation for the consulta furnished to Philip II on May 5, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente General, 738, ramo 7. The papal bulls Inter caetera and Dudum Siquidem were issued by Alexander VI in 1493; they are reproduced in full in Frances G. Davenport, ed., European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States (4 v., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917-1937), I, 80-82. The laws of the Indies formally conferred the title of Señor Natural upon the monarch; see Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de las Indias (4 v., Madrid: J. de Paredes, 1681), Libro III, título I, Ley 1-A. The theoretical background of royal authority over and ownership of the Kingdoms of the Indies has been thoroughly developed by Frank Jay Moreno, "The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach," Western Political Quarterly, XX, No. 2, Pt. 1 (June, 1967) 308-320.

10. The injunction against interference from viceroyalties is formalized in the code of laws enacted by Philip II to govern adelantamientos, promulgated at Segovia on July 13, 1563, in "Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo e población," in D.I., VIII, No. LXIX, 508. The applicable appeals route and legal jurisdiction are covered in idem, No. XLIII, 501; No. LXVIII, 507-508, and LXX, 508. Provision for officials to guard the royal treasury is located in idem, No. LXIV, 507; the residencia, No. LXXXIV, 512, visita, No. CIII, 518.

11. Appendix II, infra., itemizes a number of the clauses from selected sixteenth-century asientos. For a detailed analysis of the terms and requirements of such an agreement, see the description of that negotiated with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés; infra 77-97.

12. Ponce de Leon's patent for Bimini is found in D.I., XXII, 26-32.

13. Vazquez Ayllón reported to the Emperor about the northern discoveries; a summary of his narrative is appended to the body of his asiento, which was approved at Valladolid on June 12, 1523, and is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 415, fol. 32-40.

14. The contract of de Narvaez is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 415, A.G.I. Contratación 3,309, and has been reprinted in D.I., VIII, 224-245.

15. The agreement with Hernando de Soto is in A.G.I. Indiferente General 415. It was entered into at Valladolid on April 20, 1537.

16. The writer is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for the citation of the consulta of the Council of the Indies. It was dated June 10, 1541, and has been reproduced in Buckingham Smith, Colección de varios documentos para la historia de la Florida y tierras adyacentes (London: Trübner & Company, 1859), 109-111. Hoffman's long introductory essay about the growth of the corsair menace and the development of land and naval defense of the Spanish possessions and commerce is most cogent. It is found in Paul Everett Hoffman, "The Defense of the Indies, 1535-1574. A Study in the Modernization of the Spanish State" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1969), pp. 1-18.

17. See cedula, Toledo, January 15, 1529, in Diego de Encinas, Cedulario Indiano (5 v., 1596; Facsimile reproduction; Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1945-1946), IV, 133.

18. A complete compendium of the Spanish colonial navigation laws is that of Joseph de Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación de las indias occidentales (2 vol., 1672; Buenos Aires: Comision Argentina de Fomento Interamericana, 1945). A standard work on the Spanish commercial system is that of C. H. Haring, Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1918). Interpretation of the legal aspects of the Carrera de Indias, a deep understanding of the institutions involved in it, and the best itemized chronology of the trade from 1500 to 1650 is found in the multi-volume work of Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Séville et l'Atlantique: 1504-1650 (10 v., Paris: S.E.V. P.E.N., 1955-1959). The Carrera was, of course, the only route for the return of the Indies revenues of the Crown, including customs duties (almojarifazgo), tithe (diezmo), tribute, the royal fifth of mined bullion (quinto) court fines (penas de cámara), and sales taxes (alcabala). The machinery of cargo registries, ship visitations, and the requirement that cargoes be cleared only through Seville were used aggressively to enhance and promote the monopoly.

19. The best study of the avería is that of Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, La Avería en el comercio de Indias (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1945). Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Séville et l'Atlantique, op. cit., discuss the avería in v. 1, 175-182. An excellent summary of the development of fleet defense methods in the sixteenth century is found in Paul E. Hoffman, "The Defense of the Indies . . .," op. cit., 1-18.

20. On June 30, 1498, at Saragossa, Ferdinand and Isabella issued unlimited license for the armadores of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya to go in corse. Prince Philip, on November 24, 1551, issued a similar cedula. These are cited in Duro, Armada Española, 1, 63, 427.

21. See Duro, Armada Española, 1, 270-274. The memorial is "Información hecha en la villa de San Sebastian para acreditar las acciones marineras de los capitanes armadores de Guipúzcoa, durante la guerra con Francia."

22. The genealogy of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés can be learned, or inferred, from a variety of sources. The four main narrative sources do not furnish data of a precise nature, but are useful in establishing some of the relationships. These are Andre Gonzalez de Carballido y Zuñiga ("Barcia"), Ensayo cronológico para la historia general de la Florida (first printed 1723; translated by Anthony Kerrigan, Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 1951), Bartolomé Barrientos, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés; su vida y hechos (1567) in Genaro García, ed., Dos Antiguas Relaciones (Mexico City:

Tip. y. Lit. de J. Aguilar y Vera y Compañía, 1902) and printed in facsimile by the University of Florida Press, 1965. Another is Eugenio Ruidiaz y Caravia, La Florida: su conquista y colonización por Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (2 v., Madrid: Imprenta de los hijos de J. A. García, 1893-1894). A contemporary biography of the Florida Adelantado during the conquest is that of Gonzalo Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. This work is found in ms. in the Archivo del Conde de Revilla Gigedo, Madrid, hereinafter A.C.R. (in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library) Legajo 2, No. 2, and has been translated by Jeannete T. Gonner and published at Deland in 1923. A facsimile edition was reprinted by University of Florida Press in 1965, with Introduction by Lyle N. McAlister. Ciriaco Miguel Vigil in Noticias biográficas-geneológicas de Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (Avilés: Miguel Vigil, 1892) provides some more detail, particularly about the relationships contemporary to and since the time of the Adelantado. Ruidiaz relied upon Vigil substantially, and they shared some errors, e.g., their confusion of Pedro Menéndez Marqués with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés el mozo.

Insights into relationships gleaned from various interrogatories, testimonies and legal cases have been valuable. The noted sixteenth-century historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés and the Inquisitor Hernando de Valdés came from the Valdés family. cf. Appendix III, "Genealogy of the Enterprise of Florida."

23. Gonzalo Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 40, describes Menéndez' enlistment in an Armada "against corsairs"; it probably was the Bazán fleet.

24. Pedro Menéndez says that when he was twenty-eight or twenty-nine years of age, in 1548, he was given a royal order to sail from Asturias against an "infestation" of corsairs. See "Servicios del general Pedro Menéndez de Avilés," hereinafter "Servicios . . ." Seville, 1564, A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2, fol. 1 (Stetson Coll.). The first commission is described in Solís de Merás, op. cit., 41-42.

25. The writer appreciates the citation of the 1550 commission: A.G.S., Guerra Antigua, Libros de despachos, 18, fol. 86-88vto. It was furnished by Paul E. Hoffman.

26. Although the detailed registry of his vessels is not available in the Archive of the Indies, Menendez' ships are recorded in the "Libro de Registros," A.G.I. Contratación 2,898, 1550 Ida and 1551 Venida. Pedro Menéndez took the nao Santa Maria de la Antigua. His other vessel was probably La Concepción, whose master was Alonso Menendez.

27. Menéndez describes his adventures in a memorial to the Council of the Indies dated 1553, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71. In Stetson Collection, mis-dated 1567.

28. See Crown to Casa, February 13, 1552, A.G.I. Contratación 5,010.

29. Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Séville et l'Atlantique, I, 114. The laws relating to the authority of the generals are found in Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de las Indias (4 v., Madrid: J. de Paredes, 1681), III, Lib. IX, Tit. 15, ley 13 et seq.

A direct result of the clash between interests was a continuing argument over respective powers of the Seville officials and the Captains-General. In 1559, a dispute arose in Seville when Pedro de las Ruelas displayed a cedula outlining the powers of the Captain-General. See Casa to Crown, Contratación 7, 1559, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167.

30. The incident of 1555 in Cádiz is detailed in "Información hecha en la ciudad de Cádiz acerca de lo ocurrido entre Francisco Duarte, factor . . . de la Casa de Contratación, y el Licenciado Quevedo, Alcalde Mayor de la ciudad de Cádiz," from A.G.I. Justicia 970. Castillo, a vecino of Cádiz, was married to the former Isabel de Ribera and was probably of northern origins. His relationship to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was affirmed by Menéndez in his will, dated at Sanlúcar de Barrameda on January 7, 1574. The will is found in A.C.R., legajo 9, no. 21, and is also found in the Archivo de Protocolos de Cádiz (hereinafter A.P.C.), Escribanía of Diego de Ribera, fol. 276-277 for 1577.

31. The losses of the New Spain vessels was described in A.G.I. Contratación 2,898, fol. 193 vto., and in A.G.I. Contratación 58. Material on the ill-starred Tierra Firme ships under General Farfan is profuse, as the salvage of the Almiranta became a notable case of theft and contraband; see A.G.I. Contratación 58, and A.G.I. Contratación 2,898, 1555, Venida, inter alia. The Tarifa shipwreck is described in detail by Duro in Armada Española, I, 215-216.

32. Menéndez describes the contraband charges as mere harrassment. See "Servicios . . .," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. The case is found in A.G.I. Justicia 842, No. 9. Menéndez' fleet audit for 1555-1556 is at A.G.I. Contaduría 455.

33. Crown to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, n.p., February 26, 1557, A.G.I. Indiferente General 425.

34. Nombramiento, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés by Philip II, March 22, 1557, in A.C.R., legajo 2, No. 3, A., 1. This order has also been printed in D.I., VIX, 245, and in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 379 et seq. It is discussed by Duro, Armada Española, II, 449.

35. See "Renunciation of Maria Menéndez, nun," 1554, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. The other daughter named Maria later was married to Don Diego de Velasco.

36. The northern assignments of Menéndez are described in detail by Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 45-63. They are also discussed by Pedro Menéndez himself in "Servicios . . .," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. Fernández Duro puts the exploits of Pedro Menéndez into the larger tradition of the Spanish marine in Armada Española, I, 320-321. Cf. "Cartas de Pedro Menéndez de Avilés y D. Luis Carvajal," in A.G.S., Colección Sans de Barutell, Art. 40, No. 196-239. It was at this same time that the Asturian was proposed by the King for the habit of a Caballero of the religious-military order of Santiago. The initial proposal is found in a letter from Philip II to Don Diego de Acuña of the order sent from Valladolid on May 17, 1558. It has been printed in Ruidiaz y Caravia's La Florida, II, 739-740. Next, the long procedure of examining the background, orthodoxy and purity of Menéndez' Catholicism began. The corpus of the investigation has also been printed by Ruidiaz as "Memorial de los padres y abuelos de Capitan Pero Menéndez de Avilés . . .," from La Florida, II, 742-801.

37. The earlier order for the disposition of corsairs was formalized in a cedula from the Queen to the Audiencia of Peru written from Valladolid on September 4, 1549, and found in Encinas, Cedulario Indiano, I, 406. The order of Bazán was dated December 31, 1558, and is cited by Duro in Armada Española, II, 462.

38. The plan for the colonization of Florida was outlined by Pedro de Santander in a letter to the Crown dated July 15, 1557. See Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España (hereinafter D.I.E.) (112 v., Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1842-1895), XXVI, 340-365.

The King, overcoming a hesitation that his Viceroy undertake discoveries and settlement, authorized the effort in a cedula sent to Luis de Velasco from Valladolid on December 29, 1557. It is found in A.G.I. Sto. Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

39. The Labazaris voyage was described by the Viceroy in a letter to the Crown from Mexico February 1, 1559, A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 73-A (Stetson Collection). Vallafane's report is found in his letter to the Crown from Santa Elena dated May 27, 1561, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 73-B (Stetson Collection). The finding of Don Luis, the Indian Chieftain, in the Chesapeake region was described in a letter from the Casa to the Crown written at Seville on September 29, 1561, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167. De Luna's report on the disastrous storm in Pensacola Bay is dated September 4, 1559, and sent from "the port of Santa Maria." It is found in A.G.I. Patronato 179, ramo 1. Gayón, who was a native of Pola de Lena in Asturias, was the most experienced pilot in Florida waters. A body of information about him is found in "Services of Gonzalo de Gayon, 1558-66," from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection).

40. Sobrecedula to all officials in the Indies, Valladolid, May 23, 1559, A.G.I. Indiferente General 427, Book of 1543-1601.

41. Felix Zubillaga has summarized the disputes over the right of navigation and settlement in the Indies in La Florida: La Misión Jesuítica (1566-1572) y la colonización española (Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1941), 134-135. A more recent and exhaustive study of the question, with particular reference to its effect upon Florida, has been undertaken by Paul E. Hoffman in "Florida and the Negotiations of Cateau-Cambresis and Paris, 1559-1560: A Re-examination" (unpublished paper, typescript, Laramie, Wyoming, 1972).

CHAPTER II

PHILIP II, FLORIDA, AND PEDRO MENÉNDEZ DE AVILÉS

The unresolved questions of overseas jurisdiction between the courts were only part of the concerns of Philip II. In his eyes, a flood-tide of heresy threatened to overwhelm all of Catholic Europe. The keen and fervent apostles of militant Protestantism, aided by the output of the busy printing-presses in Geneva, spread Calvinism to many areas of France, where the threat to the Catholic faith there seemed immediate and urgent. France dissolved into chaos after the death of Henry II and the ensuing weakness of a Regency. After the insurrection at Amboise in March, 1560, leading noble families pursued their rivalries which were now sharpened by religious differences. In the Mediterranean, there was a renewed threat of Turkish naval invasion, while the Barbary raiders continued to endanger Spanish shipping from Gibraltar to Cape St. Vincent.

Philip II, pressed as never before by his external problems, also directed his attention to internal concerns. During the years after 1556, Philip moved to regularize and control the complex of organisms which composed the Spanish governmental system. He sought to improve the efficiency

and revenues from the commercial network between Spain and his possessions overseas, and strengthen defenses in the Indies. The management and financing of conquest and settlement in new lands was also an area for royal initiative.

Although he consistently sought to draw the reins of his power ever tighter, Philip II did not abandon the traditional means of licensing private conquerors. It is more correct to say that he supplemented the device of adelantamiento, or used it selectively to carry out his policies. In 1557, the King gave an asiento to Jaime Rasquín to settle and populate the area of the Rio de la Plata.¹ As has been seen, the Crown authorized the royal expedition to Florida in that same year. Thereafter, the question was closely connected with the financial ability of the Crown to underwrite conquest. The exhaustion of the state treasury at the end of the 1550s clearly posed a dilemma to the Castilian King: he sought to avoid heavy expenditure in the conquest of new lands, and yet still exercise sufficient control over their exploitation. Philip II wrestled with the problems involved, but for the moment the pressure of fiscal necessity outweighed other considerations.

The atmosphere of 1560 was thus one in which the talents of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés were in greater demand than ever. After Menéndez escorted the King to Laredo, however, he had no immediate personal employment until the

next fleet was ready to depart. Then he served for three years as Captain-General of the combined New Spain and Tierra Firme fleets alternately with Pedro de las Ruelas and Nicholas de Cardona. During these years, Menéndez used his own vessels as lead-ships in the fleets which he commanded, gaining Crown charter-fees as well as his salary. The Asturian also sent his ships in other fleets on royal errands and commercial enterprises. His private income came largely from freight charges and passenger fares; he does not appear to have been a major trader, dealing for his own account on any sizeable basis.

In Andalusia, Pedro Menéndez had made direct and profitable connection with a number of norteños engaged in the Carrera de Indias. Many of these merchants operated from Cádiz, and possessed opposite numbers in the Caribbean island ports, at San Juan de Ulua and the city of Mexico, and the entrepôts of Tierra Firme. Pedro del Castillo was spokesman for the Cádiz traders and still closely associated with Pedro Menéndez.²

Menéndez and Castillo were unfavorably linked together by officials of the Casa de Contratación in accusations arising out of the return of the 1561 fleets. Pedro Menéndez had enjoyed a prosperous voyage; he captured several English and French prizes on the return to Spain, but the day after the ships crossed the bar and anchored at Sanlúcar, the Casa authorities inspected them and made inquiries among the crew and in the vicinity.

Pedro del Castillo was arrested and charged with smuggling goods outside of registry. Witnesses swore that Castillo had come aboard Menéndez' galleon at his invitation after dark on the evening of its arrival, and had been closeted with the Captain-General and a certain Domingo Hernandez, the master of Castillo's ship in the convoy. Others reported that thirty-seven chests of contraband silver were taken from the ship at midnight, and transported to Puerto Santa Maria, where it was put into a small boat, and loaded into a cart, which disappeared into the darkness. Castillo was jailed in Seville. He denied that he had received any goods except those in the official registry. Castillo admitted that he had come to visit Pedro Menéndez at Sanlúcar, but he said that this was because the two men were long-time friends.

The Casa de Contratación put Pedro del Castillo under 6,000 ducat bond. His bondsmen were two bankers of Seville--Pedro de Morga and Gaspar de Astudillo. Although Castillo was lodged in an apartment rather than a cell, and was treated well enough, he became ill and was finally released.³

The mutual animosity between Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and his friends and supporters on the one hand and the merchants' guild in Seville and the Casa de Contratación on the other is evident throughout the proceedings. As Pedro Menéndez prepared for the voyage of 1562 he could be assured

that his every act would be closely watched and reported to Seville.

During these years, the tension between the broadening scope of Spanish foreign concerns and the limited royal resources continued. Heavy Spanish losses in ships and men at Tripoli in 1560 had been a drain upon the Crown. Philip's marriage to Elizabeth of Valois, daughter of Catherine de Medici, had brought no reassuring stability to the French scene. Indeed, after Charles IX succeeded Francis II, the weakness of the French Crown encouraged rapid polarization and dissension among the nobility. The disturbances, which shortly became a localized warfare, led to the seizure of several ports by Huguenot forces. Gaspard de Coligny, who had become Admiral of France, prepared an expedition from the Huguenot ports for the colonization of Florida. On February 18, 1562, Jean Ribault and René de Laudonnière left Le Havre; by the last of April, the French had made landfall in Florida and proceeded to plant their colony at Port Royal.

Ironically, the general depression of the Spanish Royal treasury had coincided with delayed reports of the costly failure of the De Luna and Villafañe expeditions to produce a totally negative reaction about further colonization in Florida. While the French established their colony, the Spanish King formally eschewed further royal support for Florida. This resolve was urged on him in March of 1562.⁴

Meanwhile, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had undertaken another Indies voyage as Captain-General of the combined fleets. He now owned several sizeable ships. In addition to Magdalena, he had built a large galeass, San Sebastián, and a galleon, Santa Maria. The galeass, under the command of Pedro Menéndez Márquez, had sailed the previous year as Capitana of New Spain while Esteban de las Alas commanded the New Spain division.⁵ When Menéndez sailed in April, 1562, he left under strict command from Philip II to intercept and castigate corsairs whom he might find in the Indies. The orders reflected the harsh tone of the period:

We are informed that in the Indies sailing routes go some French, English and Scotch corsair ships, seeking to steal what comes and goes from there. This is a disservice to God our Lord, to us, and is against the peace agreed upon between us and the princes of those kingdoms. Because these corsairs should, by rights, be hung as peace-breakers and robbers and violaters of the orders or their own lords and rulers, I order you, if you capture any of the said corsairs, to proceed against them and punish them in conformity with justice, executing it then upon the sea with all rigor; in order that you might do this, we give you full powers.⁶

In accordance with previous practice, Pedro Menéndez divided his fleet into two parts; he went with the New Spain vessels while his brother, Bartolomé, took those of Tierra Firme. Juan Menéndez accompanied his father. The voyage outbound proved costly to the ships; seven were found unfit for further travel in San Juan de Ulua while several of the Tierra Firme group were scarcely seaworthy.⁷ To allow more

time for commercial transactions and to permit the refit of the ships, Bartolomé and Pedro Menéndez decided to lay over in port during the winter months and depart early in the New Year. Bartolomé had sent a courier vessel to Spain under the command of Diego de Hevia; when it reached Sanlúcar with its news, the captain was put in prison by the Casa de Contratación. There he joined Esteban de las Alas, who had been imprisoned earlier on the same charge: carrying contraband goods.⁸

Royal orders reached Pedro Menéndez in New Spain in February, 1563. He was commanded to delay there until May or June, and then to return via the usual route to Europe. The King directed Bartolomé Menéndez to leave immediately and be back in Spain by the end of April with the Tierra Firme ships and bullion of Peru. Pedro Menéndez did not obey the order, or rather, he did not obey it completely. He determined to sail straightaway from San Juan de Ulua to Havana, join his brother there, and return to Spain with the Tierra Firme vessels. Since the lead ships were not in condition to navigate, Menéndez prepared and designated his own two galleons, Santa Maria and Magdalena and the patache Santiago as Capitana, Almiranta, and escort. Only his own ships left New Spain, while the others were left behind. The registries of Menéndez' ships show that they were laden with cochineal.⁹ The shipments were from norteños resident in New Spain to consignees in Cádiz and Seville, including

Pedro del Castillo. The ships left port on February 17, and made uneventful passage to Havana. Once he reached Havana, Pedro Menéndez sent his son Juan back as General in charge of escorting the remaining vessels to Spain. Bartolomé Menéndez, who had contracted fever in Nombre de Dios, was somewhat delayed in his arrival at Havana, but both brothers and their combined fleets sailed April 1, en route to Spain. They dropped their anchors off the Guadalquivir bar on June 10, 1563.

It is likely that Pedro Menéndez only heard of the new French initiative in Florida when he arrived in Spain. The King had received word of the Ribault settlement from his ambassador in France in mid-February. He had immediately written to Menéndez and to Diego de Mazariegos, the royal governor at Havana, telling them of the fort the French had built at the "point of Santa Elena." The two men were ordered to discuss the matter, investigate, and take immediate action to expel the intruders. The letter could scarcely have reached the Captain-General before his departure for Spain. Governor Mazariegos did not send out an expedition for more than a year.¹⁰

To counteract the French menace further, Philip II determined to follow the same procedure which had been considered in 1541: preventive settlement on the mainland. By the end of April, 1563, the King had decided to grant an asiento in Florida to Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón, namesake

and successor to the patent-holder of 1523.¹¹ The contract with Vazquez de Ayllón was a typical and classic one. It made no mention whatever of the French, but contained the standard benefits and obligations. The contractor was to launch a full-scale colonization, taking married settlers and a quantity of livestock. The Indians, whom he was not permitted to put into encomienda, were to be gathered by missionaries into villages near the Spanish towns. He could, however, use Indian tribute to provide pensions for his men. The colonies, which were to be in the area of Santa Elena, would concentrate upon planting sugar cane, cassia fistula, the grape and the olive. The asiento was issued on June 4, 1563.¹²

At the same time, the King matured his concept of the role of the Crown and its contractors in conquest. At Segovia, on July 13, Philip II approved one hundred forty-nine comprehensive ordinances for population and conquest. These laws provided for every detail of the exploration, occupation and development of new lands by asientistas, whether they were to be designated Adelantados, Corregidores, Gobernadores or Alcaldes. They also contained a particular injunction against royal expenditure, which served to put discovery and settlement upon a strictly private basis:

Even though (due to the zeal and desire which we have that all unknown lands in the Indies might be discovered, so that the Holy Evangel might be proclaimed, and the natives of them might come to a knowledge of our Holy Catholic

Faith) we count as little that which might be spent from our Royal Treasury for such a holy purpose, experience has shown that, in many discoveries and voyages undertaken at our cost (due to a lack of care and diligence), those who have carried them out have tried to enrich themselves from the Royal Treasury rather than carry out their designated purposes.

Thus we order that no discovery, new exploration and settlement be undertaken at expense to our Royal Treasury, neither may those who govern expend anything from it, even though they possess our written authority and instructions to discover and explore, unless they should have special authorization to do it at our cost.¹³

Although Vazquez de Ayllón was not permitted to place any Indians into encomienda, the 1563 ordinances made no such general prohibition. On the contrary, as added incentive for private initiatives in conquest, the laws permitted two- and three-life encomienda.¹⁴

While Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón was in Sanlúcar preparing three vessels for the Florida journey, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had left his ships there on the evening of June 14 and went up the Guadalquivir toward Seville in a small boat. Menéndez took with him a priest who was a distant relative, some servants, and a quantity of unregistered bullion. While his boat sailed northward through the night, the prosecutor of the Casa de Contratación was being rowed southward, searching for evidence of the smuggling of contraband. The two craft met briefly on the dark river, and the Captain-General evaded the boat from the Casa. At dawn on June 15, the Menéndez party was seen to land on the riverbank just

south of the city gates of Seville. Witnesses state that the priest and sailors appeared to be heavily-laden as they walked toward the city, where closer examination revealed that they carried bars of silver and several chests. Once inside the city, Menéndez and his party went to the houses of the Archbishop of Seville, Hernando de Valdés, where they received hospitality and lodging.¹⁵

When the news of Menéndez' arrival came to the Casa de Contratación, its officials sent to summon the Asturian to appear and answer charges of carrying contraband into Seville. Pedro Menéndez faced the judges in the Audiencia hall of the Alcazar and firmly denied their jurisdiction over him. He stated further that he had come upriver from Sanlúcar with the full knowledge of other Casa officials, and that his baggage had only held his own clothing, his arms and enough silver for personal necessities. While the judges deliberated, the Asturian left and when they finally issued their order to jail Menéndez and seize the silver, he had fled. Pedro Menéndez had gone to Madrid to seek royal support against his enemies.

Once at Court, the Captain-General quickly gained the ear of his King. Philip II responded to Menéndez' pleas by sending an immediate order to Seville that the monies due Menéndez for his galleon escort be calculated and paid, and concluded an agreement with the Asturian to escort the Licenciado Castro to Tierra Firme on Crown business in the

early fall. For the projected voyage, Menéndez would use his fine new galeass San Pelayo, just delivered from the Vizcaya shipyards. Pedro Menéndez also took the precaution of retaining an attorney to represent him at Court in his disputes with the Casa de Contratación.¹⁶ On July third, the King sent his officials in Seville a strongly worded defense of Menéndez in which he pointed out that jurisdiction over the Captains-General belonged to the Crown, not the Casa.

Meanwhile, the escape of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the evidence of Royal favor in his behalf had stirred the merchants and officials of Seville to angry action. A negative reply was sent to the King about Menéndez' request for payment for the 1563 escort galleons, as the traders' guild and the avería deputies rejected the claim. This was hardly surprising, for the administration of the avería, from which any payment would have to come, was firmly in the hands of the merchants of Seville.¹⁷ After receiving their opinion that Menéndez had evidently made his return voyage for profit and not for fleet defense, the King replied by ordering the officials to deduct from Menéndez' payment the sums he had earned from freight and passenger fees and settle the matter rapidly.¹⁸ The Casa officials' only response to Philip's defense of Menéndez in the main dispute was to hasten the gathering of evidence against him.

Witnesses from the fleet painted a picture of criminal laxity aboard the ships, in which massive amounts of contraband bullion were allegedly carried by representatives of the recent Viceroy of Peru and by the Royal visitors to that province. They accused the Captain-General of allowing a felon to escape with his funds at Tercera, of taking a bribe in New Spain, and of being caught with personal contraband in his possession. By the time Menéndez returned to Seville on July 26, 1563, his enemies were prepared to allege criminal charges against him.

When he faced his detractors, Pedro Menéndez was confident that his backing at Court would protect him, and that only minor offenses could be proven against him, so his testimony was bold and forthright. Menéndez denied that he carried unregistered funds of any importance, but merely sufficient monies for his voyage, in keeping with long practice in the fleets. He blandly admitted accepting money from New Spain merchants, but denied that this had influenced his actions, and stated that in any case it was not a mortal sin.¹⁹

After the Captain-General had posted bond and given his testimony, he had every reason to expect that he could go about his affairs. Much to his surprise, however, the officials of the Casa de Contratación seized his brother Bartolomé and then came, on August 19, 1563, to place Pedro Menéndez in custody. The commercial powers were determined

to punish Menéndez and his entire coterie through the laws of the Casa de Contratación for the threat he represented to their sphere of influence. In the course of a short time, Esteban de las Alas, Hevia, Pedro del Castillo and now the Menéndez brothers felt the power of Seville.

Although he was made comfortable as a prisoner of distinction and was lodged in the Atarazanas of the Casa between the old city walls and the Guadalquivir, Pedro Menéndez was distressed at the slow pace with which his case proceeded. The Fiscal of the Casa gathered his evidence at a leisurely rate. Although Menéndez had given bond for his presence, he could not obtain release from custody. His appeals to the King produced royal letters to the Casa de Contratación but yielded little immediate result. No rapid settlement was made of his galleon-lease case, and he could not get his freedom to supervise the preparation of his galleons for their journey.²⁰ Worse troubles were in the making, however.

Without his knowing it as yet, Pedro Menéndez had suffered some grievous losses. His galeass, the San Sebastián, had sailed with Ruelas' fleet in May with a cargo of royal mercury and other goods. Early in the morning of July 22, San Sebastián and four other vessels were shipwrecked along the reefs in the area known as the Jardines de la Reina on the southwest coast of Cuba.²¹

As Menéndez chafed at the restriction of his prison apartment, his only son Juan was drawing closer to mortal danger in the Indies. The main body of the New Spain fleet sailed from San Juan de Ulua on June 15, but was delayed by calms and contrary winds, and only reached Havana on August 1. The eleven ships in the original convoy were increased by two Honduran vessels; all thirteen left Havana together on August 15.²² In so doing, Juan Menéndez disobeyed an order of his father, for Pedro Menéndez had warned him not to sail if his departure time would put him into the hurricane season. As Menéndez told the King:

I left express commands to Don Juan, my son, that in the whole month of July he could come out of the Bahama Channel, because in the beginning of August, some years, they often have very great hurricanes.²³

For almost a month, the voyage went well. On the eighth of September, when the convoy had reached the latitude of Bermuda, they were scattered by rising winds and seas. By the morning of September 10, they were in a full-scale hurricane. One of the ships lost steering control; its hull worked open and it sank to the west of Bermuda, while three vessels drifted or were blown southward to the north coast of Hispaniola--the Almiranta Santa Catalina and the two Honduras merchantmen. One of the Honduras ships sank before it could reach port; its bullion was off-loaded onto the Almiranta; the other barely made it to the port of Monte Christi with the Santa Catalina. The

eight ships which had escaped serious damage from the storm made rendezvous at the Azores, and continued to Spain together, arriving in the first week of November.²⁴

When several accounts which arrived at Seville were finally sifted and analyzed, it was evident that the Capitana--La Concepción--was missing, together with General Menéndez. The lead ship had last been seen, sailing well, in the midst of the storm, but its later fate was unknown.

As bits of information about the shipwrecks reached Seville, Pedro Menéndez learned what little he could. If he were only free, he could lead the search for the lost ship. Chafing at his confinement, Menéndez attempted to move his legal cases forward, but met only frustrating inertia. The pressure he exerted at Court resulted in an inquiry by the King about Menéndez' imprisonment. When the charges against the Asturian were sent to the Council of the Indies in October, that body agreed that the indictment was for "grave and ugly" faults, and seemed content for the moment to leave the persecution of them in the hands of the Casa de Contratación.²⁵ The Captain-General, who evidently had good legal advice, would have welcomed a definite decision. Instead, the prosecuting officer of the Casa had been granted a three-month delay in which to gather further evidence.

In response to pressure from the Licenciado Castro, the Casa officials granted a short term of liberty to Pedro

Menéndez to go to Cádiz and dispatch his three ships. Since Menéndez had given a 40,000-ducat bond to leave on the royal mission by September 30, he was anxious to meet his overdue obligation, but was still unable to be present when the ships sailed on November 9, 1563. After leaving in a rising storm, they were scattered and damaged before they could return to port, and one of the vessels landed near Gibraltar in battered condition. Instead of the 20,000 ducats the ships would have earned, Menéndez now faced repair costs which he estimated at 20,000 ducats.²⁶

Finally, the proceso against Pedro Menéndez was complete. The deliberations of the Casa de Contratación were forwarded to the Council of the Indies. Juan Gómez de Argomedo, attorney for Menéndez, filed the plea of his client before the Council on December 16.²⁷ The Asturian was not hopeful, however; his expectations of justice and satisfaction seemed to be at a low ebb indeed. He composed several desperate appeals to the Court and Council of the Indies. In a long memorial to the King, Menéndez reviewed his entire career and recounted the history of his struggles with the merchants of Seville and the Casa de Contratación. He outlined each of the charges against him and gave his own defense against them. Pedro Menéndez expressed particular anger at the allegations of conflict-of-interest and forcefully contradicted the complaint that he had become rich through royal service. When he began to serve the Crown,

Menéndez told Philip II, he possessed two galleons. Now, after sixteen years, he only had three ships, and these were heavily mortgaged. At length he detailed his losses and sacrifices in recent years, including the bereavement suffered in the evident loss of his son and many other relatives and friends in the 1563 New Spain fleet disaster. Again, Pedro Menéndez begged for settlement of his monetary affairs, and for release from prison. The Asturian then made statements about the settlement of Florida which are of particular interest here: Menéndez labeled the De Luna and Villafañe expeditions as wasteful and misdirected, and alleged that more than a half-million ducats and five hundred lives had been expended to no visible effect. It would be far better and much less costly, said Menéndez, to plant colonies in Florida directly from Spain. Thus the expedition would avoid the dangerous currents of the Bahama Channel and the poor, low land of the extreme southeastern coast and the peninsula. For about 50,000 ducats, claimed Menendez, a profitable settlement could be implanted closer to Newfoundland, where it would be of more strategic value.

Menéndez wrote another letter to Juan de Sarmiento, President of the Council of the Indies, in an humble, almost despairing tone. It expressed emotions which Pedro Menéndez had not been able to reveal to the King, and displayed a father's grief and anger at his powerlessness to help search for his son Juan. He proposed to go with four pataches and

collect the monies left in Hispaniola from his son's fleet, and also seek the lost Capitana. His proposal was rejected, and the officials of Seville named General Juan de Velasco de Barrio to arm two heavy galleons for the task.²⁸

The mood of dejection which had assailed Pedro Menéndez proved well founded. When the Council of the Indies heard the arguments of its Fiscal and read the testimonies sent from Seville, they found Menéndez guilty on the main charge of bringing unregistered silver on his ship. The sentence and verdict they handed down on January 17 levied a fine of 100 gold pesos upon the Captain-General. Lawyer Gómez immediately began an appeal.²⁹

One positive benefit for Menéndez did result from the letters he had sent in January. The King wrote preemptorily to his officials at Seville, accused them of malicious delay in the settlement of the 1563 galleon lease case, and directed termination of the matter "within fifteen days."³⁰ Early in March, hearings resumed on the case and Pedro Menéndez was taken from confinement to testify in the Audiencia hall of the Casa de Contratación in the Alcazar at Seville. The Casa judges were in the position of mediating a dispute between Menéndez, who sought payment from avería for his ships, and the Prior and Consuls of the guild of sea-merchants and the deputies of the avería. In the face of the commands of Philip II, the Casa officials were compelled to find for Menéndez. On March 8 they decreed the payment of a

sueldo to Pedro Menéndez for his two galleons, less what he had collected in freights and passenger fares on the voyage.³¹

Now a storm of protest arose from the mercantile interests. The whole matter was a fraud, they said. Menéndez had brought his galleons and patache from New Spain for his own profit, and they served the interests of the fleet not at all. It was illegal, they maintained, for a Captain-General to use his own ships as paid escort vessels in his own convoy.³² They averred that the expenses Menéndez claimed were false, and his supporting papers were not properly certified by a notary.

Pedro Menéndez, scenting victory over his enemies, appeared and made a strong plea for a substantial advance, for his ships had still not sailed for Tierra Firme, and he badly needed 4,000 ducats to finish their refit and settle with some of his crewmen. On March tenth, the Casa awarded him 1,500 ducats. He protested strongly, but the Casa affirmed its decision: It was that or nothing. Menéndez contested the case, saying that he had received nothing for his patache, and the matter became bogged down on appeal. Frustration continued to be the lot of the imprisoned Asturian. While guards paced outside his apartment door, his financial affairs seemed as far as ever from solution. Somehow, Menéndez managed to raise the funds to send his ships off to the Indies under the command of Esteban de las Alas and Pedro Menéndez Marqués.

In the meantime, although the Spanish had as yet done nothing to erase Jean Ribault's Port Royal settlement in Florida, the French colonists had become thoroughly discouraged. Ribault himself had been in England, a part of the time in prison. The confusion in France before the pacification of Amboise had prohibited the sending of reinforcements. Finally, René de Laudonnière left Le Havre April 22, just as the French prepared to leave Port Royal, and abandon their colony. On May 12, 1564, Governor Mazariegos of Havana finally dispatched the small search ship Santa Catalina with Hernando Manrique de Rojas as captain. Rojas, a thirty-year-old nephew of Juan de Rojas, chose experienced pilot Gonzalo de Gayón to guide the expedition to seek the French settlement. None of the three groups was destined to meet.³³

When the Cuban vessel reached the Florida coast, north of Cape Canaveral, Manrique de Rojas traversed the shoreline, carefully searching for signs of enemy settlement. Finally, in 32-1/4° of latitude, they located a sizeable inlet with Indian settlements. There, they encountered one Guillaume Rouffi, a sixteen-year-old boy. Rouffi told them that the other Frenchmen had left in a small craft some days before, leaving him behind with the Indians. Searching further, they found and burned a wood blockhouse the French had built. They also discovered the six-foot marble column, bearing the arms of France, which had been planted by Jean

Ribault. The column and Rouffi were brought aboard ship and returned to Havana, where Mazariegos reported to Spain that the French threat was over for the present.

While the Rojas party was making its report in Havana, the ships of Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón, which had left Sanlúcar in October, had only reached Santo Domingo. By mid-summer, Vazquez de Ayllón had made little progress in preparing for departure for Florida. The royal officials of Hispaniola began to suspect that the expedition might never sail.³⁴

During the early summer of 1564, when so much of moment for Florida and the Indies was occurring overseas, events at Court began at last to develop more favorably for Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. In May, his ship-charter case had been transferred to the Council of the Indies. On June 18, Philip II had decided to bring the main dispute for which Menéndez had been jailed to Madrid for hearing. He sent Menendez a formal royal summons to report within twenty days to the Council of the Indies.³⁵

When the summons from the King reached Pedro Menéndez in his prison apartment in Seville, he determined to break out of his confinement. He saw clearly that he would never be free as long as he remained in the power of the Seville interests. On Saturday, July 1, Menéndez bribed or evaded his guards, and left his jail. The same day, the Menéndez brothers executed a power of attorney in Seville to a banker, Domingo de Ocaris, and a trusted young Asturian,

Hernando de Miranda, and left to them the responsibility of collecting monies forthcoming from the Casa in Seville. By the sixth of July, Pedro Menéndez was in Madrid, where he was placed in the Royal jail.³⁶

After Menéndez' servants came to take away his chests and furniture, the Casa de Contratación belatedly discovered that their prisoner was gone. A hearing was held, and the angry officials determined to take up the 30,000 ducat bonds. On July 14, they also seized and jailed the bondsmen who had given surety for Pedro Menéndez, Gaspar de Astudillo de Burgales and Juan Antonio Corzo.³⁷

Now the accused Captain-General had finally succeeded in having his litigation transferred from the biased atmosphere of Seville, but it brought him no immediate satisfaction. After an initial flurry of legal action, Pedro Menéndez languished in the Court jail. On July 24, he launched a fervent appeal to the Council of the Indies, and complained that he was confined with common criminals and persons of low estate. This treatment, he said, was an affront to the dignity of his person and to the prestige of the offices which he had held through royal patronage. Menéndez asked that he be released from the jail, and given the Court as his area of detention. On August 7, the Council of the Indies agreed that, while the litigation was under study, he might leave the jail and be placed in house-arrest at his inn.³⁸

While the legal affairs of Pedro Menéndez were moving somewhat closer to resolution in Madrid, the Spanish authorities had no clear view of what had occurred with regard to Florida. René de Laudonnière and his colony were established within the mouth of the River May, where they had erected a fortification named Fort Caroline.³⁹ The Castilian King had no knowledge of the French establishment. Intelligence from the Indies in the summer of 1564 was a blend of fact and rumor. On August 30, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo notified Philip II that a one-eyed Portuguese named Mimoso was supposed to have come from Calais with five ships of Frenchmen and three of the ships had landed at Santa Elena in Florida.⁴⁰ In this case, the actual intrusion of the Laudonnière expedition was obscured by the multitude of corsair reports which flowed continually to the Spanish Crown from France, the Atlantic islands, and the Indies.

The instrument chosen by Philip II to deny the mainland to the French through colonization proved to be a feeble one. Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón, embroiled in financial difficulties in Santo Domingo, was forced to sell one of his ships, and many of his men deserted. Finally, in early August of 1564, Vazquez de Ayllón fled Santo Domingo by night in a small craft, reportedly heading for Peru. The latest chapter in the long history of attempts to settle Florida had come to an inglorious end.⁴¹

While the Spanish were failing to discover or counter the French moves in Florida, the armada of galleons belonging to Pedro Menéndez moved around the Caribbean with the Tierra Firme ships. Estaban de las Alas brought San Pelayo, Santa Clara and Magdalena to Nombre de Dios. On August 13, they left that port for Cartagena, and, three days later, Magdalena was wrecked on the Darien coast.⁴² The diminished fleet left Cartagena September 20. After the ships sailed from Havana, Santa Clara ran aground on the eastern side of the Gulf Stream. All the crew was rescued and the treasure transferred to the ample holds of the great galeass San Pelayo, while Santa Clara was abandoned as a hopeless wreck. Heavily laden (the ship carried more than 1,400 bars of silver), Pelayo returned to Spain, and landed at Cádiz December 4.⁴³ The reports of disaster it brought to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés were tempered no whit by the news that no further trace of his missing son Juan had been found.

Meanwhile trouble had also visited the small French Huguenot colony on the River May. Laudonnière explored the area and traded with the Indians near the fort. An increasing shortage of supplies, and the desire for adventure instigated some of the garrison to mutiny. Eleven mutineers fled the fort first, taking a small shallop, and setting course for the Caribbean. Three weeks later, on December 18, 1564, seventy men from the garrison held René de Laudonnière prisoner long enough to extort from him a document authorizing

their journey. They then departed on a voyage of adventure among the Antilles in two small sailing craft.⁴⁴

The year of 1564 had thus far held little cause for rejoicing for Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. When the Council of the Indies ruled on the whole battery of charges against him on November 23, it found him guilty on nine of the fourteen charges, fined him 3,000 ducats, and sentenced him to three years without office in the Indies.⁴⁵ Immediately after this low point in his fortunes, the affairs of Pedro Menéndez seemed to improve. On November 24, he was given the court as his jail pending his latest appeal. On December 7, the Council ruled favorably for Menéndez in the galleon lease case and granted him the sueldo for his ships. Menéndez pressed his advantage and asked that his freight earnings not be deducted from the payment, and that he be reimbursed for the pay of the soldiers who accompanied the ships. The councillors took the requests under advisement.⁴⁶ Early in the New Year, the Council of the Indies reconsidered the main Menéndez case, and finally reduced its sentences to six guilty charges and the exile from Indies offices to one year. Menéndez' fine was cut to 1,000 ducats.⁴⁷ Now that the tide of influence seemed at last to be running in Pedro Menéndez' favor, a major question at Court must have been that of the future of this valuable, contentious man.

NOTES

1. The agreement with Rasquín has been printed in D.I., XXVI, 273 et seq. It is mentioned in the work of Duro, Armada Española, in "Noticias extractadas de asientos y capitulaciones que se hicieron para descubrir en Indias despves de Colon," I, 459.

2. Castillo appears as a leading merchant in Cádiz and spokesman for the other traders of that city in a royal cedula sent by Philip II to "a certain merchant of Cádiz" from Valladolid on May 23, 1559. The letter, which discusses conditions surrounding the special license given to Cádiz merchants to deal in hides and sugar from Hispaniola and Puerto Rico, is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 425, Book 23, fol. 396 and vto. In 1561, the King responded to a complaint by Castillo that the royal Corregidor had been sending the cases of Cádiz shipmasters to the Audiencia at Granada, where they languished. At that time, Castillo had just become a Regidor of the cabildo of Cádiz. The King's letter was dated May 10, 1561, and is also from A.G.I. Indiferente General 425, Book 24.

3. The case against Pedro del Castillo is found in "Pedro del Castillo, 1561," from A.G.I. Justicia 855. Menéndez advises that he was shortly set free because he was "without any guilt." The statement is found in "Servicios . . .," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2, fol. 11, vto.

4. See Crown to Luis de Velasco, September 23, 1561, from A.G.I. Patronato 19, ramo 12. When the royal order to study the matter of Florida was in the hands of the Viceroy of New Spain, he convoked a council which included Angel de Villafañe and several captains from the expeditions of 1557-61. Their judgment was that no further such ventures should be attempted from New Spain. Any future attempts upon Florida would best be mounted, they believed, from Spain directly, and should be concerned only with the areas north of Santa Elena. Velasco concurred in the findings. The parecer of the council of New Spain is from Woodbury Lowery's "Manuscripts of Florida," in microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library, reel 1 (box 141-A).

5. See "1561, Ida," from A.G.I. Contratación 2,898.

6. "Instructions to General Pedro Menéndez, 1562," A.G.I. Indiferente General 415. These are also reprinted in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 407.

7. Menéndez describes the condition of the vessels in his letter to Philip II from Havana (n.d., probably March, 1563, which is found in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2 (in Stetson Collection).

8. Ibid.

9. Detail of the ships armed by Menéndez in San Juan de Ulua is found, together with the registries of his vessels, in "Fiscal con Pedro Menéndez de Avilés sobre sueldos de dos galeones . . . , " A.G.I. Justicia 872, No. 1. The case began when the Captain-General sought payment from avería for the charter of his ships. The Casa advised the King that Menendez also carried gold, silver, and hides. See Crown to Casa, Madrid, July 16, 1563, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

10. See the separate cedulas from the Crown to Diego de Mazariegos and to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Madrid, February 13, 1563, A.G.I. Indiferente General 427. Notice was also sent to officials in Santo Domingo, Venezuela, Cartagena, Tierra Firme, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

11. In a letter from the Crown to the Casa, sent from Madrid on April 25, 1563, the King asked his trade officials to accommodate Vazquez de Ayllón in his difficulties in gathering sufficient settlers for his expedition.

12. It is found in "Asientos de Armada," A.G.I. Contratación 3,309.

13. From "Ordenanzas . . . , " D.I., VIII, No. XXV, 494-495. To a degree, the resurgence of adelantamiento during the reign of Philip II has been overlooked. In the study of the strengthening of the early modern dynastic state, some writers have viewed the coming of the Spanish viceregal system as coincident with the termination of the phase of discovery and exploitation by private persons licensed by the Crown. An example of this viewpoint is the statement of Robert S. Chamberlain, speaking of the 1550s:

. . . the time was past when the Crown would permit the development of personal control anywhere in the Indies, especially when authority of a semi-feudal nature was concerned. The absolute monarchs of Castile were determined to bring their overseas possessions, which belonged to the Crown of Castile alone, not to the nation, under their own rigid authority. Therefore, they began early to create

imposing machinery of royal, absolute government which left no place for personal governmental power or wide personal holdings of a political character.

This statement is from The Conquest and Colonization of Yucatan (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), p. 184. On the other hand, George P. Hammond recognizes that the 1595 asiento of Juan de Oñate was issued under the royal colonization ordinances as an adelantamiento. See his article "Oñate's Effort to Gain Political Autonomy for New Mexico," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXII, No. 3 (August, 1952), 321-330. Roscoe R. Hill, in "The Office of Adelantado," op. cit., also recognizes the longer duration of adelantamiento under Philip II.

14. The provision for encomienda is found in "Ordenanzas . . .," D.I., VIII, No. LVIII, 505. For a discussion of how financial necessity had almost impelled Philip II to make encomienda in Peru perpetual in 1560, see C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (3rd ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1963), pp. 54-55.

15. The main body of the 1563 case against Pedro Menéndez de Avilés is found in "Proceso de los cargos y culpas que resulta contra el General Pedro Menéndez de Avilés . . . en la flota y armada que vino de Tierra Firme este año de 1563," from A.G.I. Justicia 970.

16. The order of June 17 to pay Menéndez is referred to in Crown to Casa, Barcelona, February 26, 1564, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966. The King decided not to accept Menéndez' offer to escort the Juan Menéndez ships from the Azores; see Crown to Casa, Madrid, July 16, 1563, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167. On July 28, 1563, the King notified the Casa de Contratación of the arrangement for the escort of Castro; the letter is also from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167. The power of attorney from Pedro Menéndez to Juan Gómez de Argomedo was originally recorded in the notaries' archives, but has been reproduced with its date of June 24, 1563, in A.G.I. Justicia 872 and also in Justicia 865.

17. Pierre and Huguette Chaunu point out that the Consulado controlled the Indies avería contract from 1562-1564; in Séville et l'Atlantique, I, 203.

18. Crown to Casa, Madrid, July 16, 1563, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

19. Elements of the documentation of the 1563-1565 case between Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the Casa de Contratación have also survived in A.G.I. Justicia 865,

No. 1, entitled "El fiscal de Su Magestad con el General Pedro Menéndez sobre dos barras de plata que trajo de las Indias sin registrar." Aspects of the case are also found in "Fiscal de Su Magestad con Pedro de Menéndez de Avilés y sus fiadores Juan Antonio Corzo y Gaspar Astudillo, vecinos de Sevilla, sobre su quiebra del prision donde estaba," from A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9. Thirteen of the charges against Menéndez are detailed in the Captain-General's own complaint to Philip II in "Servicios . . .," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. The charges, and Menéndez' responses summarized, are listed below:

1. That Menéndez left Havana against royal order (he claimed that he was trying to make the royal deadline for the Tierra Firme ships in April, and came as quickly as he could);
2. He landed at Tercera in the Azores, contrary to his own order that no one in the convoy should land there (he said that a storm arose, making a landing an essential for the safety of the fleet);
3. Menéndez allowed a certain Muñoz, a prisoner, to land at Tercera (he said that he was unaware of the status of the man);
4. Menéndez permitted certain Portuguese to land with monies at Tercera (blame the ship-master, not the Captain-General, said Menéndez);
5. The Captain-General allowed a Portuguese ship to sail with the armada; much unregistered bullion and coin was passed to her from other vessels; the Portuguese left the convoy with these (his response was that he permitted the Portuguese ship to accompany the convoy so that she might not be taken by corsairs and thus betray the route and schedule of the fleet; the vessel left the convoy, he said, without his permission);
6. Menéndez failed to make the landmark of Cape St. Vincent, as was customary on the homeward route (the simple reply was that he did this to avoid storms, as any fine mariner would do);
7. Pedro Menéndez allowed the Licenciado Altamirano to take certain monies ashore (Menéndez replied by calling the accusation "vile" and countered by saying that there were no witnesses to any such action);
8. He carried unregistered silver (Menéndez admitted that he brought some silver for the expenses of the voyage, unregistered. He claimed that only 600 ducats' worth, registered and unregistered, was carried altogether. He said that this was needed for working capital

- aboard ship, and stated that no fleet General had ever been charged for this small sum of expense-money);
9. Upon his return, Menéndez had left his ships on the ways at Sanlúcar and come directly to Seville (Menéndez said his business with the Casa was urgent, and he had no option but to leave);
 10. He had his large vessels put into the shipyard before they had undergone their official visit by the Casa (similar response as to the above);
 11. Menéndez had agreed to delay his date of sailing from New Spain if certain merchants there would buy a 10,000-ducat cargo which he had brought (Menéndez replied that this was a lie; he brought no cargoes and no witnesses had testified about the charge);
 12. A bribe of 700 ducats had been paid to Menéndez to linger with his fleet five leagues from San Juan de Ulua, so that more goods could be brought out to the homebound ships and evade the customs registry (Menéndez said there was no sworn testimony as to this charge);
 13. On the voyage outbound from Spain, Pedro Menéndez held up his departure until his own galleons joined the fleet and crossed the bar, loaded with merchandise (Menéndez said his delay was due to signs of a storm impending; claimed that his ships were not then within the bar, nor did they carry merchandise).

Gonzalo Solís de Merás, in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, describes the 1563 case in some detail, from a viewpoint thoroughly sympathetic to his brother-in-law, on pp. 64-70. The unregistered bar silver was brought by Cristobal Carrecho, master of Magdalena. Witnesses for the Casa alleged that it was worth 688 pesos and was intended to be given to one Diego de Molina by Capt. Diego de Amaya by orders of Pedro Menéndez. See A.G.I. Justicia 865, No. 1, fol. 1.

20. A letter from the Casa to the Crown on August 2, 1563, contained in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book II, acknowledged royal letters of July 13, 16 and 18, and noted that Menéndez had the commercial cargoes arranged for his galleons, and had obliged himself to have them loaded aboard by September 10. Menéndez described the arrest of Bartolomé in a letter to the King on July 27, and his own imprisonment in a letter on August 21; both are found in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 34-43. The King also corresponded with his trade officials about the galleons of Pedro Menéndez in letters dated July 28 and August 11, 1563, and affirmed the arrangements for the passage of the Licenciado Castro. These letters are also found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

21. The loading of San Sebastian at Sanlúcar is described in testimony before Juan Gutierrez Tello on March 22, 1563, found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,101. Pedro Menéndez Márquez was her master. The shipwrecks are described by Duro in Armada Española, II, 465, and by the Chaurus in Séville et l'Atlantique, III, 1563 aller, 41. See also the marginal notes in A.G.I. Contratación 2,898, 1563 Ida.

22. See Casa to Crown, Seville, November 2, 1563, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167. Juan Menéndez, before his departure from Havana, wrote to the Casa (on August 9, 1563) in a letter found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,104.

23. Pedro Menéndez to Crown, August 21, 1563, printed in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 38-43.

24. The return of the surviving ships to Spain was announced in Casa to Crown, Seville, November 12, 1563, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167. The shipwrecks were inscribed on the margin of the registry book, A.G.I. Contratación 2,898, fol. 231 vto. The Royal Officials from Santo Domingo advised the King of the three vessels which arrived in their waters from the ill-fated fleet in a letter sent from that place on December 20, 1563, and contained in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection). The Chaurus discuss the matter in Séville et l'Atlantique, III, 1563 retour, 61, 66. See also Eugene Lyon, "A Lost Son" (unpublished paper, typescript, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1968), 9 pp. Pilot Noriega, who had been aboard one of the ships which reached the Azores, testified before the Casa de Contratación, which advised the King that the storm struck the ships about 180 miles south and west of Bermuda, in about 32° of latitude. Another account, cited by Dave Horner in The Treasure Galleons (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1971), p. 227, placed the ships above the latitude of Bermuda. It was from A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,003. In 1595, several witnesses testified that the ships had been in the vicinity of Bermuda when they ran into hurricane winds. See "Informacion de algunos servicios prestadas por el Adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés," Mexico, April 3, 1595, reprinted in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 590 et seq. Two accounts from Florida, so to speak, testified that the Capitana of Juan Menéndez had been wrecked in the Indian River section of the peninsula. Hernando d'Escalante Fontaneda, in Memoir of Hernando d'Escalante Fontaneda (translated by Buckingham Smith, edited by David O. True, Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1944), 33, claimed to have interviewed survivors from the Menéndez fleet. Another testimony came in the deposition of Stephan de Rojomonte (A.G.I. Patronato 19, No. 1, ramo 14), one of the Frenchmen captured by the Spanish in Hispaniola in January, 1565. Rojomonte stated, as had

Fontaneda, that two Spanish ships had been lost, the one of Juan Menéndez being wrecked close to Cape Canaveral.

25. See Council of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, October 11, 1563 (copied as 1564 in error), in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

26. See Officials of the Casa to Castro, Seville, October 23, 1563, from A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9. Pedro Menéndez described his plight in "Servicios . . .," from A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. The ships were San Pelayo, the new galleass, Santa Clara, and Magdalena.

27. See inscription of Juan Gómez de Argomedo, December 16, 1563, in A.G.I. Justicia 865, No. 1.

28. The letter to Juan de Sarmiento is dated "primero de enero" in the copy found in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2, in the Stetson Collection. Menéndez' offer was rejected in a letter from the Council of the Indies to the Crown, dated at Madrid on February 14, 1564, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 6, No. 73. General Velasco described his successful journey in a letter to the Casa from Sanlúcar dated September 25, 1564, and found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,101.

29. The sentence of the Council of the Indies and the appeal notations of Menéndez' case are from A.G.I. Justicia 865, No. 1.

30. Crown to Casa, Barcelona, February 26, 1564, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.

31. From "Fiscal con Pedro Menéndez de Avilés sobre sueldos de dos galeones . . .," A.G.I. Justicia 872, No. 1.

32. Philip II had made such a ruling in a cedula to the Casa dated July 15, 1562. It is cited by the Chaunus in Séville et l'Atlantique, III, 1563, aller.

33. Both the first Ribault and the Laudonnière expeditions are described in a long narrative entitled "Información del Gobernador Blas de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212. Rene de Laudonnière's own narrative, "L'Histoire Notable de la Floride," has been reprinted in a number of places; the writer prefers the version in the work of Suzanne Lussagnet, Les Français en Floride (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1958), pp. 37-200. The dispatch of the Manrique de Rojas ship is described in "Report on the French who went to populate Florida," Havana, July 9, 1564, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 99 (Stetson Collection), and has been translated by Lucy Wenhöld in "Manrique de Rojas"

Report, 1564," Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVIII, No. 1 (July, 1959), 45-62. See also "Services of Gonzalo Gayon," from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection).

34. Report of the dispatch of Vazquez de Ayllón's ships from Sanlúcar came in a report from Captain Juan de Texeda to the Casa written on October 4, 1563, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167 (Stetson Collection). For reaction to the delays in Santo Domingo, see the letter from the Licenciado Echegoyen to the Crown, Santo Domingo, August 10, 1564 (enclosing letter from April, 1564), A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).

35. Crown to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Madrid, June 18, 1564, from Justicia 868, No. 9.

36. The jailbreak was described by the discomfited Fiscal of the Casa in a report dated July 15, 1564, from A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9. The power of attorney was executed on July 1, 1564, and was originally from the Archivo de Protocolos de Sevilla (hereinafter A.P.S.), Escribanía of Juan de la Cobaco. It has been reproduced in A.G.I. Contratación 4,802 (Stetson Collection). The main body of the Menéndez case in 1564 is found in A.G.I. Justicia 869.

37. Corzo was a shipowner, merchant and slaver, while Astudillo served as banker and financial agent in Seville. Astudillo was also fiscal representative for Pedro del Castillo and his wife Dona Isabel de Ribera for certain juros the Castillos held in the Casa de Contratación. See revocation of poder of July 28, 1563, in A.P.C., Escribanía of Medina, 1576-78, fol. 287, 287 vto.

38. Order of August 7, 1564, from A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9.

39. An excellent description of the construction, dimensions and armament of the fort is found in "Information of Governor Blas de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212. Fort Caroline was also described in an account and map sent with the letter of Governor Mazariegos to the Crown, written at Havana on December 22, 1564, and found in A.G.I. Patronato 267, No. 1, ramo 37. It has been depicted by Jacques Le Moyne du Morgues, the contemporary artist who served in the fort; see the color reproductions in The New World by Stefan Lorant, published by Duell, Sloan and Pearce in New York in 1946; pp. 55. Charles Bennett has also reproduced these in the Settlement of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965), pp. 21, 23. The reconstruction of the fort by the National Parks Service at St. Johns' Bluff has closely followed the contemporary depictions.

40. The report of the Audiencia, dated August 30, 1564, from A.G.I. Patronato 254, ramo 38 (Stetson Collection), recounts a route of the supposed Portuguese-French fleet which does not square with the actual course of the Laudonnière vessels. The Huguenots, who left from LeHavre, touched at the Canary Islands, watered at Dominica, and went directly from the Virgin Islands to the eastward of the Bahamas, and thence westward to the River May. See the description in "Information of Governor Blas de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212. The Santo Domingo story placed the French ships in the vicinity of Cape San Antonio on the western tip of Cuba.

41. See letter from the Licenciado Echegoyen to the Crown August 10, 1564, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).

42. See Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Séville et l'Atlantique, 1564 aller, III, 58.

43. The return of San Pelayo and the loss of Santa Clara is described in the text and margins of A.G.I. Contratación 2,898, fol. 230 vto., and by the Chaunus in Séville et l'Atlantique, 1564 aller, III, 60, 62. The officials at Seville reported the arrival of San Pelayo in a letter to Philip II dated at Seville on December 5, 1564, and found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

44. René de Laudonnière describes the mutiny in "L'Histoire Notable . . .," in Lussagnet, Les Français en Floride, pp. 124-125. Some of the mutineers recounted their version of events, which was recorded in the "Information of Governor Blas de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212.

45. See the sentence of November 23, 1564, from A.G.I. Justicia 869.

46. See the petitions of Pedro Menéndez and his attorney in A.G.I. Justicia 872, No. 1.

47. From A.G.I. Justicia 869, sentence of January 24, 1565.

CHAPTER III

FROM ASIENTO TO JOINT-VENTURE

While Pedro Menéndez pressed for favorable settlement of his lawsuits and was still technically a prisoner in Madrid, events were taking place rapidly in the Indies. Although the Spanish were as yet unaware of Laudonnière's settlement at Fort Caroline, some Frenchmen from that place took a course of action that would shortly bring their colony to open and dramatic attention in the Spanish Indies.¹ The two little vessels which had left the River May together in mid-December, 1564, were separated in a storm. One of these arrived at Cagay, a Spanish town within the great bay on the southwest coast of Hispaniola. The men aboard captured a small prize, which they ransomed; after trading their own vessel for a larger, finer Spanish ship, they sailed off on further adventures. The second French craft soon came to La Yaguana, a port thirty miles from Cagay. When they appeared off the harbor entrance, Spanish ships sailed out to intercept them, and the Frenchmen fled. Not aware of their compatriot's earlier raid on Cagay, the corsairs went there. Their landing-force had surrounded some settlers' houses when armed Spaniards attacked them and

killed or captured several of the French, while the rest were put to flight.

Near Cape Tiburón, at the extreme southwest point of Hispaniola, the two groups of Frenchmen rejoined forces. They crossed the Windward Passage together, came within sight of the mountains of Oriente, and landed at the Cuban port of Baracoa, where they raided the town for supplies, ransacked houses, and took a small caravel which they found in the bowl-shaped harbor. The little fleet then re-crossed to Hispaniola. On January 16, 1565, they assaulted a Spanish ship anchored close to Cape Tiburón. The men aboard it were well armed and determined to sell their lives dearly, and their surrender came only after three of their force had been killed--a soldier, a slave, and one Anton Nuñez.² This action of the Frenchmen was certain to bring them to the notice of Spanish officialdom, for Nuñez was secretary of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, who had been travelling to Cuba on a mission for that body. In addition to the wines and other goods they seized, the French captured more than twenty Spaniards. Now they abandoned the last remaining vessel of those brought from Florida. The little fleet, now composed entirely of prizes, shaped its course for the southwest and Spanish Jamaica, where they hoped to exchange their prisoners for food.³

Meanwhile the Frenchmen in the third small craft from Fort Caroline had decided to try their luck in Cuban

waters. At the town of Savanna, they captured a mulatto and seized some supplies. When they raided the port of Arcos, the man escaped and made his way to the governor at Havana. As soon as the notice reached him Governor Mazariegos readied two small boats, sailed for Arcos, and surprised and captured all eleven of the French raiders. When the prisoners were brought to Havana, they were interrogated by Guillaume Rouffi, the French lad whom the Spanish had found at the site of Ribault's deserted colony at Port Royal. The captives' narrative was written down on December 22, 1564.

A careful description was made of the French craft and the stolen goods it contained. Five of the men testified, and their stories contained a startling message: the French had again settled in Florida! They had built a fort at a location between twenty-eight and twenty-nine degrees of latitude. The French prisoners described the fort, its garrison, and armament in some detail. The men, who claimed to be Catholics, said that they had fled Florida to avoid the harsh labors their "Lutheran" officers imposed upon them. Governor Mazariegos prepared to send three of the prisoners with their vital news to Spain.⁴

Less than a month after the capture of the men at Arcos, on January 20, 1565, three sails appeared off Point Morant, the southeast cape of the isolated island of Jamaica. As soon as he sighted the ships, Governor

Blas de Merlo hastened to put his forces in a state of defense. The Frenchmen dropped anchor and sent their smallest craft into the harbor of Caguaya, near the capital of Santiago de la Vega (near old Port Royal harbor and the modern city of Kingston). They chased down and boarded a small caravel. Governor Merlo learned from one of the caravel's crew that the raiders were French, and he prepared to attack. First, he put the Frenchmen off their guard by parleying with them and promised to trade them food for the Spanish captives they held. While they waited for the food to arrive, the governor came against them with several ships. The action was short but sharp and when it was over, two vessels and thirty-two Frenchmen were prisoners. One of their ships had escaped, however. It made its way out of the harbor and began the long voyage back to Florida.⁵

The corsairing of the three little craft from Laudonnière's Florida was, after all, no more than small-bore piracy, and had posed no major threat to the Carrera de Indias. Some concern had been aroused in the Spanish Indies, but real damage done was minor. The effects of the adventures were, however, major ones, and would spell disaster to the French in Florida.

Now at last, the location of the French settlement was unmasked, and the vague menace was given definite shape. The prisoners said that the offending colony was at about

twenty-eight to twenty-nine degrees of north latitude. This put it clearly within the territories of the Crown of Castile, and those who had settled there were guilty of trespass under Spanish law. The raiders from the settlement had also added piracy to their crimes. The punishment thus merited by the Huguenot colony and compounded by its mutineers would eventually be forthcoming. Only the factors of time and distance could delay it, as the news slowly filtered back to Spain. As it fell out, the message the Governor of Cuba had sent in the ship La Vera Cruz was the first to arrive. The urgent and momentous dispatch about the French fort would not reach Seville until March 26.⁶

In the meantime, on February 3, 1565, the Council of the Indies finally terminated the two cases affecting Pedro Menéndez. The long pleito with the Casa de Contratación was definitively ended, in his favor. The two bars of silver, now the only remaining issue, were ordered returned to Menéndez; he was absolved from all charges. At the same meeting, the Council also terminated the case involving charter fees and reimbursements for Menéndez' two galleons and patache, from the 1563 fleet. In their decision, the councillors agreed to the terms Menéndez' attorney had asked the previous December--he would receive full repayment for the pay of the soldiers he brought aboard the ships.⁷

Now this able, vital and troublesome figure could again serve his King. In the Indies there was an area of

real concern where his abilities and knowledge might be most useful. Philip II formally asked Menéndez to study and report on the problems of Florida. What, asked the King, did he know about its coasts and lands--what did he believe could be done to settle it, after so many failures to do so--what measures should be taken in the event corsairs had gone there to establish a base for raids against Spanish ships?

In reply, Menéndez sent a lengthy memorial.⁸ He began by recounting current rumors about corsairs who might have settled in Florida; he had heard of two groups. The first, captained by the infamous Portuguese Mimoso, had been reported by the Audiencia of Santo Domingo the preceding August.⁹ In Menéndez' version of the story, Mimoso had been seen at Tenerife in the Canaries in the late spring of 1564; possibly he was now in Florida. The second expedition was composed of five heavily-armed English galleons. When it touched briefly at El Ferrol on Spain's north coast at the end of December, Galician fishermen learned that the squadron planned to go to Florida. If, said Menéndez, these tales were true and an enemy colony was established in Florida, homeward-bound ships would stand in danger of being taken by fast galleys from the corsair settlement. He also raised the spectre of enemy-incited slave insurrections in the Spanish Caribbean, which could lead to the loss of vital island strong points. Menéndez also expressed his great concern that such an establishment, if not quickly

eradicated, might quickly take deep root in the land, as the English or French found favor with the Indians there. The Asturian was strongly convinced that Protestant heretics and American aboriginals held similar beliefs, probably Satanic in origin. These shared beliefs naturally led them to affinity, unless they were kept apart. An alliance between foreign intruders and the Indian peoples would prove most difficult, if not impossible, to break.

Shifting his emphasis to the geographic features of the North American mainland, Pedro Menéndez told Philip II of the rumors he had heard of the great passage to the South Sea. He was certain that "an arm of the sea" extended from Newfoundland twelve hundred miles to the westward, where it came into close proximity with another waterway. This last passage, Menéndez believed, gave access to the mines of Zacatecas in New Spain, and led ultimately to the South Sea. It was only necessary to explore the first water route, make a short overland journey to the second passage, and the way to the Pacific lay open.¹⁰ It was vital, he asserted, to let no enemy learn the secrets of this strategic waterway and threaten the trade of the East, or seize the rich silver mines. Menéndez was also concerned that the French could easily create trade routes to a North American colony, since many vessels already came each year to the Newfoundland fishing banks from France. He could even foresee the possibility that they might

establish sugar-works and flocks to provide them with the sugar and wool they continually sought through trade or piracy.

Pedro Menéndez then outlined concrete proposals for Florida's settlement. If no actual intruders were in the land, an expedition should proceed directly to Santa Elena. A force of five hundred sailors, soldiers and farmers would probably suffice. Menéndez urged that four Jesuits accompany the expedition to establish doctrinas and teach the faith to the sons of the native chiefs. While small vessels explored and mapped the coasts north to Newfoundland, agricultural settlements would be made in fertile inland areas. The cost of such an enterprise was estimated at 80,000 ducats for all expenses of initial outfitting and a year's supply. Menéndez suggested that the Crown bear the cost of the undertaking, in order to do it more quickly and secretly. If there should turn out to be Frenchmen in the land, a different approach would be advisable. In that case, a punitive expedition should be mounted with four well-armed galleons and a thousand soldiers and sailors. For a six-month military effort of this kind, Menéndez estimated a cost of 50,000 ducats.

After receiving and studying the memorial, Philip II and his Council of the Indies determined to carry out the Florida enterprise. They chose not to undertake it as a Crown-sponsored activity, but to license it as

an adelantamiento, with Pedro Menéndez as adelantado. Now that the bothersome legal obstacles were out of the way, the decks were clear for meaningful negotiation. At this point, one can analyze the diverse motivations of the parties to these negotiations and the purposes which they held in common. First of all, from the standpoint of the Crown of Castile, a number of considerations justified another attempt at the settlement of Florida. The King and his advisers were never forgetful of the continuing threat of French or English incursion along the long North American coastline. Whether or not this had already occurred, it remained a possibility. Aggressive population and fortification could deny any establishment to another power and at the same time protect the legal rights of Castile. Exploration would unlock the secrets of the ports, currents and shoals, and more accurate marine charts would lead to more secure navigation. Perhaps the storied Northwest Passage could be found, with all which that implied for the Eastern trade. The Carrera de Indias would be buttressed and protected from enemy assault by the very existence of mainland settlements. If Havana were adequately defended and the Florida coast fortified, the strategic Bahama Channel would be covered.

The evangelistic mission of the Catholic faith, so inextricably mixed with the other purposes of conquest and colonization, was an important consideration in preparing

the Florida asiento. As royal authority for conquest was delegated to the adelantado as surrogate for the King, so was a portion of responsibility for carrying out the Patronato. All previous experience in Florida indicated that it would be a difficult and challenging mission-field. In the face of such difficulties, the winning of the souls of the Florida Indians would be an enterprise of great spiritual merit for the Crown of Castile and its adelantado. Conversely, for those souls to remain in their heathen state or, even worse, to become infected with the deadly virus of heresy would be reproach in the eyes of God.

For Pedro Menéndez himself, one might wonder at his interest in the enterprise, after his disparaging remarks about Florida as a graveyard of hopes. For one thing, he must have held a lingering hope that his explorations might uncover the fate of his son Juan.¹¹ Another was the strong inducement to build further his family name, reputation, and estate. An enterprise which promised lands, revenues, high titles, and expectation of exalted service to God and prince would stir any sixteenth-century hidalgo. In such an undertaking, moreover, there would be honor and profit, lands and offices enough for the whole circle of kinsmen and friends in the Menéndez orbit. In the bargaining, Menéndez pressed for the title of Marquis and the lands which would support it.¹² He had before him the example of the marquise of Hernando Cortés in New Spain, which was

granted in 1529. By 1565, the extent of the private holdings of the Marques del Valle, now held by the successor to Hernando Cortés, were well known. Cortés' economic empire was founded upon Indian labor and tribute, which probably amounted to 30,000 pesos in value annually by 1560. This income permitted further investment in stock-raising, sugar production, money-lending and mining ventures, while Indian and Negro slaves worked the agricultural properties. It was this kind of empire that Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had in mind when he petitioned for the title and lands of a Marquis.¹³ Pedro Menéndez also sought ways to gain privileged entree into the Carrera de Indias for his maritime operations---shipping licenses granted by the Crown. At the same time, he wished to be freed from some of the onerous regulations imposed upon ship-owners by the Casa de Contratación.

Certain motives were shared by both parties. The establishment of a prosperous, thriving colony was a matter of mutual interest--revenues from it would flow both to the King and to his privileged adelantado. Such a flourishing settlement would be the best defense against any enemy and the most sure guarantee of profit from trade and agriculture. It would lend value to the land which could, in turn, support a high rank for the holder of that land.

The attempt to populate Florida was thus to be accomplished through the ancient institution of the adelantado.

Even had they wished to do so, Philip II and his advisors would scarcely have been able to conquer Florida through the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Luis de Velasco, the aggressive Viceroy who had sent Miguel de Legazpi to the Phillipines just the past year, and who had dispatched the De Luna and Villafañe expeditions to Florida, was dead. The government of New Spain was currently under the control of the Audiencia of Mexico until a new Viceroy could arrive.

It has been pointed out that royal financial limitations had discouraged Crown financing of discovery, and that Philip II had determined in 1563 that the funding of exploration and settlement should, as a general rule, be private.¹⁴ At this point, there was no reason to depart from this policy. After all, no grave and immediate threat was yet known to be in Florida. To the contrary, every circumstance dictated the continuance of the "no-cost" tactic; a host of urgent necessities pressed in upon Philip II from every quarter.

For four years and more, Spanish ships and men had been lavishly used to stem the Moslem assaults upon the North African bases as Oran and Mazalquivir. Now the main Turkish fleet threatened to break into the western Mediterranean by taking the island of Malta. Don Alvaro de Bazán's armada of galleys had to be sent there to bolster the Christians, but unfortunately the asiento undertaken by the

merchant guild of Seville to support his ships had expired. Themselves embarrassed for funds because of dislocations in the Indies trade, the Sevillians were dragging their feet at renewing the agreement.¹⁵ The merchants felt that the galleys should be used to protect the Indies fleets against corsairs near Spain, instead of sending them eastward to do battle with the Turks. Anxious to increase his flow of revenues from overseas, Philip II had proposed (in late 1564 and early 1565) a major re-working and tightening of fleet sailing laws and defense.¹⁶ Due to his own lack of money, the King was himself constrained to borrow from the private deposits in the Casa at Seville, until the next fleet should arrive.¹⁷

The Spanish Crown, moreover, faced other grave diplomatic problems. Amid a climate of hardening ideological conflict, Philip II had been pursuing his own counter-Reformation in his dominions in the Netherlands, where he had published the Tridentine decrees in 1564. The King was irritated at slow progress in their implementation and the growth of opposition to the royal commands, and he felt gradually compelled to show a stronger hand.

In neighboring France, personal, dynastic and religious involvements complicated the diplomacy of Philip II. His own ties to the Valois kingdom were close--his wife Isabel was daughter to the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medici, and sister of Charles IX, the King. Catherine and her son held

tenuous control over a nation in an increasingly ambiguous and difficult internal situation. After the Pacification of Amboise in 1563, rival noble families, whose differences were compounded by religious loyalties, lived in uneasy proximity within the Court and ministries of the French Crown. Philip II, who took a dogmatic position for the Catholic faith, stood ready to furnish his mother-in-law with concrete support against the Huguenot nobles. Under the circumstances, he had to watch events in France closely, for they might require substantial commitment at any time.

In spite of the collapse of the adelantamiento of Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón, and the failures of the other would-be adelantados of Florida, there seemed no better way to conquer Florida at minimum royal cost. Menéndez' suggestion of Crown underwriting was therefore rejected, and the adelantamiento of Florida was approved. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés fitted the needs of the moment by offering, in addition to his skill and zeal, one fine ship as the nucleus of a fleet. He could also call upon a host of friends and relatives in Asturias and the rest of the north coast of Spain who would pledge their persons, ships and followers to his cause. In Cádiz, Seville, and in the Indies Menéndez had credit sources to aid in the arming of vessels and the carrying-out of the expedition. Without question, moreover, his drive, ability and reputation could act as a loadstone to draw support to the enterprise of Florida.

The Council of the Indies chose one of its members, Dr. Juan Vazquez de Arce, to negotiate with Menéndez and agree upon the conditions under which the Florida expedition and settlement would be carried out. The bargaining ended on March 15, 1565, when both men signed a lengthy asiento.¹⁸ To appreciate the underlying nature of this contract and understand the relation of the parties to it, one must examine the relative positions of Pedro Menéndez and his sovereign. First of all, this was clearly not an accord between two parties of legally equal standing; one cannot view the asiento as a modern business contract. Neither the would-be Adelantado nor his King was able, as is done today, to deal in contractual terms limited strictly to the business at hand. Their mutual binding on the enterprise of Florida was done within the framework of their broader relationship as ruler and subject. An example of this was the final clause which the King inserted in the last version of Menéndez' agreement. It stated that non-compliance by Pedro Menéndez would not be a mere contract violation; it would be "treason to his natural Lord." An agreement with a sixteenth-century monarch would always exhibit this disconcertingly open-ended feature: there always existed the possibility of unilateral, prejudicial action.

Yet Philip II was not a totally unlimited despot. Among other restraints upon his power, the legalism which obtained in all of Spanish life also affected the King's agreements

with his subjects. In this tradition, therefore, the terms of the asiento had been set forth in great detail. For his part, Menéndez could rely upon receiving what had been promised to him in the contract, provided he lived up to his obligations . . . and provided Philip II did not decide to recast the nature of their relationship.

The asiento contained a rough quid pro quo of duties and rewards, obligations and benefits which approximated what is termed in modern business law "consideration." This bilateral contractual balance must also be considered in its broader setting of an agreement between a loyal subject and a patrimonial monarch.¹⁹

The contract agreed to by the representative of the King and Pedro Menéndez embodied many of the provisions proposed by Menéndez in his earlier memorial. It is divided into two main parts. The first enumerates the tasks and obligations undertaken by Menéndez. In the second half, the Crown lists the privileges which it agreed to grant as recompense for the efforts of the Adelantado.²⁰

The asiento began with a promise that Menéndez would prepare four fast zabras and six shallops, fully equipped with oars, artillery, arms and munitions for any action on the sea. Next, he agreed to bring a force of five hundred men on his expedition, of which one hundred would be farmers, one hundred sailors, and the rest armed men and officers. He agreed to carry two clerics, and to bring stone-cutters,

carpenters, farriers, blacksmiths, barbers and surgeons. All of his men would have to be fully armed with arquebuses, crossbows, helmets and shields. The expedition would have to leave by May 31, 1565.

Because the smaller vessels had neither the tonnage nor the facilities to carry large bodies of men and their requisite equipment and supplies, Menéndez was instructed to prepare his fine new galeass, San Pelayo, to take part in the journey. San Pelayo was sizeable enough to transport three hundred of his men and most of their supplies, and was thus admirably fitted to accompany the expedition. It was, moreover, relatively fast and maneuverable for its size, and was large enough to constitute a formidable gun platform. Since, however, this was Menéndez' finest and largest ship, and his best single source of income, a bargain was struck. He could load it with goods for his own account or carry merchandise for others for the freight income, up to one-half or even two-thirds of the ship's tonnage. At some point in the West Indian islands, he would then off-load the men and supplies intended for Florida into the smaller vessels, and San Pelayo could then proceed on its profitable journey.²¹

Next, Menéndez was required to sail to the coast of Florida and seek the most advantageous places for settlement. He was also to search for traces of any corsairs or other unauthorized intruders in the lands of Philip II and

expel them, if such should exist. Upon landing, Menéndez was to claim and take Florida in the king's name.

The geographic limits set upon the mission of Menéndez were immense. No bounds were set upon inland expansion, save the implicit limitation of the existing frontiers of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Expressed in shoreline terms, the confines of the adelantamiento ranged from the Ancones, or St. Joseph's Bay, on the Gulf of Mexico around the Florida Keys and up the east coast to Terra Nova, in from fifty to sixty degrees of north latitude. Thus the coastal expanses which Menéndez had to explore, chart and protect were extremely protracted. The distances involved were reasonably well comprehended by the Spanish, for they had a good grasp of the measurements of latitude. The worst distortions of their geography seemed to arise out of an imperfect understanding of longitude, and hence of the east-west dimension. The wanderings of De Narváez and De Soto had given some indications of the extent of the North American landmass, but its true limits were not appreciated. In any event, the areas granted in the asiento afforded a great scope for enterprise. Completion of the first phase of exploration was required to be done as soon as possible, but had to be completed by the end of three years.

Next, the King dictated definite terms for the effort of population and settlement. The initial thrust of conquest was to endure for one year, and supplies would have

to be furnished for that period. An additional four hundred settlers were to be put into the land before the first three years had elapsed. Of the total of five hundred settlers, at least two hundred would have to be married men, and at least one hundred of them farmers: the essential purpose was to found viable agricultural settlements. As in Spain, the farmers were to cluster around villages; the town was to be the spearhead for the advance of Castilian civilization. Menéndez was to found two or three towns, and to fortify each with a stronghouse of stone, adobe, or wood with a moat and drawbridge. It was intended that these fortified villages would then serve as refuges for the settlers, in the event of Indian troubles or corsair attack.

Menéndez was required to bring in five hundred slaves as the basic labor force to construct the towns, build fortifications and cultivate the land. These slaves were to plant sugar-cane, and build the sugar-works with which to grind it. It was the contractor's responsibility to provide the livestock essential for the self-support of the colonies and for future commercial hide production--one hundred horses and mares, two hundred calves, four hundred hogs, four hundred sheep, some goats, and other domestic animals and birds. The effort of colonization was to continue for the three-year term.

Relatively little was said in the asiento about relations with the Florida Indians. It provided that every

attempt should be made to bring the natives into the Christian faith and to loyal obedience of the king. For the religious life of the settlers, and the conversion of the Indians, Menéndez was obliged to bring ten or twelve religious of any order desired to Florida during the long-term effort of conquest and colonization. More specifically, four additional Jesuit missionaries had to come to establish doctrinas among the Indians. It was, further, ordered that the Florida enterprise be carried out in peace, friendship, and Christianity. As to the rest, the contract advises that the usual instructions apply as are given in regulations for those who go to make such settlements. With regard to land tenure and Indian service, the 1563 ordinances specify that, in such population efforts, an adelantado might make two-life repartimientos of Indians in each village, for himself and his heirs. They also permit three-life encomiendas, to be granted to other settlers, in areas apart from the ports or main towns. It should be noted that Lucas Vazquéz Ayllón's 1563 asiento for Florida had cautioned him that he could establish no encomiendas of Indians. Pedro Menéndez' agreement, however, is totally silent on this point, except for the reference to the 1563 ordinances.²²

Pedro Menéndez had, then, obligated himself for a mission of exploration, population, and religious conversion. These purposes were interdependent, were of a piece with the requirements made of others who had signed sixteenth-

century asientos, and were consistent with the general aims of Spanish expansion.

The second part of the asiento began with a statement that Menéndez' mission would impose such great efforts and expenses upon him that the king offered certain benefits and privileges to him in remuneration. The first benefit promised was an immediate cash payment of 15,000 ducats. This, the only royal outlay in the entire agreement, was to be paid if Menéndez sailed before the end of May. He was required to post a valid performance bond that he would return the funds if he failed to meet the sailing date.

A number of titles and offices were immediately granted to Pedro Menéndez, or were held out to him as future possibilities. He was to enjoy the title of Adelantado of Florida, and could bequeath it to his heirs in perpetuity. To insure that both the civil and military government of the adelantamiento would be in his hands, the offices of Governor and Captain-General were conceded to him for two lives--his own and that of a son or son-in-law. A salary of 2,000 ducats a year, to be paid from royal profits, accompanied the posts. If an Audiencia were ever established in Florida, the position of Alguacil Mayor would be set aside perpetually for Menéndez and his family. He was to be named Captain-General of the ships which were to go on the Florida expedition. The Adelantado was allowed to name a properly qualified lieutenant to take his place during absences from Florida.

He could, therefore, be a part-time official, and would thus be free to carry out his own economic interests elsewhere in the Indies, return to Spain, or serve in other posts of privilege and honor to which his sovereign might call him. This whole assemblage of offices and titles can be described as a grant of rather complete authority for Menéndez' lifetime, with some elements of it planned to continue after his death.

One of Menéndez' more valuable authorizations, and one which would help to attract eager followers to his enterprise, was the power to distribute lands in Florida. The asiento granted him the faculty of giving tracts of land for plantations, farms, and stock-breeding facilities as he might see fit, provided that he did not impede the rights of Indians. As to his own lands, the King granted him an estate, or estates totalling twenty-five leagues squared. These immense tracts of land, more than fifty-five hundred square miles, could provide the territorial backing and, hopefully, the revenues to support the title of Marquis. If, the asiento recited, the expedition was accomplished and the other terms of the agreement successfully completed, the king would consider his services and grant him the appropriate favor. Menéndez' jurisdiction over the land-grant was, however, to be limited. He would not, for example, possess governmental powers there like the ones exercised by the Marquis del Valle or by the Columbus family

in Jamaica; neither would he possess any sub-surface mineral rights--these would be reserved for the Crown.²³

A key cluster of privileges to be conceded to the Florida adelantado and to his followers were economic ones. Of these benefits, some were usually given to adelantados: Menéndez could bring five hundred slaves free of any duties, provided that they were intended only for Florida; the Adelantado and other Florida residents would receive an exemption from customs duties (the almojarifazgo) for a period of time, and the usual royal quinto paid on precious metals, pearls and other jewels would be reduced to one-tenth for a term of ten years. Pedro Menéndez was promised two fisheries--one of pearls and one of fish--of perpetual duration, and was guaranteed 6-2/3 percent of all net royal profits in Florida in perpetuity. All of these provisos were generally found in sixteenth-century asientos. Only the number of slave licenses to be given Menéndez was at all unusual.

Some of the economic benefits were particularly linked with the Spanish trade system, the Carrera de Indias. While some limited shipping privileges and exemptions were often noted in asientos for conquest and population, these were always modest and tied specifically to trade with the proposed new settlements. In the case of Pedro Menéndez, however, a significant departure was made. He was given permission to put into the Indies trade two galleons of

from five hundred to six hundred tons' burden, together with two pataches. The Adelantado was free to send these ships to any port in the Indies, and to sail them with the fleets or outside of them, as he chose. For cargoes sent in these ships, in no way tied to the Florida expedition, Menéndez did not have to pay the avería, or convoy-tax. The only restrictions placed upon this trade were that the outward-bound vessels only carry foodstuffs and beverages. On the return voyage, any cargo could be brought, but Menéndez was forbidden to bring gold, silver, or precious stones unless they belonged to him or were earmarked for his account because he had earned them through freight-payments. These ship-licenses were valid for six years.

A separate trade-privilege involved Menéndez' smaller vessels, and was more particularly tied to the Florida enterprise. He was granted the licenses for six shallops and four zabras, to operate between Florida and Spain, or to Puerto Rico, Hispaniola or Cuba. For the first year, it was understood, these ships were dedicated to the initial conquest; then the trade privilege would run (after June, 1566) for six years. The cargoes of these little vessels were intended for the Florida settlement. It was provided, however, that Menéndez could bring foodstuffs or beverages to the islands, unload and sell them there. Then he could load cattle or other merchandise for Florida, which could be bought in those islands. These ships could

also sail freely without regard to the fleet regulations of the Casa de Contratación. The King allowed the Adelantado to sail with unexamined pilots, and waived the requirement that a notary or ship's secretary be aboard each of the small vessels.

Another maritime privilege given to Menéndez allowed him to debark some of his ships directly from the north of Spain without examination at Sanlúcar, Seville or Cádiz. Instead, he was to be permitted to sail directly to the Canary Islands and to have his official papers approved before the local justices there. The Adelantado's small vessels were exempt from avería payments on the initial Florida expedition. After that time, if they wished to sail in convoy with the regular fleets, it had to be paid. If they preferred to sail singly or together outside of fleet protection, no avería was to be collected. The asiento specifically provided that none of Pedro Menéndez' ships could be taken, or embargoed, for Royal service. Finally, the Adelantado was given what amounted to an open-ended letter-of-marque. Any prizes which he might take at any time during the six-year ship license term would belong to him, subject only to the usual Crown share of one-third.

The asiento closed with a clause establishing the rights of succession for all of Menéndez' rights and privileges, if he should die before the basic three-year term had expired. It was signed by Dr. Vazquez and Pedro Menéndez.

Five days later, on March 20, 1565, Philip II affixed his signature to the formal, royal decree establishing the Florida agreement. In this instrument, no change was made in the terms agreed to in the first asiento. The King had, however, added a lengthy introduction, converted the form of address to the "Vos" mode used by a monarch to address a favored subject, and appended a closing related to compliance.

The introduction recalled the long, fruitless attempts to settle Florida. It emphasized that the need to convert the Indians to the holy Faith was the primary motive of the Crown in seeking to populate the mainland. Then it repeated the tasks Menéndez had offered to perform at his own expense, and accepted the offer on those terms, by virtue of Menéndez' evident qualifications.

In the closing, Philip II reaffirmed that Pedro Menéndez would conduct the entire conquest and population at his own cost, would honor the asiento in so doing, and would agree to obey other, later instructions which the Crown might make relative to the enterprise. The King then promised to carry out his obligations, and pledged his Royal word that each and every proviso of the agreement would be honored if Menéndez faithfully carried out his part. If he failed to do so, he would be punished as a disloyal subject.

Comparison of the Menéndez agreement with those of four other Florida adelantados and with the asientos for

sixteenth-century settlement in Costa Rica, the Río de la Plata, and "the province of Omagua" demonstrates the similarities and differences between agreements and thus helps establish the distinctive characteristics of Pedro Menéndez' asiento.²⁴ From such a comparison, it can be concluded that the striking uniformity of many clauses and provisions in the asientos bears testimony to the marked continuity of the settlement policies of the Crown of Castile. Requirements as to population, defense, Indian policies and the granting of privileges remained remarkably similar over the fifty years spanned by these contracts. Even the area of relations with the Indians, beset as it was during those years with dispute preceding and following the passage of the New Laws, changed little. Indeed, differences in the asientos appear to have been a matter of degree rather than one of kind. With particular regard to Florida, it can be affirmed that the 1565 compact with Pedro Menéndez represented the culmination of a long series of attempts to people eastern North America through the use of the adelantado instrument.

Notwithstanding the basic and underlying similarity of the asientos studied, one difference stands out clearly: the unusual nature of the benefit-package afforded to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. First, the scope of some of the benefits is far greater. Five hundred slave licenses, duty-free, are five times as many as the number permitted to any of the other seven contractors; in 1563, Ayllón was allowed

to bring only eight slaves, and he had to pay duty upon these. Menéndez was to control the government of the adelantamiento for two lives; the other Florida grantees could only govern for one. The tracts of lands to be given him were more than double the size of those offered to Narvaez, De Soto, and the second Ayllón; they were almost twice as large as those provided for the first Ayllón contract. They were, in fact, the same size as the Veragua lands tendered to Don Luis Colón, grandson of the discoverer, in 1537.²⁵

By far the most remarkable privileges which the new Florida Adelantado was to receive, however, were those connected with maritime trade. Taken together--the out-of-fleet permission, avería exemptions, exemption from examination of ships and cargoes in Andalusia, permission to carry unlicensed pilots and sail without a notary, and the ship-licenses themselves--these represented a substantial breach of the privilege-system of the Seville merchants. The whole collection appears to have been tailored to the deepest inclinations of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés--to engage freely in the Indies trade under special royal patronage with a very minimum of restriction. The benefits were, moreover, almost all convertible into money terms for Menéndez. Ship-licenses or slave-licenses, for example, if not used could be sold.

For the Crown, the advantages given to Pedro Menéndez represented the price of the Florida conquest. This was not a price to be paid directly by the king. In part, its

payment would be realized through the granting of an estate which the Adelantado would be allowed to create in Florida. For the rest, it would be paid by giving Menéndez license to profit through trade--a privilege to be carved out from the sphere of the mercantile monopolists of the Carrera de Indias. In return, the Crown could hope for a bulwark of Castilian civilization against any enemy incursion upon the North American continent.

Now there was much to be done. In addition to making copies of the asiento for the parties, another was prepared by the royal secretary to be sent to Seville for the books of contracts kept in the Casa de Contratación. Thus the maritime privileges of Menéndez could be accounted for, and his licenses could be granted as needed. It was also necessary to draw up separate cedulas, or decrees, embodying the main privileges allotted to Menéndez and to his followers in the asiento, together with patents of the titles which he had been granted.²⁶ On March 22, 1565, a letter was sent from the king to the officials of the Casa de Contratación at Seville. It asked all possible aid for Pedro Menéndez, so that his armadas might be sent off as soon as might be feasible. A form letter containing the same advice was posted to the Casa representative at Cádiz, Antonio de Abalia, and to the king's officials in Vizcaya, the "four villas of the coast," Galicia and the Canary Islands. Two days earlier, another, separate dispatch had already been sent

to Abalia in Cádiz, pointing out that particular aid would be required for Menéndez in that city, and asking Abalia to see to it.²⁷

Pedro Menéndez left Madrid, armed with the proofs of his agreement with the Crown, to begin his journey to Andalusia. Now he could ask for immediate payment of the 15,000 ducats which the asiento promised. With a letter of judgment from the Council of the Indies, he could also press for settlement of his ship-lease case. He could begin the outfitting of his expedition for Florida in Cádiz.

While the Adelantado was still travelling south from Madrid, the merchant ship La Vera Cruz had ended its long voyage from Havana, and had anchored within the port of Sanlúcar de Barrameda. The urgent dispatch from Diego de Mazariegos telling of the French settlement was sent along at once by messenger to Seville, together with the three French prisoners sent by the Governor. A rapid courier then forwarded the governor's letter from Seville to Philip II. Its delivery was swift indeed: the note of enclosure was dated March 26 and the King had it by March 30. Now the momentous news was in Philip's hands, and he and his counsellors knew for the first time of the French post at Fort Caroline. They had also learned that Laudonnière shortly expected substantial reinforcement from France.²⁸

Pedro Menéndez' newly authorized expedition of settlement and population would go ahead, but first it would have

a punitive mission to perform. The same day he received the news, Philip II wrote two insistent letters to Menéndez. In the first, Philip tersely advised the Adelantado of the message from Havana. He ordered Menéndez to leave as quickly as possible, as already required by his asiento and capitulacion. The second dispatch was even more importunate in tone: the King asked Pedro Menéndez to move up his departure date and leave by the first of May for Florida. He asked Menéndez to keep his destination secret, and that he spread the word that his goal was to be the Rio de la Plata.²⁹

The notice which Philip II had received of the French fort and colony in his Florida territory apparently did not disturb the friendly tenor of his correspondence with the French monarchs. An affectionate letter from Catherine de Medici was addressed to "the most high, excellent and powerful Prince, our very dear and well-beloved son-in-law, son, and cousin."³⁰ Catherine's letter crossed with one Philip wrote on April 2 to Charles IX and his mother. It assured them that, in spite of the pressure of his affairs, he would come with Isabel to see them as many times as possible. His note closed with a warm salute "to the most Christian Queen, my mother and lady," and was signed "the good son and brother of Your Majesties."³¹

In spite of such pleasantries, however, some concern had arisen at the Castilian court about the projected meeting of the two royal families. Both Queen Isabel and her

mother believed that a friendly family conference would somehow solve their mutual diplomatic problems and could even help resolve the internal religious tensions in France. Philip was unwilling to disappoint his young wife by disavowing the meeting; but his conscience was most uneasy about the possible contact with heretics at such a conference. Even after his Councils had debated the issue and had recommended that the King go in person to the meeting, he demurred. At this early April date, there was real doubt that the meeting would actually take place or, if it did, that the King would attend. Philip could not, however, reject the thought that he should use every means possible to strengthen the Catholic cause in France; the royal conference might help further this aim.

Certainly a part of the ambiguity in the King's feelings about France must have been related to his recent knowledge of Laudonnière's settlement at Fort Caroline. One thing was sure in his mind--the threat which the fort posed to the Indies and to the fleets should be erased as soon as possible. From his palace at Aranjuez, Philip sent urgent dispatches on April 5 to the commanders of his key defense points in the Caribbean--the Audiencia of Santo Domingo on the island of Hispaniola and to his governors at Puerto Rico and Havana. Philip II also urged the Seville officials to speed up payment to Pedro Menéndez of the 15,000-ducat merced promised to him in his asiento and to make

rapid money settlement with him over the long-pending galleon lease case. The Adelantado had, the King advised, pressing need for the funds in order to mount his expedition.³²

The dispatches warned the Indies of the dangers which the French fort represented, and initiated the necessary counter-moves. With these messages, the enterprise of Florida entered a new phase; now, for the first time, the Crown planned to furnish its adelantado with material support. This fateful step permanently imposed a dual character upon the maintenance of the adelantamiento of Florida. In his letter to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, Philip described the message he had received from Governor Mazariegos and reported the location of the French fort in Florida. He ordered the Audiencia to raise two hundred armed men for Pedro Menéndez' use under "a good captain," and that a ship, horses and ample supplies be furnished for an expedition of four months, at the cost of the royal treasury.

The message to Havana acknowledged the Governor's earlier report, and asked Mazariegos to provide fifty armed men, a number of horses and a ship. When Menéndez arrived in Havana, the Governor was to turn the force over to him for the Florida enterprise. Again, the estimated term of service (and the duration of expense) was to be four months. By thus setting a time limit upon royal participation, Philip demonstrated that he felt that the punitive aspect

of the expedition would be relatively short. The King also cautioned that all the usual controls upon expenditure from royal funds would be observed in this case.

The urgency of the King's commitment to this enterprise--and the priority which he assigned to it--can best be measured against what is known of his financial position during those days. As mentioned above, Philip II was struggling with pressing needs in several key diplomatic and military undertakings. He was especially concerned with the state of the royal forces in Oran and Mazalquivir. To meet some of his obligations, the King asked the officials of the Casa de Contratación to attempt to borrow 200,000 ducats in Seville; the royal coffers there were entirely empty.³³ As for the supplemental measures the King had set in motion for Florida in the Indies, they would not result in direct royal expense from Spain. Crown monies used in the Indies would, of course, never reach Seville as royal revenues. At this point, then, the expulsion of the French at Fort Caroline did not seem to call for any major effort by the Spanish Crown.

The Duke of Alba, the head of a major faction at the Spanish Court, and a militant hard-liner in upholding his sovereign's dynastic rights and orthodox Catholicism, gave his opinion to Philip II on April 11. Alba first expressed great firmness in opposing the presence of any Huguenot nobles at the planned conference at Bayonne, and advised

that if any of these planned to come to the meeting Queen Isabel should not be permitted to attend. Turning to the question of Florida, the Duke urged an immediate move to dislodge the French from their fort there, but did not reject the diplomatic approach. Alba pointed out that prisoner interrogations affirmed that the Queen of France and Admiral Coligny had authorized the expedition of Laudonnière. In view of this, the Duke urged the King to gather together the proofs of Castilian title to the North American continent. Next he suggested that the Spanish Ambassador to France make formal presentation of the evidence before the Valois rulers, and that he ask Catherine de Medici and Charles IX to recall the French Huguenots in Florida, and cancel any reinforcements that were to be sent there.

After study of the Duke's parecer, the King gave immediate assent to the part about the coming royal conference at Bayonne. On April 16, the King ordered the Ambassador to France, Don Francis de Alava y Beaumont, to give Catherine de Medici formal notice that he would not permit Isabel to attend the meeting if any religious undesirables, e.g., heretics, planned to be there. If that were the case, Philip II would annul the visit. Ten days later, a reply came from Catherine; the French Queen had concurred with Philip's wish.

Only sporadic action had yet been taken with regard to the French incursion in Florida. The Menéndez expedition was to be supplemented with some Crown aid from Caribbean Indies bases, and the General of the New Spain fleet, Pedro de las Ruelas, was to provide naval support for the Florida Adelantado. Although the King and his officials had learned from the prisoner interrogation that Laudonnière expected reinforcement soon, they were not yet aware that the arming of the Ribault fleet had already begun. At this point the Adelantado returned from a trip to the north coast of Spain with some alarming intelligence. Menéndez noted that he heard in Vizcaya that sixteen French ships, with two thousand men, were being outfitted in LeHavre for the Florida reinforcement journey. On the first of May, Philip wrote his French ambassador, asking him to determine the truth of Menéndez' report. Alava's reply, dated just six days later, deprecated the Adelantado's story. He noted that he employed able and diligent agents in Normandy and Brittany to detect any such sailings, and that none of these had given him any information about it. He had heard other rumors that a fleet was being readied for Florida, but had discounted them, believing that they were probably corsair ships being prepared for raids on Spanish shipping lanes. The ambassador did promise, however, to send a skilled spy, Dr. Gabriel de Enveja, to make a special investigation.³⁴

As concern grew in Madrid about the possibility of added French commitments in Florida, Philip II sent his secretary Gonzalo Perez to the President of the Council of the Indies to carry an urgent request. Philip II agreed with the suggestions of the Duke of Alba and asked the Council to study the proof of his title to Florida and report quickly to him about it. The Council made a diligent search in royal archives and delivered its opinion to the King on May 5, 1565.³⁵

In its findings about the rights of the Crown of Castile in Florida, the Council relied heavily upon the donation of Pope Alexander VI, and enclosed a copy of the original Bull. As vicar of Christ, the Pope had chosen Ferdinand and Isabella to carry the faith to all infidels within a certain sphere of control. Since Florida was located within the limits established by the papal decree, no man could exploit or even visit the land without particular license from the rulers of Castile and Leon.

Next, the Council offered evidence that the rights granted to the Reyes Católicos had been validated in and for Florida by the recorded actions of a long series of explorers and conquerors. The time allowed to prepare the memorandum for the king had been altogether too short to permit the Council to locate proof of all these explorations, but reference was made to two specific instances. First was the voyage of Guido de Labazaris in 1558; the second,

the 1561 expedition of Angel de Villafañe. The king's advisers attached sworn statements of the formal acts of possession-taking, that essential step in the establishment of dynastic claim to the land.³⁶ In its haste to render its opinion to the king, the Council made some glaring geographic errors. It stated that the new French fort was built in the same place formally appropriated for the Crown by both Labazaris and Villafañe. As a matter of fact, Fort Caroline was nowhere near the Bahia Phillipina which Labazaris had discovered on the Gulf coast nor the Santa Elena area, where Villafañe had landed. In any event, the Council of the Indies determined that Philip's claim to Florida was perfectly clear and valid. The councillors warned the King that the French fort presented a continual threat to the safe passage of Spanish ships through the Bahama Channel. On the cover sheet of the document, a note traced in Philip's hand indicates his approval of its deliberations. The document illustrates the advancing priority of Florida as a strategic concern and demonstrates a vital stage in Philip's step-by-step escalation of his support for the Florida enterprise. The proof-of-title parecer was the first of a regular flurry of letters, dispatches and consultas in which the new policies were developed and implemented.

As a result of the Council's report, another, higher level of royal support for Florida's conquest was approved.

Now direct aid was to come, in the form of troops and munitions, to Menéndez; five hundred men would be raised in Spain, to be paid and supplied at royal expense. An increase in the level of aid to be furnished in the Indies was also agreed upon. Letters to this effect went out to the Casa de Contratación, to the fleet General readying for departure in Cádiz, to Pedro Menéndez, and to officials in the Indies.

On the same day on which the Council of the Indies had furnished the king with proof of his title to Florida, its secretary Eraso wrote Pedro Menéndez, enclosing a royal order that the Adelantado should raise two hundred more armed men, to be carried with him on his voyage at Crown expense. Eraso told Menéndez further that the king had written the royal officials in Seville, formally ordering them to provide the funds for the pay and provision of those men. In keeping with its function as royal factor in the equipping of sea-going expeditions, the Casa was to gather supplies, take muster of the men, and provide a ship for their passage to Florida. Menéndez, who had left for Andalucia, did not receive these orders until May 12.³⁷

In the face of the threat from Fort Caroline, the Crown communicated again with the Casa de Contratación on May 6 with regard to the defenses of Havana. The new royal governor there, Garcia de Osorio Sandoval, had complained to Philip that there were only four pieces of artillery in Havana, very few arquebuses, and scanty supplies

of gunpowder. The king ordered that the necessary artillery and munitions be sent at once.³⁸ A third letter to Seville informed the Casa that the king had agreed to underwrite the cost of the artillery and munitions needed to batter down the walls of the French fort in Florida. If, the Council of the Indies noted, Menéndez had not obtained enough artillery for this purpose, it should be furnished at royal expense by the Casa.³⁹

The King sent a notice on the ninth of May to Pedro de las Ruelas, general of the New Spain fleet being outfitted for its journey, and ordered him to sail to Cape San Antonio at the western tip of Cuba, and detach his Capitana. That vessel would then sail with two hundred armed men to Havana to await Menéndez' orders. The Adelantado could use the ship and its men in Florida, but was required to return it in time for it to rejoin the fleet for the return voyage to Spain.⁴⁰

Next, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo was asked to increase the force being readied for Florida from two hundred to three hundred men because, said the King, "We hold it to be a very important thing to defeat those Frenchmen and expel them from the province of Florida."⁴¹

Although the Crown and Council had ordered measures to enlarge the Florida effort, their deliberations were hampered by a lack of clear intelligence about the size and strength of the French reinforcement. Menéndez had told

them of the rumor that the force was large, with sixteen ships and up to two thousand men. Two Spanish seamen, testifying in Seville, reported that they had seen three ships being prepared for Florida in LaHavre on April 16. Don Francis de Alava had doubted that any such Florida expedition existed. The situation was further complicated by the King's expressed hope that French knowledge of Menéndez' preparations might frighten the French into abandoning their reinforcement attempt entirely. The King's counsellors were in a quandary. On the one hand, if rumors were true, it might become necessary to increase the Spanish force substantially, both with ships and with men, for it was essential to match Menéndez' effort adequately against the French. At the same time, the Council did not wish to delay the Adelantado's departure even one day. The tension generated between the need to furnish enough strength for the sure ouster of the French and the desire to reach Florida before the enemy reinforcements arrived formed the atmosphere of urgency in which the Menéndez expedition was outfitted.⁴²

When he arrived at Seville on May 12, Pedro Menéndez found awaiting him the royal order to raise two hundred royal soldiers for Florida; he immediately sent out captains to begin the task. Meanwhile, the officials of the Casa de Contratación began to accumulate supplies and equipment for the royal troops.⁴³ All was not going smoothly for the

interests of the Adelantado in Seville, however. The long-standing differences between Menéndez and the merchants had never ended, and soon appeared that opposition to his ship-privilege for San Pelayo had arisen among them. The entry of such a large vessel into the closely controlled Tierra Firme trade was an unwelcome intrusion in the eyes of the Seville monopolists. After the Prior and Consuls who represented the merchants' guild carried their discontent to the officials of the Casa de Contratación, the Adelantado claimed that he experienced many obstructions and delays.⁴⁴ In spite of royal licenses, the Casa officials could find many ways to hold up the measurement, loading and inspection of a ship, and Menéndez claimed that such delays made it impossible to load the goods from Seville aboard San Pelayo. He further alleged that this badly damaged his credit at a critical time, and made it difficult to raise the bond needed to collect the 15,000 ducats promised in the asiento. To compound his financial woes, Menéndez had not been paid one ducat of the 20,000 he claimed for the 1563 ship-charter.

The king's officials in Seville were in a dilemma, for their old adversary and former prisoner had returned, armed with a royal asiento and Crown-guaranteed privileges in the Carrera de Indias. As if this were not enough, the nature of the Florida expedition had changed rapidly since the coming of the news of Laudonnière's fort. Now the Casa was thrust into the position of Crown agent in helping Pedro

Menéndez with royal funds, while anxious Royal dispatches urged them to meet his needs and speed his departure, to close his long-pending cases and settle the matter of his inability to make satisfactory bond. For his part, Pedro Menéndez was not likely to lose the opportunities inherent in such a situation; he had not forgotten the long months of confinement in the Torre del Oro. In a mood of thinly veiled conflict, negotiations began between Menéndez and the Casa de Contratación over the use of San Pelayo to carry the King's troops and their supplies.

From the moment when the decision was taken to furnish Crown soldiers to accompany Menéndez' own men, the major difficulty had been that of finding space for the men, their arms and supplies. The Adelantado naturally preferred not to interrupt his plans to send San Pelayo on a profitable voyage, but the Council of the Indies finally determined to lease the galeass to carry the men and goods. Their alternative was to embargo another ship for the purpose, and that cost might be substantially more.⁴⁵ San Pelayo was already required to make the Florida journey, and it would be under the direct command of the Adelantado. In itself, this would make for tighter military control in the event of action against the enemy. Another, perhaps unmentioned, pressure impelling the leasing of San Pelayo was the obvious preference of the Seville merchants that Menéndez' ship go to Florida instead of to Nombre de Dios.

There was room for argument in setting the compensation which Menéndez would receive for the use of his ship. Although the per-ton lease charge was fixed at seven reales per month, there were other expenses for which Menéndez could seek Crown payment, including the sums he had spent in outfitting San Pelayo, reimbursement for salaries and rations of his crew after the date of taking for Crown service, and recompense for his inability to profit from the Panama journey. He had anticipated a profit of 12,000 ducats from freight charges on the outbound journey along and could have expected an immediate 2,400-ducat advance from the traders who loaded goods for Nombre de Dios. He might also have realized monies for passenger fares and for the sale of goods carried for his own account. It was in Menéndez' interest that he would dramatize and maximize his expenditures and losses. In a letter to Philip II Menéndez claimed, for example, that the goods loaded by Cádiz merchants had been aboard San Pelayo since May first, but that Casa interference had badly disturbed his commercial arrangements.⁴⁶

Although discussions about placing the King's troops in San Pelayo took place in Madrid and Seville prior to May 22, it appears that this was the date of the formal order to take the ship for royal service.⁴⁷ After that date, Pedro Menéndez began to argue seriously for repayment of funds he said he had expended in carpentry work, caulking,

and strengthening his ship to carry heavier artillery. He also maintained that he should be paid the salary and rations of his eighty seamen, twenty ship's boys, and ten pages retroactive to April first, 9,000 ducats altogether. Since the Casa treasurer, factor, and accountant only offered 4,000 ducats, the parties were still far apart in their negotiations.

The Adelantado was, moreover, discouraged over the slow progress of the settlement of the sums due him from the 1563 ship-lease, and on May 22 he wrote the king that virtually nothing had been accomplished. Menéndez acknowledged that the officials of the Casa de Contratación were heavily occupied with the dispatch of the New Spain fleet, and one of them had been very ill. He also admitted that he had lost or mislaid certain receipts and other supporting papers vital to his case. But, since he was so financially pressed, Menéndez demanded at least seven or eight thousand ducats on account so that he could get on with the business of readying the Florida expedition.⁴⁸

The Seville officials had also received a list from Menéndez, in which he estimated the additional artillery and munitions needed for his assault on the French fort in Florida. The material which Menéndez requested, which included 100 hundredweight of gunpowder, would cost 2,500 ducats. In addition, the Casa had to find the funds to pay and supply the king's soldiers, which it estimated at another

seven or eight thousand ducats. Neither the New Spain nor Tierra Firme fleets had yet come into port, and the Royal coffers in Seville were still empty of Indies revenues, but it was possible to borrow from various trust funds. Some avería money had also begun to come in as outbound ships loaded for their journeys. Silver from the Guadalcanal mines had also arrived in Seville. In spite of financial scarcities, imperative commands from Madrid directed the settlement of all matters with Menéndez, and authorized the release of four thousand pounds of gunpowder to the Ade-lantado.⁴⁹ The Crown also requested that the three French prisoners sent by Governor Mazariegos be turned over to Pedro Menéndez, so that he might use their knowledge on his expedition.

After a brief journey to Cádiz, Menéndez reappeared in Seville on May 26 and offered two bondsmen for the Casa's consideration, so that he could receive the 15,000 ducats. Since it did not appear that the bondsmen could actually stand good for such a sum, they were not accepted. Menéndez then pleaded that the cash was vital to his preparation, and offered to accept a lesser sum, 6,000 ducats. The money was paid to him the next day, and was taken from the Guadalcanal silver.⁵⁰

The circular nature of the money disputes in Seville is illustrated by Menéndez' dilemma over the ordering of supplies and munitions for his own account for the Florida enterprise. Lacking cash, he could order the goods, but delivery would

not be forthcoming until payment was made. Thus, Menéndez complained, he could not complete his lading until the monies due to him from the Crown were paid, which made it impossible to meet the sailing deadline of May 31. Yet the royal merced was payable on a contingency basis--provided the expedition sailed by the end of May. Clearly, the deadlock would have to be resolved if Menéndez were to depart soon.

On the twenty-eighth of May, both parties to the negotiations over Menéndez' accounts outlined their respective positions in letter to Philip II. The Royal Officials of the Casa advised the king that they were still working on the Adelantado's claims. They noted that this task was rendered much more difficult by the fact that Menéndez could not produce the documents of proof of his expenditures; thus it was necessary to take lengthy testimony and produce sworn statements in lieu of receipts and invoices. The Casa finally paid Pedro Menéndez 3,000 ducats on account, while the work continued. For his part, Menéndez flatly told the king that he just could not undertake the Florida journey until he was completely paid.⁵¹

During the negotiations in Seville, essential information about the nature of the French reinforcement forces finally reached Philip's court. Ambassador Alava, who had come to Bayonne to make final preparations for the meetings between the two royal families, was contacted there by his spy, Dr. Enveja. The information the man gave was so

startling and gave such a complete picture of the French preparations in Normandy that Alava sent Enveja to Spain on May 27 to report to the King.⁵²

Philip II heard the spy's story on June 2 and had it written down the next day. There was every reason for the King to praise the thorough and perceptive report which Dr. Enveja had made, for it provided excellent intelligence about the enemy's plans and dispositions. The account, moreover, holds much of interest for the historian--it affords a contemporary description of Ribault's second expedition.⁵³

When he had arrived in Dieppe on May 17, Dr. Enveja had found seven ships in harbor, in an advanced stage of preparation for the Florida journey. They were already almost fully loaded and many military contingents were aboard. Only Jean Ribault's insistence upon clear understanding of his lines of authority, which had compelled him to await instruction from Admiral Coligny, had delayed the departure of the fleet.

Ribault's flagship, Trinité, was much smaller than San Pelayo at 150 to 160 tons, but was also rigged and equipped as a galeass. Two of the other vessels were of a similar size, while the fourth was only slightly smaller. These three ships were probably Émerillon, Épaule de Mouton, and Truite. The three remaining vessels were rather small--of from sixty to seventy tons' burden; these must have been

Perle, Levrière, and another named Émerillon. Since the ships were outfitted in LeHavre and Dieppe, their officers and crews were almost all Norman seamen. The five hundred soldiers who had joined the expedition came from more varied backgrounds; two hundred were of noble origin, and seven were German noblemen. From a military standpoint, the soldiers impressed Alava's investigator as well set-up troops. Touches of color were added to their dress by their shining helmets, fine wool tunics and long, multi-hued breeches "in the Levantine style." Almost all of the land forces, under the command of Captain François de la Grange, were equipped with arquebuses. The ships were alleged to carry two hundred dismounted cannon to use in land fortifications, with ample powder and shot.

The purpose of the French expedition appeared to be the mirror-image of that being prepared by the Spanish. The spy stated that the Huguenots planned an enterprise of thorough-going conquest, population and improvement of the land. As evidence of this, Enveja reported that one of the seven ships had been converted into a veritable Noah's Ark--it carried horses and mares, rams and sheep, bulls and cows and even asses for the Florida colony. A number of wives and children had been embarked for the voyage. What most alarmed the Spanish was the Huguenots' avowed aim of evangelizing with the "Lutheran" religion; seven or eight ministers of the new, heretical faith were carried for that very purpose.

With regard to the quality of French leadership, Dr. Enveja did not rely upon second-hand information. He sought and obtained an interview with Jean Ribault himself, and carried away vivid impressions of the Huguenot chief. Ribault projected the image of a man of competence and vigor, combined with determination and high temper. In these qualities, as well as in his ruddy complexion and reddish hair, Ribault strangely resembled his future antagonist, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. The two men were, moreover, of equivalent age and had both sprung from maritime cultures of great vitality. The accidents of history had brought these into conflict in which both men also professed contending religions.

Like Menéndez, Ribault had been given some degree of control over the terrain of Florida.⁵⁴ It is interesting to speculate upon the extent of French royal involvement in Ribault's effort; indeed, it is a vital historical question. Enveja's report contributes to our knowledge of this matter through his statement about the position of Admiral Coligny as arbiter of Ribault's authority as well as his assertion that Charles IX had pledged 100,000 francs to the expedition. This evidence seemed to convince Philip II that the French Crown was deeply involved and committed to the Florida adventure, for he was moved to "amazement" at the revelations. In a letter to his ambassador in France, Philip II expressed open shock at such an action

by the French rulers at a time when both Crowns were formally at peace. To Philip, this constituted open aggression against a Spanish province. The Spanish King made a careful distinction between past Spanish actions against unauthorized corsairs and what should be done in a case like this, and urgently required his ambassador to determine immediately if Ribault's fleet had already sailed. If it had not, he commanded his envoy to lay the matter directly before Charles IX and the Queen Mother in Paris, making formal protest and asking officially that the expedition be halted at once. The King made his next order abundantly clear: if Alava found that Jean Ribault was already gone beyond recall, he should say "not one word" to the French rulers about it, but leave the matter to be discussed at Bayonne when the two courts met there. On the same day, Philip II wrote to Catherine and Charles, noted that he was sending the Duke of Alba as his representative at Bayonne, and declared that he was already rejoicing at the pleasure they would all have, when Isabel was in their midst.⁵⁵

The revelations of Dr. Enveja provided the final spur to the anxieties of the Spanish King and his Council, and they redoubled the pressure upon those in Andalusia and the Indies who were preparing the forces for Florida. An order to the Santo Domingo Audiencia advised that Pedro Menéndez was about to leave; if the troops, ship and supplies were not yet ready, they should be provided for immediately.

A notice was sent to Menéndez, telling him of the strength of the Huguenot forces, and pointing out to him that the Frenchmen were about to sail. If Ribault reached Florida before he did with the fine troops seen in Dieppe, and mounted heavy cannon upon the ramparts of Fort Caroline, Menéndez' mission might be impossible. The Adelantado must speed up his departure; he had already passed the date fixed in the asiento. Now, he was told, he might raise as many troops as he could load aboard his ships in addition to those already gathered; the Crown would pay for them. To the Casa de Contratación went another letter, urging immediate payment of the balance of the 15,000 ducats to Menéndez, bond or no, deadline notwithstanding. As the outfitting of the Florida expedition in Cádiz and Seville entered its last, most frenetic stages, the feverish pace imposed by the court seemed to add another dimension to the fierce and glaring heat of the Andalusian summer.⁵⁶

NOTES

1. The material which follows is taken from the "Information of Governor Blas de Merlo," taken at La Vega, Jamaica, on March 6, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Justicia 212. The "Information" is a fifty-one folio narrative of events in all the French expeditions to Florida, taken from the prisoners captured in Jamaica by Merlo on January 25, 1565, together with testimonies by Spanish eye-witnesses to the corsairing activities of the French. Merlo had the document copied at Bayamo, Cuba, and sworn to before the alcalde ordinario there on May 13, 1566. That copy eventually found its way into the papers relating to the French prisoners in A.G.I. Justicia 212.

2. On October 2, 1565, the Council of the Indies advised the King of the French raids on Santo Domingo; in July, word had come to the Council from that Audiencia about Nuñez' death. The correspondence is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,218. Another account of the capture of the ship off Cape Tiburón is the "Deposition of Francisco Ruiz Manso," which has been translated and printed in Charles Bennett, Laudonnière and Fort Caroline (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), pp. 103-106.

3. Jamaica was well-known in the Indies for its production of beef and cassava. A comprehensive description of Jamaica as a sixteenth-century center for the export of cassava is found in Francisco Morales Padrón, Jamaica española (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1952), pp. 282-284.

4. The prisoner interrogation is found in A.G.I. Patronato 267, No. 1, ramo 37. The names of the men (as given by the Spanish) were Alberto Melenes, Francisco Juan, Miguel Cobin, Juanes de Sigaray, and Martin Joaber. One of them, Joaber, testified that he had been a part of the 1562 Ribault expedition, had returned to France and had left Le Havre with Laudonnière in April of 1564. Another deposition, made on February 28, 1565, was given by one Stefan de Rojomonte, who had been with the corsairs on the Hispaniola coast. Although the folder is marked "Cuba" and presumably had been taken there, Rojomonte was evidently captured at Cagay and had no knowledge of the eleven Frenchmen taken at Arcos. His testimony is found in A.G.I. Patronato 19, No. 1, ramo 14, and in A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,081.

5. René de Laudonnière advises that the ringleaders of the corsairing expedition--Desfourneaux, LaCroix and De Gênes--got away safely from Jamaica in the vessel which escaped; from Laudonnière's "L'Histoire Notable," in Lussagnet, Les Français en Floride, op. cit., p. 126. On the other hand, Governor Merlo states that he had captured the French captain in charge.

6. The officials of the Casa advised the King of the vessel's arrival in Casa to Crown, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

7. The final sentences are found in A.G.I. Justicia 865 and Justicia 872, No. 1, respectively. The settlement of the main case with the Casa described in A.G.I. Justicia 865 is at variance with its description by Solís de Merás in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 67-68.

8. The memorial, from A.G.I. Patronato 19, has been reprinted in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 320-326. It bears no date, but internal evidence indicates that it can hardly have been written before February 1, 1565, and must have been presented before negotiations began on the asiento signed by Menéndez on the following March 15.

9. See supra, 57. Menéndez had spoken in May, 1564, at Seville, to sailors returning from the Canary Islands. His story added little to the version sent from Santo Domingo.

10. There is an excellent appreciation of the geographical concepts of Pedro Menéndez, as well as some discussion of earlier hopes of the western passage in L. A. Vigneras, "A Spanish Discovery of North Carolina in 1566," North Carolina Historical Review, XLVI, No. 4 (October, 1969), 398-402.

11. See supra, 48, 49. Rojomonte's deposition, which advised that Juan Menéndez' ships had been lost near Cape Canaveral, could not yet have reached Spain to raise Menéndez' hopes.

12. See Appendix I, "Agreement between Dr. Vazquez of the Council in the name of the King, with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés."

13. Hernando Cortés described the richness of his dominions, his 23,000 vassals, and his struggle to maintain political power as over against the municipalities in his land-grant in a letter to Francisco Nuñez, his attorney in Spain, dated June 25, 1532. The letter is reproduced in a work by Jorge Fernando Iturribarria entitled Oaxaca en la

historia (Mexico City: Editorial Stylo, 1955), pp. 64-65. An excellent discourse on the commercial side of Cortés' affairs was written by France V. Scholes in "The Spanish Conqueror as a Business Man; A Chapter in the History of Fernando Cortés," New Mexico Quarterly, XXVIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1958), 6-29.

14. See supra, 42-43; footnote 13, Chapter II.

15. See Prior and Consuls to the Crown, Seville, April 13, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,093.

16. Casa to Crown, Seville, December 8, 1564, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III, and Ordinances of the Fleets, March 6, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.

17. Casa to Crown, Seville, April 8, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,093.

18. The 1565 Florida asiento can be found in many places in the Archive of the Indies. A signed copy of the March 15 agreement is in Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 3; it has been reproduced for the Stetson Collection. A signed copy of the March 20 contract was found in Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Entire copies are located in Patronato 19, No. 1, ramo 15; Contratación 3,309, 1°; Justicia 918, No. 3; Indiferente General 415 and in Indiferente General 2,673. A copy is in the Archivo del Conde Revillagigedo (Madrid), legajo 2°, No. 5; positive microfilm of this, obtained through the kindness of Father Michael Gannon, is in the P. K. Yonge Memorial Library of Florida History, University of Florida. The asiento of March 20 has been printed in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 415-427, and in D.I., 2nd series, XXIII, 242-258. As they were needed to support the claims of Pedro Menéndez or his followers for certain privileges and exemptions, sections of the asiento were put piecemeal into various records in Spain and in the Indies. The agreement is summarized in A.G.I. Contaduría 941, fol. 4; this is available on negative microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. The contract was dissected minutely by the Contadores Mayores in the audit they undertook for the 1567 legal case over the asiento, in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. The March 15, 1565 agreement is translated and reproduced herein as Appendix I.

19. With certain reservations about the application of the terms "fief" and "feudal" to sixteenth-century Castile, the writer has accepted the model of the "decentralized patrimonial state" as applicable to the European and Indies kingdoms of the Hapsburg ruler Philip II. This conceptualization is set forth by Max Weber in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), and especially found on pp. 346-358.

20. See supra, 4-7, for a general discussion of the privileges and obligations in the asientos of adelantados.

21. See supra, 58, for the earlier voyage of San Pelayo. Although the asiento recites merely that she was "of more than 600 tons," San Pelayo was far greater in size than 600 tons. Just before her Florida journey, she was measured officially at 906 tons' burden; see the audit of the Contadores Mayores, 1567, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

22. In the "Ordenanzas," D.I., VIII, provisions are made as follows: encomienda, No. LVIII, 505; and No. CXLIX, 536; repartimiento, No. LXI, 506, and No. CXLV, 535; with regard to tribute, see No. CXLVI, 535-536.

23. In a cedula of March 22, 1565, sent from Madrid, the King promised Menéndez a letter granting the privilege in the land, and advising again that the title of Marquis would be forthcoming if the expedition were successful. Perpetual jurisdiction within the land-grant was not to be given, however, nor were any mineral rights in the land; these were reserved to the King. Compare the powers given to the Columbus family in Jamaica. These are discussed at length in Morales Padrón, Jamaica española, 125 et seq. The March 22 cedula is also found in A.C.R., legajo 2, No. 4, and may be seen on microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. Expectations of a marquisate were formalized in the "Ordenanzas" for all adelantados; in D.I., VIII, No. LXXXV, 512.

24. A comparative table of several asientos is found herein as Appendix II. The writer is indebted to Professor Roscoe R. Hill for his creative introduction to the comparative approach in the study of adelantados in his article "The Office of Adelantado," op. cit., passim.

25. See "Lo que le parece a Loaysa se ha de dar a Don Luis Colón, 1536," in A.G.I. Patronato 10, ramos 2 and 4.

26. These individual decrees, all dated March 22, 1565, were given to Menéndez. They were concerned with the reduction in the quinto, the 25-league-squared land grant, the two fisheries, the $6\frac{2}{3}\%$ of royal profits, the title of Captain-General of the Florida armada, the title of Adelantado, the ship-privileges, the slave licenses, and the 2,000 ducat salary. These are all found in A.C.R., legajo 2; on microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.

27. Crown to Abalia, Madrid, March 20, 1565, A.G.I. Justicia 918; also in A.C.R., legajo 2, No. 3-B, Microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.

28. The Casa's letter is Casa to Crown, Seville, March 26, 1565, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III. The prisoner interrogation was also enclosed. Pedro Menéndez himself said "when Your Majesty contracted with me for the conquest and population of the provinces of Florida, it was unknown that the Lutheran Frenchmen were already in those places;" this is from "Menéndez reports to the Crown, 1565 (sic)," from M. S. Div., Library of Congress, typescript translation, 1937. The transcript is also in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. The fact that Carillo's vessel brought the news for the first time is also found in Crown to Casa, August 27, 1565, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection).

29. Crown to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (two letters), Madrid, March 30, 1565, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

30. Catherine de Medici to Philip II, Burdeos, April 1, 1565, Archivo Diplomático Español (21 v., Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1950-) (hereinafter A.D.E.), Tomo VII (1565), No. 1,019, 205. It originally appeared in Archivo General de Simancas (hereinafter A.G.S.), Estado, legajo K, 1503, No. 50.

31. Philip II to Charles IX and Catherine de Medici, Madrid, April 2, 1565, A.D.E., VII, No. 1,021, 209. From A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 15,03, No. 51.

32. Philip's messages of April 5 to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo and to the governor at Havana are found in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. His cover letter is Crown to Casa, Aranjuez, April 5, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.

33. See Francisco Duarte to Crown, Seville, April 8, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,093. The King may have taken these funds. At some date prior to July, 1565, he had incurred an obligation of 80,000 ducats to Anton Fugger. That sum, with 120,000 ducats available in Seville, would have totalled the 200,000 ducats Philip was seeking. See Casa to Crown, Seville, September 4, 1565, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book II, for the Fugger debt.

34. The parecer of the Duke of Alba, April 11, 1565, is from A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1503, No. 57, and has been printed in A.D.E., VII, No. 1,028, 235-236. The consulta of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, May 12, 1565, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74, makes note of Menéndez' report. This consulta is also found in the Stetson Collection. Alava's letter to Philip II was from St. Micon, May 7, 1565, is from A.D.E., VII, No. 1,046, 313-314 (A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1503, No. 77), and refers to the report. The emissary was identified in Alava's letter to Philip II,

Bayonne, May 27, 1565, from A.D.E., VII, No. 1,063, 355 (A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1,503, No. 93).

35. The May 5, 1565, document is found, together with supporting material, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 73-A (Stetson Collection). It has been cited at length in Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements (2 v., Reprinted, New York: Russell and Russell, 1959), II, 107-108, and may be found in D.I., IV, 136-140.

36. The act of taking formal possession of lands to be claimed for the rulers of Castile provided the legal formality which clearly established dynastic rights to the territories thus taken. The manner in which this was to be done was carefully circumscribed, and was dictated in "Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo e población," D.I., VIII, No. XIII, 490.

37. Francisco Eraso to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Madrid, May 5, 1565, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Menéndez acknowledged that he received word of the two hundred troops he was to raise when he reached Seville on May 12. See Pedro Menéndez to Crown, Seville, May 18, 1565, from Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 60-66. The letter is in the Stetson Collection, listed under the "old" legajo number of 148-4-9.

38. Crown to Casa, Valladolid, May 6, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966. Although he had communicated with the king earlier about Havana's defenses, Osorio did not take office until September 18, 1565. See García Osorio to Crown, Havana, December 18, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115. The letter has been printed in Irene Wright, Historia documentada de San Cristobal de la Havana (Havana: Imprenta el Siglo XX, 1927), I, 202.

39. Council of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, May 7, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74-A.

40. Crown to Pedro de Ruelas, Valladolid, May 9, 1565, I.G. Indiferente General 1,966. The ship, named the Santa Catalina, had been embargoed in Cádiz. For its owner's lengthy protest, and the story of the ship's adventures, see "Ximeno de Bretendoña sobre sueldo," A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673, bearing a date of August 8, 1569.

41. Crown to Audiencia of Santo Domingo, Valladolid, May 9, 1565, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

42. The dilemma was manifested in the consulta of May 12, 1565, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7,

No. 74. It is in the Stetson Collection. The seamen testified in an información taken before the officials of the Casa de Contratación in Seville on May 5, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738. It is also in the Stetson Collection.

43. On May 20, authorization was given to expend 14,237 ducats for this purpose: A.G.I. Contratación 4,989-A, fol. 269.

44. Menéndez voices his plaint in his letter to the Crown, written at Seville on May 18, 1565, and found in the Stetson Collection at 148-4-9. It has also been printed in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 60-66. At this time, the Prior and Consuls of the Universidad de Mercaderes at Seville were: Pero López Martínez, Consul; Diego Díaz Bezerril, Consul; Luis Sanchez Balvo, Prior; Luis Marquez, Consul; and four Councillers--Francisco Descobar, Gonzalo Jorge, Gonzalo Mustrenco and Rodrigo de Illesecas; see listing as of March 22, 1565, Seville, in A.G.I. Contratación 4,981.

45. The cost of charter, for example, for the two guard ships carried to New Spain in 1562 had been more than 28,000 ducats, after all payments due had been settled. See Casa to Crown, December 8, 1564, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

46. According to Agustín Francisco, a German resident in Seville who was financially affiliated with Menéndez, the freight charge for merchandise from Cádiz to Nombre de Dios in 1565 was 30 ducats per ton. Menéndez had noted that he had contracted for one hundred tons of goods with merchants and shippers of Cádiz, and three hundred with Seville traders. Francisco's comments about the lading of San Pelayo are found in A.P.C., Escribanía de Alonso de los Cobos, n.d., 1565. A copy is in A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673.

47. On May 22, 1565, letters from the officials of the Casa de Contratación and from Madrid crossed. In these dispatches, the Casa proposed and the Crown ordered that Menéndez' galeass be taken for lease to carry the soldiers. Council of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, May 22, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966 and Casa to Crown, Seville, May 22, 1565, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

48. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Crown, Seville, May 22, 1565, at 148-4-9, Stetson Collection.

49. Council of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, May 22, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.

50. The writer is indebted to Dr. Paul E. Hoffman, who furnished the citation of this payment to the Adelantado; it is from A.G.I. Contratación 4,680 (Libro de Guadalcanal), fol. 127 vo.

51. Casa to Crown, Seville, May 28, 1565, A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III. Pedro Menéndez to Crown, Seville, May 28, 1565, in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 66-67.

52. Alava to Philip II, May 27, 1565, A.D.E., VII, No. 1,063, 355 (originally A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,503, No. 93).

53. This key report has been printed in full by Antonio Tibesar, ed., in "A Spy's Report on the Expedition of Jean Ribault to Florida, 1565," The Americas, XI, No. 4 (April, 1955), 590-592. It comes originally from archives of the Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid, No. 11-4-3 - 9°). The new number is 9-30-3; 6271. 848

54. Dr. Enveja states that Ribault had been given a two-year term of control; the title of "colonel of the voyage and lieutenant of the king in New France" was allegedly given to Ribault. This latter phrase is cited by Charles de la Ronciere in his Histoire de la Marine Francaise (6 v., Paris: Librairie Plon, 1910), IV, 54-55, and came from Ms. No. 17294, Bibliothèque Nationale, fol. 231.

55. In his letter of June 2, 1565, Philip acknowledged receipt of all of Alava's letters bearing May dates, expressed his gratification for Enveja's services, and issued his orders about the Ribault fleet; in A.D.E., VIII, No. 1,072, 372 (from A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,504, No. 2).

56. Crown to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, Madrid, June 3, 1565, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A; Crown to Pedro Menéndez de Aviles, Madrid, June 3, 1565, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. The letter to Menéndez mentioned the king's note to the Casa de Contratación and advised of its contents.

CHAPTER IV

UNDERGIRDING THE EXPEDITIONS

Both parties to the Florida contract faced a host of urgent tasks in preparing the expeditions for early departure. The officials of the Casa de Contratación, as Crown agents, had to assemble the Royal troops, purchase supplies and munitions, and arrange ship-charters; they had somehow to finance this from their treasury at Seville. To meet his contract obligations, Menéndez had to furnish and supply the ships, troops and seamen required of him. The new Royal support of the Florida expedition had in no way relieved the Adelantado of these necessities, but had merely added additional striking power to his own forces. Pedro Menéndez' main fleet was to sail from Cádiz, but he also prepared to dispatch forces from the north of Spain.

The Matrix of Conquest

In organizing and administering the enterprise of Florida, Pedro Menéndez placed his trust in a small number of associates. At the heart of Menéndez' command structure were men who stood in close personal relationship with the

Adelantado, for they shared with him common bonds of blood or marriage.¹ All were Asturian hidalgos, and all were seamen with long experience in European and Mediterranean waters and in the Carrera de Indias.

In the first rank of Pedro Menéndez' lieutenants in 1565 were his brother Bartolomé, Esteban de las Alas, Pedro Menéndez Marqués, and Diego Flores de Valdés. Bartolomé Menéndez had served long and loyally with his brother, had commanded the Tierra Firme ships in 1562-63, and shared the lengthy imprisonment in Seville in 1563-1564. Although he had been released from prison and planned to go to Florida with the Cádiz contingent, the illness he had contracted on the 1562-1563 voyage still dogged him.²

Since 1553, another kinsman of Pedro Menéndez, Esteban de las Alas, had been a close associate of the Adelantado. Born in the village of Avilés, he was married to Doña Maria de Valdés. He was General of the 1561 New Spain fleet. In 1562, de las Alas had been imprisoned by the Casa de Contratación, upon return from the Indies, thus sharing a similar experience with his chief. During the Menéndez brothers' confinement, de las Alas commanded the Menéndez ships in 1564, and was responsible for taking the Royal visitor Castro to Peru. It was he who had directed the salvage operation when the galleon Santa Clara had stranded on the eastern side of the Bahama Channel on the return voyage. The Adelantado placed Esteban de las Alas in charge of the two northern elements of his Florida expedition,

which were to leave Asturias and rendezvous with Menéndez in the Canary Islands. He would sail from Menéndez' native city of Avilés. With that trusted and reliable lieutenant in charge of the Asturian ships, Menéndez could safely concentrate his own efforts in the south, where the main contingent was being armed.³

Pedro Menéndez' nephew, Pedro Menéndez Marqués, was the son of Álvaro Sánchez de Avilés. By his uncle's own testimony in 1568, he "had served me twenty years in the armadas of my charge as captain of armada ships, and is one of the most expert mariners which your Majesty has in kingdoms."⁴ This meant that Marqués had been affiliated with Pedro Menéndez since the date of his first entry into the Carrera de Indias in 1548. He was maestre of Menéndez' own ships in 1551 and 1564. Now Marqués had been designated by the Adelantado as second-in-command, or Almirante, of the Asturian vessels.⁵

In the southern fleet which was to sail from Cádiz, Diego Florés Valdés had a similar position to that of Menéndez Marqués in the north. Florés, a native of Laredo, was named Almirante of the Cádiz division of ships as the Adelantado's maritime lieutenant. Menéndez noted that Flores had been with him since 1550, and had greatly indebted himself in so serving, having encumbered all of the patrimony inherited from his parents. Pedro Menéndez extolled Florés' careful and loyal service and evidently thought highly of him as a subordinate.⁶

All of these top-level lieutenants of Menéndez could count many years of command experience and were thus qualified to serve in the Florida expedition by virtue of their accomplishments as well as by their relationship with the Adelantado. Their careers, however, like that of their chief, had been oriented entirely around the sea--in privateering, freighting for the Indies trade, or carrying out naval functions for the Crown. Although they were accustomed to the handling of troops as men-of-war aboard ships, none of these men had become experienced in land-based operations with bodies of soldiers.⁷

A man who might have been able to supply that lack of experience was Pedro de Valdés of Tineo, in Asturias. He was the twenty-five-year-old son of the founder of the Valdés mayorazgo and had served the Crown for more than five years with land forces in Italy, had also been a gentleman officer in the galleys, and received the habit of caballero in the order of Santiago. Since Valdés had been recently betrothed to Pedro Menéndez' daughter, Ana, however, the Adelantado had directed that he not risk his person on the expedition to Florida.⁸

Another young nobleman, Hernando de Miranda, from Avilés, was enrolled, together with his brother Gutierre, as an ordinary soldier in the Florida expedition, but he was marked out for advancement within the organization of the Adelantado.⁹

A number of loyal Asturians occupied a second echelon among Menéndez' subordinates, including the Junco brothers, Juan and Rodrigo, Alonso Menéndez Marques, Thomas Alonso de las Alas, Diego de Hevia, and Diego de Amaya, a fine pilot and skilled ship-handler. The brother-in-law of the Adelantado, Gonzalo Solís de Merás, also planned to join in the enterprise of Florida. Some of these men remained in the north of Spain to sail with the contingents preparing for sea in Gijón and Avilés; others joined Menéndez in Cádiz. In addition to these, a sizeable group of old associates of the Adelantado in his ship crews were enrolled for Florida as soldiers, seamen or skilled workers.

What was most remarkable about Menéndez' men was the close-knit nature of their inter-relationships. Almost without exception, the men who shared the confidence of Pedro Menéndez and were scheduled to hold the posts of responsibility in Florida, belonged to a number of Asturian families which were tied together by complex kinship links.¹⁰ Scores of rank-and-file soldiers and sailors from the same families also participated in the Florida enterprise. It was a family affair, or rather the affair of a small number of closely connected families from the north of Spain. In addition to the Menéndez and Valdés clans, these included the Miranda, de las Alas, Quiros, Sánchez, Arango, Solís, de Soto, Recalde, Florés, Ribera, Arguelles, Junco, Marquéz, Hevia, and La Bandera families. These families had inter-married at many points over several generations.¹¹

This family complex was rooted in the fishing villates and valley and mountain hamlets of the rugged coast of Asturias and Santander.¹² Men came to take part in the Florida expeditions from villages which for more than fifty years had sent out conquistadores, encomenderos and priests to the Indies.¹³ They came from Avilés, Tineo, Villaviciosa, Gijón, Colunga, Siero, Grado, and Parilela. They came from Rivadesella, and from the "four villas of the coast," Santander, Santoña, Castro Urdiales, and Laredo. Some also came from as far west as La Coruña in Galicia and from San Sebastian and other towns in Guipúzcoa, near the French border. The force which linked these localities and produced men, money, ships and supplies for the enterprise of Florida was that of family. An inter-connected web of kindred provided the backing for Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, but he had not created it. The network pre-dated 1565, and was to continue its influence in the maritime and political life of Spain and the Indies long after the death of the Adelantado.

Bound together by common ties, the Adelantado's command and control structure shared in his hopes of patrimony in Florida. As patrón of his supporters, Menéndez was the fountainhead of royal privilege, the source of present employment, and the focus of the future expectations of his subordinates. Under his asiento powers, Pedro Menéndez could divide substantial allotments of land among these men. The major civil and military offices would be theirs.

Successes in Florida would evoke royal approbation and the award of honors to the Adelantado. A portion of this glory would, in turn, be reflected upon the lieutenants and upon their houses. By establishing themselves in Menéndez' service, members of the group might also hope to rise in the service of Philip II.

Neither the command élite, nor its supporting group, was a static organization, with a fixed membership. Individuals might enter or leave the group, but its character did not change markedly. Menéndez' criteria for selection of men for the highest level of his establishment remained the same: that they be Asturian or at least norteño in origin, that they be noblemen and related in some meaningful way to himself. An administrative organism arose out of the group, as various persons were appointed to formal office within the military units and the governmental structure of Florida. Their relationship with their commander was, however, deeper than the formal and legal. In a sense, they were stockholders in the Florida enterprise. They acted at least in part out of feelings of deep loyalty to their chief, mixed with hopes of substantial gain. In turn, the Adelantado could delegate his powers legally to these men, but his delegation could be made with more certainty because he knew that his trust reposed in those who held his purpose in common loyalty.¹⁴

A genealogy chart of the enterprise of Florida, such as the one furnished in this study, does not demonstrate the full complexity of the familial matrix from which Menéndez' conquest effort sprang. Many subtle ties, perhaps even vital connections, are not completely understood. Some individuals who are termed "deudos" of Pedro Menéndez cannot presently be related directly by his biographers Vigil and Ruidiaz to the Adelantado. Neither can a chart illustrate the full meaning of such an interlocking organism, for it cannot depict the human forces present in such a complex. This homogenous group, bound together by common cultural and familial ties, could provide great reserves of purpose for the conquest. The fierce loyalties engendered within it and the common expectations shared by its members afforded a source of vital energy for the tasks of conquest and population. The organism was self-reinforcing in nature, and could maintain a united front against outsiders. It gave depth to the efforts of an Adelantado. This was, therefore, a regional reservoir of talent. The strength of arms, the provision of ships and financial backing and many skills and abilities could be drawn from this pool for Menéndez' use. Representatives of these Asturian families could also be found in Andalusia, in a number of key ports and centers in the Indies. A certain stiffening of purpose was also added to the Florida effort by the back-up of a sizeable company of

friends, relatives and allies--their hopes could cause them to persevere in their venture in the face of whatever adversity. This was the matrix of the adelantamiento of Florida.

Ways and Means

In seeking to fund the effort of arming and manning the Florida expeditions, the newly named Adelantado found himself hard-pressed. He had emerged from his long imprisonment without substantial cash reserves, and his maritime assets had been reduced to one sizeable new vessel and several smaller ones. Pedro Menéndez had an urgent need for ready money, for little of what he had to purchase could be obtained on credit, and he needed cash to keep his ship crews from deserting and to make the customary three months' advance to his soldiers. His first approach was to press for the monies owed him by the Crown; it would not only help him meet his obligations, but would undergird his credit through the aura of Royal patronage it imparted to the Florida enterprise.

Under daily pressure from the Adelantado and after receiving a number of communications from Philip II about the matter, the Casa officials finally paid Pedro Menéndez the remaining 9,000 ducats of his merced, in spite of the fact that it was to have been contingent upon his leaving by May 31. They also indemnified Menéndez with 2,000 ducats

for the profits lost through the diversion of San Pelayo to Florida. In order to give Pedro Menéndez this money he so badly needed, the officials at Seville had to borrow from the merchants' deposits in the Casa. By June seventh, however, the Royal accountants had not yet been able to total the sums due to Menéndez from the 1563 ship charter case, as they struggled with a mass of incomplete data.¹⁵

On the twelfth of June, Pedro Menéndez appeared before the tribunal of the Casa de Contratación and made a lengthy plea. The Adelantado reviewed his total expenses in the preparation of San Pelayo for its voyage to Tierra Firme, and asked for reimbursement of 1,500 ducats which he spent for carpentry and caulking. He also demanded repayment of the salaries and rations for his entire 110-man crew, retroactive to April first. Menéndez also asked the Casa to grant a five-month advance in pay and rations, to offset the risk and uncertainty of the hazardous journey in his fine new ship. The rate of pay Menéndez asked was, moreover, much higher than ordinary. Many Spanish seamen were paid as little as three ducats per month, and the Adelantado admitted that his own men from Vizcaya would be paid five pesos. Menéndez asked, however, that the mariners aboard San Pelayo, being a picked and loyal crew, should have seven or eight ducats' pay. Otherwise, he stated, they might desert or become so dissatisfied that the expedition might be endangered.

Menéndez' ambitious demands were disposed of coolly and rapidly. After reviewing a report of Factor Duarte's inspection of San Pelayo, the three royal officials decided to allot only 500 ducats for improvements made to the vessel, to be paid when proper receipts were presented in evidence. They flatly declined to authorize any pay or allowances for Menéndez' crewmen before May 22, the date San Pelayo was officially taken for Crown service.¹⁶ Finally, Pedro Menéndez received his last payment from the Casa de Contratación--2,300 ducats, paid on June 23, 1565, as advance on the San Pelayo charter.¹⁷ Although he continued to request further payments, time had simply run out, and no amount of Royal compulsion could enforce a rapid and full settlement between Pedro Menéndez and the functionaries of the Casa over the bitterly disputed matters of 1563. Since returning to Seville from Madrid with his asiento in late March, Pedro Menéndez had collected 22,300 ducats in cash from a variety of claims on the royal treasury.¹⁸ Although far less than he had asked, this money was very helpful indeed. In a very real sense, Royal funds were helping underwrite the Adelantado who was to supply the "private" effort to support the Crown's hand in Florida.

Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had to meet the rest of his money needs from other sources, and he bent his efforts to the difficult task of fund-raising. Since Menéndez' ships were pledged to Florida for most of 1565, he could not

count on much income from freight or passenger revenue. He was to collect one partida of 893 pesos which came consigned to him from Spain in the 1565 Vera Cruz ships, but the New Spain vessel which brought it did not dock in Sanlúcar until June 24. The money could scarcely have reached him before his departure.¹⁹ Another thing Menéndez could do was to collect or assign any outstanding obligations which others had made in his favor. On June 25, the Adelantado discounted a debt due him from the estate of one Santiago Bozino for almost 400 ducats by turning it over to Domingo de Ocaris of Seville for cash.²⁰ In this way, however, only a modest sum could be realized, compared with the funds he urgently required. For the bulk of his monetary needs, Pedro Menéndez had recourse to a financial complex which merits description.

In the last half of the sixteenth century, the main source of liquid funds was commerce. The injection of bullion from Peru and Mexico into the mercantile stream undergirded the economy and added to the liquidity of traders and bankers in Seville and elsewhere in Europe. Contained within the registries of each homeward-bound ship were partidas of monies due to merchants, suppliers and ship-owners in Spain, as the result of sales transactions. A sophisticated system of exchange values easily comprehended a variety of bullion forms--gold and silver came in bars or were worked into plate or jewelry, while silver was

coined in several forms. Quantities of various agricultural products--tobacco, sugar, hides, cochineal and indigo-- also came in the ships to be sold in Spain.

Although the registry documents themselves (certified as correct by the ship-masters and accepted by the Casa de Contratación) served as valid commercial instruments in the Indies trade, other means were developed to facilitate credit. Execution of an ordinary poder, or power of attorney, proved to be a most flexible way to extend a man's financial reach. By the uncounted thousands, these poderes fill the notaries' archives of Spain; they make up the very fabric of trade. They represent a time when money and property rights were entirely and intensely personal, when it was often essential to name a properly empowered surrogate to represent one before courts, tribunals and justices. Such a surrogate could thus receive a delegation of the grantor's inherent prerogatives.

The poder could also be directly and immediately applied to the commercial sphere, as a means of collecting obligations due another. The grantee was given the faculty to stand in the grantor's place, to receive the goods or funds which were due, and give valid receipts in the name of the originating party. Since the standard poder recited that the grantee could then proceed to substitute another party for himself, a theoretically endless chain of right and obligation could be created from a single original grant of authority.

The credit aspect of the poder becomes evident when one considers that a poder was usually granted for consideration. Thus, merchant A could grant trader B his poder to collect a sum due him from a third party. The sum due might not be immediately available, and might not actually mature for some period of time. The first party could, however, discount his obligation and obtain immediate advantage by trading off a future collectible. As a practical matter, therefore, poder obligations could not be greatly removed in time from the real money sources which had nurtured them. An individual's credit could be extended substantially by such a paper network, but was ultimately no better than the genuine assets which backed them.

The development of late-medieval commercial organizations had been centered on what might be termed "associations of trust." The earliest Italian companies were, therefore, built around family groups or a small number of inter-related families. Within this circle of close relationship, business transactions could be most safely carried out.²¹ Since credit obtained under this system was limited and personal, such an arrangement was best adapted to close-knit groups whose other relationships reinforced their paper obligations. Much the same tendency could be seen in sixteenth-century Spain. Commercial ties were supported by stronger underlying connections of blood, marriage or regional identification. In the case of Pedro Menéndez de

Avilés, the web of inter-related Asturian families which was involved in his command organization also had its fiscal aspect. Long-established ties existed between Menéndez and norteño bondsmen, bankers and merchants living in the authorized trading centers of Seville and Cádiz. As a man deeply involved in advancing his fortunes, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés fitted well into the atmosphere of growth, prosperity and diversity in the Andalusian ports in 1565. In Seville and in Cádiz, the socially mobile, acquisitive society described by Ruth Pike featured much interaction between upper merchants and the lower nobility.²² Some of these men were of converso origin, who had, long since, created commercial bases in the Indies. For Pedro Menéndez and his associates, there were such bases at San Juan, Puerto Rico, in the city of Mexico, at Santo Domingo on the Island of Hispaniola and in the city of San Cristobal de la Havana. In San Juan, for instance, lived Diego Montañés and Pedro Menéndez Valdés, who acted as representatives for the Adelantado there.²³ The familial inter-connections between Santo Domingo, Cádiz, the Indies and the north of Spain are illustrated by a later poder from one Diego Menéndez de la Aspriella, a vecino of Santo Domingo, to Favian de Solís, merchant, a vecino of Avilés, but residing in Cádiz.²⁴

The central figure of Pedro del Castillo, regidor of Cádiz and a substantial merchant there, and a kinsman of

Menéndez, has previously been linked to that of the Ade-lantado. Pedro del Castillo was related to Menéndez, but the degree of relationship is not known. Castillo had developed trade ties to New Spain, with representatives in Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico. Gaspar de Serfate, who resided in Mexico, had shipped cochineal to Castillo as early as 1562.²⁵ In Seville, Castillo's banker was Gaspar de Astudillo de Burgales. Astudillo had also served as Menéndez' bondsman in 1563 and was to act for him in the future. All three men, Menéndez, Castillo and Astudillo, employed the same norteño attorney, Sebastian de Santander. He acted as their counsel in cases involving them before the Casa de Contratación and the Council of the Indies.²⁶

Miss Irene Wright has ably outlined the role of the linked Rojas and De Soto families in the early development of the Cuban city of San Cristobal de la Havana.²⁷ The real founder of the clan which was to rule the economic and political life of Havana for much of the sixteenth century was Diego de Soto, of norteño origins, who first came to Cuba in 1529. In Pedro Menéndez' time, the most influential member was Juan de Rojas, whose kinfolk dominated the cabildo of Havana and occupied most of the other local posts of honor and privilege there. Rojas' wife, Dona María de Lovera, had demonstrated her close ties to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. She named him in her 1563 will as executor of a bequest, vital to the peace of her soul, for the building of a chapel

in her memory in Spain.²⁸ Juan de Hinestrosa, who had testified in Seville for Menéndez in his 1564 jail-break case, was the son of Manuel de Rojas de Bayamo, and served after 1565 as one of the Royal Officials in Havana.²⁹

In his need for money, therefore, Pedro Menéndez turned to those of his associates who had access to funds gained in the Indies trade. Most particularly, he turned to Pedro del Castillo. On June 25, in Castillo's house in Cádiz, Menéndez executed a lengthy poder.³⁰ In some ways, the instrument follows the usual pattern of documents of its kind. It lawfully establishes Castillo as Menéndez' representative in prosecuting civil or criminal actions in his name, in receiving monies due the Adelantado, and ends in the standard recitation that the goods and wealth of the grantor are pledged to support the powers given.

The poder to Castillo was, however, far more than a limited, ad hoc delegation. It was quite broad in nature and was deeply involved with the asiento which Pedro Menéndez had received from Philip II. In it, the Adelantado conceded full use and exploitation of the Florida contract to Pedro del Castillo, giving him the free use in his name of all clauses and sections. Castillo was given exclusive right to handle the purchase and embarkation of the five hundred Negro slaves whose licenses had been granted to Menéndez in the asiento. In fact, the entire business side of the administration of the king's contract and Menéndez' private

financial affairs was given over to Pedro del Castillo. He was to have charge of the ship-licenses which had been promised to Menéndez. He was empowered to buy and sell vessels, hire and dismiss masters and crews, purchase supplies, equipment and cargoes, and see that Menéndez' maritime ventures were carried out with dispatch, in Cádiz and in the north of Spain. All other poderes granted by Menéndez were annulled, except those which the Adelantado stated were still valid in the north coast cities.

In order to enable Castillo to recover what he had advanced for the Florida outfitting, Menéndez gave him full power to collect monies due from the 1563 suelto case, the carpentry work on San Pelayo, as well as whatever might be realized from another claim Menéndez had made against the Casa for the loss of Santa Clara in 1564. He empowered Castillo to dun Factor Duarte for the balance of San Pelayo's sueldo, as it should come due. General authority was given for Castillo to collect any cash or valuables which were owed to the Adelantado from his own trade enterprises. The poder especially referred to the uncollected sums due Menéndez from freight-charges of goods that the merchants Alonso Rodrigues and Juan Dias Bezino had shipped in San Pelayo the previous year.

The Castillo poder is a business-like document; it sets forth crisply the authority which the Cádiz entrepreneur should have in Menéndez' affairs. Yet the instrument was

also a real expression of trust and confidence. Castillo could draw freely upon all the monies of the Adelantado to satisfy debts which had been incurred in his name and his figures were to be accepted by Menéndez and could set up his own accounts for these matters. This merely emphasizes the degree to which this relationship was not merely a legal and fiduciary one. The formal dealings of the two men were buttressed and enhanced by their closer ties.

When Pedro del Castillo and Pedro Menéndez signed the poder on the eve of the departure of the Florida expedition from Cádiz, Castillo had acted as general factor for the Florida outfitting, expending more than 20,000 ducats for the Adelantado. He had also involved his own friends and relatives in the effort.³¹ It was Castillo's task to recover this money by collecting funds due Menéndez in the Casa, and from private parties; he could then repay himself from those sources. Menéndez' royal patronage (evidenced by the asiento and its titles, privileges and licenses), the earning power of the Adelantado's own ships, and the back-up of friends and relatives would, hopefully, keep the money-machine going. In carrying out his mission, Castillo proceeded to delegate his authority under the poder from Menéndez by substituting in his own place a German residing in Seville, one Agustín Francisco, who was given an instrument to that effect. Francisco was to solicit the 500 ducats which had been promised by the officials of the Casa de Contratación but which remained unpaid.³²

Next, Pedro del Castillo established a branch office, so to speak, of Pedro Menéndez' business concerns in New Spain. He executed a poder to Gaspar Serfate, the merchant living in the city of Mexico. Castillo passed along to Serfate the rights Menéndez had ceded to Castillo in Cádiz. Serfate was given the capacity to collect monies which one Isidro de Solís owed to Pedro Menéndez, and was invested with the power to receive any sums due the Adelantado from other dealings. He could also handle the details of cargo purchases and the loading of ships from New Spain in Menéndez' name, and could further subdivide this authority if he wished.³³

By their own testimony, both Pedro Menéndez and Pedro del Castillo had made heavy expenditures in the preparation of the enterprise of Florida. They had also noted that many of their own friends and relatives were also deeply encumbered as a result of the outfitting of the Florida expedition. As the main financial backer of the adelantamiento of Florida, Castillo was clearly a man of substance.³⁴ His own resources were essentially derived from his activities in the Indies trade, although he was also a ship-chandler. Five of the 1565 New Spain ships which had arrived in Sanlúcar late in June carried a total of 12,706 pesos in silver for Castillo, which somewhat renewed the funds of the Cádiz merchant after his heavy expenditures in Menéndez' behalf. He acted as banker and factor for the Adelantado out of his

own commercial resources, but the financial support of the enterprise of Florida was not the work of any one man. Although its administration was centered in Pedro del Castillo, the network could enable the tapping of commercial sources and royal monies in many areas, to keep the venture going. Through the associates and allies of Menéndez located in Cádiz and in the north of Spain, fresh shipments of soldiers, settlers, men and supplies could be made to Florida. Resources in the Indies could be utilized there to buttress the effort. These arrangements could serve as a partial hedge against the hazards of the sea and the vagaries and dangers of the discovery, conquest and settlement of the new Florida colonies.

Thus it was that a combination of merchant and Crown money served to support Pedro Menéndez' efforts in Florida. Since a great part of the royal revenues used to help launch and support the effort also arose originally out of some tax upon the Carrera de Indies, it might be said that the first successful settlement of Florida was largely underwritten by trade and commerce.

Due to careful and detailed records, which have survived, one may gain a rather precise estimate of the aggregate of Royal expenditure in the outfitting of the Florida expedition.³⁵ Direct Crown costs were 17,681 ducats. The merced paid to Menéndez was 15,000 ducats and the Adelantado was also paid 2,000 ducats to recompense him

for losses sustained through missing his trading voyage to Tierra Firme. He had received 3,000 ducats on account of the sums due in the 1563 case. This total of 37,681 ducats thus represented the down payment on the Crown share of the Florida costs. It covered all supplies bought for the Royal account in Spain and the initial sueldo payments for sailors, soldiers and vessels underwritten by the King. Set over against this were the funds expended by the Adelantado. For several reasons, it is not a simple task to furnish a reliable total of Menéndez' costs. In the first place, his private records are not to be found in any single continuous series comparable to the account books of the Casa de Contratación. Where his contribution was officially audited, good materials survive. For the Cádiz effort, for example, Factor Duarte's itemized list of materials, ships and men may serve as a reasonable basis for conjectured cost. At Avilés, Gijón and Santander, where the northern contingents of ships and men were prepared, documentation is not as complete but can still yield enough data for some estimate of the Adelantado's expenses.³⁶

There is a second complicating factor; Menéndez' costs were directly shared by others in his organization. Some of his lieutenants and supporters absorbed these expenses as their own investment in the enterprise of Florida. For example, one of the Asturian ships was furnished by its master, Alonso Menéndez Marqués. Likewise, there are

indications that Diego Flores de Valdés encumberes his patrimony in the Florida effort, while Francisco de Reinoso made Pedro Menéndez a loan of 2,000 ducats. The Adelantado also noted that he had borrowed from "brothers, relatives, and friends."³⁷ One thing, however, was certain. The ~~sixteenth~~-century soldier, sailor and artisan had to be paid in cash; he required some money before he would begin his service. Cash funds had to be provided at once, or the needed carpentry and caulking would not be accomplished and the manning of the ships would never take place. Likewise, ready money was essential for the purchase of foodstuffs, munitions, and equipment. The settlers and clergy who accompanied the expedition were not paid salaries as such, but their maintenance and defense was the responsibility of the Adelantado. Religious materials and agricultural "capital"--hoes, axes, livestock--were also furnished by Menéndez. He had also found it necessary to buy a galiot and bergantin to supplement the Cadiz contingent of ships.

Considering, then, all conceivable items, it appears that the initial outfitting of the Florida enterprise cannot have cost Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and his supporters much less than 50,000 ducats. Thus, in the first phase of the effort, the Adelantado was the heavier investor (partly with Crown money), although both parties made substantial and manifest contributions. The efforts of the Adelantado

and his entourage represented, moreover, far more than any investment of cash. It amounted to a major risk of their persons and capital. For the ship-owners and their men, the vessels pledged to the Florida expedition represented their livelihood. Whether their income was earned in the Indies trade or through Crown sueldos, these ships were its source. They were the main property at hazard in the voyage.

In addition, the men and women aboard the craft--the captains and soldiers, artisans, the settlers and priests--constituted a very special kind of asset. They were the human resources at hazard in the enterprise. Lives, careers, reputations and patrimonies hung in the balance. Florida represented an immense speculation, a gamble undertaken for great stakes. It was not, moreover, the risk of any one man. The enterprise of Florida was a group effort. The hopes and the lives of many depended upon its outcome.

The joint nature of the undertaking made it essential that the Spanish Crown exercise a degree of control over the expenditure of its monies and the payment of its soldiery. Wherever Crown money or supplies were to be provided, it was required by law and by precedent that a royal official be appointed to protect the King's interest.³⁸ The three main offices of treasurer, accountant and factor, called in practice Royal Officials, had for sixty years been a bulwark of Crown authority in the Indies, and long predated the establishment of the Viceroyalties. A system

of Cajas, or royal treasuries, had spread by 1565 through the Caribbean islands and the mainland settlements of the Spanish. Royal revenues, such as customs duties, court fines, the tithe and cruzada income, Indian tributes, and the quinto were collected, safeguarded, and accounted for by the Royal Officials. Any expenditures from Crown funds would pass through their records. Even though the Florida asiento privileges would diminish some of these revenues or exempt the payment of some for a period of years, it was still planned that these three positions would shortly be filled. Since the salaries for the positions were to be paid out of royal income, the jobs would not mean much until the settlements were a going concern. An Adelantado was given the authority to propose individuals for the posts, but final confirmation of the appointments was in the King's hands.³⁹ Even though Royal Officials were not immediately named, a lesser position, that of tenedor de bastimentos--was created. It was the duty of the Tenedor to keep records of the Crown property received, and to account for its proper distribution.

Pedro Menéndez made the appointment himself, on June 1, in Seville, exercising his powers in the King's name. The circumstances were significant--Menéndez named Juan de Junco of Oviedo, a faithful member of his own retinue. Junco was not required to post any bond, which was unusual. He was to draw a salary of 300 ducats annually, and would

be responsible for all artillery, munitions and other supplies furnished by the King. Junco could make distribution from Royal stores as ordered by the King or the Ade-lantado. The ostensible purpose of this office was to provide for an independent defensor of the King's goods and interests. In actuality, however, the nature of the appointment of Juan de Junco made such objectivity impossible from the beginning. The close-knit structure of Pedro Menéndez' adelantamiento militated against effective Royal control.⁴⁰

Preparation for Departure

In a very short time, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had to provide additional ships, gather his soldiers, and purchase and load supplies and munitions for the Florida journey. He took personal charge of preparations at Cádiz, and delegated the tasks of equipping the three contingents from Avilés, Gijón and Santander to trusted lieutenants. Menéndez placed Esteban de las Alas in overall command of the effort in northern Spain, and named Pedro Menéndez Marqués as his second in command.⁴¹ Meanwhile, Casa factor Francisco Duarte and his representative in Cádiz, Juan Carrillo, labored diligently to prepare the Crown share of the Cádiz expedition.

It had been an unusually late and stormy winter along the coast of the Bay of Biscay, where continuous rains and heavy winds delayed the work of outfitting and equipping the

vessels. On the twenty-seventh of June, 1565, de las Alas appeared before Pedro de Valdés, the judge in Avilés, and made a statement of compliance with the royal asiento.⁴² De las Alas averred that he had, in the name of Pedro Menéndez, readied and supplied certain ships to go from Gijón and perhaps Bilbao as well as from Avilés. When the local justices made their ship visits, he would be ready to leave with the first good weather to join the Adelantado for a Canary Islands rendezvous.

The judge then required the shipmasters to open their hatches, list their cargoes, and name the officials and men who would be embarking. The men listed included 237 soldiers and 20 sailors. The man chosen as pilot of the ships from Avilés was a highly qualified Asturian, Alonso Candamo.

From Avilés eastward it is scarcely fifteen miles by land to the port of Gijón. Alongside the village mole in Gijón, two ships were being readied, and Pedro Menéndez Marquéz, made application to the local justice on May 31, 1565, for a visit of his ships. The two vessels--Espiritu Santo and Nuestra Señora del Rosario--were small zabras, of from fifty to fifty-five tons. Menéndez Marquéz stated that bad weather and heavy rains had delayed the work of preparing the ships for departure. This justification was put on record, since Menéndez Marquéz knew that the asiento required departure by the end of May.⁴³

On the same day, one of the ships, Espiritu Santo, was visited by the Judge and Regidor, Juan de Valdés. The ship's registry showed that she carried 55 pipes of wine, sails, anchors, rigging and other gear, two barrels of powder, six thousand pounds of sea-biscuit and thirty hams. Her master, Alonso Menéndez Marquéz, swore that nothing had been hidden or overlooked and presented a list of the men aboard. The two small vessels carried fifty soldiers and seventeen sailors.

In the meantime, the first vessel from Vizcaya was rejected as being too small. Another vessel was prepared for the Florida voyage almost a hundred miles to the east, in Santander. This ship was a new galeoncete, from Vizcaya, owned by Pedro de Lexalde. She was to be used to carry six hundred arquebuses made in Vizcaya, a supply of oars and other bulky arms and munitions purchased for the account of the Adelantado. Lexalde had been associated with Pedro Menéndez for nine years.⁴⁴ When, finally, the ships sailed from Avilés, Gijón, and Santander, it was so late that the possibility of making the rendezvous with Pedro Menéndez at the Canary Islands was only a remote one.

While the enlistment of ships' crews and soldiers and the outfitting of vessels continued in Asturias and Santander, work went forward rapidly in Andalusia as well.

Pedro Menéndez and the Casa de Contratación engaged three caravels in order to spread the troops and cargoes

around more evenly among the Cádiz ships and provide needed space. One, named San Antonio, of one hundred twenty tons burden, had been found in Puerto Santa Maria, was embargoed by the Casa de Contratación for the journey, and was rowed across the bay to Cádiz. The other two caravels were smaller. It was planned that they should all carry supplies as far as the Canary Islands, where the consumption of food and wine and the rendezvous with the Asturian ships would enable the re-distribution of cargoes. The caravels would then be sent back to Spain. Work began at once upon the building of new bulkheads aboard them so that they would have sufficient store-rooms and magazines.⁴⁵

In addition to his flagship and Capitana, San Pelayo, and the caravels, Pedro Menéndez armed four small one-deck shallops which ranged from sixty to seventy-five tons in size. These were Magdalena, San Miguel, San Andrés, and La Concepción. The Adelantado had also purchased a fine galiot with eighteen banks of oars, La Vitoria, and a large bergantín of twelve banks, La Esperanza.⁴⁶

It is useful to compare the materials and supplies provided in Cádiz by the Crown and those furnished by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés under his asiento obligations, although such comparison cannot be reduced precisely to money terms, for all of the price data are not known.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the lists are not identical. The Crown's effort involved the equipping and supply of some three hundred soldiers, and the

furnishing of certain artillery, ammunition and marine supplies intended to bolster the expedition and insure the ouster of the Huguenots from Florida. The broader-scale nature of Menéndez' commitment is reflected in the enumeration of the things he purchased for the expedition. First, both Crown and Adelantado provided large quantities of the components of the basic sea-ration, wine and sea-biscuit, as well as the supplementary foodstuffs--olive oil, vinegar, rice, and beans. Menéndez was to carry supplies for one year, while the royal forces were supplied for a shorter period.

With regard to military supplies, the Crown furnished armed troops and cannon with which to besiege and capture Fort Caroline, and the powder and shot with which to do it. Sixteen large bronze cannon were provided by the Crown. The Adelantado bought two hundred fifty arquebuses and also provided one hundred helmets, thirty cross-bows and a quantity of pikes, breastplates, and the harness for fifty horses. Six hundred more firearms were coming from Vizcaya for Menéndez. To supply the cannon aboard San Pelayo and his other ships, Pedro Menéndez brought substantial amounts of gunpowder and iron shot.

Although the ships were fully equipped, additional marine supplies were also carried for the upkeep and repair of hulls, sails and oars on a long voyage. The materials of husbandry and colonization were, moreover, supplied in

quantity by Pedro Menéndez. For the smithy, six tons of bulk iron and a half-ton of steel were brought aboard San Pelayo. Fifty axes, and four hundred fifty shovels and mattocks of iron were brought to clear and work the land. Fish-nets, in the number of two hundred, were provided; shoe-making supplies were included. Cloth for trade with the Indians was loaded on the ship. For the religious life of the new colonies, the Adelantado contributed eight church bells and the altar furnishings necessary for the celebration of the Mass.

In addition to items of supply and equipment for Florida, Pedro Menéndez brought in his Cádiz ships one hundred thirty-eight soldiers who also held the "office," or possessed the skills, of artisans and craftsmen. These seamen were enrolled, equipped and paid as soldiers, but were qualified by experience in their particular trade. Virtually all the crafts of sixteenth-century Spain were represented: There were ten stone-masons, fifteen carpenters, twenty-one tailors, ten shoe-makers, eight smiths, five barberos and two surgeons. There were hose-makers, metal-smelters, cloth-weavers and cloth-shearers. Two specialists in the making of lime and mortar were aboard, as well as tanners, farriers, wool-carders, a hat maker, a book-seller and an embroiderer. Weapon experts there were in the persons of three sword-makers, a gunsmith and a cross-bow repairman. There were coopers, bakers, gardeners, a dealer in silks, a blanket

maker and two men skilled in the working of flax to make linen. An apothecary, a keeper of granaries, and a master brewer rounded out the list. That essential of the paper-bound, legalistic Spaniard--the escribano público, the notary who would record all formal actions--came along, together with twenty-four reams of paper and a quantity of ink. Also, one hundred seventeen of the soldiers were listed as labradores, or farmers; these men were ready to make settlement on the land when their military duties would permit. Twenty-six of them had brought their wives and children.

The Adelantado was thus preparing a full-scale transfer of Castilian civilization to the cities he planned to found in Florida. He carried in his ships enough skilled persons to service the needs of the colonies and to aid in the exploitation of their agricultural potential.

Both parties to the outfitting of the Florida jornada incurred direct expenses arising out of the immediate advance pay of officials, of soldiers and mariners, the purchase of equipment and supplies for the expedition, and lease or purchase of ships in which to carry them. Likewise, both the Crown of Castile and its Adelantado obligated themselves for substantial continuing expense for the later pay and supply of their men and for the operation of the vessels which would serve the Florida conquest and population. Of the two obligations, Menéndez' was the heavier and the more enduring; it was to last for at least

three years. As it was seen in Madrid, the royal support in Florida was intended to be a temporary thing, lasting only long enough to see the intruders defeated and ousted from the land.

The remaining days before sailing proved hectic for all parties. Much of the labor of preparing and loading the materials purchased by the Casa de Contratación fell upon the shoulders of its escribano, Juan Carrillo, at Cádiz. Supplies purchased by his agents came in on oxcarts, on mule-back, and in small boats. Wine, sea-biscuit, rice, beef and pork, sides of bacon, fish, beans, cheese, garbanzos, olive oil, salt and vinegar--even a medicine chest--was supplied by the Crown. Coopers knocked together the casks and barrels in which the bulk items would be stored. Goods, bought from many vendors, came from all of lower Andalusia--from Ronda, Jérez de la Frontera, Puerto de Santa María and Puerto Real, from as far away as Seville, and from Cádiz itself. So much came, in fact, that it was necessary to lease storage space in the town. Some of the supplies were even stockpiled on the beach opposite the open roadstead where San Pelayo and the other ships rode at anchor.⁴⁸ In the meantime, Menéndez had stowed away the supplies which he had bought.

In order that some basis might be established for the payment of the ship-lease fee for San Pelayo, the Casa sent Francisco Bernal of Seville to measure the galeass. He

figured it at nine hundred six tons, and the rate of payment for the ship-lease could be calculated.⁴⁹

The two hundred royal soldiers gathered by Menéndez during May 1565 embarked from Seville. In mid-June they were transported by boat to Sanlúcar, from whence they were brought to Cádiz. The Adelantado advanced them a sum of earnest-money--about one-third of a ducat apiece--for which he was shortly reimbursed by the Casa.⁵⁰ Two hundred fine new Vizcayan arquebuses were purchased for these men, together with the lead, match-cord and powder for the weapons.

Because of the shortness of time in which the troops were recruited (Pedro Menéndez had stated that the first two hundred had come in on May 18; he had only received the order to raise them on May 12), their enlistment must have taken place in Andalusia. An examination of a list of these men and their birthplaces, however, indicates that they came from villages and towns all over the peninsula. Some few were from Catalonia, but most were Castilian; many places in Extremadura, the northern meseta, the north coast, and Andalusia were represented. These were professional soldiers, available because employment in Italy or elsewhere was not obtainable at the present. When he sought to provide the military arm to fill out his table of organization for the Florida conquest, Menéndez sought experienced men, blooded in the last of the Italian wars, in the Mediterranean

galleys, and in North African expeditions.⁵¹ By May 28, the Adelantado had made a muster of his own troops and presented it to the Casa de Contratación, so that each man (and wife, if she were coming on the expedition) could be examined for religious status and approved for the Indies journey.⁵² In mid-June, 1565, the first two hundred who were to be paid by the Crown came down river from Seville to Sanlúcar de Barrameda, and were then transported to Cádiz. On Sunday, June 17, a muster was held. At that time, or shortly thereafter, arquebuses were issued to the men.

Due to the exigencies of loading the ships for Florida, it was not possible to put the Royal troops aboard immediately. Menéndez had to maintain and feed them ashore, before they could reach San Pelayo and begin to draw upon the rations which awaited them there. He provided for the men from his own supplies until Thursday, June 22, when ninety-nine more royal soliders arrived. The Adelantado then provided for the whole body of Crown troops ashore until they could be transported aboard ship on the twenty-sixth.⁵³ All the men received a payment of two months' advance salary, dating from the day of their muster.⁵⁴

The sixteenth-century professional soldier was a hired man. The Spanish tercios were all composed of contract men who had been recruited by a captain and signed agreements with him. In the case of Menéndez' own soldiers, or those

whom he enlisted for the royal account, each man signed his own asiento, received his advance pay and equipment, and began to draw rations. By terms of his contract, as long as he served, each soldier would be paid and receive his rations, worth thirty maravedís a day. Since the tools of his trade, his weapon and his accoutrements were furnished by his employer, the cost of these was given in lieu of one month's pay. In posts or circumstances deemed to be particularly hazardous, isolated, or non-productive of loot, ventajas, or additional-duty pay, might also be forthcoming.

In organizing his own assortment of soldiers at Cádiz, Pedro Menéndez did not make an appointment of a full number of captains. The non-commissioned corporals named for the voyage kept order, drew supplies and served to keep the units organized until regular companies could be set up.

Artillerymen were in great demand, were difficult to find and could command a high wage. Pedro Menendez had looked all along the Andalusian coasts as far as Malaga and Gibraltar without finding the men he needed. Finally, he was able to fill the position of chief gunner and eventually enlisted a total of eighteen artillerymen. Diego López, who became artillero mayor, was only twenty-four, but could already count long years of service in his specialty. A native of Villaneuva de Alcaraz, near Toledo, López had served for six years in the galleys of Don Álvaro de Bazán

and had been at the taking of the Peñon. His lombardero, Antonino Escopo, was a native of Naples, and forty-four years old in 1565. Escopo had been paid twenty ducats at the muster, 'as had Gil Talón, another lombardero aboard San Pelayo.⁵⁵

From the list made at the muster of the King's soldiers, it is evident that Pedro Menéndez recruited several men who had a close connection with him and let the Crown pay for their support. These included Diego de Hevia of Oviedo, Pedro de Coronas of Tineo and Gutierre de Miranda, also of Tineo in Asturias.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, a question which related to the Menéndez mission had been decided in Madrid. The King sent a dispatch to Ambassador Alava, asking him to determine if the Ribault expedition had sailed, and proposing that the matter be brought to an open confrontation if it had not. Alava replied on June 8 that the Huguenot ships had indeed weighed anchor about May 26. He had no immediate way of knowing that the fleet had only crossed the channel and taken refuge in England from a spring storm. They were still within recall. In so far as Philip II was concerned, however, the die was cast. Isabel journeyed to the border of the kingdoms of France, proceeding to Bayonne with the Duke of Alba for the long-heralded Royal conference. While the parley began, preparations for conflict in Florida were to go on in Cádiz, at Gijón, Avilés and Santander, as the ships made ready to sail.⁵⁷

In Cádiz, financial arrangements had at last been completed, and all the men and equipment were placed aboard the vessels. Final preparations for the ships' departure were made. Castillo bought fifteen hundred water-bottles, for which the Casa reimbursed him, for the royal soldiers. Three men filled the bottles and casks at the Cádiz wells, and the fresh water was then stowed aboard. A last muster and pay of the officials and mariners of San Pelayo was arranged by the Casa's representative, Carrillo. One additional official had been added--the Crown decided to retain Gonzalo Gayón, a skilled Asturian pilot, at its expense. Gayón would act as chief pilot to guide the expedition to Florida waters. For this, he was to be paid four hundred ducats. As a final touch, the Casa officials presented Menéndez with a ship's lantern for each of the vessels, and gave him four standards painted with the royal arms, to be flown from the mastheads of San Pelayo and San Andres.⁵⁸

Shortly before Menéndez was to sail, his brother-in-law, Gonzalo Solís de Merás, appeared at Cádiz. Solís had left his studies at Salamanca and wished to embark on the Florida adventure. Since he had almost completed the requirements for his degree, and was a married man, the Adelantado was much loth to permit him to come. He could not, however, resist the importunity of Solís de Merás, and finally gave his consent.⁵⁹

By this time, the issue of Menéndez' compliance with the royal asiento was already very much at issue. The King and his Council of the Indies had every intention of holding the Florida Adelantado to his agreement. The Casa, charged with the overseeing of the preparation of the Crown's part of the expedition, also had the responsibility of checking upon Menéndez' fulfillment of his contract. On June 23, 1565, Factor Duarte made a formal requerimiento. He asked Menéndez to show proof that he had carried out his obligations. In reply, Menéndez furnished the list of equipment and supplies which he had bought, or which had been purchased for him by Pedro del Castillo.⁶⁰ Then, Duarte made a personal inspection of the vessels anchored in the Bay of Cádiz, after all lading had been completed. From Monday noon, June 25, until Wednesday the twenty-seventh, he was rowed from ship to ship in a bergantín, counting heads and verifying cargoes. He also gathered the muster rolls of the royal troops and lists of Pedro Menéndez' own personnel in the registries of each ship. His report is most useful in that it summarizes the entire effort and furnishes the best list of ships, armament and the distribution of men. In the meantime, similar reports had been made from northern Spain, from the ports of Avilés, Gijón and Santander directly to the Council of the Indies.

At this point, Menéndez clearly established his position on the question of compliance with the asiento. In Duarte's words:

He responded that with the ships, people, and artillery, arms, munitions and supplies contained in this relation and with the ships which he says go from Vizcaya, Asturias, and Galicia and with the personnel, arms and artillery, munitions and supplies which go in them, he has complied with the asiento which his Majesty ordered be taken with him more completely and in greater quantity than he was obliged to do⁶¹

On Wednesday, June 27, 1565, in the afternoon, the weather appeared favorable. Pedro Menéndez' whole fleet of ships left their anchorage and passed along the bay side of the ancient city of Cádiz with sails drawing and flags flying, on their way to the Atlantic. Factor Duarte, doubtless relieved to have dispatched the fleet, sat down to write up his report.

Now there occurred an event, about which much controversy was later to arise. It bore directly on the question of Menéndez' compliance with his asiento. According to the Adelantado and a number of other witnesses, the ships had no sooner left the harbor entrance on Wednesday when strong and contrary winds sprang up. After endeavoring to hold the fleet together and make headway against the winds, Menéndez gave up the attempt and brought the ships back to Cádiz. Toward nightfall, he anchored off the ancient fort of San Sebastian at the farthest point of the peninsula. Here, claimed Menéndez, contact was made with the shore. A large number of additional men were ferried out and came aboard the vessels during the night. One witness later testified that one hundred fifty more people had come out to the

ships; another stated that three hundred additional passengers had embarked in Cádiz.⁶² Then Pedro Menéndez and his Florida fleet set sail for the second time.

Pedro Menéndez claimed that his Cádiz expedition had sailed from Spain with a total of 1,504 souls aboard. The total of Duarte's muster was 995 persons. Duarte had not, however, included the wives or children of the twenty-six married soldiers aboard San Pelayo, nor had he counted the sailors aboard the caravel, San Antonio. All of these together could probably not, however, have exceeded seventy-five in number; the two sums were still far apart.

It is evident, however, that some would-be voyagers to Florida had been left behind when the fleet sailed. On Thursday, the twenty-eighth, Captain Diego de Luna, a professional soldier from Malaga, arrived in Cádiz, too late to catch Menéndez' ships. De Luna immediately applied to Factor Duarte, saying that he wished to charter a vessel to carry himself and his men to meet the Adelantado at the Canary Islands, so that they might yet be a part of the Florida expedition. Duarte simply told the Captain to see Pedro del Castillo, who was in charge of all Menéndez' affairs, in order to make any such arrangements. The Casa de Contratación would neither accept the responsibility nor the expense.⁶³

The same day, the frustrated officer went to see Castillo. He stated that he had gathered a fine group of

almost seventy experienced soldiers who had served in Italy, had exhausted his own resources in bringing them to the port, and needed help to find transport to the Canaries.⁴⁸ Since it was known that Pedro del Castillo was Pedro Menéndez' deputy in Spain, de Luna came to him, having nowhere else to turn.⁶⁴

Castillo replied directly to de Luna, and stated that he had indebted himself and his kinsmen deeply, in the amount of 20,000 ducats, for the arming of Menéndez' Florida enterprise. Nevertheless, he said, the troops would be needed, and Castillo agreed to provide the needed supplies so that de Luna could embark immediately. The caravel Nuestra Señora de los Virtudes was chartered and made ready to sail that very day.⁶⁵

When the delayed armadas finally set sail for Florida from Cádiz and from Spain's north coast, what then was the character of the effort? First, as to support of the expeditions, it was a mixed enterprise, with the larger share of the cost and risk borne by the Adelantado. To sustain his part of the burden, Pedro Menéndez committed an entire coterie of relatives, friends and associates, well-experienced upon the sea. He hired, paid and equipped some additional soldiers to round out his own organization, and took into his own forces three hundred Crown-supported soldiers. Almost half of his own costs were, in fact, paid indirectly

by Crown grants to the Adelantado. In order to underwrite his efforts, Menéndez had recourse to sources of credit linked with his regional and familial associations. He entrusted financial and logistical maintenance to his relative Pedro del Castillo, a Cádiz merchant and long-time colleague.

The bureaucrats of the King had conscientiously furnished the funds, arms and supplies their master had ordered. Philip II had also obligated the royal fisc for substantial additional sums in support of the expedition from overseas treasuries and from the New Spain fleet.

The Florida expeditions thus represented a joint-venture in conquest--both Adelantado and Crown shared the costs of the effort. The parties had other joint considerations as well. The royal desire to erase the French presence in Florida was deeply shared by Pedro Menéndez. In their most cherished hopes, however, both parties looked beyond the coming battles. They looked for glory and profit, and to the enlargement of their own domains and holdings. The ships which sailed carried more than soldiers, supplies, and cannon. They were laden with a full cargo of expectation.

NOTES

1. The careers of Pedro Menéndez' main lieutenants are well documented, as most of them achieved prominence as fleet Generals or Admirals in the Carrera de Indias, as governors or in other official posts, in positions in the Armada Real or in other fleets or expeditions. The correspondence relating to their offices, the audits of their accounts, the corpus of legal cases affecting them, and the sentences of the Council of the Indies sitting as judicial chamber, contain much about these men. In secondary literature, two accounts have devoted some space to the subordinates of Menéndez. Ciracio Miguel Vigil gives a brief sketch of each figure associated with the Adelantado in his work Noticias biográficas-genealógicas de Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (Aviles: Miguel Vigil, 1892). Following Vigil Eugenio Ruidiaz de Caravia did much the same in La Florida, I and II. Both men erred in confusing Pedro Menéndez Marqués with Pedro Menéndez el mozo, another son of Alvaro Sanchez de Avilés, brother of the Adelantado.

2. Pedro Menéndez' own description of his brother's services and his illness during the Seville imprisonment of 1563-1564 are found in "Memorial of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés asking grace from His Majesty," Seville, 1564, in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. Bartolomé's selection as fleet general is described by the Adelantado in the same Memorial. An accumulation of material about Bartolome Menéndez is found in "Bartolomé Menéndez sobre sueldo," Madrid, 1570, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219. The long service of Bartolomé Menéndez is described by the Adelantado in a letter written to the King from Santander on May 15, 1568, and found in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 171.

3. Descriptions of various services by Esteban de las Alas are found in A.G.I. Patronato, legajos 179, No. 5, ramo 4; 254, No. 2, ramo 1; 254, No. 3. Correspondence and legal matters relating to him are found in A.G.I. Contratación 2,937 and in Contratación 135, No. 5 (autos fiscales), which deal with de las Alas' presence in San Juan de Ulua in 1562. Reports of de las Alas' voyages in 1564 are in two letters; Casa to Crown, Seville, Dec. 5 and Dec. 5, 1564 A.G.I., Contratación 5,167, Book III. A pertinent sentencia of the Council of the Indies is found in A.G.I. Escribania de Cámara 952. Audits of De las Alas accounts in various posts in the fleets are found in A.G.I. Contaduría 466 and 547.

4. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Crown, Santander, May 15, 1568, from Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 171.

5. Pedro Menéndez Márquez does not lack for archival data of a biographical nature. As fleet General, material may be found about him in the "Papeles de armada" series for the fleets under his command, in A.G.I. Contratación 2,946 to 2,948. Márquez is listed as maestre of one of Pedro Menéndez' ships in 1561 in Huguette and Pierre Chaunu, Séville et l'Atlantique, III, 6. Bonds of Márquez are listed in A.G.I. Contratación 9. Sentences against him are found in A.G.I. Patronato 177, No. 1, ramo 25, Escribanía de Cámara 967, 1010 and 1011. An audit of Márquez' fleet accounts is found in A.G.I. Contaduría 464. Various descriptions of his service are in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, ramos 1, 6, 8, and 11. He testifies at length about his early services in Florida in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 20, "Daños de los indios de la Florida." Consultas and cedulas about Pedro Menéndez Márquez during his term as Governor and Captain-General of Florida are found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 2,528 and Indiferente General 738, as cited infra. Ciracio M. Vigil discusses Menéndez Márquez in Noticias . . . de Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 49-50, as does Ruidiaz in La Florida, II, 629-629 (see note 4, supra, for their mutual error). Jeannette Thurber Connor devotes considerable space and exhibits great interest in Pedro Menéndez Márquez in the introduction to Colonial Records of Spanish Florida (2 v., Deland, Florida: Florida Historical Society, 1925-1930), I, xxiii-xxvi.

6. Pedro Menéndez had recommended Diego Flores Valdés as one of three qualified to be fleet General for Tierra Firme in 1562; see Memorial of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Crown, n.d., in 1564, Seville, A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. Sentencias relating to Flores are found in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 952 and 967. He is praised in fulsome terms by the Adelantado in his letter to Philip II dated at St. Augustine, September 11, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in the Stetson Collection).

7. It is certainly true that no clear-cut distinction between "navy" and "army" existed in the sixteenth century, and that a commission as "ordinary Captain" in the King's service could be utilized on land or at sea. What is under discussion here, however, is the matter of experience.

8. Pedro de Valdés' qualifications are discussed by the Adelantado in his letter to the Crown in the letter sent from St. Augustine on September 11, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection).

9. Miranda appears on a ration list of the first soldiers of the Menéndez contingent; this is "Lista de la gente de guerra que fueron con el Adelantado Pedro Menéndez a la conquista de la Florida," from A.G.I. Contaduría 941, fol. 9. This is found in microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. On June 1, 1565, he served as a witness to the appointment of Juan de Junco as Tenedor de Bastimentos; this is from "Relación de los bastimentos, artillería, armas, y municiones que recibio Juan de Junco . . . " and is found in A.G.I. Contaduría 941, ramo 2.

10. See "Genealogy of the Enterprise of Florida," Appendix III.

11. For example, Pedro Menéndez married his cousin, Dona Maria de Solis, and was thus required to seek Papal dispensation for marriage within the forbidden degrees; Solis de Meras, op. cit., p. 40. He was at times himself called Pedro Menéndez Valdés (see Libro de Registros, 1551, Ida, A.G.I. Contratacion 2,898), and married his daughter Ana to Pedro de Valdés, who was also at times called Pedro Menéndez Valdés.

12. There are extant various lists of participants in the Florida enterprise. Several lengthy lists of officials and soldiers and some shorter ones of mariners are found in the Florida accounts in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 ration lists from 1566-69. Three similar lists of the royal troops in the Cádiz contingent are found in A.G.I. Justicia 817. In many cases, together with the names of men (or women) the birthplace and/or place of citizenship is given. Thus, the origin of key figures of rank-and-file in the conquest of Florida may be determined.

13. Peter Boyd-Bowman, Índice geobiográfico de cuarenta mil pobladores españoles de América en el Siglo XVI (2 v., Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1958), describes (page 9 and passim) the activities of the Miranda, de la Ribera, del Busto, Junco, Valdés, Hevia, de las Alas, del Castillo, Solís and other Asturian families in Cuba, Santo Domingo, Cartagena, Yucatan, Puerto Rico and New Spain.

14. Menéndez recognized the strength of this motivation. In a letter to the Crown, he noted that he preferred men from Asturias and Vizcaya, "who are the people best fitted to work in Florida, some because of their nature and some because of kinship and friendship." Pedro Menéndez to Crown, Seville, December 3, 1570, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,093.

15. The trade officials reported to Philip II in a letter which bore no date. Apparently, however, it was written on June 7, 1565, for the payment it mentions was made on that day. The letter is found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III. Payment of the 9,000 ducats is from A.G.I. Contratación 4,680 (Libro de Guadalcanal), fol. 128; this citation kindly furnished by Paul E. Hoffman.

16. See "Petition of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés before the Casa de Contratación," Seville, June 12, 1565, A.G.I. Escribanía de Camara 1,024-A.

17. The payment is listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B; 455: 2.

18. This includes the entire 15,000-ducat merced, the 3,000-ducat advance on the galleon lease case settlement and the 2,000 ducats paid as recompense for losing the Tierra Firme voyage for San Pelayo. At mid-June, the Adelantado was still due an advance on the sums which would be payable for the lease of San Pelayo and the 500 ducats for repair work done on the galeass.

19. The author is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for this citation; "Fe de registro, Santa María de Ondiz," A.G.S. Junta de Hacienda, 67.

20. Poder, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Domingo de Ocaris, Cádiz, June 25, 1565, A.P.C., Escribanía of de los Cobos, fol. 297.

21. Some apt insights into the relationship of families in commerce appear in Armando Saporì, The Italian Merchant in the Middle Ages (translated by Patricia Ann Kennen. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 45-46. Saporì states the matter well: "... in the early Middle Ages, these men (in a company) belonged to the same family, which formed a closed block of interests and individuals. They lived under the same roof, submitted to the authority of the eldest among them, and broke bread around the same table. Like the family, a compact group by reason of its ties of blood, the company had its honor to safeguard in society, and this family-company identity imposed on each of its members a line of irreproachable conduct in business affairs. Anyone who committed a fraud would ruin both his own name and that of his entire family ... In this way there was a rigorous reciprocal control, which was made bearable by the affection uniting the families.

As the business grew, it required more capital, and therefore, outsiders, capable of supplying the necessary funds, had to be admitted. These men were chosen from a wide circle of relatives and associates and finally people who had no particular ties to the old family group."

22. See Ruth Pike, Aristocrats and Traders; Sevillian Society in the 16th Century (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), especially p. 99 et seq.

23. The presence of Diego Montañés and Pedro Menéndez Valdés in Puerto Rico is mentioned by Pedro Menéndez Márquez in his visit to San Juan in September, 1566. The documents are from A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, ramo 1.

24. Poder, Diego Menéndez de la Aspriella to Favian de Solís, A.P.C., Escribanía of de Ribera, 1577, fol. 176.

25. See "Registro de la nao Santa Maria," A.G.I. Justicia 872, fol. 217 vto.-221.

26. Astudillo, a vecino of Seville, testifies for Menéndez in his claim to recover funds allegedly advanced to Florida soldiers. The testimony, on March 27, 1572, is from A.G.I. Justicia 817. Astudillo served as bondsman for the Adelantado in the 1564 jailbreak case. See "Fiscal de Su Magestad contra Pedro Menéndez de Avilés y sus fiadores," A.G.I. Justicia 868, pieza 9. Sebastian de Santander represented the Adelantado through much of the main case involving the asiento, and found in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, and represented Astudillo in the jailbreak case. Ruth Pike, in Aristocrats and Traders; Sevillian Society in the 16th Century, p. 123, describes the Astudillo banking family.

27. Irene A. Wright, Historia documentada de San Cristobal de la Habana en el siglo XVI, I, 82, 83.

28. The Lovera will is found in A.H.P. (Madrid), Escribanía of Nicolas Muñoz, No. 635, fol. 4 of 1568.

29. Hinestrosa's antecedents are discussed by Irene Wright, op. cit., 82. His role in the 1564 case is outlined in A.G.I. Justicia 868, pieza 9.

30. The poder from Pedro Menéndez to Pedro del Castillo is in A.P.C., Escribanía of Alonso de los Cobos, 1565. A copy is in the A.G.I., at Indiferente General 2,673.

31. Castillo describes his expenditures and those of his "friends and kinsmen" in "Requerimiento de Luna a Castillo . . ." found in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A under the date of June 28, 1565, in Cádiz. He outlines his financial sacrifices further in a letter to the King, received in Madrid on January 30, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673.

32. The Agustín Francisco substitution is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. It comes originally from A.P.C., Escribanía of Alonso de los Cobos, 1565.

33. Substitution by Pedro del Castillo, Cádiz, August 17, 1565, A.P.C., Escribanía of Alonso de los Cobos, 1565, fol. 409.

34. Castillo, who had served in 1563-64 as Receptor de Avería in Cádiz, was adjudged guilty of undervaluation of goods shipped for the tax. For a shortage in his books of 238,524 maravedís, he was fined 50,000 maravedís. Castillo had, however, also been the supplier for the galleys for which he was to have collected the avería, and was owed 224,531 maravedís for this service. See "Culpas y cargos contra Pedro del Castillo," A.G.I. Justicia 956. Shipments from New Spain for Castillo are listed in the Fé de registros for the vessels La María, Santa María de Ondiz, La Trinidad, San Juan, and Santa María. These were found in A.G.S. Junta de Hacienda, 67, and furnished through the kindness of Paul E. Hoffman.

35. See Appendix IV.

36. See Appendix V.

37. Pedro Menéndez mentions Flores' investment in the enterprise in his October 15, 1565, letter to Philip II found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection). Woodbury Lowery, in The Spanish Settlements, II, 146, advises that Flores had pawned his patrimony to support Menéndez. The Adelantado discusses his loan from Reinoso in his Havana letter to the Spanish King written on Christmas Day, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection). It has also been reproduced in Lawson, Letters of Menéndez, I, 271. Menéndez reminds the King of the loans from his brothers, relatives and friends in "Menéndez reports to the Crown, 1565 [sic]," from Ms. Division, Library of Congress, typescript translation, 1937. It probably dates from 1568. The transcript is found in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida.

38. A good general description of the place of the Royal Officials in the Spanish colonial financial system may be found in C. H. Haring's The Spanish Empire in America (3rd ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), pp. 279-282. A more recent and far more detailed study has been done by Ismael Sánchez-Bella in La organización financiera de las Indias, Siglo XVI (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1968). See especially Chapter 1, "Desarrollo histórico," pp. 7-68.

39. "Ordenezas," D.I., LXIV, 507.

40. It was, of course, difficult to guarantee a position for Indies Royal Officials independent of local power centers. This, however, was the reason for their separate salary arrangements. Sanchez-Bella discusses this problem in La organización financiera de las Indias, p. 28. The point here is that no member of Menéndez' own organizational apparatus was likely to establish such independence, even if he should desire to do so. Juan de Junco's brother Rodrigo was affiliated with Pedro Menéndez by 1562. See registry of vessel Magdalena, in "Fiscal with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés over pay of Sueldos . . . 1563," A.G.I. Justicia 872. The Junco appointment, dated June 1, 1565, is found in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (Microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Reel 1).

41. The documentation of the arming of the northern expeditions has been accumulated in the legajo, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, which contains the corpus of the suit by Pedro Menéndez over his asiento with the Crown. The Adelantado and his heirs inserted the material into the record in order to prove the extent of compliance with the Florida contract. From the text of their works, it appears that the material was available to Gonzalo Solís de Merás and to Eugenio Ruidiaz y Caravia. The data is, however, scanty as compared with that for the Cádiz section of the enterprise. The author assumes that perusal of the north-coast notaries' archives may uncover much more material.

42. The document is entitled "La lista que hizo el (sic) de las Alas en Avilés de 257 personas." It was copied in Avilés on September 27, 1567, from the original, which was dated June 27, 1565. The copy is found in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Unfortunately the ship registries, enclosed with the original, were not included or at least are not now found with the copy. The supplies and men listed from Menéndez' native town would be invaluable.

43. "Visita y registro de los navios y gente en Gijón," Gijón, May 25, 1565, and "Visita y registro del navio Espíritu Santo," May 31, 1565, also at Gijón, from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

44. The Lexalde ship is described briefly in "Memorial de los navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones que se perdieron el Adelantado Pero Menéndez yendo a echarlos luteranos que estaban poblando en aquella tierra de la Florida," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A; cf. "replica el Adelantado," loc. cit.

45. Pedro Menéndez describes the embargo of San Antonio in his letter to the King sent from Matanzas, Cuba, on December 5, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection). Payment for the tow of the caravel, for loading water and wine into the caravels, and the carpentry work is itemized in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B; 451: 4; 452: 1 and 2. Another description of the lading of the caravels and their subsequent journey is found in "Pedro del Castillo--información sumaria hecha en Cádiz," September 22, 1567, in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

46. The names of the vessels are found in the list of ships, men, and supplies made by Casa factor Duarte in Cádiz, June 28, 1565, which has been reproduced in toto in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. It has been printed in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 558-566, where it is cited as coming from A.G.S., Consejo de Hacienda, leg. 67. Menéndez describes the purchase of the two ships in his letter to Philip II from Seville, May 18, 1565, which is printed in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 60-66.

47. See "Relación de los navios, gente, bastimentos, artilleria, armas, municiones . . . que lleva el adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés en su armada para la conquista de la Florida," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, and the royal list immediately following it.

48. There is a rich accretion of data on Casa pay for San Pelayo and Royal troops in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B accounts of Factor Duarte. This was kindly furnished by Paul E. Hoffman.

49. See report of Contadores Mayores, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

50. Menéndez' advance of 23,800 maravedís to the troops was repaid by the Casa as per the record found in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B, fol. 437.

51. When the Adelantado described the non-commissioned officers and captains whom he had appointed (including Sergeant-Major Villaroel, the alfereces and other sergeants), he noted that "those without experience are few . . . they were soldiers of Italy skilled in war." Menéndez described this quality of his men in the letter dated September 11, 1565, and sent to Philip II from St. Augustine; from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection).

52. The Royal Officials of the Casa notified Philip II of the muster in a letter sent from Seville on that date and found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

53. Repayment to Pedro Menéndez is itemized: A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B, fol. 447: 4; fol. 455; 2.

54. Gabriel de Ayala de Salzedo, who later served as Alférez for the 300 Royal troops in Florida and then became a Captain in Menéndez' Armada Real, describes the muster and payment in Cádiz. He noted that, as an arquebusier, he received his weapon and four ducats, representing two months' salary from June 17 at 2 ducats per month. The full pay of an arquebusier would have been four ducats per month. In "Captain Graviel Ayala de Salzedo," A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,222. At the payment, which evidently was made close to the sailing date, eleven corporals and 288 soldiers, 299 men in all, were paid. Each corporal received 8 ducats and each soldier four, as Ayala de Salzedo had said. See A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B, fol. 472-4. Pedro Menéndez criticized the payment Duarte made as "ruin" in his letter to the Crown of October 15, 1565, from St. Augustine, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231; in the Stetson collection.

55. See Diego López to Crown and ff., Madrid, December 7, 1571, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,222, and "Antonino Escopo. Artillero," November 8, 1570, Seville, loc. cit.; Talón's bond, in which he agrees to serve aboard San Pelayo and not absent himself, and in which he acknowledges that Pedro Menéndez has paid him 20 ducats, is found at the date of June 25, 1565, in A.P.C. Escribanía de los Cobos, fol. 297 vto.

56. Three copies of the 1565 muster roll are found in a 115-folio section of A.G.I. Justicia 817, at No. 5, within testimony before the Casa de Contratación and the Council of the Indies over Pedro Menéndez' attempt to recover funds he claimed to have paid the soldiers. The dating begins with June, 1570, and continues for three years. Labels on the various numeros of the legajo have been switched, and the pieza can only be identified by its content.

57. Alava to Philip II, Bayonne, June 8, 1565, A.D.E., VII, No. 1,076, 384-390.

58. The final payment to the men aboard San Pelayo is in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B, 472-3. Castillo's reimbursement for the water-bottles is in the same legajo, at 488-2/3. The first payment of 56,250 maravedís, as part of the 400 ducats due to the pilot Gayón, is also recorded in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B, 452-4. His final payment on this sum was recorded in A.G.I. Contaduría 299; 19: 3. The writer is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for these citations.

59. The Adelantado discusses Solís' joining the expedition in his letter to the Crown from Havana, July 1, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection).

60. "Los bastimentos, armas, artilleria y municiones que el dicho Adelantado Pero Menéndez lleba en los dichos nabios de su armada . . . en quenta de lo que hes obligado conforme a su asiento . . . por una relación jurada y firmada del dicho Adelantado Pero Menéndez . . . y Pedro del Castillo . . . que es la persona por cuta mano se an comprado y probeedo la mayor parte de todo hello . . .," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. On May 28, 1565, the Casa officials had assured Philip II that they would send veedores to Cadiz to insure that Pedro Menéndez lived up to his asiento. From A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III.

61. From "Los bastimentos, armas . . .," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

62. Menéndez' claims of his return to Cádiz and the loading of additional men aboard his ships is found in "Informacion ante el Alcalde deste Corte," Madrid, October 16, 1567, in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. In their 1567 audit, found in the same legajo, the Contadores Mayores treated Menéndez' claim as a "pretension." It was, however, not refuted by any testimony appended to the trial record.

63. From "El Capitan Luna dize ante Factor Duarte . . .," in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

64. In "Requerimiento de Luna a Castillo que le de para los fletes y costa de los soldados," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

65. loc. cit.

CHAPTER V

SPANISH VICTORY AND FIRST FOUNDATION

Pedro Menéndez' basic plan of operations for the Florida conquest involved a joint rendezvous at the Canary Islands of several contingents which sailed at different times. The united ships would then sail to the Indies, join the Santo Domingo forces and Ruelas' vessel and proceed to Florida. The expedition which left Cádiz on June 29, however, was really Menéndez' main spearhead, for it included his largest vessel, ample artillery for land and sea use, and the bulk of the troops, private and Royal.

At the time he sailed, Menéndez' main concern was to reach the French fort before Ribault's reinforcement fleet arrived. The intelligence in the hands of the Adelantado was really rather complete, for he had good knowledge of the French works at Fort Caroline, and he knew exactly the composition of the forces of Jean Ribault. Since discovery of the French settlement on the river May, the Florida enterprise had assumed military, punitive and ideological aspects. Pedro Menéndez had especial reason for hostility toward "the Lutheran French," for they stood in the way of his hopes for colonization and profits, and represented the long-time

enemy, now tagged unmistakably with the stigma of religious heresy. Menéndez was particularly alert to the charge that there were heretics among the crewmen aboard San Pelayo, and he arrested and confined several men on the ship.¹

The first stage of the voyage went well, for the expedition sighted the easternmost islands of the Canary group only five days after setting sail. On July the fourth, Menéndez' fleet entered the harbor of Las Palmas on the island of Great Canary, having come more than 750 miles. At once Pedro Menéndez saw that his ships from Asturias had missed the rendezvous. Since he could not delay further to await their arrival, Menéndez left word that, when they should arrive, they were to proceed to Puerto Rico and Havana. He would then make arrangements to meet them in the Indies.

Menéndez replenished his wood and water and rearranged the lading of his vessels in the Canaries. To correct the overcrowding which had resulted from the hasty loading of the vessels in Cádiz, it was decided to take to Florida the caravel of Jorge Dias which was originally to have returned to Spain. Menéndez then made muster of all the soldiers and seaman in the fleet, which revealed the presence of a noble stowaway, if the Adelantado had not realized it before. Pedro de Valdés, the man betrothed to the Adelantado's daughter Ana, had come along in defiance of Menéndez' wishes.² With Valdés aboard, the fleet of eight vessels

left Las Palmas on July 8, 1565 and took their departure from the great, cone-shaped peak of Teneriffe. Two of the caravels had remained in the Canary Islands to return to Spain, and the Florida fleet consisted of the Capitana, San Pelayo, the large galeota La Vitoria, the bergantín La Esperanza, the caravel San Antonio and the four shallops, Magdalena, San Miguel, La Concepción and San Andrés. The last named shallop served as Almiranta of the fleet, under the command of Diego Flores Valdés.

After an initial breeze carried the ships from port, they encountered light winds and began to separate, in spite of Menéndez' every effort to keep them together. In one group was the San Pelayo, and a smaller vessel, whose voyage is described in Menéndez' own account of the voyage. Five other vessels clustered around the Almiranta. The expedition's chaplain, Francisco López de Mendoza Grajales, sailed in this group. Father Mendoza Grajales has left a vivid narrative of the events of the voyage of the ships which accompanied the Almiranta.³ Both versions of the journey report that, in less than two weeks of their departure from the Canaries, the ships were struck by a major storm while en route to their projected landfall in the Windward Islands. Even large and staunch San Pelayo was roughly treated by towering seas and gusting winds. Since the galeass was prepared for action against the French, and had mounted heavy artillery on her upper decks, Pelayo was in some considerable

danger of foundering. After the wind carried away two of the vessel's masts, Menéndez had several pieces of artillery thrown in the sea to lighten ship. After the weather moderated, the Adelantado had jury-masts rigged from spare yards and was able to sail moderately well. The condition of his ship was such, however, that he determined to make straight for the Puerto Rico instead of attempting the usual landfall in the Windward Islands. San Pelayo and its accompanying vessel entered the harbor of San Juan on August 8.⁴

According to Father López, trouble began for the other ships, even before the hurricane struck. One of the shallows began to leak badly, left the other five vessels in the convoy and returned to the Canaries. By this time, strong winds had already begun to blow. By early morning of July 21, full hurricane winds were lashing the little vessels, while they wallowed in a wild confusion of sea and spray. All the iron cannon aboard the Almiranta were thrown into the sea, and many casks of water and other supplies, including seven millstones destined for use in Florida, were thrown overboard to lighten ship. The priest had all he could do to hear the seamen's confessions and lead them in fervent prayers for deliverance. When the winds finally moderated at noon on July 23, the Almiranta found itself sailing alone. Meanwhile, the galiot La Vitoria, which carried none of Menéndez' troops but transported large

quantities of supplies, was lost on the windward coast of Guadeloupe, in the Windward Islands, and its crew drowned or fell victim to the Carib Indians. The caravel San Antonio was blown far westward and finally arrived at the port of Santo Domingo on Hispaniola. It was eventually lost to the Florida expedition; French corsairs took the vessel with more than a hundred of Pedro Menéndez' soldiers and substantial amounts of his own supplies.⁵

The two remaining ships anchored on the leeward side of Dominica, and sent ashore to seek wood and water. They left Dominica August 8, passed Guadeloupe and Montserrat, negotiated the Virgin Islands, and entered the harbor of San Juan on August 13.⁶

When the Adelantado had brought his small convoy through the rocky harbor entrance and dropped anchor in San Juan harbor, it was evident that the first stage of his voyage to conquer Florida had been disastrous. There had been a serious depletion of Menéndez' striking force, for several vessels were missing, and he could see that the ships gathered in San Juan had been badly maltreated by the storm. Only hasty repairs were possible in Puerto Rico, but the vessels were put in some semblance of sailing condition.

Other disappointments came to the Adelantado. As he realized that Pedro de Las Ruelas, who was to provide him with a major ship and its soldiers, had fallen behind him on the journey. When Menéndez left Spain he was 22 days behind

Ruelas' fleet--at the Canaries he had cut the time between them to eight days. Now the Adelantado had reached Puerto Rico before them. Neither this reinforcement nor his own contingent from the north of Spain would be immediately available. Menéndez also learned that the Santo Domingo authorities had not yet prepared their share of the striking force for the Florida enterprise. In view of such deficiencies, Menéndez found it difficult to gather his scattered forces and meet the French challenge. The Adelantado could, nonetheless, perceive some very real assets. One of these was the spearhead of the striking force--San Pelayo. The ship was fast, heavily armed, and could carry a substantial number of soldiers and tonnage of supplies. The Adelantado also discovered a fine ally in one of the Royal Officials of Puerto Rico, Juan Ponce de Leon. Ponce sprang from the founding family of the island, that of the first Adelantado of Florida, was a large landholder and also served as Alcaide of the Fortaleza. Pedro Menéndez made common cause with Juan Ponce de Leon, gave him his poder, and thus established another base in his personal supply network. The Adelantado was able in this way to tap a source of credit at San Juan, in return for which he granted Ponce some rights expected to arise out of Menéndez' trade privilege in the Caribbean. This would also facilitate the planned purchase of cattle and horses for Florida.⁷ Menéndez was able to obtain a ship in San Juan and two small boats to

bolster his shattered fleet, and also enlisted 42 soldiers in San Juan. This gain was partly offset by the desertion of 30 of his men and three of the priests who had come on the Adelantado's ships. Menéndez threatened the deserters with perpetual galley sentences if they should ever be caught, but there was little else that he could do. A sixteenth-century military leader had often to face such wholesale desertions.

While rapid repairs were made to the ships, the Adelantado rearranged the organization of his soldiers to replace the temporary, hasty formations established in Cádiz. Menéndez turned to the traditional Spanish military formation, the tercio, perfected in the long Italian wars, which ordinarily enrolled 12 to 15 companies under a Maestre de Campo. Each company was enrolled under a captain and bore his name. The executive officer of the tercio was a Sargento Mayor, and the company was also served by an Ensign, Chaplain, Sergeant, piper and drummer. Each was further 'sub-divided into squadrons and a squadron-leader (Cabo de esquadra) assigned to each.⁸

To command his soldiery, Pedro Menéndez chose his future son-in-law, Pedro Menéndez de Valdés. In this choice, the Adelantado was consistent with his earlier selection of lieutenants, for Valdés was of a major Asturian noble family and related to the Archbishop of Seville. He was a trained soldier in the arts of war who had served the Spanish Crown

in Italy. Although only 25 years of age, he was an experienced soldier.⁹ He was, moreover, to be closely tied to Menéndez by his coming marriage. On August 13, 1565, aboard San Pelayo in San Juan harbor, Pedro Menéndez de Valdés was invested with the office of Maestre de Campo for the Florida enterprise in the following words:

"Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Governor and Captain General of the land and of the provinces of Florida and Adelantado of them, says that I have need for good government of these provinces in order to expel the Lutheran French who are in the said provinces, to discover the land and to bring its natives to the service of God, our Lord, and to the obedience of His Majesty. Thus, I have need of naming a proper and sufficient person, from among those I bring with me, to be Maestre de Campo. Thus, Pedro Menéndez de Valdés, since you have the necessary qualities . . . in the name of His Majesty, I name you to such office for this enterprise."¹⁰

Valdés' salary was to be 300 ducats a year, paid from the Adelantado's own resources. The two men began to create a coherent organization from the formless mass of manpower aboard the ships.

With the reorganization of his forces somewhat in hand, the Adelantado reviewed his strategy for the conquest of Florida. Although he knew that the French reinforcement had left Dieppe before he had departed Cádiz, Menéndez still felt fairly sure that he could arrive at the River May before Ribault's fleet. Since the French prisoners had advised him of the location of Laudonnière's fort, Menéndez planned to seize the river mouth and divide the French forces. He would next fortify his base, and hold it until reinforcements from

Asturias or the Indies would enable him to wipe out the French. This plan was risky but urgently necessary, for if the French should arrive first and unite their forces, it would be very difficult to dislodge them. In order to encourage the lagging officials in Santo Domingo to provide his reinforcements, Pedro Menéndez sent Hernando de Miranda there with the message that the royal contingent should immediately be sent to Havana to join the Adelantado there. As added inducement, he sent along a pilot skilled in the navigation of the old Bahama Channel, together with a current marine chart of the area.¹¹

One essential element in Menéndez' plan was to use mounted men to give his Florida campaign power and mobility and to overawe the Florida Indians. Menéndez arranged for the purchase of some horses from Puerto Rico, but rough weather sprang up as they loaded the animals aboard ship in San Juan harbor. Some of the horses got loose and knocked down some of the ships' bulkheads, and most of the animals had to be destroyed. Adding further to his growing sense of unease, Menéndez learned that a French corsair had captured the King's courier vessel carrying instructions to the Audiencia in Santo Domingo about the rendezvous with the Adelantado. He began to fear a French ambush somewhere along his known route to Florida.

On August 15, 1565, the little fleet left port. It consisted of San Pelayo, the almiranta San Andrés, the

shallop San Miguel, the galiot La Esperanza and the ship which Menéndez had obtained in Puerto Rico. The vessels made their way westward along the north shore of Puerto Rico, crossed the Mona Passage and came into sight of the Hispanola coast on August 17, 1565. At this point, all of the doubts and concerns which had been building up in the mind of Pedro Menéndez coalesced, and compelled an abrupt change in his plans. If he continued to Havana in the doubtful hope of finding reinforcement there, he would run the risk of interception by the French. The Adelantado determined to forego any reinforcements and strike out directly for Florida. He chose to take an untried route through the channels, shoals and islands of the Bahamas, which would avoid possible ambush and would save precious days. In taking this risky step with his diminished forces, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was staking his whole enterprise upon the gamble of first arrival in Florida.¹²

As the ships set forth on their new course, Pedro Menéndez and Maestre de Campo Valdés completed their military reorganization and announced the appointment of ten captains. Each of his captains was in command of a company of 50 men. Examination of the Adelantado's military captains discloses that they were all noblemen and experienced soldiers. Only two of Menéndez' 12 captains were soldiers paid by the Crown; the rest were carried on his own account. Nine captains--Bartolomé Menéndez, Martín Ochoa, Juan Vélez de

Medrano, Juan de San Vicente, Antonio Gómez, Francisco de Recalde, Gonzalo Solís de Merás, Diego de Amaya and Francisco de Castaneda were norteños. Two of the men--the Adelantado's brother Bartolomé and Solís de Merás were closely related to the Adelantado. Pedro Menéndez thus attempted to insure control over his organization by placing his troops under the overall command of his Asturian son-in-law, and relying upon those whom he trusted most--men from the north of Spain. He appointed Gonzalo de Villareal to the position of Sargento Mayor, and chose sergeants and ensigns who were skilled in war and experienced in Italy.¹³ Pedro Menéndez' firm organization of his troops, which included those 300 men who had been furnished by the Spanish Crown, shows clearly that he assumed full jurisdiction as Captain General for the enterprise of Florida. The Royal troops were thoroughly integrated into his organization, and there was no question of separate command.¹⁴ The seven days' journey through Bahama waters afforded time to accustom the men to their new commanders, and to carry out some training for the most inexperienced. An area was provided on San Pelayo's decks where the men could practice the loading, firing and cleaning of their arquebuses. The Adelantado's fleet finally emerged into the Gulf Stream, in the vicinity of Grand Bahama Island, and sailed north and west, taking advantage of the strong current of the Gulf Stream, to seek landfall in Florida.

The chaplain's narrative describes a sign seen in the heavens by the Spanish, during their first night in the Bahama channel. Toward morning, there appeared to the watcher's eyes the bright light of a comet which rapidly made its way across the sky in the direction of Florida. It seemed a good omen for the coming enterprise. After a day and a half in the channel, the low coastline was finally sighted in the vicinity of Cape Canaveral.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the summer months in Spain were passing in a fever of anxiety and activity for Philip II. At the time of Menéndez' departure from Cádiz, the Spanish King knew that Ribault's fleet of reinforcement had already sailed. In view of its departure, he had decided not to treat directly with the French rulers about the matter, but rather to send a copy of the May 5 parecer of the Council of the Indies to his representative at Bayonne, the Duke of Alba. Alba was then to bring the matter up on the proper occasion.¹⁶ Later it was decided that the issue of Florida should not be raised at all at Bayonne, since it might becloud the major concern of Spain at the meeting--that of the conservation and advancement of the Catholic faith in France.¹⁷ Thus the two monarchs most concerned chose to avoid a direct confrontation over Florida while their fleets sailed to their inevitable clash there.

During the long time of waiting, before any real intelligence could come from the Indies, it was inevitable

that rumors and intrigue should flourish. Early in July, Philip II heard from his ambassador in London who reported the rumor that eight French ships and 1,200 men were being prepared in England to go to Florida.¹⁸ Perhaps this referred to the second reinforcement which the Spanish feared was forthcoming to back up Ribault's fleet and further strengthen French fortifications in Florida.

In the meantime, in Andalusia, the financial embarrassment of the Seville merchants was relieved somewhat by the arrival of the New Spain fleet on July 10 but commercial conditions continued somewhat disturbed. Governor Mazariegos of Havana had sent five of the Frenchmen captured in the port of Arcos the previous December in one of the ships. After interrogation, the men were placed in the Casa jail. While Frenchmen's confessions were being taken, the Seville officials were still discussing another deposition recorded four days before the fleet dropped anchor in the Bay of Cádiz, when one Juan Sánchez had stated to the Casa officials at Cádiz that he had just come from Florida. Sánchez claimed that he had been captured seven months before in the Bahama channel by a 500-ton French ship. According to the man's story, he was carried a prisoner to the French fort in Florida, which he described in great detail. He claimed that it was a stone fortress with four towers which mounted 40 pieces of artillery and had a garrison of 3,000 Englishmen and 2,000 Frenchmen. The Captain of this supposed

settlement, said Sánchez, was one Robert Hawkins, an Englishman. Having given his testimony, the man disappeared, and neither he nor his companions could be found by agents of the Casa de Contratación. On August 15, the Seville officials sent the message to the King.¹⁹

Now Philip II had occasion to weigh the adequacy of his measures to expel the French and expunge their threat to the Spanish Indies. He and his counsellors had previously understood that a sizeable French reinforcement would be forthcoming. After they learned of the departure of Ribault's ships, the Spanish came to believe that other French vessels were also being prepared to go to Florida. By the end of July, the Spanish King decided that the measures previously taken--the sending of the Menéndez expedition and the troops and ships to be provided for the Adelantado in the Indies--were insufficient. Philip notified the Casa in Seville that the previous efforts were not enough to dislodge the French already in Florida and the others who had gone and would shortly go to reinforce them. The King saw the threat as substantial and widespread, extending to all the islands of the Spanish Caribbean, and told his officials in Seville that planned to reinforce Menéndez further by raising fifteen hundred armed troops and sending another armada to Florida. Philip added that he felt that this reinforcing fleet should be sent, if possible, that very August and should go supplied for a year.²⁰

As the effort began to locate appropriate vessels for Royal embargo and to begin the recruitment of troops for the new expedition, still more news and rumor came to the Spanish officials.

As Pedro Menéndez' ships sighted the Florida coast and moved northward toward Fort Caroline, testimony was being taken in Seville from yet another witness of French activity. The treasurer of the Casa de Contratación received the sworn deposition of a man who claimed to have left Le Havre on the previous August 16, where he saw four ships being armed and equipped for a voyage to Florida.

As the summer of alarms and rumors drew to a close, concrete activity for the arming of the second Florida expedition slowly got underway, but the fleet was not ready to sail by the end of September. On September 4, however, the Seville officials reported to Philip II that captains had been appointed to recruit 1,500 troops and supplies and munitions for the armada were being slowly gathered and placed in the storehouses in Seville. The Casa had previously advised Philip of their difficulty in finding suitably seaworthy vessels and cannon. It was now clear that the Spanish reinforcement could not arrive in Florida in time to aid Pedro Menéndez in his immediate tactical situation. They might still arrive in time to bolster what the Crown now saw as a lengthy effort to dislodge a numerous and dangerous foe.²¹ Meanwhile, the issue lay firmly in the

hands of the Adelantado. Since he had decided to strike directly with the slim forces at his disposal, the contest would be decided in Florida.

As Pedro Menéndez sighted Cape Canaveral and turned his course northward, the French fleet of reinforcement under Jean Ribault was just about to arrive at the mouth of the River May. Its outbound voyage from France had taken place in two stages. As the Spanish had been told, Ribault had indeed sailed from Dieppe on May 22, 1565 after receiving his final orders from Admiral Coligny. It is evident that the French commander had also received some word of the Menéndez expedition being prepared in Cádiz.²² Weather compelled the French fleet to take refuge on the Isle of Wight for more than two weeks. After their Atlantic crossing, the French arrived at the Gulf Stream in the vicinity of 27° of north latitude, and they crossed directly to the Indian River area. When they landed to seek fresh water at a small inlet, the Frenchmen traded with Indians for silver from wrecked Spanish ships, and found a Spanish castaway who had been captive there for 20 years. Ribault took the man aboard his ships and sailed northward to find Laudonnière's fort.²³

There is striking contrast between the voyages of Pedro Menéndez and Jean Ribault. Although both fleets required two months for their ocean crossings, the French dissipated the two-week lead they held over the Spanish. While Pedro

Menéndez was driven by urgency to risk the Bahama passage with his reduced forces, Ribault was leisurely cruising the Florida coast on his way to Fort Caroline. Thus, on the day that Jean Ribault dropped anchor off the St. Johns, Pedro Menéndez had already made his Florida landfall at Cape Canaveral.

While the opposing fleets made their way to Florida, the Laudonnière settlement had undergone a summer of crisis. After the return of the mutineers from the Caribbean late in May and the punishment of their ringleaders, Rene de Laudonnière had found himself increasingly hard-pressed to keep order among his men as their necessity increased. The reinforcements he had long expected from France had not arrived, and the search for food among the Indians had endangered the good relations Laudonnière had sought to maintain with the natives. On August 3, the colony had been revived by the visit of John Hawkins, who brought food and sold a small ship to the Frenchmen. After the English corsair had left, Laudonnière and his men prepared to vacate Fort Caroline and return to France. By August 15, their supplies were ready, and only a fair wind was lacking to speed their departure.

When the Indians brought word to the French fort that several sails were in sight off the river mouth, Laudonnière feared that his Spanish enemy had come upon him. His suspense was ended the next afternoon when seven small craft crossed

the river bar, loaded with armed soldiers, and with banners snapping in the breeze. The Huguenots ashore could see the hulls of seven larger vessels anchored offshore, and finally the forces met, to be mutually identified as French. The Ribault reinforcement had almost come too late, but it had at last arrived.

Ribault began the lengthy process of unloading supplies, munitions and troops from his ships. He had arrived with written Royal orders that he replace Rene de Laudonnière and send him home, but the newly-arrived French leader offered to keep his predecessor in charge at Fort Caroline. Laudonnière set to work with his own men and the newly arrived Frenchmen to put the defenses of the fort in good order, while the discharge of the ships was accomplished by Pierre d'Uilly, Ribault's chief of finance and supply. Laudonnière was worn by strain and labor, and fell ill for more than a week while unloading continued. Finally, the three smaller vessels Ribault had brought from France were lightened enough by the discharge of their cargoes to pass over the bar and enter the river, which they did on the fourth of September. Off the inlet, the four main French ships had swung around their anchors to face a steady south wind.

By mid-afternoon of the same day, lookouts aboard the anchored vessels could see five sails coming north before the wind. Then they were blotted from view by a summer

thunderstorm, which swept torrents of rain, laced with lightning, across the sea. The oncoming ships, pushed ahead by the squall winds, came to within a mile and a half of the French anchorage before the breeze lightened and then died completely. As the Frenchmen strained to identify the limp flags on the mastheads of the strange ships, they could not help but wonder if the Spanish had at last arrived in Florida.

They were indeed the ships of Pedro Menéndez. Since the French prisoners had told him that the French fort lay in from 28° to 29° latitude, the Adelantado coasted northward from his landfall, exploring every inlet and every plume of smoke rising from the shore. On September 2, he had reached the latitude of 29 1/2° and sent a shore party to examine an Indian settlement.²⁴ After its captain reported to the Adelantado that the Indians seemed to possess information about the French fort, Menéndez went ashore himself to parley with them. It was most important to Menéndez to impress upon the natives his own personal authority as surrogate of the Castilian King, in order to seek allies against the French and to aid in his future plans for colonization. The visit was most successful, and convinced the Adelantado that even though he had passed the latitude where the French fort was supposed to be, he should continue to the north to seek it.

On the next morning, which was the 4th of September, the five Spanish vessels picked their way along a shoreline of wide and spacious beaches. About two in the afternoon, they sighted four anchored vessels moored off the mouth of a great river. As the afternoon thunderstorm swelled and burst in a shower of rain, Menéndez' look-outs discerned French standards flying from the Trinité, Ribault's flagship. Immediately the news was brought to him, Pedro Menéndez experienced a great revulsion of feeling. Since he had learned in Cádiz that French reinforcements had sailed from Dieppe, every fibre of Menéndez' being had been stretched to beat the French to Florida. His entire voyage, and his vital decision to go directly to Florida without reinforcements was predicated on one thing--to arrive first at the mouth of the River May. Now he had lost the race and Jean Ribault had won. As the gusty winds of the summer squall died and choppy waters became glassy calm, the Spanish ships drifted, making no headway toward the enemy. The Adelantado quickly weighed the state of his forces and determined, as soon as the wind would permit, to attack at sea.²⁵

Finally, well after night had fallen, the breeze began to blow again, filling the sails of the Spanish ships and bringing them closer to the anchored French. Menéndez determined to proceed in the dark, anchor closely among the French ships and be in position to attack them at first dawn.

In that way, the French men within the river would not have time to furnish any aid to their four larger ships. As the great San Pelayo and the four smaller Spanish vessels glided among the French ships and let go their anchors, hails and shouts were exchanged. The first questions were meant, by both sides, to furnish positive identification. The Spanish asked specifically who commanded the French forces, and were told in reply that Jean Ribault was the leader authorized by the King of France. The French then queried the Spanish flagship, put the same question, and received the reply that they were indeed Spanish, led by the rightful Adelantado of the provinces of Florida, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. They were further told that the rightful ruler of these lands and waters, King Philip II, had given his Adelantado orders to burn and hang the Lutheran French he might find there. In the morning, the French vessels would be boarded, and if they proved to be such people, the justice of the Spanish King would surely be carried out.

After this exchange, an outburst of shouts and curses came in a babble of tongues. Someone called out from the Trinité, taunting the Spanish and asking why they should wait until morning. Pedro Menéndez decided to attack, even though it was dark. He had anchored San Pelayo so closely to the French flagship that the current had swung the great galeass' stern right around to the bow of Trinité. Menéndez

ordered his anchor line to be paid out, so that the two vessels would come alongside each other for boarding. As he gave this order, all the French ships cut their anchor lines, raised their sails, and began to move away to leeward. Since the large bronze cannon on San Pelayo's decks were shotted for action against the French, the artilleros got off five shots at the fleeing Frenchmen, but could not discern in the darkness what damage had been done to Trinité by the Spanish fire.

As soon as they could get underway, Menéndez and Diego Flores Valdés led contingents of the Spanish fleet in a night-long chase of the French, but, with vessels still bearing the marks of the July hurricane, the Spanish were unable to catch the more rapid-sailing French. At dawn, it was evident to Menéndez that his enemy had escaped, so he determined to put his original plan into motion. Calling his scattered forces together, he sailed back again to the river mouth, where he proposed to seize the point of land adjoining the inlet. By interdicting the river to the French forces off-shore, he could carry out his first objective. What the Adelantado had not counted on, however, was that almost all of the French soldiery had disembarked and was, in fact, drawn up in fine order on shore, while the three smaller French vessels had stationed themselves as a barrier right across the river mouth. Since Pelayo could

not cross the bar and heavy forces opposed him ashore, Menéndez decided not to accept the challenge. He sailed south to make his own establishment and take up what might prove to be a long campaign.

Examination of the opposing forces in Florida at this point can provide some evaluation of their relative strengths, as they faced each other for mastery. Insofar as naval tonnage was concerned, the Spanish held an almost two-for-one edge, but a large part of this tonnage was in one ship--the galeass San Pelayo. That great gun-platform could indeed outrange any opponent, but was still not fully re-rigged after the hurricane had struck it west of the Canaries. The French had, in fact, just demonstrated that they could outsail Menéndez' vessels.²⁶ In the holds of the French vessels lay an enormous wealth of bronze artillery, which remained only a potential weapon until the dismounted guns could be put into service. Insofar as manpower was concerned, the two opponents were nearly equal. Menéndez advised that he commanded some 800 souls--500 soldiers, 200 seamen and 100 others. On the French side, there were an equivalent number of soldiers, possibly 200 hundred officers and sailors, and the remaining effectives from Laudonnière's original garrison of 300, depleted by death, disease and corsairing in the Caribbean.²⁷ The main striking force, in any land action would be the armed and trained arquebusier, of which each side possessed 500. With regard to the matter

of supply, it appears that the ship losses Pedro Menéndez had suffered to date had not destroyed his basic store of supplies, food, and munitions, much of which was still safely stowed aboard San Pelayo. On their side, the French had come well supplied for an expedition of settlement and conquest, a part of which had been unloaded. In sum, after striking some balance of advantages and disadvantages, the two sides were roughly equal. Under such circumstances, the decisive factor would be that of leadership, as the action began.

The Spanish fleet sailed southward, then anchored off the wide bar of St. Augustine, which they had discovered a few days before. On the 8th of September, with ceremony and ritual, the Adelantado of Florida was landed from his vessels and formally took possession of the land in the name of the King of Spain. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was then sworn in as Adelantado as well as Captain General and Governor, together with the captains and officials of the expedition. The occasion was not a mere ceremony nor did it simply mark a beginning date for the Spanish occupation of Florida. It held much greater significance.

The first stage of a Spanish conquest--that of the construction of the political foundation upon which its social and economic structure should be built--was then and there accomplished. The first essential, the act of possession-taking itself, done with solemnity and made a

public record, fulfilled the requirements of the King's ordinances for conquest.²⁸

To halt at this point, however, would be to overlook a vital part of the machinery for Spanish conquest and settlement. A major purpose of an Adelantado was to introduce a most significant medium of conquest--the municipal institutions of Spain.²⁹ One of these institutions--the concejo--was juridically based on the military and governmental center which was the city proper, but its limits and its influence extended far beyond that area. In St. Augustine, each man could expect to become a vecino or citizen of the municipality who would be granted a city lot, his solar, and would also be given land to cultivate in the rural sections of the concejo. Through the estates thus granted, the Spanish municipality reached out into the country as the primary institution of settlement. The role of the Adelantado was essential in establishing, protecting and commanding this organism. In each of the Florida settlements to be made, beginning with St. Augustine, Menéndez named the Alcalde and Regidores of the first cabildo. Royal Treasury officials would later be named. There was thus created a microcosm of Castilian civilization to effect the conquest, as the Spanish ventured forth into new and uncertain territory, basing their enterprise firmly upon their ancient urban customs.³⁰ Pedro Menéndez moved to fulfill these traditions. As noted by Barcia:

"The Adelantado had set up the courts and the municipal government in St. Augustine and left as Alcalde his brother Bartolomé, who had always been a governor. He held the first session of the Cabildo with the officers of the Ayuntamiento, who were the captains. It was decided that appeal from the sentences handed down by the Alcalde and Regidores would be handled by the Maestre de Campo, whom he had named his Lieutenant General, in accordance with the royal authority he possessed."³¹

At St. Augustine, the first step had been made. To those who took part that day in the ceremonies of establishment, the other steps would shortly follow. Their expectations were great, for every free man, no matter how humble, could hope at least for the status of labrador, farmer, and would gain land for his own cultivation. Each man hoped to raise his status, but this advance would be along a well known and traditional scale. As a matter of course, the hierarchial society of Asturias or Andalusia would be reproduced in Florida. The higher the rank of the settler, the more exalted his vision of his future estate. If he were but a soldier, he could hope for land and profit. If he were noble, his expectations were greater--he could picture his city and country homes, complete with Spanish and Indian vassals, land, cattle, and horses. He hoped for profit through familiar and established agricultural enterprise: the raising of cattle for local consumption and hides and the cultivation and refining of sugar for export.

It was evident that this hoped-for utopia of mutual hopes could only be built where there were peaceful and

fruitful relationships with the Florida Indians, a number of whom attended and observed the ceremonies of possession-taking and governmental establishment that day in St. Augustine. The Spanish who came to Florida found themselves in the midst of one of the great culture-areas of the native peoples of the southeast. From a line north of the St. Johns and St. Marys rivers westward to the Aucilla River southward to Charlotte Harbor and Cape Canaveral lived the people known as Timucuans. Although these Indians generally shared cultural characteristics, they were divided into separate, warring groupings. The most powerful chief was Saturiba, whose seat of authority was located close to Fort Caroline, near present-day Mayport. Further north dwelt the Tacatacuru. To the south, up the St. Johns River, was the home of chief Calibay. Even further south dwelt the rival to Saturiba, Utina, and in the very upper reaches of the St. Johns lay the kingdom of Macoya or Mayaca. Some of the best descriptions of the life and culture of the northeastern Florida Indians came from the French, particularly through the narrative and pictures of Jacques Le Moyne de Morgues and the insights recorded by René de Laudonnière. The 16th century Adelantados such as Pedro Menéndez had no appreciation of comparative religion or interest in anthropology. Menéndez does, however, describe the northeastern Florida Indians with some insight in the following passage:

"The ceremonies of these natives, for the greater part, are to worship the Sun and Moon; they have dead stags and other animals for idols. Each year they make three or four feasts for their devotions, where they worship the Sun. They are three days without food, drink or sleep; these are their fasts. He who is weak, who cannot suffer this, is taken for a bad Indian. He goes about scorned by the noble people. He who passes best through these troubles is taken for the principal, and is given the most courtesy. They are a people of many strengths, swift, and great swimmers. They have many wars with each other, and no chief among them is recognized as powerful."³²

It is the best measure of the distance which the Florida conquest would have to travel in order to realize the expectations of the Spaniards that relations with the Florida Indians were in a very primitive first stage, one of mutual exploration at arms' length. In this time of first contact, Menéndez elected to act with caution, because of legal proscriptions against the exploitation of the Indians, and because of the existing state of affairs in Florida. The Spanish had landed in a place where the French had clearly established a degree of influence with the Indians, and the native cultures were in a condition of strong organization. By contrast, the Spanish invaders had as yet insufficient number and power to effect a total conquest, so Menéndez sought to implant Spanish settlements alongside of the Indian cultures without disturbing their essential rights in the land. He did not endeavor to change at once their religious and political arrangements.

Wherever he went in Florida, the Adelantado proclaimed the overlordship of Philip II as rightful ruler of the land, and sought to make agreements with the Indians based upon this concept. As a practical matter, however, the Spanish lacked the power to enforce the relationship. They were, moreover, dealing in a situation of war; even though the Crown forbade alliances with one Indian group against another, the realities of the French-Spanish struggle dictated that some Indians would be friends and some would be enemies.

Far from reaching the stage of encomienda or repartimiento, relations between the Spanish and the Florida Indians were still in the stage of trade for booty known as rescate. Under the agreement with his Indian friends, Pedro Menéndez was to receive tribute in the name of his King. Before the pacification of the country had reached the state where outlying agricultural settlements could function in peace, tribute was to be paid at the top level--from Indian chiefs directly to the Adelantado. Evangelization of the natives had to await further developments. In this first stage, when the number of interpreters was few and the language barrier requisitely great, religious contact was limited. The clergymen who had come on the first expedition were intended to provide religious examples to the Indians and to furnish the sacraments to the Spaniards in the expedition. They could accustom the natives to the broad outlines

of the Christian faith and give some hint of the mystic power of its chief symbols, but more complete religious instruction and the use of the doctrina would have to await the coming of trained missionaries and a more settled relationship with the Indians.

On the day of the formal possession-taking at St. Augustine, Pedro Menéndez named his brother Bartolomé Governor of the district of St. Augustine, which extended from San Mateo to the river of Mosquitos. Bartolomé was also designated Alcaide, or warder of the fort. As the Adelantado signed the formal certificate of appointment for his brother, the men improved that part of Chief Seloy's village which they were laboring to convert into a fort. The language of the document imparts the atmosphere in St. Augustine that day:

Because the Lutheran French are fortified . . . teaching their evil sect among the Indians, I need to establish arrangements here, while I go to expel them . . . it is necessary to make a fort in the port of St. Augustine to guard the port so that His Majesty's vessels can navigate freely . . . they are making a place in it where the artillery and munitions will be . . .³³

In the meantime, the French, having felt out the Spanish forces in their first skirmish, and having reconnoitered the Spanish establishment at St. Augustine, returned to Fort Caroline where Jean Ribault and his captains assembled for a council in the bedroom of the ailing René de Laudonnière. From the friendly Indian Emola, they had word that the

Spanish had begun to build a fort, and had landed in force to establish themselves there. It was decided in the council that they should descend upon the Spanish with all their larger ships, for the enemy might be caught with his forces divided while unloading supplies. In spite of Laudonnière's objection to the plan, the motion carried and most of the French left the fort, even taking along 38 of Laudonnière's soldiers. Estimates of the garrison remaining in Fort Caroline ranged from 150 to 240. It had been substantially weakened in order to bolster up the marine striking force.³⁴ Ribault left the Sieur de Lys to aid Laudonnière in the fort. After delaying two days to assemble their forces, the four main vessels of Ribault's fleet sailed southward together with a number of small craft, carrying altogether 400 soldiers and 200 seamen.

In the meantime, Pedro Menéndez was increasingly anxious over the safety of his most valuable asset, San Pelayo, and was fearful that it might be captured by the French or lost in a September storm on the little-known Florida coast. Even though its cargo was not fully discharged, Menéndez determined to send the galeass to Hispaniola. He unloaded much of the arms and ammunition from the great ship, but left the bulk of the food supplies aboard. This left him enough rations ashore to last him into January, when he hoped to have San Pelayo back. It was after midnight on the 10th of September when San Pelayo sailed, and when dawn

broke on the morning of the 11th, Spanish seamen and soldiers were caught unloading munitions near the St. Augustine bar when the French fleet suddenly appeared. Even though the tide was low, Menéndez was able to escape across the bar to safety. The French, after sailing around briefly, went off to the southward, seeking to find and destroy the San Pelayo.

On the second day after the French attack, a storm, which may well have been a hurricane--struck the area. It began with strong and heavy north winds, which (as Menéndez sensed at once) prevented the French from returning immediately to their base. His instincts also told him that the French had left no great garrison at Fort Caroline, and had probably put their best troops into their marine assault. He was told by friendly Indians that one could reach the lower St. Johns and Fort Caroline by way of the Matanzas River, and could thus take the French works from the rear. Pedro Menéndez decided to attack, left less than 300 men at St. Augustine under the charge of Bartolomé Menéndez, and set out on the 18th of September to assault Fort Caroline. Menéndez' 500 arquebusiers, led by their captains, were guided by Pedro de Valdés and the Adelantado himself in the general direction given by the Indians. Once they reached the near vicinity of the fort, they would be guided by one of the French prisoners brought from Spain. During the storm, heavy rains had fallen and continued to fall during

the next several days. The route of the Spaniards carried them along low areas west of the sandy coastal ridge and led them alongside broad, grassy sloughs. In normal weather, small streams wound through the marsh grass in these low areas, but the inundations of rain had converted these lowlands into lakes. The normal banks were overrun and the water rose into the tangled underbrush which lay beyond. In such conditions, the march was difficult and arduous. In the vanguard went Basque axmen who could prepare the way for the little army. By the evening of September 19, the Adelantado estimated that they had come 45 miles, and were less than three miles from the site of the fort. The Spanish column left the low and marshy land, crossed open pine-barrens, and finally reached rolling country. Here, near the banks of the river, was deep virgin forest, studded with many magnificent oak and maple trees and covered thickly by wild grapevines.

At nightfall, the leaders and their captains labored to gather the straggling forces and camped for the night in great discomfort from the continuing rains. Sometime before daybreak, the men were aroused and the Frenchman began to direct the Spanish toward Fort Caroline. At this point, Menéndez' purpose was only to try the defenses of the fort after an approach under cover of the woods on the south side.

The French garrison inside the works was markedly inferior in numbers to the Spanish force which approached it,

in about the ratio of one to two. The make-up of the garrison itself, moreover, rendered its inferiority even greater. Perhaps less than 100 of those within the fort were capable of bearing arms. The worst weakness of Fort Caroline, however, was its lack of vigorous leadership, for authority for the garrison was divided between the Sieur de Lys and Rene de Laudonnière. As a result of this division of command and the illness of Laudonnière, little had been done to put the fort into a state of defense. Some work had been accomplished on the palisades, but a strong and vigilant guard was not being maintained.³⁵

As dawn broke over Fort Caroline amid pelting rain, some of the sentinels left their posts because of the weather. The Spanish drew near the fort, discovered a lone French sentry outside and captured him. Pedro de Valdés then led the way as the Spanish quickly forced the poorly defended main gate with two battle standards carried by his side. The Spaniards swarmed in after their flags and quickly took the fort. As the Frenchmen poured out of their lodgings in their nightclothing, they were cut down. One hundred and thirty-two were killed within the fort in what, by all accounts, must have been a confused, violent scene. A French eyewitness has described the slaughter:

They made a pretty butchery of it, except for a small enough number, among which were the deponent, three drummers (one from Dieppe, the other two from Rouen), and four trumpeters (three from Normandy and the other, named Jacque DuLac, from Bordeaux).³⁶

Forty-five men climbed the stockade and escaped into the woods, or plunged into the river in an attempt to reach the French vessels anchored near the fort. Among these were Rene de Laudonnière himself, the carpenter Le Challeux, and the artist Jacques Le Moyne. Pedro Menéndez, who entered the fort after the first wave of attackers, called out to his men to spare the women and children huddled within the huts. Some 50 of these were granted their lives.

When he had gained control of the fort, Menéndez held parley with Jacques Ribault, son of the French commander, aboard the Pearl anchored just off the fort stockade. When negotiations broke down, the Spanish opened fire with a cannon and sank one of the small vessels. The men aboard Pearl and Levrière cut their cables and moved down closer to the river mouth, to a place of comparative safety.³⁷

The Adelantado surveyed the arms of the captured fort, but found only a few bronze guns with some ammunition. The spoils of war also included 200 casks of flour and wine, some hogs, sheep and donkeys, and a quantity of silver the French had obtained from the Indians. The victorious Spanish soldiery appropriated most of the booty, except for the food, artillery and ammunition, which Menéndez put under guard. He also had come into possession of two small French craft as well as the sunken ship in the river; another boat was found under construction near the fort.

The rejoicing and feasting of the victors was somewhat tempered by the discovery in the fort of some of the books and symbols of the Huguenot religion. These, and the presence of the heretic women and children, gave the Spaniards deep disquiet. Menéndez made a mental note to have the French dependents sent away as soon as possible. He began to negotiate with the Indians for the ransoming of some of those men who had fled Fort Caroline and been captured by Saturiba's Indians. The French nobles would be valuable properties whose ransom could bring large sums from their families in France.³⁸

Those surviving Frenchmen who had escaped searching Spaniards and the Indians gathered aboard a little cluster of anchored vessels near the river mouth. After consultation between Jacques Ribault and René de Laudonnière, the three smaller craft were scuttled and sunk in the river. On September 25, the French set out in the Pearl and Levrière for France without any attempt to join Jean Ribault. Pedro Menéndez wished to take the escaped Frenchmen and return to his St. Augustine base to protect it against assault by Jean Ribault. On September 23, the Adelantado set out across the same country he had traversed the week before, and left a garrison behind in the captured fort, now renamed San Mateo, under the command of Gonzalo de Villaroel. At St. Augustine, his welcome and the celebration of his victory was tumultuous.

In deep contrast, there was no joy whatever among the men who had been aboard Jean Ribault's ships. The storm which had lashed the coast and interrupted the raid on Pedro Menéndez on the 11th of September had driven the ships to the southward. Desperately, the shipmasters attempted to claw their way out to sea, but as the strong winds shifted and they lost sails, masts and rudders, the vessels were driven toward the shore. One by one, they stranded and broke up in the heavy surf. Three of the heavier ships were wrecked in the vicinity of the Mosquito (Ponce de Leon) inlet, and many of their men drowned in the churning seas. The flagship Trinité, with its commander and crew, grounded intact not far from Cape Canaveral and most of its men came safely ashore. One smaller craft managed to make its way free of the winds and seas. Its crew decided to leave Florida waters and go to the Caribbean.³⁹

The shipwrecked men found themselves lost upon a hostile shore, with their supplies destroyed or damaged in the storm. As Indians appeared along the beaches to raid the scattered survivors, the castaways gathered into two large parties for mutual defense. One of these was formed of survivors from the Trinité; the other of men from the other ships. After mutual communication the separate groups began a long trek northward, headed for Fort Caroline.

In the meantime, Pedro Menéndez had begun to take stock of his resources in order to be ready to strike again at his

enemies. Having disposed of the French fort, his major concern was the marine striking force of Jean Ribault. He was now ready for San Pelayo to return with his reinforcements from Santo Domingo and Havana, for he realized that the supplies aboard his galeass would soon be sorely needed in Florida. He sent Gonzalo Gayón in San Andrés to search for Pelayo in the islands, and dispatched Juan Rodriguez on the same errand in San Mateo, a renamed vessel which had once been French.⁴⁰ It was also necessary to resupply the soldiers sent by the Crown and outfitted at Cádiz, for many of them, Menéndez claimed, had left their arms and clothing aboard San Pelayo in the haste of its departure. Pedro Menéndez furnished the men from his own stores, and the men signed a document agreeing that they had received 150 reales' worth of goods apiece.⁴¹

On September 28, friendly Indians brought the Adelantado the news that many Frenchmen had gathered on the south shore of a small inlet of the sea 18 miles from St. Augustine. With one company of men, Chaplain Mendoza Grajales, and a French prisoner for interpreter, Menéndez set out and arrived at the inlet at dawn on September 29. After some shouted exchanges across the water, Menéndez and his interpreter spoke at length with a French pilot and shipmaster. The Frenchman told Menéndez frankly the situation of his marooned countrymen. After Pedro Menéndez broke the news of the taking of Fort Caroline to the envoy, he sent

him back to his fellows with the message that he was their enemy, bound to pursue them with fire and blood war to extermination. Shortly a French nobleman came to parley with Menéndez, asking for their lives in return for surrender. The Adelantado claims that he said that they could place themselves at his mercy, but that he made them no guarantees of safety.⁴²

As a practical matter, the options open to the French at Matanzas were few and poor. If they turned away to the southward, they could only expect starvation, death or captivity at the hands of the Indians. The friendly base to which they had been marching was now occupied by their enemy. They chose to surrender, and were ferried across the inlet in small parties. Their hands were tied, and they were taken a short distance beyond, to a place out of sight behind the dunes. Pedro Menéndez removed the French pilot, four carpenters and caulkers, and 12 Breton sailors from the group of bound men. He spared their lives, and had the rest put to the knife.⁴³

Menéndez returned to St. Augustine with his prisoners. Since he had learned that Jean Ribault still lived, he feared that Ribault might refloat his flagship and threaten the Spanish settlement. The Adelantado placed cannon at the St. Augustine bar and posted sentinels and lookouts. He began his first report to his King since the taking of the French fort. Writing with an obvious feeling of elation,

the Asturian recounted the events of his victories over the enemy, listed the booty found in the fort and described his general strategic situation. Menéndez emphasized anew the continuing threat posed by the French to the whole Atlantic coastline and to the galleon routes. To counter the danger, the Adelantado proposed to build a fort further south, to anchor the Bahama Channel and complement the works at Havana and St. Augustine. He then shifted his subject to a major interest--his future settlements in the north.

Menéndez stated that he would go first to Santa Elena to found a colony. Then he would pass along to the Bay of Santa Maria, where, he again reminded Philip II, lay the key to the entire continent. It was there that the great waterway to the southwest, which offered a new and shorter route to return the New Spain silver to Spain, lay waiting. He planned to protect this route by fortifying a town in the Province of Coça, inland at the foot of the mountains. The great kingdom thus secured would be rich in cattle, vineyards, and sugar plantings. Its timber resources would provide naval stores, so that ship-building could flourish along its coasts. In Menéndez' view, his mission in the vast stretches of land called Florida was to "fix our frontier lines here, gain the waterway of the Bahamas, and work the mines of New Spain."⁴⁴

The King's Adelantado reminded his sovereign of the costs he had undergone in his Florida effort. He advised

that he had committed a thousand people so far to the enterprise, counting those en route to Florida but not yet arrived. Although the contract only obliged him to bring 500 persons for the conquest, he had asked Pedro del Castillo to send 300 soldiers in addition to the 1,000 already committed. Menéndez urged the King to increase the Royal forces in Florida to the level of the promised 500. For his own costs, the Adelantado stated that he would need 30,000 ducats. He pledged his willingness to devote all the funds he could earn or borrow from his friends or kinsmen, but begged that the King hasten the payment of monies due him in Seville.

Pedro Menéndez' letter writing was interrupted at this point. First, news was brought to him of the burning of Fort San Mateo; he dispatched food and munitions to the place at once by sea, and realized that supplies would now be shorter than ever. Then there came another urgent message to the Adelantado: more Frenchmen had come to the inlet where the first group had been killed, and among them was Jean Ribault. This time, Menéndez took 150 armed men and arrived at the place at dawn on October 11. The drama played out on the banks of the inlet now called Matanzas followed much the same course as before. After almost an entire day of negotiation, the French leader came himself under a flag of truce to see the Adelantado of Florida. When the two antagonists faced each other personally for the

first and last time, they met under vastly different circumstances than when the two fleets had clashed off the St. Johns river mouth a month before. Although he attempted to do so, Ribault could not move Pedro Menéndez from his terms of surrender: The Frenchmen must yield themselves entirely to the mercies of the Spaniard. The next morning, half of the French force chose to retain their liberty--they retreated southward away from the Spanish. Jean Ribault, together with several of his captains and 70 of his men, came to surrender and be taken across the water. A few of the Frenchmen were taken as captives and the rest were killed. Among the dead was Jean Ribault. The major enemy figure had now been eliminated, together with the greater part of his forces.⁴⁵

Menéndez commissioned Diego Flores de Valdés to sail at once in the San Miguel to carry the tidings of victory to Philip II. At the same time, he dispatched Francisco Genovés to Puerto Rico with 50 Huguenot women and children, survivors from Fort Caroline. Genovés was also to seek and inquire further about the whereabouts of San Pelayo, now gone more than a month from Florida. At this moment of triumph for Pedro Menéndez, he had no way of knowing that his great ship had been seized by heretic mutineers aboard, and was even then on its way to Europe where it was shortly lost on the coast of Denmark.⁴⁶

Within two weeks after the second slaughter of the French at the inlet of Matanzas, word came that many survivors from the lost Ribault ships had gathered and fortified themselves at Cape Canaveral. Pedro Menéndez determined to make a foray into the area of the great cape. The expedition would serve to expunge the remaining French, to explore a section where the Adelantado hoped to plant a fort, and would also enable further search for Juan Menéndez. In the last of October, Pedro Menéndez left St. Augustine with 250 men divided between a land and sea force. Three small craft commanded by Diego de Amaya sailed southward close to shore. Along the beaches marched the Adelantado with 150 of his soldiers. The boats offshore carried the bulk of the supplies and munitions for the expedition.

One early dawn in the very first of November, Pedro Menéndez approached a point just a few miles above the headland of Cape Canaveral. There the Frenchmen had created a rough earthworks surmounted by six bronze cannon from the Trinité. Nearby, they had a small boat well along in construction. Huguenot sentries gave the alarm as they spied the morning sun flashing upon the helmets and armor of the Spaniards. From the sea they could see three boats closing in upon them. Alarmed, the Frenchmen fled over the sand ridges through the low palmetto into deeper woods to the westward. The Adelantado sent a French prisoner, a trumpeter, to offer safety to the enemy if they would

surrender. Except for a few of their leaders, the Frenchmen came in and yielded to the Spanish. Perhaps 75 were thus captured. The crude fort was burned, the boat destroyed, the cannon buried in the sand, and the expedition continued southward.⁴⁷

As his land forces, swollen by the number of the French prisoners, slogged along the long expanse of beach which stretches like a crescent moon south from Cape Canaveral, the Adelantado of Florida entered a new and distinctive part of his kingdoms. As the marching men moved down the narrowing island they soon caught glimpses of the broad open waters of the Indian River. Menéndez could quickly see that the waterway would afford protected navigation by small craft which would enable more rapid and secure communication along the central East Coast.

The Spanish had also entered a quite different culture-area of the Florida Indians. The people who lived in this area, who were called the Ais, had built a long and stable culture organized almost entirely around the sea. Their life was sustained by turtles, fish and shellfish from the river, inlets and the ocean. Over 20 years of acquaintance with Spanish shipwrecks along the east coast had accustomed the Indians to the taking of white prisoners and the salvage of ships. By 1565, they had already built a reputation for ferocity and cruelty which compelled the advancing Spanish to move with caution. When they came to the place where the

land between river and ocean was a mere sand-spit, they had arrived at a thick cluster of Indian villages and the dwelling place of the chief of the Ais.⁴⁸

The first meeting between the Spanish and the Indian chiefs went very well indeed. Although communication was difficult between the men, Pedro Menéndez and the Cacique Ais concluded an agreement, in which the Indian swore fealty to Philip II and promised peace and obedience. Menéndez sealed the treaty with gifts of clothing and personal jewelry. He undertook no direct trade for bullion, but noted the gold and silver ornaments worn by the Indians. A number of the soldiers did engage in trading for the precious metals. Since the need of the Spanish who had come by land for food was becoming acute, they welcomed the coming of the three supply boats with joy. When Amaya landed there was momentary relaxation from the tension which short rations had brought, and the place was named "Puerto de Socorro." It was soon realized, however, that the food-stuffs on hand could not last the Spaniards and their French prisoners for long and the Indians had little food which the Spaniards would eat. To return to the forts in the north would be no solution, for they had no reserves after the burning of Fort San Mateo. The Adelantado decided, after consultation with his captains, to proceed with his original design to fortify the area, and determined to leave Captain Juan Vélez de Medrano there with 200 men and 50 of the French

captives. His intention to populate the Indian River was shown by the appointment of Vélez de Medrano as Civil Governor as well as military commander of the district.⁴⁹ He himself would take two of the small craft, 50 men and 20 of his prisoners, and proceed directly to Cuba, and make a link-up with the reinforcements coming from the north of Spain or with the New Spain Capitana which was to await his orders in Havana. After locating his men in a better situation somewhat to the south of the complex of Indian villages immediately surrounding that of the chief, Menéndez put to sea in the two small ships, pushed toward Cuba by the strong north winds of winter. For the Adelantado, the first phase of the conquest of Florida had ended.

NOTES

1. Pedro Menéndez to Crown, n.d. (prob. October, 1567), A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1024-A. In this letter Menéndez describes the arrest of the heretics and their confinement.

2. A description of the re-arrangement of Menéndez' fleet at the Canary Islands is found in "Información sumaria hecha en Cádiz," Pedro del Castillo, Cádiz, September 22, 1567, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1024-A. The muster is described in "Información ante Alcalde," by Pedro Menéndez de Aviles, Madrid, October 16, 1567, in the same legajo. Menéndez mentions the stowaway of Valdés in his letter to the Crown from Florida dated September 11, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231. This letter has also been reproduced in Ruidiaz, La Florida II, 74-84. It has been translated and reprinted in Charles Bennett, The Settlement of Florida (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1968), pp. 148-155, and is also in the Stetson Collection.

3. The Grajales narrative comes from A.G.I. Patronato 19. It has been reprinted in the Colección Muñoz. See Real Académic de La Historia, Catálogo de la Collection de J. B. Muñoz (3 v., Madrid: Real Académic de la Historia, 1954-1956), II, folio 283-200 vto. It has also been reproduced in D.I., III, 441-479, as "Relación del capellan Francisco López de Menanza Grajales." The narrative was translated by Benjamin F. French, and is found in his work Historical Collections of Louisiana and Florida (New York: A. Mason, 1875), pp. 191-234. Edward H. Lawson has made a translation in his book Letters of Menéndez (2 v., type-script; St. Augustine: E. H. Lawson, 1955), pp. 167-176; 180-195. A more effective translation is found in Charles E. Bennett, Laudonnière and Fort Caroline (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), pp. 141-163.

4. See Pedro Menéndez to Crown, Puerto Rico, August 13, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 224. In Stetson Collection.

5. The loss of La Vitoria is described in "Ship Losses of the Adelantado," n.d. (November, 1567), A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1024-A. Menéndez describes the loss of the caravel in his letter to the Crown, Matanzas, December 5, 1565, Santo Domingo 115.

6. There are many discrepancies between the chronology of the Mendoza Grajales narrative and that given by Pedro Menéndez in his letters to the Crown. The priest's story was, however, written at some later date, while Menéndez' letters were current. Where there is conflict between dates, therefore, the writer has chosen that given by the Adelantado. For instance, Mendoza Grajales states that they arrived at San Juan on the 10th of August while Menéndez gives the date as the 13th. As a check on the correctness of Menéndez' dating, the Adelantado mentions the arrival of the Almiranta, in correspondence dated August 15, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71. A previous letter, which bore the date of August 13, did not mention that the other ships had yet arrived. Solís de Merás, in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 78, gives the date of arrival as August 9.

7. Ponce advised that the poder enabled him to buy and sell goods so as to supply ships bound for Florida; see his letter to the Crown, San Juan, April 20, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71, Stetson Collection. The King acknowledged these services in a letter to Juan Ponce de Leon from Madrid dated May 12, 1566, found in A.G.I. Justicia 1,000, Stetson Collection. Menéndez' description of his connection with Ponce de Leon is found in his letter to the Crown, dated August 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71.

8. An effective description of the sixteenth century Spanish military organization may be found in Rafael Altamira y Crevea, Historia de España y de la civilización española (4th ed., Barcelona: J. Giu, 1928), Tomo III, 293-294.

9. See supra, 132.

10. "Nombramiento de Pedro Menéndez de Valdés . . . Maestre de Campo," in "Relación de los bastimentos, artillería, armas . . . municiones que recibió Juan de Junco . . .," A.G.I. Contaduría 941, ramo 1 . . . in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida.

11. Menéndez' plans and actions in Puerto Rico are well described in his two letters to the Crown dated August 13 and August 15, 1565, op. cit.

12. The decision to sail directly to Florida without any stop in Havana is described by the Adelantado in his letter to Philip II from St. Augustine, dated September 11, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231. From the Stetson Collection.

13. Father López describes the naming of the captains in his narrative, on page 148 of the Bennett translation. The Adelantado describes and names ten of the captains whom he had chosen in his letter of September 11, *op. cit.* The names of the other captains were Diego de Alvarado, Pedro de Larrandia, and Francisco de Mexia.

14. A case in point was that of Graviel Ayala Salzedo, who was appointed Ensign at this time. Ayala was a member of the three hundred-man Royal contingent, but was appointed by the Adelantado to the rank of Ensign in the troop reorganization. Upon his return to Spain in 1570, Ayala attempted to collect from the Crown the additional pay due him for his post as Ensign. The Casa de Contratación demurred, saying that when the troops left Spain there really were no officials, only squadron leaders. The Crown, however, insisted on payment. Ayala's petition is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,222 under the date of December 9, 1570, in Seville.

15. Father Mendoza Grajales and Pedro Menéndez are far apart in the dates they assign to the sighting of Florida. In his letter of September 11, the Adelantado advises that the landfall was made around noon on "Sunday the 25th." The priest advises that the landfall did not occur until "afternoon of Tuesday September 28th." Menéndez erred--the date of August 25 fell on a Saturday; Father Mendoza Grajales had the days of the week right. The Adelantado's letter was, however, written much closer in time to the event. Perhaps his dating is correct even though he has erred in assigning the correct dates to the days of the week. Gonzalo Solís de Merás' account of the landfall agrees with that of the priest.

16. Woodbury Lowery in The Spanish Settlements, II, 111, cites a letter from Philip II to the Duke of Alba, written on June 15th.

17. See Alba to Philip II, June 28, 1565, A.D.E., K. 1504, 30.

18. Amb. de Silva to the Crown, London, June 25, 1565, printed in D.I.E. LXXXIX, 173.

19. Sánchez' deposition is found in A.G.I. Patronato 267, No. 1, ramo 41; it is also in the Stetson Collection. Notice of Sánchez' testimony was sent to Philip II in Casa to Crown, Seville, August 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Contratación 5167, Book III. It is obvious that Sánchez' description of Fort Caroline is extravagant, if not totally imaginary. It is, further, doubtful that any French vessel of the size he described was near the French colony at the end of 1564

or the beginning of 1565. Woodbury Lowery expresses his complete skepticism of Sánchez' testimony in "Manuscripts of Florida," microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of History, reel 1.

20. See Crown to Casa, Bosque de Segovia, July 30, 1565, A.G.I. Contratación 5,012; in Stetson Collection.

21. The Casa's letter of August 22, 1565, is referred to in Crown to Casa, Bosque de Segovia, September 6, 1565, A.G.I. Contratación 5,012; in Stetson Collection. The letter of September 4, 1565, from Seville is found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book II.

22. See Admiral Coligny to Jean Ribault, cited in Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements, II, 95. One of the best descriptions of the departure of the French reinforcement fleet is found in Nicholas Le Challeux, "Discourse de l'histoire de la Florida," in Suzanne Lussagnet, ed., Les Français en Floride (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1958), pp. 208-209. Le Challeux, who shipped as a carpenter with the expedition, has given a simple and graphic narrative of the Ribault expedition and its fate.

23. The episode is described in Le Challeux, "Discourse," p. 209. It appears that this man was Pedro de Bustinçury, who is probably the man known as Don Pedro Vizcaino, of the Escalante Fontenada narrative. See Eugene Lyon, "Captives of Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly, L, No. 1 (July, 1971), 6, 15.

24. It is quite likely that this landfall was at the Ponce de Leon inlet, between present-day New Smyrna Beach and Daytona Beach, where there was a sizeable concentration of Indian population. This description of Menéndez' northward journey from Cape Canaveral and the first clash with Ribault's ships was taken from his letter of September 11, 1565, op. cit.

25. Menéndez describes no deliberation in reaching his decision. Gonzalo Solís de Meras, however, states that a council of officers was held. He advises that the majority of his lieutenants proposed an immediate return to Santo Domingo to collect the forces prepared by its Audiencia, await the vessels of de las Alas and Pedro Menéndez Márquez and the galleon of Ruelas. Menéndez, says Solís de Meras, then said "no," believing that he had the advantage of surprise. Solís de Meras, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 84.

26. The spy's report (supra, 116) assigned Trinité a tonnage of 150 to 160. Two of the other French vessels 150 tons apiece, one of 120, and three smaller craft, at

between 60 and 70 tons. On the Spanish side, their chief vessel was rated at more than 900 tons, with the bergantín La Esperanza at 150 tons and San Miguel and San Andrés at 60 and 70 respectively. The tonnage of the vessel purchased in San Juan is not known.

27. Menéndez estimate of forces is found in his letter of September 11, 1565, op. cit. The French forces are estimated in the spy's report and Laudonnière's "L'Histoire Notable." It appears that Menéndez' September 11th estimate gives the lie to his later claim that some 1,504 left Cádiz under his command (see supra., 169). It appears, in fact, that Factor Duarte's original muster must have been essentially correct and that few, if any, additional persons could have embarked at Cádiz. This evaluation comes from deducting the men lost through the sinking of La Vitoria, the turning-back of La Concepción and the straying and eventual loss of the caravel San Antonio. It further involves allowance for the gain of 43 men at San Juan balanced against the desertion of 33 others.

28. See "Ordenanzas . . . , " D.I., XIV, No. XII, 490.

29. Many historians have discussed the significance of the concejo and other municipal institutions in Castilian conquest and settlement. Richard M. Morse has done a fruitful analysis of the concejo in "Some Characteristics of Latin American Urban History," American Historical Review, LXVII (January, 1962), 317-388. His cogent statement (on page 325) runs: "The city is the point of departure for the settlement of the soil." Francisco Domínguez y Compañy, in "Funciones económicas del cabildo colonial hispano-Americano," in Rafael Altamira y Crevea et al., eds., Contribuciones a la historia municipal de América (Mexico City: Pan American Institute of Geography and History, 1951), has the following comment (page 166): "The municipality is in fact the juridical agent authorized by the Crown to effect concessions and allotments of land, whether rural or urban." Perhaps the most detailed outline of the functioning of the Castilian municipality in the Indies has been done by John Preston Moore in The Cabildo in Peru Under the Hapsburgs (Durham, N.C.: The Duke University Press, 1954), pp. 15-28. James Lockhart discusses a variety of applications of the basic municipal institutions in different parts of the Spanish Indies. He also proposes an evolutionary connection between the colonial city and the hacienda system. Of particular value to this writer was his article "Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX (1969), 419-429.

30. See the statement of Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois in La Idea Colonial de Ponce de Leon: un ensayo de interpretación (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1960), p. 14. Speaking of Ponce de Leon, Ballesteros says: "He had no utopian ideas of creating a new society, but simply wished to reproduce, on a small scale, that of Castile." As a good example of the way an Adelantado moved in practice in the Indies to create the municipal framework is found in the way that young Montejo founded Ciudad Real at Chichenitza in Yucatan. He appointed the first cabildo, designated one hundred of his soldiers as vecinos, and assigned plots of land to each. This is described by Robert S. Chamberlain in The Conquest and Colonization of Yucatan, p. 136.

31. Barcía, Chronological History, p. 98. Although no books of the acts of the Florida cabildos have been found, a number of documents refer to these acts and bear the signatures of the Alcaldes and the escribanos of the cabildos in St. Augustine, San Mateo and Santa Elena. See certifications of Alcalde Peleaz and his escribano in "Probanza hecha a pedimento de Gonzalo Gayón . . .," St. Augustine, October 28, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection); those of Diego de Valles as escribano of the cabildo at St. Augustine during September, 1566, from A.G.I. Contratación 58, ramo 2, No. 3 ("Criminales"); the memorial of the settlers and cabildo at Santa Elena, July 15, 1569, from A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, reel 1, frame 35). Formal requirements for the foundation of the concejo, república, and appointment of the legal officials for the cabildo in newly discovered territories are outlined in "Ordenanzas . . .," D.I., XIV, No. XLIII, 501.

32. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to a Jesuit friend at Cádiz, St. Augustine, October 15, 1566, in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 155-156. Juan López de Velasco, in Geografía universal de las Indias (1571-1574) (Madrid: D. Justo Zaragoza, 1894), pp. 159-160, provides a good description of the customs of the aboriginal Florida Indians. The culture area of the Timucuan is described by Ripley P. Bullen in "The Southern Limit of Timucua Territory," Florida Historical Quarterly, XLVII, No. 4 (April, 1969), 414-419. The matter of language is discussed by Father Francisco Pareja in Catecismo en lengua Timuquana y castellano (Mexico City: Imprenta de Juan Ruyz, 1627).

33. Nombramiento of Bartolomé Menéndez by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, St. Augustine, September 7, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219.

34. Laudonnière's own account of the circumstances surrounding the departure of Ribault and his remaining garrison are found in his "L'Histoire Notable," from Lussagnet, Les Français en Floride, pp. 176-178.

35. For the French commander's version of events prior to and during the taking of Fort Caroline, see ibid., pp. 179-182.

36. From "Deposition of Jean Mennin," from Paul Gaffarel, Histoire de la Floride Française (Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1875), p. 445.

37. For an outline of events concerning the Frenchmen captured by the Spanish at various times see Eugene Lyon, "Captives of Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly, L, No. 1 (July, 1971), 1-24.

38. The Adelantado describes the taking of the fort with its booty and the captured ships in his letter to the Crown sent to Philip II from his base at St. Augustine on October 15, 1565; from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection). The unease felt by the Spanish, which led to the sending away of the French women and children is described by Hernando de Baeza in "Los despachos que se hicieron en la Florida . . .," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. The rescue and ransom of the French nobleman Pierre d'Uilly is described by the Adelantado in his letter to the King sent from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

39. The estimate of the location of the three major French shipwrecks was given to Pedro Menéndez by survivors of the first massacre at Matanzas. From the same source he learned that Trinité was grounded some five to ten leagues from the other vessels. See his letter to Philip II from St. Augustine on October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection). The story of the small French craft which survived the storm and sailed to the Caribbean is found in "Papers relating to various Frenchmen who came as prisoners in the fleets and were captives in the jail of the Contratación of Seville; 1571," from A.G.I. Patronato 267, No. 2, ramo 7.

40. See "Los despachos que se hicieron . . .," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

41. See the hearing before the Casa de Contratación in Seville in February and March of 1572, and found in A.G.I. Justicia 817. Menéndez claimed a total of 4,080 ducats for this aid to the Crown soldiery.

42. The writer will not attempt to render judgment upon the vexed question of the good faith of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés in the episodes at Matanzas. Rumor that he had in fact offered Ribault and the others their lives and then had them killed in contravention of his word was transmitted from Madrid by the Sieur de Fourquevaux in letters to the French rulers sent from Segovia on July 5, 1566; from "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," in Paul Gaffarel's work, La Floride Française, pp. 439-441. In his own letter to his sovereign Pedro Menéndez states that he obtained the surrender of the French without any specific promise as to treatment, and then simply had them quickly and systematically killed. He evidently neither asked nor expected any further justification of his actions than that dictated by the exigencies of war and supply and felt himself to be fully empowered by royal authority to carry out his action. See the description of the executions at Matanzas in Menéndez' letter to Philip II written from St. Augustine on October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection).

43. Observers at the scene of the first slaughter at Matanzas differed as to the number of those who died and who had been saved. Father Mendoza says that 111 were killed, and "ten or twelve" were given their lives because they were Catholics; see "narrative of Francisco López de Mendoza Grajales," in the book of Charles E. Bennett, Laudonnière and Fort Caroline (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), p. 163. Gonzalo Solís de Merás, in contrast, states that eight were saved and two hundred were executed: from Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 115. The Adelantado gave no total of the slain.

44. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Crown, St. Augustine, October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection).

45. The Adelantado estimated the number which surrendered at seventy; Solís de Merás put the figure at 150. While Pedro Menéndez states that he spared five men, Solís de Merás says that the lives of sixteen were saved. See Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 115.

46. The Adelantado mentions his sending of Flores in his letter of October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection). The dispatch of Genovés is described in "Los despachos que se hicieron . . .," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. The loss of San Pelayo through its seizure by "Lutherans" aboard, and its subsequent shipwreck, is described in expository statement by Pedro Menéndez introducing his case against the Crown. It bears no date, but is probably from October, 1567, and is contained in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. The event is also

described in "Ship Losses of the Adelantado," n.d. (November, 1567), from the same legajo. News of the loss of San Pelayo had come to the Spanish Court by April 9, 1566, on which date it was transmitted to the Queen Mother of France by her ambassador Fourquevaux; the letter is from "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," found in Paul Gaffarel, Histoire de la Floride Française, p. 436.

47. Pedro Menéndez describes the taking of the French force at Cape Canaveral in his letters to Philip II dated December 5, 1565, at Matanzas, Cuba, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection) and dated January 30, 1566, from Havana, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection). Irving Rouse, in his Indian River Archaeology (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 192, lists a site numbered BR 84 not far above the extremity of Cape Canaveral. He believes this to have been a possible site for the French works.

48. Although the Indian background of the Indian River area has not been thoroughly developed by historians and anthropologists, some very useful studies have been made. The basic theory of the location of the Ais culture-center was developed by Mr. Homer N. Cato of Micco, Florida, who has done much fruitful field work in a number of Ais sites in the vicinity of the Sebastian River and the ocean inlet opposite it. His work on the Spanish salvage site and on the Cato site led to later investigations by Dr. and Mrs. Ripley Bullen and Mr. Carl J. Clausen. See Homer N. Cato, "Found--Ancient Sebastian Man," Florida Sportcamping, II, No. 3 (September, 1966), 32-34. Also see Ripley P. Bullen, Adelaide K. Bullen, and Carl J. Clausen, "The Cato Site near Sebastian Inlet, Florida," The Florida Anthropologist, XXI, No. 1 (March, 1968), 14-16. Charles D. Higgs studied some sites and wrote "Some Archaeological Findings and Investigations in the Land of Ais" (unpublished manuscript at office of the National Park Service, St. Augustine, 1941), and "Spanish Contacts with the Ais," in the Florida Historical Quarterly, XXI (1942), 25-30. Irving Rouse summed up all the archaeological publications to 1950 in Indian River Archaeology (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1951). Work was also done by Dr. Hale G. Smith; see Two Archaeological Sites in Brevard County, Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1949). The writer attempted to summarize the ethnology of the Ais in "More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast" (unpublished paper, typescript, Gainesville, 1967). As to the culture-boundary between the Ais and Indian groupings to the north, it is fairly well established by the "Useful, profitable, and totally correct geographical course-description of the rivers, inlet-channels, lagoons, woods, villages, stream-crossings . . . from the city of St. Augustine to the bar of Ais,"

written in 1605 by Captain Álvaro Mexia and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 224 (from a recent translation by Homer N. Cato and Eugene Lyon). The cultural line is also emphasized by Fray Francisco Pareja in Catecismo en Lengua Timuquana y castellano (Mexico City: Imprenta de Juan Ruyz, 1627), in which Brother Pareja pointed out that speakers of the languages of the south coast could not be understood by the Timucuans.

49. The appointment of Juan Vélez de Medrano is found in "Testimonio de los documentos de Capt. Juan Vélez de Medrano," in A.H.P., Protocolo 646, fol. 256-259.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONSEQUENCES OF VICTORY; NEW OUTREACH BEGINS

When he arrived in the Cuban port of Bahiahonda, Pedro Menéndez had behind him a remarkable small-boat journey. It had been more than just a hasty voyage through rough autumn seas, impelled by the urgencies of supply. It was a trip of exploration and discovery. As the two barcos had threaded their way southward along a low shoreline, the features of Florida's southeast coast were gradually revealed to the eyes of a master seaman. Menéndez had made an important navigational discovery: one could sail southward inside the north-setting Gulf Stream with a vessel of any usual draft. He had also found and reconnoitered two ports suitable for Indies ships seeking refuge from storm or corsairs. The combination of easy round-trip navigation from Florida to Cuba suddenly made Cuba very important to the Adelantado, for it offered the best way to channel supplies and reinforcements from the Indies to the Florida garrisons.¹

Pedro Menéndez did not remain long in Bahiahonda. By November 13, he was within the great harbor of Havana, where many vessels were anchored.² He shortly found that at

least one part of his Asturias fleet had arrived--his nephew Pedro Menéndez Marquéz had come with the two Gijón ships and a Portuguese prize they had taken. Gonzalo Gayón and Francisco Genovés were also in harbor with San Andrés, and the patache Espiritu Santo after returning from their unsuccessful search for San Pelayo. Menéndez could also see the nao Santa Catalina, the promised Capitana of Pedro de las Roelas, anchored in somewhat deeper water.

From his nephew, Menéndez learned that the whole northern fleet had also had a stormy passage from Spain. After a halt at the Canary Islands, where they met Captain Luna, the ships had reached San Juan in badly damaged condition and Juan Ponce de Leon gave them substantial help.³ Off the north coast of Hispaniola, the convoy had sighted two Portuguese caravels and given chase. Estevan de las Alas took the larger vessel, while Marquéz captured the smaller. Since they were found to be present in the Indies without legal registry, the caravels were fair game. The fleet continued around the precipitous shore towards the port of La Yaguana and, on October 8, saw three vessels offshore. They were discovered to be an urca, a fregata, and a captured French patache with the Santo Domingo aid for Florida under the command of Captain Gonzalo de Peñalosa. It carried 250 men, 20 horses, and the necessary supplies and munitions. Peñalosa had also indulged in some corsair-chasing and had just captured a French patax when he met

Esteban de las Alas. After the united convoys entered the harbor of La Yaguana for water, Pedro Menéndez Marqués left with his prize, and came directly to Havana. He brought 200 men and a quantity of arms and munitions, but little food.⁴

Gayón and Genovés had been utterly unable to find any trace of the great galeass, San Pelayo. She had not come into any island port. The unavailability of the supplies aboard the missing ship only made Menéndez' need the more pressing. The supplies from Santo Domingo had not yet arrived. Menéndez also received another piece of bad news: the caravel San Antonio, outfitted at his expense, had been seized by French corsairs and then lost in a storm off Cuba. The French survivors had been hung by the Governor of Havana, Garcia Osorio de Sandoval and all the supplies were lost. Menéndez had little in the way of money at hand; he began to explore all possible means to raise cash.

The Adelantado began by selling the Portuguese prize and its cargo at public auction. With his share of the proceeds, Pedro Menéndez bought seabiscuit, meat, cassava, corn and some cattle, and loaded these for Florida. San Andrés was sent with supplies to St. Augustine and San Mateo under the command of Diego de Amaya, while the second captured French patax, renamed Santiago, went to Puerto de Príncipe, Bayamo, and Santiago de Cuba to seek out supplies.⁵

When he turned to examine the Capitana of de las Roelas, and learned the circumstances of her stay in Havana, Pedro

Menéndez became embroiled in controversy. The Adelantado learned that the ship had been detached at Cape San Antonio by Roelas, who had placed Captain Juan de la Parra in command of the ship, until he could turn it over to Menéndez in Havana. On his way to Havana, Parra also went hunting for prizes. Off Matanzas, he surprised and took another Portuguese caravel, which proved to be richly laden with hides, pearls, gold and Negro slaves. The capture was escorted into Havana by Parra, who then made the necessary legal proceso against the Portuguese. As soon as he had anchored, the Cuban Governor, Garcia Osorio, sent armed men to take charge of the caravel. The Governor's men roughed up Parra's prize-master and Osorio had the captain jailed in irons.

When he learned of the arrest and confinement of Parra, Pedro Menéndez was furious. His anger was rooted in two things which always moved him powerfully: a matter of his authority and a matter of his money. Parra, the ship he had commanded and the prize he had taken, were now under Menéndez' authority, and the Governor's action against Menéndez' subordinates was an affront to the Adelantado. The Portuguese ship represented, moreover, a value of between 13 to 14,000 ducats and his share would go far towards replenishing the depleted funds of the Adelantado.

For three days, the two antagonists exchanged requerimientos. Since these had no visible effect, the men finally

met, and joined conflict personally. Other tensions lay between Pedro Menéndez and Garcia Osorio. Menéndez had strong and long-standing affiliations with some of the members of the most powerful local faction, that of the linked Rojas, De Soto, Lobera and Hinestrosa families, and Osorio knew it. Menéndez had further angered Osorio by moving into the house of Juan de Hinestrosa, the Treasurer at Havana, and hiring Gonzalo Gallego, Parra's maltreated prize-master, and sending him to Florida as a ship captain. Pedro Menéndez represented another threat to Osorio: he held direct evidence of Royal favor in his asiento. Cedulas had come to Havana, bidding special attention to the needs of Florida, and Pedro Menéndez, with privileges from the King in hand, prepared to make demands and assert his authority against that of the Royal Governor. Both men were intensely proud personalities, jealous of their prerogatives and highly sensitive to any encroachment upon them, and their rivalry rapidly became a deadly one.

Pedro Menéndez and Garcia Osorio were unlikely to achieve any meeting of minds. Menéndez asked for the release of Parra, and the release of some of the goods from the prize caravel. If he could have these, Menéndez averred, he would use the money he realized to supply the Royal troops in Florida. Osorio refused to release the ship or anything from it. Menéndez then asked for a loan, so that he could better supply his own men in Florida. This was

also refused. Discussion of the royal order to furnish 50 supplied soldiers also resulted in deadlock. Menéndez needed no more troops in Florida, and Osorio would furnish no separate supplies. Finally, Pedro Menéndez tried to take possession of the four bronze artillery pieces which had just arrived for the fort at Havana. Osorio, anxious for the defense of the place and concerned about its weakness, refused this as well.

In any event, it is unlikely that Garcia Osorio could have done much for the Florida supply. It does appear that the Governor had an obligation to help supply the Royal men in Florida, if not Pedro Menéndez' private soldiers. Although Menéndez was already moving to meet his needs in other ways, the Governor's obstructions did impede and embarrass him. While he outwardly concealed his deepest feelings about the Governor, Menéndez began a campaign against him at the highest levels. He accumulated materials about the Parra case, made other procesos against Osorio, and prepared to send them to the King. He began to explore the possibility of obtaining the Cuban government for himself.

After being rebuffed by Osorio, Menéndez attempted to obtain supplies from friendly Havana merchants. He established a warehouse, stored the munitions brought by Menéndez Marquéz to Havana, and began to sell or trade them for food stuffs, but prices in Havana were high and food was

scarce. Menéndez gave Hinestrosa his poder to handle business matters in Havana. From the captain of a fregata, Menéndez learned that the Santo Domingo support fleet had met with disaster, and that the urca had been sunk, but could find out nothing about the fate of Esteban de las Alas. He decided to outfit an expedition, search the old Bahama Channel for de las Alas, and attempt to negotiate a loan from the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. Most of all, however, he hoped to capture other valuable corsair ships. This was his best opportunity to realize enough money to relieve his financial necessities, and was, after all, in line with Menéndez' most deeply-held inclinations and longest experience. Menéndez had to justify his taking the crown-leased New Spain Capitana on such an adventure. In order to do this he established it as a contra-cosario expedition, and later told Philip II that there was great danger that Juan Ribault's son, who had fled Florida with two "armada ships" would come to the Caribbean, join with other roaming pirates there, and assault the shipping and settlements of His Majesty's loyal subjects.⁶

In order to refit and supply the vessels for the corsairing voyage, the Adelantado spent or encumbered himself for 4,000 ducats. Menéndez hoped that this investment, probably realized from the sale of arquebuses and munitions and credit from Hinestrosa, would pay real dividends. To help cover his expenses, Menéndez dispatched Captain Luna

to Verz Cruz with an urgent request that the Audiencia of Mexico lend him 3,000 to 4,000 ducats. At the same time, he asked the New Spain officials to send him Don Luis Velasco, the Indian from the Chesapeake Bay area, so that he might be available to Menéndez in his projected northern exploration and colonization in the spring.⁷ Menéndez left Havana November 30, 1565, with his ships and men. At the very beginning, it appeared that fortune smiled upon the Adelantado. A short distance to the east of Havana, his look-outs sighted a sail. Since it seemed to be a Portuguese caravel, Menéndez sent his nephew to chase it down. The vessel took refuge in the port of Matanzas, and Menéndez followed with his four ships. It turned out that the caravel was in reality a Spanish dispatch ship sent from Seville with messages to the authorities in Santo Domingo and Cuba. In one of those fortuitous accretions of information which occurred in an age of infrequent communications, the Adelantado was suddenly brought up to date on events in Europe.

Nothing aboard the caravel was addressed to Pedro Menéndez, but he took the liberty of reading the cedulas the King had directed to the Santo Domingo and Cuban officials. They contained a revelation. Obviously Menéndez' suggestions that a backup fleet be sent to reinforce and support his efforts against the French had borne fruit, for the King advised that he was sending many ships with 1,800 men to

Florida by way of the islands, and asked the Indies officials to provide supplies for the force for nine months.

This momentous news roused a mixture of feelings in the Adelantado of Florida. While greatly relieved to hear that Crown-paid reinforcements were coming, Menéndez felt it imperative that the succor fleet save valuable time by sailing directly to Florida. He also felt a nagging concern that, if the Royal forces were coming to Florida in the spring, he had best attend more decidedly to the supply and maintenance of the forts and garrisons he had left in Florida, or he might feel the weight of Royal censure. Pedro Menéndez decided to protect himself and advance his cause by doing some corresponding of his own.

First, he wrote to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, and objected to the King's supply plan, proposing instead that he provide fresh meat from the islands and fresh fish in Florida at less cost to the Crown and with better results for the health of the garrisons. He also advised that he would not be financially able to return to Florida before March, but was concerned that the men there be provided for properly. Next, Menéndez sent Philip II his first letter since October, reported on all that had taken place since the death of Jean Ribault.⁸ He repeated the recommendations he had made to the Santo Domingo Audiencia and noted that he was sending a pilot to Spain who could guide the ships directly to Florida. Menéndez also made complaint against

Garcia Osorio, and sent along certain formal allegations in the Parra case.

Next, Menéndez looked beyond the immediate problems of logistics. He sketched out to the King his broad proposals to benefit the kingdom and himself by vigorous action on the sea. If Philip would grant him the title of "Captain-General" of these parts of the Indies, Tierra Firme and the Ocean Sea, Pedro Menéndez would provide and command a fleet of small, fast and mobile fregatas. Two of these, to be equipped with oars and powerful guns, he had already ordered for delivery in the spring. With two more, Menéndez could secure the entire Atlantic coast from Newfoundland to the Caribbean islands. All he wanted in return, said Menéndez, was the title and a thousand slave-licenses. He could sell some of these to finance his operations, and would use the other licenses to obtain Negroes for the guard fleet.

While he was in Matanzas, the Adelantado prepared to actuate his small vessel trade privilege. He told Philip that an error had been made in the asiento, when the tonnage of the shallops had been listed at 50 instead of 100 tons apiece and asked that the asiento be amended, thus increasing his tonnage permission substantially. While at Matanzas, Menéndez organized his trade fleet, named Pedro Menéndez Márquez as commander of the six shallops and four zabras, and prepared to send him to Spain with dispatches and to seek supplies to put into the Indies trade for the provision

of Florida.⁹ He was able to utilize the Portuguese captured by Menéndez Márquez as galley-slaves, as well as some of the French prisoners captured in Florida.¹⁰

Menéndez next turned to matters of personal privilege and appealed to the King for certain key appointments in Florida. For the principal Royal posts in Florida, he exercised his adelantamiento powers and proposed four men. He described the Asturian hidalgos nominated as follows:

They are people of confidence and high standing who have served your Majesty many years in my company, and are all married to noblewomen. Out of covetousness for the offices (for which they are proposed), and out of love for me, it could be that they might bring their wives and households. Because of these and of others who would come with their wives, it is a fine beginning for the population of the provinces of Florida with persons of noble blood.¹¹

Those proposed were Esteban de las Alas, Pedro Menéndez Márquez, and Hernando de Miranda, as Treasurer, Accountant, and Factor--the three Royal financial posts in Florida. He also suggested Diego de Miranda, successor to the Miranda mayorazgo, as Escribano Mayor of Florida and Secretary of the government there. Thus, before the struggling Florida garrisons had achieved more than a foothold, Menéndez looked ahead to the fulfillment of the dream he shared with his principal lieutenants and supporters. The letter was immediately sent to Spain in a patache, with a request that its crew be paid by the King or, failing that, by Pedro del Castillo.

In stark contrast to his exalted plans for gain and expansion expressed to the King, Pedro Menéndez had to face unpleasant realities when he returned to Havana and abandoned his voyage. By December 12, he had received full news of the disaster which had befallen the Santo Domingo expedition. A storm north of Cuba had sunk the urca and the zabra of Candamo which left Avilés the previous summer with all the supplies they had carried, and a host of shipwrecked sailors and soldiers were stranded 350 miles east of Havana. Pedro Menéndez Marquéz and Esteban de las Alas joined together to ferry the men across to the mainland. It was decided that the men should go to Bayamo or Puerto Principe to seek food at Menéndez' expense, and Menéndez sent them a letter of credit, drawn upon Juan de Hinestrosa. Pedro Menéndez commissioned Diego de Miranda to go to eastern Cuba with 2,000 ducats and establish supply sources in the Savanna of Vasco Porcallo, Puerto Principe, Bayamo, and Baracoa. He authorized his lieutenant to purchase more than 16,000 arrobas of meat a year, to build warehouses to store the provisions, and to draw upon Menéndez' credit freely in so doing. He also made arrangements in Puerto de Plata with Francisco de Zavallos to furnish supplies for Florida.¹² The Adelantado also decided to dismiss the soldiers from Santo Domingo and reduce the expense of their maintenance. The prize caravel of Esteban de las Alas, still half laden with valuable hides, remained in Matanzas.

Menéndez tried to sell the caravel and its cargo, but none would buy it sight unseen. Finally a deal was struck with Francisco de Reinoso, of Menéndez' entourage. Reinoso agreed to buy the caravel and the 2,000 hides remaining in it, for 4,000 ducats. He would cancel the 2,000-ducat debt already owed him, pay and supply the caravel crew, and give Menéndez 1,000 ducats in cash. The Adelantado then sent one of the captured French barcos, renamed Buenaventura, to the garrison which had been left with Captain Veléz de Medrano at the Ais village with 10,000 pounds of sea biscuit, cassava, meat and corn.¹³

Pedro Menéndez, worn by the strain of recent months, fell ill, seriously enough to require the attentions of a physician. After 10 days' sickness, he recovered sufficiently to write a lengthy letter to the King. Menéndez complained again of the lack of cooperation he had received from Governor Osorio, and noted that 40 men had taken advantage of his illness to desert. He accused the Governor of permitting some of these deserters to escape the city and flee inland. Another witness, more favorable to the Governor, notes that Osorio had quite properly subdued many of the soldiers who had fled.¹⁴

Menéndez now redoubled his efforts to provide and send supplies to his Florida forts. Armed with the 3,000 ducat loan sent by the Audiencia of Mexico and the money he obtained from Reinoso, the Adelantado shortly also received

the remaining arms and munitions which had come from Asturias and Vizcaya. He established a warehouse in Havana, gathered foodstuffs and livestock from his Indies sources, and named Hernando de Baeza as Tenedor de Bastimentos for the Florida supply.¹⁵

The Adelantado purchased Peñalosa's fregata, and leased a Portuguese caravel named La Asención from its master, Álvaro Gómez. He sent the caravel to buy corn in Yucatan, where it was cheap and plentiful. By January 28, two small vessels had already been sent to Florida with hams, chickens, cassava, and corn when Diego de Amaya returned to Havana with more unpleasant tidings.¹⁶ Amaya had gone first to St. Augustine, where he had found that an early and harsh winter and the poor state of supply had led to more than 100 deaths in the two forts. After leaving off foodstuffs for the St. Augustine garrison, Amaya had sailed northward with San Andrés with supplies for San Mateo, only to be caught in a strong gale off the St. Johns' river bar. Amaya tried to cross the lines of breakers which marked the bar entrance, but the veteran San Andrés was driven ashore and broken up in the surf. The rest of the supplies were lost, and Amaya had to return to Havana in another vessel. On his return voyage, he could not locate the garrison at Ais, and had sailed to a point just south of the St. Lucie Inlet when he sighted a small boat with Captain Juan Veléz de Medrano aboard. Veléz told a harrowing tale of hardship and mutiny.

Soon after the departure of the Adelantado the previous November, the garrison's rations had given out. The friendly Indians possessed no store of food sufficient for such a large body of men. As discipline disintegrated, roaming bands of soldiers roved the area seeking food. Friction between the Indians and the Spanish became outright war.

A soldier named Escobar persuaded 100 of his fellows to desert and to march southward with him, seeking an escape from Florida and passage to New Spain. Captain Veléz followed in the small boat the Adelantado had left him, and found the mutineers encamped 45 miles south. They had reached the north side of the wide St. Lucie River and could go no further. Keeping his distance from the rebels, Veléz told them he would go to Havana to seek supplies. Soon after he reached the open Atlantic, the two vessels met.

Diego de Amaya and the Captain sailed together along the coast and found a promising harbor at the Jupiter Inlet, where an elevation commanded a good view of land and sea. There, on December 13, 1566, St. Lucie's Day, they built the fort Santa Lucia. Amaya left supplies, and went on to Havana to report to Pedro Menéndez, while Veléz recovered his rebel soldiers and ferried them south 18 miles to the new fort. Artillerist Diego Lopez aided in the placing and siting of the cannon in the works, and the men began to trade with the Indians, called the Jeaga, for bits of gold

and silver recovered from Spanish shipwrecks.¹⁷ News that many men from Veléz' garrison had died came to Havana with the supply ship. Discontent with Florida was expressed in many private letters which then spread from Cuba to other parts of the Indies.¹⁸ Pedro Menéndez determined to relieve the garrison by March.¹⁹

When, at last, Esteban de las Alas had rejoined his chief in Havana, Menéndez could arm his ships and prepare his next move. He had established a supply pipeline from Cuba to Florida, even though it was poorly funded for any long-run operation. Help was coming from Spain: He knew of the large, heavily-laden reinforcement fleet which should shortly leave Andalucia and come directly to Florida. In addition, the Adelantado had sent by Menéndez Marquéz a request to Pedro del Castillo to furnish wine, shoes, and Indian trade goods, together with some settlers and their equipment. He could send no money, but could repay Castillo with the slave licenses. He was still hopeful that the missing San Pelayo could be found.

Menéndez' plans now were clear: he would continue the mission of exploration and conquest interrupted by the expulsion of the Laudonnière and Ribault French. His next expedition had multiple purposes. First, he would explore the lower keys for a passage east of Tortugas for the home-bound New Spain fleets on their way to Havana. Then, with

pilot Gonzalo Gayón (who knew the area from the time of the De Luna expedition) he would skirt the western coast of the peninsula and seek a good port near the Bay of Juan Ponce.

Pedro Menéndez' settlement strategy was tied to his belief that the Florida peninsula was crossed by a navigable river system. He believed that the St. Johns emptied into the Gulf at some point on the southwest coast, and wished to place his fort and found a settlement near that place. Thus, easy water communication between his cities would facilitate the interchange of men and supplies and help in their mutual defense against any enemy. The southwestern port would be in the best position to receive supplies from Havana, from Yucatan and from his galleons in the New Spain trade. Settlers and missionaries could then solidify the establishments. Menéndez planned to leave Esteban de las Alas in charge of all the forts, and direct his attentions to eradicating the supposed French presence in Guale, and building his main base of operations at Santa Elena. Always in the background, as the matter of the highest priority, was Menéndez' search for the great interconnecting passage to the New Spain mines and the South Sea, and the urgent need to deny the secret of it to the French. He would launch himself northward to explore and populate this area at the earliest possible moment. Another continuing motive was the hope that Christian prisoners, perhaps even his son Juan, might be recovered from Indian captivity.

On February 10, 1566, Menéndez made a proclamation in Havana, to justify his use of the New Spain ship Santa Catalina in his proposed expedition. He stressed the possibility of finding French corsairs, and the need to eliminate the threat they represented to the Florida coasts, the other Indies and the Spanish fleets. Next, he took formal control of the supplies and rations aboard Santa Catalina. There were some 86 soldiers and sailors still aboard; some had deserted in Havana. Several months' supplies were turned over to Menéndez. He bought some additional materials of his own, and prepared to sail.²⁰

While Pedro Menéndez prepared to return to the scene of his triumphs in Florida, no solid news of the September clash between Frenchman and Spaniard had yet reached Europe by the first days of 1566. In the absence of any real intelligence, the military and diplomatic lines of action already decided upon by the King and his Councils went forward. Concrete actions were begun to implement a heavy reinforcement of Pedro Menéndez with Royal troops and instructions were sent to the Casa de Contratación to embargo private ships for the new Florida fleet, and to gather supplies of foodstuffs and ammunition. The difficult task of locating artillery, powder, helmets and arquebuses for the journey was begun.²¹

The choice of a commander for the relief and reinforcement expedition had been made--Philip II selected Sancho de

Archiniega, a Basque seafarer, on September 14, 1565. On September 26, the King had written to his Florida Adelantado explaining that he was sending him 1,500 soldiers. Philip II was careful to spell out the touchy issue of jurisdiction over the new force, and ruled that General Archiniega and Colonel Hernando de Orsuna would have full legal control over their troops once they left Spain. When they arrived in the adelantamiento of Florida, the King assured Menéndez that the commanders had instructions to obey and defer to him as "the person in whose charge was the enterprise of that land."²² Philip II did urge Pedro Menéndez to cooperate with and seek military advice from these men who were so experienced in war. In addition to Colonel Orsuna, who would raise a company himself, Captains Juan Pardo, Pedro Redroban, Pedro de Andrada, Miguel Enriquez and Juan de Zurita began to assemble their companies. They concentrated their recruiting in lower Andalusia.²³

In the meantime, the Spanish King felt it was time to disclose to the French that Pedro Menéndez had been sent to Florida. He instructed Ambassador Alava to speak to Catherine de Medici and advise that the Spanish had learned of "usurpers" in their land and had taken action to punish them. Before this formal notice was finally given them on November 23, 1565, the French already knew of the Menéndez expedition. When the announcement was made, a dispute then arose between Alava, the Queen, and Councillors of the

French King, in which the old arguments about territorial jurisdiction were repeated without any agreement.²⁴ In actual fact, the actions of Pedro Menéndez in Florida had already made the question a moot one. The Spanish Queen had already warned the French Ambassador to Spain that Philip II would not tolerate any French colonies in his lands or near the fleet routes of Spain. Late in December, Ambassador Fourquevaux had an interview with the Duke of Alba on the question of Florida. The Duke flatly told the Frenchman that, in spite of the lack of agreement on the question of territorial rights after the signing of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, the Spanish position was that this treaty definitively denied any land rights in the Indies to the French. The Florida incursion would, therefore, be vigorously resisted and ejected.²⁵

This position brought no relief for the Spanish from their concern over further French reinforcements to Florida. In August and September, reports had come to the Court that a new armada for Florida was being outfitted in LeHavre.²⁶

The eagerly awaited news of what had happened in Florida was contained in the Adelantado's letter of October 15, 1565, entrusted to Captain Diego Flores de Valdés, and had been long delayed in reaching the Spanish Court. The San Miguel, which carried the message, had been wrecked in the Azores and Flores had great difficulty in finding another

vessel to brave the winter gales and carry him to Spain.²⁷ Although Pedro Menéndez Marquéz was also enroute to Spain, he had not arrived either.

It was after the first of the new year that any intelligence came from Florida to the Spanish King, and this news came by way of France. Philip received, by mid-January, a letter from his Ambassador in France, advising of the arrival there of Jacques Ribault. Thus word of the taking of Fort Caroline, but not of the massacres of Matanzas, was communicated to the Spanish Court. Another, more direct messenger came shortly to Philip II. Pedro de Bustinçury, a Vizcayan prisoner aboard young Ribault's ship, escaped the French, and made his way to Madrid. This man, the shipwreck survivor who had been an Indian captive among the Ais Indians on the Florida east coast, told the King of the Spanish victory at the French fort. He so impressed Philip II that he was commissioned to return to Florida to aid Pedro Menéndez in his relations with the Indians of that area.²⁸

The vessel which had brought René de Laudonnière back from the tragedy in Florida had been much slower in arriving in France. His ship had arrived in England in mid-November. After experiencing illness and difficulty there, the Huguenot leader had finally reached the French Court on March 18. Another captive Spaniard who had been kept aboard Laudonnière's vessel also escaped and came to Spain.²⁹

In the meantime, the long-awaited news from Pedro Menéndez finally came to Philip II in Madrid. Diego Flores Valdés arrived in Seville on February 13, and dispatches telling of his coming probably just preceded the arrival of the man himself at Court.³⁰ When Philip II learned of the clear-cut and decisive victory of arms won by Pedro Menéndez in Florida, the monarch wasted little time in rejoicing. Because of the eradication of the French garrisons in Florida, he could change the extent and emphasis of his commitments in the Indies. The King sent the news to Sancho de Archiniega, and began to consider alteration of his military force. He also took immediate steps to reaffirm the contract obligation of his Adelantado in Florida.³¹

Since the danger in Florida was clearly lessened, Philip II toyed with the idea of cutting the force the Crown was to send from 1,500 to 1,000 men. He finally concluded that it could now be put to a wider use than duty in Florida, and directed that the Archiniega force, under the direction of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, should serve as the response to a widespread menace to the Spanish Indies. A part of the expedition would be used to reinforce the Florida troops, while the greater portion would become a mobile defense force for use elsewhere in the Indies. By the last days of March, 1566, these decisions had been taken and advices of them sent to the Casa de Contratación and to Pedro Menéndez.³²

The private side of the Florida conquest was not neglected by the Spanish King. In a letter to his officials in Seville, the monarch advised that he expected that Pedro Menéndez would supply and pay 300 of the men who were to go with Archiniega. Pedro del Castillo, who had already protested that he had not yet received the Casa de Contratación money due Pedro Menéndez, reacted strongly to this news. Castillo said that there was no way that he could underwrite any new draft of soldiers nor even supply the Adelantado's own men currently in Florida without the 20,000 ducats which was owed to Menéndez. Creditors were pressing him for outstanding obligations, and he pleaded also for payment of the additional charter fees earned by San Pelayo. According to the accountants of the Casa, perhaps 16,000 ducats in all could be owing and Castillo had not yet presented all of the proper supporting papers. The King directed that Menéndez be paid 6,000 ducats, including reimbursement for the journey of Flores Valdés even though the ship had not made the complete voyage to Spain. The Casa de Contratación did not make the payment.³³

As he made certain that the private obligations of his Adelantado in Florida were not neglected, the King also moved to improve the supply of his own Florida troops from the Indies. On February 24, 1566, he directed the Royal Officials at Havana to furnish ample supplies for this purpose. Unfortunately for Pedro Menéndez, however, the order

was not a very realistic one. In view of the poverty of the public treasury of the little community at Havana and the hostility of its Governor, any such aid for Menéndez was as unlikely in 1566 as it had been in 1565.³⁴

Seventeen ships, laden with supplies, sailed for Florida with the 1,500 men originally planned for on April 19, 1566.³⁵ The Archiniega expedition, originally intended to help in the expulsion of Jean Ribault and the capture of the fort built by Rene de Laudonnière, would now serve to reinforce the general defense of the Indies. The continuing menace to Spain represented by French marauders had served to encourage another substantial royal investment. The responsibility of utilizing this great force, whether in Florida or the Caribbean, had been put in the hands of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés.

In the meantime, the King's Adelantado had left his winter base at Havana and sailed with his convoy toward the lower Florida Keys. The seven vessels, led by Santa Catalina and the ship which had come with De las Alas from Santander, probed cautiously among the shallows and discovered an ample channel to the eastward of Tortugas. This was the passageway Menéndez had been seeking for the New Spain fleets. Sailing through the new channel, the ships continued in a northeasterly direction until they sighted the Florida coast in the vicinity of the Ten Thousand Islands. Then the vessels moved in closer to shore, seeking

the Bay of Juan Ponce.³⁶ Leaving Esteban de las Alas off-shore with the larger ships, Pedro Menéndez went in to shallower water, and soon came to an inlet where he spied an Indian canoe. In the canoe was Hernando Escalante Fontaneda, who had been 20 years a captive. The Adelantado describes the young man who came out to greet him in the following terms:

. . . very good looking, of noble parents, the son of the late Garcia Descalante, a conquistador of Cartagena . . . (one) of two brothers, boys of 10 years of age: they were being sent to Salamanca when their ship was lost. The people aboard escaped, but over the years the father of this (chief) Carlos had killed 42 of the captives, among whom was his elder brother.³⁷

Pedro Menéndez had arrived in the land of Carlos, or the Calusa.

In his contact with the principal chief of Carlos, it was the Adelantado's purpose to assure the security of his communications network and that of the settlers which he hoped to leave in the area. He hoped to accomplish this by making friendly connections with the Indian whose sway extended over much of extreme southwestern Florida, the Keys, and the southeast of the peninsula as well.

The Solís de Merás narrative pictures the arrival of the Adelantado at the island kingdom of Carlos as one of considerable pomp. Accompanied by an entourage of arquebusiers with matchcords lit and weapons ready, Menéndez landed at the village to the music of fife, drum and trumpet.

The ruler of a large part of the southwest end of the Florida peninsula was seated in state, to receive the homage of a large assemblage of his own people and to greet the Spanish leader as an equal.

Menéndez persuaded Chief Carlos to release the shipwreck survivors who had been held captive there, and to conclude an agreement of peace and friendship with the Spanish. The Adelantado advises that he found five men, five mestiza women from Peru, and one black woman as living prisoners in the area of Carlos. The Chief promised also to free three other Christians who were held captive at some distance inland.³⁸

The Adelantado and Cacique Carlos exchanged gifts and entertained each other with food and drink. Carlos granted to Menéndez the highest honors that he could in light of his traditions by giving his sister, later christened and renamed Doña Antonia, to the Adelantado as wife. In order to seal this agreement, Menéndez felt it advisable to consummate the marriage while at Carlos. At this time, he did not leave religious missionaries nor colonists at Carlos, but did re-indoctrinate the shipwreck survivors who chose to remain there, and he left behind symbols of Christianity and of Spain. He had endeavored to some degree to instruct the Indians in the basic tenets of Catholicism, and hoped to accustom them to worship of the Cross.

Pedro Menéndez' approach to Carlos embodied many of the elements of his developing policies towards the Indians of Florida. He believed that the mouth of the strategic cross-peninsular waterway was nearby. When the friendship with Chief Carlos had sufficiently developed, he would anchor the Gulf entrance to this vital channel with a Spanish settlement. The three-fold purpose of the conquest--colonization for economic exploitation, evangelization of the native peoples in the Catholic faith, and the establishment of a military base for Spain--would thus be accomplished.

Menéndez restrained himself considerably in the matter of the obtaining of trade through booty. While his men entered enthusiastically into the exchange of trinkets for gold and silver recovered by the Indians from shipwrecks, Menéndez did not do so. Where the men gathered perhaps 3,500 ducats worth of treasure, Menéndez simply received the gift of a single gold bar from the Chief. He then sailed away, to double the Keys and proceed to the northward. The news of the expedition was sent back directly to Spain in the vessel which had been brought from Santander, so that the King might have word of the recovery of the shipwrecked Christians and of the alliance with Indians of Carlos.³⁹

Pedro Menéndez turned his fleet northward on the east side of the Florida peninsula, sailing through rough seas. On March 19, 1566, as his convoy moved along the lower south-east coast, lookouts sighted the sails of a southbound

caravel. As they drew closer, it was evident that the ship was the Ascension, which had been loaded with corn in Yucatan and sent to supply the forts. When the Adelantado boarded the caravel, he could immediately sense what had occurred; he had intercepted the escape of a shipload of mutineers! In addition to the crew of the vessel, the captain, ensign, and entire surviving garrison of the fort at Santa Lucia were aboard. In the last weeks before the relief ship came, rations in the little fort had been systematically reduced--for two weeks, the men received nothing but a bowlful of corn a day. The last four days before the caravel arrived, there was nothing: the supplies had run out. Only 75 of the 250 Spanish soldiers and French prisoners left at Ais had survived. When the ship came to anchor outside the Jupiter inlet, the rebellious soldiers seized it and forced Captain Juan Vélez de Medrano and Ensign Ayala to come along in an escape from Florida. Grimly, Menéndez took command and turned the caravel around in the direction of St. Augustine.⁴⁰

Worse troubles awaited the Adelantado in the north. When he entered the port of St. Augustine on March 21, he quickly learned that there had been a general rising of the soldiery in that fort and at San Mateo. His coming interrupted a formal investigation being conducted by Maestre de Campo Valdés, who brought his superior up to date on the mutinies. The events had been both gruelling and dramatic.⁴¹

Disaffection had begun in the two forts more than two months before. Although some supplies had come to the garrisons from Havana, rations were often meager. Also in short supply were opportunities for entertainment and loot, those essential needs of the 16th century private soldier. Foci of discontent arose in both forts, and correspondence between the two groups of malcontents was advanced by mid-January. Their purpose was to leave Florida as soon as possible. Pressure from the disaffected men forced Valdés to grant permission for work to begin on the uncompleted frigate left by the French on the ways near the former Fort Caroline. Sergeant Gutierre de Valverde came from St. Augustine to supervise the construction, and persuaded 12 captive Frenchmen who were skilled at carpentry and ship-building, to help get the ship ready for an escape to the Indies.

By mid-February, it was evident that Captains Recalde, Mexia and San Vicente, some of their noncommissioned sergeants and many of the men were affected by the rebellious mood--Licenciado Rueda, Chaplain of the tercio at St. Augustine, was a leader in the plot. Several of the married settlers were also involved in the conspiracy. One night, while searching for food, a large group of soldiers assembled at the armory and forced Valdés to let them examine the building to see if any supplies had been buried there. They also searched the houses of Juan de Junco and Pedro de

Coronas, who were known to be close associates of the Adelantado and of Bartolomé Menéndez. None of the civil or military officials could do much in the face of such widespread disaffection. Significantly, those officials who remained loyal were all close associates or relatives of Pedro Menéndez--Pedro de Valdés, Bartolomé Menéndez, Juan de Junco, Captain Ochoa, Diego de Hevia, Pedro de Coronas, Antonio Gomez, Rodrigo Montes and Martin de Argüelles. Valdés fortified himself in the armory to guard the arms and munitions stored there. As things settled into an uneasy truce, it was apparent that only a spark was needed to set off a full-scale revolt.

That spark was provided by the coming of the frigate La Concepción, which arrived at the port of St. Augustine in the first week of March, 1566. The vessel brought a quantity of corn, more than a ton of prepared meat, wine, oil and live hogs--more than two months' rations for both forts. As the news spread that a supply ship had come, the plans of the mutineers quickly took final shape. When the word reached San Mateo, Valverde and Captain San Vicente set out for St. Augustine. On the night of March 8, led by Sebastian de Lezcano, a large number of soldiers assaulted the armory where Pedro de Valdés was lying ill. Shouting and beating on the doors with their halberds, the soldiers broke their way in and seized Valdés. Soon the other officials were in their power. The Maestre de Campo was

confined in Captain San Vicente's house, and the others were placed in the stocks. The rebels next went to the shore, took small craft and shortly possessed the frigate at anchor, which they began to prepare for their escape. It appeared that the authority of the King and his Adelantado in St. Augustine had come to an end.

It would seem, however, that Pedro de Valdés was as resourceful as was Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. The Maestre de Campo escaped from his imprisonment, freed Junco and others and gathered a small nucleus of loyal troops. With these, he hurried to the water's edge, where the mutineers were busily engaged in loading munitions aboard the captured frigate.

Valdés and his men assaulted and took the small boat into which the rebels were loading artillery from the fort. Lezcano was taken prisoner and the loyalist forces again took charge of the city and the fort. The frigate withdrew to the bar, and prepared to sail. Valdés mounted a bronze cannon in a small craft and went to parley with the mutineers, whom he urged not to leave the men, women and children of St. Augustine without food and munitions. When negotiations broke down, Valdés fired several shots at the rebel vessel, and it sailed away.

Pedro de Valdés began formal legal hearings on the mutinies, heard Lezcano confess his role in the uprising, and had him hung on the public gallows. Many of the other

guilty parties had departed with the frigate, while some fled inland and were killed by the Indians. About 120 from St. Augustine had left; a similar number, had fled San Mateo in the other vessel. The mutineers took with them the books of the cabildo and other papers.⁴²

Pedro Menéndez was infuriated when he arrived to find that such "great mutinies, disgraceful insubordinations and . . . treason" had occurred among his garrisons.⁴³ He moved immediately to restore the discipline of the troops and attempt to locate and punish those who had fled. In a bando proclaimed the day after his arrival, the Adelantado labelled the actions of the rebel troops as mutiny and treason. He noted the sacrifices which had been made to undertake the jornada to Florida, and added that he fully expected another French attempt to conquer the territory. Because he wanted no disaffected soldiers or settlers in his provinces, Menéndez freely offered to anyone who wished the privilege to leave Florida, at their own expense.⁴⁴ A number availed themselves of the opportunity.

On March 24, word came to Pedro Menéndez at St. Augustine that the rebel frigate had sailed to the bar of the St. Johns, to await the other mutineers of the San Mateo garrison and sail together to the West Indies or to New Spain. He took three small craft and went directly to the spot, and loaded one of his vessels with corn, to demonstrate that supplies would be furnished to those who

renounced the mutiny. Indeed, these seemed to be reluctant rebels. Some of the men returned to the fort at San Mateo, and the frigate delayed its departure while negotiations continued. The Adelantado offered amnesty to the men aboard the ship, and some of the men ashore accepted the offer, but the ships finally left in a powerful storm which covered their departure. The mutinies of March had come to an end, but the trials continued so that action could be taken against those who had fled to other parts of the Indies.⁴⁵

The desertions of 1565-1566, and deaths caused by illness, starvation or by Indian action, had cut the original Spanish forces in Florida by almost one-half. The fresh soldiers which Pedro Menéndez had brought from Cuba were essential to maintain a presence in the adelantamiento, and to support the start of a new impetus of exploration and colonization. After the garrisons at St. Augustine and San Mateo had been reinforced with more than 200 men, the Adelantado directed his fleet northward in early April, 1566. He took his primary Lieutenant, Esteban de las Alas, to begin the first exploration of the seacoasts of his northern dominions. From the time of the first Ayllon voyage to that of Angel de Villafañe, much information about these coasts had entered the store of mariners' common knowledge, but this was a more systematic examination of the lands and waters which could yield substantial fruit in the prosecution of the Florida conquest. The official royal

geographer, Juan López de Velasco, who used the accounts of Pedro Menéndez' explorations in his work, has described the shore which Menéndez saw:

From the river of San Mateo, the coast runs to the northeast to Santa Elena. The coast is made up entirely of great and small islands, which create many bars and inlets so that, although it seems to be a mainland, it is not.⁴⁶

Across this maze of inlets, sounds and sea-islands, land communication was difficult, if not impossible. The Florida Adelantado and his entourage, mariners all, chose to conquer, establish, and supply their provinces by sea. The sea-route they pioneered was rapid and convenient--it would become the lifeline linking the Florida forts and settlements to the Havana supply-base and other points in the Caribbean. A vessel of any size, Menéndez learned, could sail from the St. Augustine-San Mateo area all the way to Santa Elena in a safe depth of more than 60 feet of water. As the low coastline slowly unrolled before the appraising eyes of Pedro Menéndez, his evaluation of each inlet had to do directly with the amount of water over its bar. Thus the large and deep entry at the bar of Sena, where the St. Mary's flows out to the sea at the south end of Cumberland Island, was marked down as a strategic place: Ships upwards of 200 tons' burden could enter and find harbor there. Since the people who inhabited the area, the Tacatacuru, were allied with Saturiba and hostile to the Spanish, it might be

necessary to fortify the river mouth. Other inlets to the north, Gualequeni, Osao, and Ospoque, were shallow and dangerous, and only fregatas or chalupas could traverse them.

As the Santa Catalina and the smaller escort ships that made up Menéndez' armada of discovery approached the next opening in the belt of shoreline, it became evident that it was a far more commodious and convenient port. The bar and its principal Indian settlements bore the name of Guale. It was evidently the pass at the south end of the island presently called St. Catherine's.⁴⁷ Soundings indicated a safe depth of 19 feet over the bar at low water, enough for substantial vessels.

Leaving his armada at anchor in charge of Esteban de las Alas, Pedro Menéndez took two small craft with 50 men and entered the sound to the westward of the sea-island. He moved with caution, as it was here that he expected the possibility of a colony of French, fled from the defeats or shipwrecks of the past year. At about 1,000 yards from the bank of the sound, he discovered a village of Indians. The village, a few huts of wattle-and-daub thatched with sabal fronds, was no more impressive than its surroundings. The land west of the sound was marsh, interspersed with low oak-hammocks and other trees; what soil could be seen was sandy. The scant population of Indians eked out part of their living from scattered cornfields, hunted the deer and small game in the scrub or the deeper woods, or fished along the shores.

Menéndez did find his "Frenchman" here--a Spaniard who had come to the area as a part of Ribault's 1562 expedition to Port Royal. With this ready-made interpreter, named Guillermo, the Adelantado explained his presence, appealed to the Indians for obedience to Philip II, and for their acceptance of the Catholic faith. The chief at Guale had heard of the triumphs of the Spanish at Fort Caroline and Matanzas, and was glad to acquiesce in Menéndez' demands. A cross was erected in the village, and the Spanish and Indian leaders joined in evening and morning ceremonies of litany and adoration of the Christian symbol.

A central part of Menéndez' Indian policy was the bringing of order to broad areas of his provinces--reaching across the parochial culture-boundaries of warring native groups to enforce peace in the name of the Hapsburg monarch. Thus an overlordship of power could pacify the land and pave the way for peaceable exploitation. The Adelantado had learned that Guale was at war with the Indians of Orista, in the vicinity of Santa Elena in the north, where he hoped to make a major settlement. Now he asked the chief at Guale to yield up to him two captive Indians from Orista; in return Menéndez would leave Alonso Menéndez Marquéz and seven other Spaniards as hostage. Menéndez assured the chief, however, that any injury to the men would mean his return to cut off the heads of those guilty of the offense.

In spite of its poverty, the Spanish retained favorable impressions of Guale as a future site for colonization. The Indians seemed tractable, and there was a good port for marine supply and reinforcement. If the soil was poor, then at least the spot could serve as entrepôt into the interior, where richer lands and mines surely beckoned. As he had done in Carlos, Menéndez evaluated Guale for its fitness in his scheme of peripheral settlement at places of strategic importance easily reached by water. If friendly Indian relations could be established at these key points, his rear would be protected and he would have a safe path for retreat to the sea.⁴⁸

The fleet left with its hostages, and departed for the north. The northeasterly course of the Adelantado's ships carried them past several more inlets, none of which would admit vessels of any draft. They sailed by the shoals at the mouth of the Savannah River and soon approached the great point now called Hilton Head, but long known to the Spanish as the Punta Santa Elena. Beyond it lay the finest harbor in the provinces of Florida, which the French had named Port Royal.

As the Spanish rounded the point they saw a wide entrance, more than six miles across, containing several islands. The south bar lay deep enough to allow the Santa Catalina to pass within, but it was swept by strong currents. Pedro Menéndez brought the large ship to anchor, and

proceeded to explore the harbor in two bergantines with Alas and 100 soldiers. The Adelantado spied an island placed advantageously in the center of the harbor entrance. Its seaward point, he noted, held a white sand-hill eminence that would be ideal for fortification.⁴⁹

The expedition passed further into the port and surprised a number of Indians near an old burned village. With the aid of the interpreter brought from Guale, they identified themselves, to the mutual pleasure of both parties. When the Indians learned that Menéndez had brought back the captive Oristans, their delight increased, and a formal parley was arranged with cacique Orista. The Adelantado of Florida utilized the ceremony of returning the prisoners who had been held in Guale to proffer Spanish peace and order and the Christianization of the tribe. Chief Orista retired to consult with his council and returned directly to accept the offer. Menéndez then agreed to leave men among them to learn their language and to teach them the rudiments of Christianity.

The Orista Indians lived in several groupings around and to the north of the main harbor of Port Royal. They were somewhat greater in numbers than the Guale people and they appear to have been more closely integrated in culture. Although dedicated to the cultivation of corn and other crops, they were still attuned to the rhythms of the acorn harvest and the seasonal runs of fish in the ocean and bays, and moved their residence during these times.

The Spanish commander chose the site for his city with an eye to strategic considerations and in line with his desire to be near the centers of Indian population, yet not directly among them. The central island in the harbor, now named Parris Island, became the location of the second municipality founded in the adelantamiento of Florida. Here the dual entities--the city of Santa Elena and the fort of San Salvador--were built around the high sand bluffs, a little distance from the Ribault settlement of 1562-1564. Although there was fertile soil to be found in some parts of the great bay, the island chosen for settlement and fortification was not particularly blessed with good soil. Menéndez named Esteban de las Alas to govern both the civil and military elements of the district, making him Alcaide of the fort and Governor of the province of Santa Elena.⁵⁰ The municipal regimiento and cabildo was formed for what promised to be the center of the King's dominions in Florida. Again, the location of settlement was directly related to marine access and established in this case upon a fine deep-water port.

It was now time for Menéndez to begin the return voyage down the east coast of his territories, for it would shortly be necessary to return the large galleon and her crew to the New Spain fleet as escort for the homeward journey to Spain. On his way south, he would stop at Guale and then inspect the peninsular garrisons, still shaky in morale after the

mutinies. At Havana Menéndez would endeavor to pump more resources into his supply pipeline, which had continued to function during the late winter and early spring of 1566, bringing corn from Yucatan, wine, biscuit, cassava, vegetables, pork, live chickens, goats and sheep from Cuba.⁵¹ Now that Santa Elena had been added to the route, the small ships would touch there also. The Adelantado promised the men he had left in Fort San Salvador that he would send them supplies in very short order, but keeping that promise might be difficult, for Menéndez' resources were becoming slim indeed; if the promised fleet of reinforcement from Spain did not soon arrive, it would be difficult for him to continue the enterprise.

When Menéndez came to St. Augustine he found that raiding Indians had attacked and burned the fort built near Seloy's village. Many of the papers of the expedition, a quantity of food and munitions, and the French banners and trophies captured the previous fall were destroyed in the fire. The fire sharpened the problem of supplying all of the forts, for there was little left in Florida, and another voyage to Havana had become urgently necessary.⁵²

The Adelantado arrived at the Cuban port in mid-May, 1566. The supplies he had found aboard Santa Catalina when it was taken for his service had been exhausted, and Menéndez had to supply the soldiers and crew aboard at his cost. Menéndez was not yet ready to release the big ship

from his service, for he had another voyage to make. On May 25, 1566, he left Havana to make a rapid trip to Carlos. He wanted to further cement his relationship with the chief there, and had promised to bring Doña Antonia, his "wife," to Havana with other Indians for instruction in the Christian faith.⁵³

The little fleet from Florida reentered the harbor at Havana on June 7, and Pedro Menéndez dismissed the large ship which had served him so well. The rough seas along the Florida coasts that winter had taken their toll, for Santa Catalina's owner complained that the vessel was returned in badly damaged condition. Four of the crew had died on the voyages (one at the hands of the Indians), and 26 remained in Florida.⁵⁴ The Adelantado established the first household of instruction for the Indians of Florida in Havana; when the religious personnel arrived to take charge they would have a body of potential Christians for their pupils.

Again the Florida leader attempted to obtain aid for the Royal troops in Florida from the Governor at Havana. For the second time, Garcia Osorio refused to use funds of the Havana treasury for any such purpose; this time, a member of the Council of the Indies and the Royal Officials at Havana were also involved in his action. In February, 1566, the King had written the Havana officials, ordering them to give the Florida Adelantado the supplies he needed, since they had not been forthcoming from Santo Domingo.

When the royal cedula was received in Cuba, the Licenciado Geronimo Valderrama was present. The Governor, Valderrama, and the King's officials met to discuss Menéndez' requests for supplies and aid. It was Valderrama's opinion that nothing should be given until a specific order should come from the Audiencia of Santo Domingo to that effect. Garcia Osorio, for his part, said that Pedro Menéndez would have to pay for whatever he got.⁵⁵ Geronimo Valderrama, who had been away from Spain for more than two years, was hardly in any position to have had much knowledge of the Florida venture. His involvement with Osorio, Menéndez and the Royal Officials in Havana must have been nothing more than a matter of momentary judgment, and was not a formal examination of the affairs of Florida. His record in New Spain indicates that the man was inclined to weight all government matters in the light of strict observance of his Majesty's ordinances and stern protection of the royal fisc. His legalistic reaction was entirely predictable.

In the first week of July, and just before the departure of Menéndez for Florida again, both Garcia Osorio and Pedro Menéndez wrote to the King. The Adelantado's letter is disappointing to the historian, for it refers to a letter Menéndez had written Philip II from Santa Elena in early May, and notes that Gonzalo Solís de Merás, who was coming to Spain, would furnish more particular information. Both men, in their letters, asked the King to seek further data about

the Florida enterprise from Valderrama, who was returning to Spain with the same fleet after his visit to New Spain. In his dispatch, Governor Osorio refuted coolly the accusations Menéndez had made against him to the King, saying that he had done all he reasonably could for Menéndez, and that Valderrama would vindicate him.⁵⁶

The Adelantado obtained more cash or credit, and was able to purchase additional supplies and munitions for his enterprise. On the same day he had written his letter to the King, Menéndez left Havana to carry supplies to his forts along the now well-known route. As Pedro Menéndez returned to the Florida provinces, the expedition sent from Spain under the command of Sancho de Archiniega was completing its voyage. The ships had followed the usual route for vessels outbound from Spain to the Indies; they had reached Grand Canary on May 4. On June 10, the worst of their journey over, the fleet entered the harbor of San Juan in Puerto Rico after watering at Dominica. Sancho de Archiniega wrote Philip II that he received a letter in Puerto Rico which described the sufferings and starvation of the Spaniards and French at Santa Lucia in Florida. It also told him of Menéndez' "marriage" to the sister of an Indian cacique--evidently a reference to the happenings in Carlos. Archiniega also advised his King that cannibal Carib Indians had killed most of the survivors from Pedro Menéndez' ship lost the year before in Guadeloupe.⁵⁷

The further journey from Puerto Rico to Florida was routine, except that one of the vessels, San Salvador, strayed from the rest and found harbor at Puerto de Plata on the northeast coast of Santo Domingo. There 60 men from the company of Captain Andrada became embroiled in controversy when their sergeant, Diego de Buytrago, attempted to lead them in the capture of a Portuguese ship which had anchored in that port. The arrival of the men in Florida was delayed while the case was tried; the Audiencia of Santo Domingo sentenced Buytrago to three years at the oar in the galleys, for a soldier had been killed in the action.⁵⁸

Great was the rejoicing in the fort and town of St. Augustine when, on June 29, 1566, a large fleet of Spanish vessels was seen off the bar. Their coming meant reinforcement, supplies, and the bolstering of the will to persist in Florida. Since the Adelantado had not yet returned from his last voyage to Havana, Bartolomé Menéndez made the necessary formal welcomes in his name. Hernando de Miranda began his duties as Royal Factor by receiving the ships officially. Then he and Juan de Junco acknowledged receipt of the soldiers and cargoes that the vessels had brought. The King's reinforcements had arrived, and the belated Royal support could not have come at a better time.⁵⁹

NOTES

1. See Menéndez' assessment of the navigational discoveries in his letter to Philip II from Matanzas dated December 5, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). An excellent description of the journey of the Adelantado from Florida is found in Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 129-131.
2. Garcia Osorio states that the Adelantado arrived in Havana November 13, in his letter to the Crown from Havana, December 18, 1565, F.M. A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).
3. Ponce describes his aid to Alas' ships in his letter to the Crown, San Juan, April 20, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).
4. The send-off of Peñalosa and his subsequent adventures is described in "Copia de una relación que Capitan Gonzalo de Peñalosa dió de un viaje que hizo a la Florida con socorro de las armada del Adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés," from A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 22 (Stetson Collection). The Audiencia of Santo Domingo discusses its role in the dispatching of the expedition in its letter to Philip II, sent from Santo Domingo on December 12, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection). The Royal Officials of that place also reported on the matter to the King in a dispatch dated November 26, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 74 (Stetson Collection).
5. Menéndez describes the sale in his letter to Philip II from Matanzas dated December 5, 1565, op. cit. Hernando Baeza recounts the return of San Andrés from Havana in "Los despachos que se hizieron en la Florida . . ." from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.
6. In reality, of course, young Ribault had returned to France. In any event, his feeble force would have posed little danger to Spanish fleets, and could only have done scattered raiding. Menéndez outlines the supposed threat and the arming of the expedition, in his letter to the Crown from Matanzas on December 5, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

7. Menéndez mentions the Luna mission in the December 5 letter, op. cit. Confirmation of the loan request is found in Royal Officials of Mexico to Crown, Mexico City, March 30, 1566, A.G.I. Mexico 323.

8. See Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Audencia of Santo Domingo, Matanzas, December 2, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection). The letter to the King is the December 5 letter, op. cit.

9. The nombramiento is addressed to Pedro Menéndez Márquez, dated December 4, 1565, at Matanzas, and is found in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, ramo 1.

10. The Adelantado mentions the use of the Portugese in his December 5 letter, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). The French are shown on ration lists for 1566 and 1567 as ship crew and found in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (in microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida).

11. Pedro Menéndez to Crown, Matanzas, December 5, 1565.

12. The events described here are outlined by Pedro Menéndez in his letter to the Crown from Havana dated December 12, 1565. Menéndez wrote that letter and mailed it separately. This separate letter is also included as a part of Menéndez' letter of December 25. It appears that, when he had recovered from his illness, he also mailed both letters together, thus repeating the contents of the earlier letter. In the Stetson Collection are found the combined letters of December 12/25, and also a separate copy of the December 12 letter, all from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231. It is the separate December 12 letter which bears the marginal comment of Philip II. The letter of December 12, but not the one of December 25, is included in "Siete cartas escritas al Rey," 45 fol., from "Cartas de Indias," in the Colección Navarrete, XIV, fol. 281-326. The letter has been reprinted from the collection of Francis Parkman in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, series 2, VIII (1894), 459. For the supply data, see "Instruction of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Diego de Miranda," Havana, November 8 (sic), 1565, from Santo Domingo 11. The arrangement with Zavallos is described in Menéndez' letter to Philip II written from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

13. See "Despachos que se hicieron," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

14. Menéndez' letter is that of December 25, 1565. The royal accountant at Havana, Diego López Osorio, wrote to Philip II from Havana on January 26, 1566, found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115. In Stetson Collection, misdated December 26, 1565.

15. Baeza came with Menéndez on the Cádiz ships. His career is described by witnesses in "Cargo y data de la cuenta que dio Fernando de Baeza," Havana, February 10, 1569, from A.G.I. Contaduría 941, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. His commission as a notary public in the Indies is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 425, Book XXV, fol. 233 and vto. Menéndez describes the establishment of the supply depot in his letter of January 30, 1566. (See note 47, p. 236, supra.), op. cit. Baeza's list of supply vessels from Havana is found in "Despachos que se hicieron," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. In addition to Menéndez' letters and the ship-dispatches of Hernando de Baeza, we are most fortunate in having the detailed list of supply vessels and cargoes sent by the Adelantado from Havana from 1566 to 1574 contained in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174. These data, collected by the Royal Officials of Havana at the request of the Crown, were gathered at Menéndez' request to support his position that he had supplied royal soldiers at his own expense. There is record of Baeza's dealing in Yucatan with one Juan Fernández of Campeche; see Declaration of February 17, 1569, from A.G.I. Contaduría 454.

16. Pedro Menéndez discusses Amaya's report in his letter of January 30, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168, which he directed to the King from Havana.

17. Captain Vélez' recollections are from his "Testimonies . . .," St. Augustine, May 15, 1566, from A.G.I. Justicia 999. A description of the sufferings of the men in Fort Santa Lucia is found in "Méritos y servicios de Diego López," St. Augustine, December 16, 1569, from the Woodbury Lowery Collection, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, I: 2: 414: 265-290. In his narrative, López baldly stated that the Spanish in the Vélez garrison resorted to cannibalism. As to location of Santa Lucia, Woodbury Lowery, in The Spanish Settlements, Appendix S, II, 434, places it at the present St. Lucie River inlet near Stuart, Florida. On the other hand, Captain Juan de Soto placed the location of Santa Lucia in "Xega" in his testimony in "Daños de los indios de la Florida," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 20. After working with Mr. Homer N. Cato of Micco, Florida, in the translation of the Mexia derrotero, the writer believes that the beginning point of the mutineers' southward journey was not far south of the Sebastian River in Indian River County. Their course, estimated at from twelve to fifteen leagues in length.

would have brought them to the north side of the wide St. Lucie River, from whence it is about eighteen miles, or six leagues, to the Jupiter Inlet.

18. See Diego López Osorio to Crown, Havana, January 26, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115. The news of trouble and disaster in Florida reached San Juan before the arrival of Sancho de Archiniega there in June of 1566. See Archiniega to Crown, San Juan, June 11, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection). Many deserters also carried the news to Santo Domingo and other places in the island Indies.

19. The Adelantado's decision is mentioned in his letter to Philip II from Havana dated January 30, 1566, and from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168.

20. There is much material about this ship-arming in "Información de Pedro Menéndez de Avilés," Seville, 1567-1568, which was assembled in an attempt to prove that Menéndez had spent much of his own money in feeding and supplying the crew of Santa Catalina. This is found in A.G.I. Contratación 4,802 (Stetson Collection). There are two lists of ships engaged in the expedition; one, in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174, gives the sailing date as March 1, 1566; the other, from "Despachos que se hicieron," in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, gives the date as February 20. Solís de Merás, in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, sets the date at February 10 (page 138).

21. On September 4, 1565, the Casa officials reported to Philip II that cannon and arquebus powder, matchcord and lead were being gathered in the Seville warehouses for the expedition; from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book II. On August 15, they had been busy trying to locate ships; on that date, the shallop La Trinidad was embargoed in Port Santa Maria--see A.G.I. Contaduría 299, 12: 3, 4. Evidently they had difficulty finding a proper Capitana for the fleet and in locating enough cannon; the King, in a letter to the Casa from the Bosque de Segovia, September 6, 1565, commented on their problems, and advised that he had sent to Vizcaya for a thousand arquebuses and helmets. The letter is from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection). The orders to the proveedores of artillery at Malaga and to the officials of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa were dated the same day, and come from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74, 74-C, and 74-E (Stetson Collection).

22. Crown to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Bosque de Segovia, September 26, 1565, from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Archiniega's appointment is from A.G.I. Patronato 254, and his first day of duty was listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 299, 12: 7.

23. Royal messages were taken to the captains recruiting men at Utrera, Port Santa Maria, Librijia and Medina-Sidonia; see A.G.I. Contaduría 299, 21: 2 vto. Difficulties and a lawsuit eventually arose out of the expenses incurred by Captain Pardo in the town of Tolox del Marqués, near Marbella on the Mediterranean coast, as the municipality sued for reimbursement. The case, dated January 27, 1566, somehow came to rest in A.G.I. Mexico 209, ramo 1.

24. Philip II gave his orders to Alava in a letter dated September 30, 1565, and found in A.D.E., VII, No. (A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1,504, No. 66). The Ambassador's report on his meeting and arguments with the Queen and her advisers was found in his letter to Philip II sent November 29, 1565, and from A.D.E., VII, No. (A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1,504, No. 80).

25. Isabel's comments to Fourquevaux are found in the Ambassador's letter to the Regent written November 3, 1565, from: Celestin Douais, ed., Depêches de M. de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne, 1565-1572 (2 v., Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), I, 63. The meeting of Fourquevaux with the Duke of Alba is described in a letter from the Ambassador to the Regent dated from Madrid on December 24, 1565, ibid., I, 17.

26. See testimony of Sebastian de Vacoli Pedrossa, taken by Juan Gutierrez Tello in Seville, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74-A, and the response from the Crown in a letter to the Casa sent from Bosque de Segovia on September 14, 1565, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012.

27. The loss of San Miguel and the subsequent delay in receipt of the news of Menéndez' victory is described in a letter from the Crown to the Casa de Contratación dated February 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection). It is also contained in "Memorial de los navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones que se perdieron el Adelantado Pedro Menéndez yendo a echarlos luteranos que estavan poblando en aquella tierra de la Florida," in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, n.d. (probably October, 1567).

28. The letter from Alava to Philip II is dated January 6, 1566, and is found in A.D.E., VIII, No. 1, 184, 189 (A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,505, 61-63). Fourquevaux wrote back from Madrid about the coming of the Basque to the Spanish Court in two letters: February 4 and 18, 1566, from "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel, Histoire de la Floride Française, pp. 417, 421.

29. Laudonnière describes his voyage in "L'Histoire Notable," from Lussagnet, Les Français en Floride, pp. 183, 184. Alava described the coming of Laudonnière to the French Court and the incident of the second captive in a letter to Philip II dated March 16, 1566, from A.D.E., VIII, No. 1,205, 271 (A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,505, 81) and one written on March 18, 1566, to Secretary Gonzalo Perez, from A.D.E., VIII, No. 1,206, 272 (A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1,505, 84).

30. Philip II had not received the dispatches from Florida by February 10, when he issued a commission to Juan de Ubilla as Almirante of the Archiniega fleet and urged him to go and expel the French from Florida. See cedula to Juan de Ubilla, Madrid, February 10, 1566, from A.G.I. Contratación 58. The arrival of the message and Diego Flores Valdés were acknowledged by Philip II in a letter to the Casa de Contratación on February 21, 1566, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection). It is also described in Fourquevaux's letter to Charles IX dated February 18, 1566, from "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel, Histoire de la Floride Française, p. 421.

31. The Spanish King's letter to Archiniega was dated February 24, 1566, and is described in the auditor's summary of events affecting the Menéndez asiento in the first pages of A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (especially fol. 2), which is in microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.

32. After consideration by the Council of the Indies on March 15, 1566, the King sent his decision to the Casa on March 21 from Madrid. The letter is found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection). The cedula to Pedro Menéndez is outlined in A.G.I. Contaduría 941, fol. 2. In another letter sent from Madrid on March 21, 1566, the King also notified his officials in Havana that parts of the Archiniega force would be used to man the fort there. This is from A.G.I. Contaduría 454.

33. See Castillo to Crown, Cádiz, January 30, 1566, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. Castillo had also evidently written the King on February 15, for Philip II replied to him in a letter sent from the Escorial on March 15, 1566; this letter is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966, Book II. The trade officials discussed the matter with the King in a letter sent from Seville on March 6, 1566, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167, Book III. On the fifteenth of March, Philip had written the Casa functionaries, ordering them to make a payment of 6,000 ducats. This letter is described in a Royal cedula sent to Casa representative Abalia in Cádiz, dated at Madrid August 28, 1566, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966 (Stetson Collection).

34. The cedula of February 24, 1566, to the Royal Officials at Havana was sent from Madrid; it is found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). It is also referred to in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174, and also in Contaduría 454.

35. Led by the 480-ton galleon Los Tres Reyes as Capitana, the Archiniega expedition carried four urcas, vessels of great capacity and relatively small draft, to transport supplies to Florida and enter its ports. The outbound ships are listed in A.G.I. Contratación 2,898 in Yda--1566. The successful departure is described in a letter of Francisco Duarte to the Casa on the same date, found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,185.

36. The departure of the expedition to Carlos is described in "Despachos que se hicieron . . .," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Menéndez evidently sent dispatches to the King from Carlos, which were lost when the courier vessel, Nuestra Señora del Rosario, was taken off Spain; see "Memorial de los navios . . . que se perdieron . . .," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Because of this gap in Menéndez' correspondence, one must rely upon the Solís de Merás, Barrientos, and "Barcía" narratives. The Adelantado does, however, give some details about Carlos and the Spanish prisoners there in his letter to Philip II sent from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection).

37. From Menéndez' letter of October 20, 1566, op. cit. De Escalante has usually been called Fontaneda, and his striking Memorial has appeared in a number of places. The best and most recent edition is Memoir of Hernando d'Escalante Fontaneda (translated by Buckingham Smith, edited by David O. True; Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1944). De Escalante appears on a Spanish ration list of 1565-66, with another captive at Carlos, Alonso de Rojas, as an interpreter. See "Lista de la gente . . . conquista de Florida," A.G.I. Contaduría 941, fol. 9 and 10 (in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History). The culture of Carlos, Calus, or Escampaba was a vigorous one, whose history is well described by Professor Charlton W. Tebeau in Florida's Last Frontier (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1956), pp. 25-32. Dr. John M. Goggin has identified it as a Glades III culture in "Cultural Traditions in Florida prehistory," from The Florida Indian and his Neighbors (edited by John W. Griffin; Winter Park, Florida: Rollins College, 1949). The northern boundaries of the Calusa area on the peninsular west coast were defined by Ripley P. Bullen in "The Southern Limit of Timucua Territory," op. cit. Woodbury Lowery, in The Spanish

Settlements, II, states his belief that the capital city of Carlos was located at Charlotte Harbor; see pp. 230-231, n. 2. On the other hand, Father Clifford M. Lewis posits the location of Mound Key in Estero Bay; this view is expressed in an unpublished manuscript entitled "The Spanish Jesuit Mission of 1567-69 in Southwest Florida: Search for Location," written at Wheeling, West Virginia in 1967. After reading the description in Juan López de Velasco, Geografía universal de las Indias, esp. 164, this writer tends to agree with Father Lewis.

38. From Menéndez' letter to the King, St. Augustine, October 20, 1566. Pedro Menéndez Márquez advises that eighteen captive Christians were rescued at Carlos; see "Daños de los Indios de la Florida," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 20. With Rojas and Escalante appear the name of "Luis, mulatto, interpreter of the land of Carlos"--from A.G.I. Contaduría 941, fol. 9, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.

39. See Menéndez' letter to the King, St. Augustine, October 20, 1566.

40. Captain Vélez describes the incident in "Información que enbió el General Pedro Meléndez de Avilés sobre cierto motin que passo en la Florida," A.G.I. Justicia 999. The caravel can be identified from the list in "Despachos que se hicieron," A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, and is also mentioned in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174. The description of the number of survivors of the garrison is found in the "Meritos y servicios de Diego López," St. Augustine, December 16, 1569, from the Woodbury Lowery Collection, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, I: 2: 414: 265-290.

41. The author has utilized the detailed testimonies about the soldiers' revolts of March, 1566, and later in that year which are found in several piezas in A.G.I. Justicia 999. It appears that some of this material had originally been located in A.G.I. Contratación 58, but is not now to be found in that legajo. The papers were evidently gathered in connection with appeals of the Redroban and Enriquez cases to the Council of the Indies.

42. See "Order to hang Sebastian Lezcano," St. Augustine, March 13, 1566, from "El Fiscal de Su Majestad con el Capitan Pedro de Redroban," A.G.I. Justicia 999.

43. From statement about his arrival given on March 27, 1566, and found in "Información que enbió el General Pedro Meléndez . . . , " A.G.I. Justicia 999.

44. Statement of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, St. Augustine, March 22, 1566, from "Información que enbío . . . ," A.G.I. Justicia 999.

45. Pedro Menéndez forwarded the procesos of the cases to the King with his letter written at Havana on July 1, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection).

46. Juan López de Velasco, Geografía universal de las Indias, p. 168.

47. After comparing the Velasco derrotero with later maps, the writer would follow the identification of Guale inlets suggested by John Tate Lanning in The Spanish Missions of Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 11, and seconded by Felix Zubillaga in La Florida, p. 353, and by Verne Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1941), esp. 35-40. The most complete record of the Guale visit in the spring of 1566 is in Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 199-210. The missionaries' letters cited by Zubillaga give by far the best view of Guale in the Menéndez years to 1572.

48. Menéndez described his policy of peripheral settlement in his letter to Philip II, written from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

49. The descriptions of the port of Santa Elena or Port Royal are taken from the contemporary account of Juan Lopez de Velasco, in Geografía universal de las Indias, pp. 161, 169. The specific location of Menéndez' first fort there was also described in the "Derrotero que hizo Andres Gonzalez, piloto de la Florida, del viage que verifico al Xacan," from A.G.I. Patronato 19, No. 1, ramo 31.

50. Alas' first appointment is affirmed in his later nombamiento as Governor of Florida, found in A.G.I. Contaduría 941, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, under the date of August, 1566.

51. The shipments, carried from February through May, 1566, in the navios La Ascensión, Santa Ysabel, and San Simon, in the pataches San Sebastián, Buenaventura, and San Mateo, the fregata Espíritu Santo and the bergantín San Anton, are detailed in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174 and described in "Los despachos que se hicieron," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

52. Menéndez' promise to supply Santa Elena quickly was described by Licenciado Godoy in "Governor Osorio sobre los amotinados de Santa Elena," Havana, July 5, 1566, from A.G.I. Justicia 999. The burning of the fort and the destruction of its contents was mentioned in A.G.I. Justicia 817, No. 5, and in "Información ante el Alcalde desta Corte," Madrid, October 16, 1567, from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

53. The Solís de Merás narrative and the work of Felix Zubillaga appear to have confused and merged the two voyages to the Calusa area, that of February and that of May, 1566. The register of ship sailings from "Los despachos que se hicieron," in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A clearly show that the second voyage was for the purpose of bringing Doña Antonia to Havana.

54. Xímeno de Bretendona, the owner of Santa Catalina, outlined the damages caused in the Florida expedition in his petition for larger charter fees in a petition found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. The return of the vessel is also mentioned in "Información de Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Seville, 1567-68," A.G.I. Contratación 4,802 (Stetson Collection).

55. The refusal to aid Menéndez is described in a letter from Juan de Hinestrosa and Juan de Carteağa to the Crown, Havana, December 24, 1568, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). Solís de Merás mentions the episode in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, p. 141. The visita of Licenciado Valderrama is detailed by Mariano Cuevas in Historia de la Iglesia en Mexico (Mexico City: Imprenta de el Asilo "Patricio Sanz," 1922), II, 2 v., 70, 95, 122, 180-190, 252-253, 324.

56. See Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Crown, Havana, July 1, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection), and Garcia Osorio to Crown, Havana, July 3, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

57. The passage of Archiniega's ships and the accounts of his Almiranta are discussed in a large pieza in A.G.I. Contratación 3,259 (Stetson Collection). This legajo also contains a list of the Florida troops aboard; many of these same men can also be identified by later petitions for their back pay; these are found in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B; the writer is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for this citation. Archiniega's letter to the King is dated at San Juan on June 11, 1566, and is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).

58. See "Petición de Diego de Buytrago," seen in Madrid on March 31, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220. The case itself is found in A.G.I. Justicia 1,000.

59. A record of some of the formalities at St. Augustine when the fleet arrived there is found in A.G.I. Contratación 58.

CHAPTER VII

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

In contrast to his feelings of the previous summer, the Spanish King could feel a degree of satisfaction by mid-1566 about affairs in Florida. He had learned fully of the victory of his Adelantado there, and had dispatched to him a fleet of reinforcement. In a mood of approbation, Philip II wrote Menéndez late in the spring praising his acts and acknowledging all of his dispatches sent from August through December of the previous year. The King advised that he was sending formal confirmation of the appointments of captains and officials that Pedro Menéndez had made, noted his approval of Menéndez' seizure of the Portuguese caravel taken off Cuba, and supported him in the Parra controversy with Garcia Osorio. On the same date, a royal letter of commendation was sent to Bartolomé Menéndez.¹

Another of Pedro Menéndez' protegés was soon to be honored, as the Adelantado had wished. On July 5, 1566, Captain Diego Flores Valdés was named General of the Tierra Firme fleet which would next leave Spain for the Indies.²

Thus the influence of the Menéndez coterie in the

Carrera de Indias continued, even while many of its members were heavily engaged in the Florida enterprise.

By spring of 1566, the news of the slaughters at Matanzas and Fort Caroline had provoked a formal reaction from the Valois court. On June 18, Ambassador Fourquevaux filed a second written protest against the acts of Pedro Menéndez in Florida on behalf of the French King. He presented his protest in an audience with Philip II, who took the matter under advisement. The French Ambassador followed up his protest with a detailed letter about the situation of individual French prisoners being held in Florida, Cuba, Puerto Rico and Spain. When the Spanish ruler gave Fourquevaux his reply, he decreed that all female prisoners and their children under 14 years of age could return to Seville, where they would be freed. The men would also be brought to the Andalucian port, where their cases would be tried under Spanish law by the Casa de Contratación. Philip II refused, however, to categorize Pedro Menéndez or his acts as criminal.³

By midsummer of 1566, events in the Netherlands dominions of Philip II clearly justified substantial concern. The King's efforts to enforce obedience to the Tridentine decrees he had proclaimed, together with some episcopal reforms of his own, had brought first passive and then active resistance. As Philip II pondered the conflicting advice of his counsellors in this matter, the

direction he sent Margaret of Parma, the Regent, was conciliatory. His decision finally to take a hard line was dictated by the outbreak of the iconoclastic fervor which swept Flanders in August, 1566. After that time, rebellion and heresy in the Netherlands were fused in the mind of the King, and he determined to send an army shortly to enforce his will. A new battleground in the worldwide war against "the Lutheran sect" was about to open, but this did not make the needs of the Indies any less pressing. Having expended much upon Florida, Philip II was prepared to spend more. He authorized a shipload of supplies for the royal troops in Florida to serve as a backup for the original Menéndez and the Archiniegas expeditions. The urca Pantecras was loaded with food and munitions and sent with its Flemish master at a cost to the Crown of more than 26,000 ducats.⁴

The urca contained a vital cargo of another kind: Two priests, a brother of the Society of Jesus and an interpreter, sent to Florida to begin the great effort of evangelization of the Florida Indians. Thus the "shock-troops of the Counter-Reformation" would furnish the necessary spiritual weapons in the struggle against heresy. Pedro de Bustinçury, the Basque who had for many years been a captive of the Ais on the east coast of the peninsula, would aid the missionaries in their communication with the Indians until they could themselves learn the languages of Florida.⁵

Pedro Menéndez had considered other religious orders for the work in Florida, but he had been in contact with the Jesuits for some time. His friendship with Diego de Avellaneda, the provincial of Andalusia, dated back to the time of his imprisonment in the Atarazanas in 1563-1564. During his preparations for the 1565 journey in Seville, Menéndez had written Francisco de Borja, then vicar-general of the order, asking for missionaries for Florida. Within 60 days, Borja replied, giving his approval and advising that he would attempt to send three missionaries.

Although the necessary formalities with the Casa de Contratación were completed in time for Jesuits to sail with the Archiniegas expedition, it appears that internal complications in the Society prevented it. Examination of the correspondence of the missionaries with their superiors and of the qualifications of the men chosen for the task reveals the zeal and the quality of the Jesuit mission. The order which served as the cutting edge of conversion and reconversion in Europe and overseas was characterized by organizational discipline and personal dedication. These qualities would now be put to the test in the Jesuits' first commitment to American missions. The three men chosen were Fathers Pedro Martinez, Juan Rogel and Brother Francisco Villareal. They spent the time prior to the departure of the urca preaching to the men in the New Spain fleet and preparing themselves spiritually for the tasks ahead. The Pantecras sailed June 28, 1566.

While the Spanish Crown was busily engaged in the supply and support of Florida, the agents of Pedro Menéndez were no less so. Pedro Menéndez Marqués, who had come from Cuba with his uncle's dispatches, visited Pedro del Castillo in Cádiz. He then went to the court and thence to Asturias to restock the vessel San Sebastian for the journey to Florida. In the port of Cangas, Menéndez Marqués supervised the loading of the vessel; in addition to the items of food and drink permitted by the Florida asiento, he also loaded tar, rigging, ship fastenings and cloth--illegal cargo under the King's contract.⁶

After Menéndez Marqués' departure from Cádiz, bad news reached Pedro del Castillo there. One of Menéndez' pataches had been taken by Turkish galleys off the Andalusian coast on its way from Santo Domingo, the second ship from Florida to be seized in a few months. Castillo had other problems as well, for the Casa representative in Cádiz, Juan de Abalia, was delaying the sailing of other vessels of the Adelantado. Pedro del Castillo protested about this to the King and also asked again for the payment of back charter fees due on San Miguel and San Pelayo. The great galeass was now known to have been totally destroyed upon the Danish coast.⁷

As the ships bearing supplies, reinforcements, and missionaries left Spain for Florida, the French were also

preparing ships for an Indies venture. More than 20 vessels were being outfitted in Norman and Breton ports for a major raid upon Spanish and Portuguese commerce.

Meanwhile, in Florida, while the Archiniega expedition began to disembark its soldiery and unload supplies and munitions in St. Augustine, Pedro Menéndez had not yet returned from his most recent trip to Havana. His major lieutenants at St. Augustine, Pedro de Valdés, Bartolomé Menéndez, Hernando de Miranda and Juan de Junco agreed with the leaders of the expedition to send the two largest ships to Santa Elena with supplies. It was agreed that pilot Gonzalo Gayón, experienced from the Villafañe and Manrique de Rojas expeditions to that place, would guide the ships. Captain Juan Pardo's company of 250 men was embarked aboard as reinforcement for the northern garrison. By July 18, the relief ships had arrived at Santa Elena.⁸

When the Adelantado landed again in Florida, he touched first at the St. Johns' River and learned to his inexpressible relief and satisfaction, that the Archiniega fleet had arrived. By July 10, Menéndez was in St. Augustine where he met with Sancho de Archiniega to arrange the disposition and division of the forces which he had brought.

The two men agreed that 750 soldiers, one half of the new reinforcements, would remain in the Florida forts. Captain Pedro de Redroban, an experienced military engineer, remained in St. Augustine with his company to aid in

reconstruction of the fort. Another officer who had arrived with Archiniega, Miguel de Enriquez, was also stationed at the first settlement. Colonel Orsuna did not come to Florida, and his company was assigned to Juan de Vascocaval. The company of Captain Martin de Ochoa remained at San Mateo; the fort there was still commanded by Sargento Mayor Gonzalo de Villaroel. Death and the desertion of some officers had left some companies decimated and others leaderless. Francisco de Reinoso was promoted to Captain and assigned the men who would shortly leave for the new fort at Carlos. Captain Juan Vélez de Medrano of Ais and Captain Zurita would go with the Adelantado on his voyage to reinforce the Caribbean islands. Until they left, the forces designated for the West Indies expedition could stiffen Menéndez' forces for special missions he had planned in Florida.

To replace the military organization he had used to defeat the French, Pedro Menéndez had prepared a system of regional lieutenants exercising civil and military powers under the overall command of another subordinate. As the Adelantado planned a journey of some months in the Islands and a lengthy voyage to Spain in the coming year, he decided to act as an absentee overlord, while Florida would be administered by his norteño associates.

It was now time for Pedro Menéndez to go northward for his final tour of inspection of the new settlements made

there in the spring. After his vessels left St. Augustine the Adelantado paused at San Mateo on August 1 to commission an expedition to the north. It was Menéndez' plan that it probe for the "Bahia de Santa Maria" and the Western Passage while Don Luis de Velasco, the Jacan chieftain, made the first contact with the Indians there. The Adelantado also instructed his men to reaffirm the Spanish dynastic claims by taking formal possession of the lands in the name of Philip II. An Asturian relative of Menéndez, Pedro de Coronas, was promoted to Captain and directed to share authority for the expedition with Dominican friar Pablo de San Pedro. A skilled pilot, Domingo Fernandez, and 15 soldiers rounded out the contingent, which sailed in the patache La Trinidad on August 3, 1566.⁹ Pedro Menéndez had already sailed for Santa Elena.

When the Adelantado dropped anchor in the Santa Elena harbor, he discovered that the garrison had almost been wiped out in June by a mutiny which had followed much the same course as those in the south. The arrival of the promised supply vessel had precipitated a full scale revolt. Trouble had flared earlier when a junta of dissatisfied soldiers forced Esteban de las Alas to permit them to wander inland seeking food from the Indians. Now the leaders of the mutineers seized the Spanish commander and Captain Pedro de Larrandia and put them in irons. The rebels divided the meager supplies and munitions in the fort

and left some with the twenty-six men who chose to remain with their leaders at Santa Elena. The mutineers then deserted the enterprise of Florida by sailing away with the captured vessel and a French Huguenot pilot, Phillipe Buser. Their adventure ended at Tequesta in Biscayne Bay for some; for the rest, it ended in their capture by Governor Osorio in Cuba more than a month later.¹⁰

The infusion of men and supplies provided by the Archiniega expedition allowed Pedro Menéndez to turn the situation at Santa Elena around. When he arrived, Menéndez found that Pardo and de las Alas had the situation under control and had arrived at a modus vivendi, in which the Captain scrupulously observed the jurisdiction of the senior official. The Adelantado allotted enough soldiers to build and man a larger and better fort. With the rest, Juan Pardo was to undertake a lengthy exploration into the interior of Florida and was to seek the land and water route to New Spain, thus completing the unfinished work of Hernando de Soto. Menéndez' most significant action at Santa Elena was governmental, for he shifted the center of the Adelantamiento of Florida. Esteban de las Alas was named Chief Lieutenant and was to exercise his control from Santa Elena, which became the capital of Florida. Alas' appointment as Governor and Captain-General was dated August, 1566.¹¹ In St. Augustine and at San Mateo, regional Governors Bartolomé

Menéndez and Gonzalo Villaroel would continue to exercise their offices. Juan de Junco remained in the office of Tenedor de Bastimentos at St. Augustine while Thomas Alonso de Alas carried out the same duties in Santa Elena.

On August 17, Menéndez paused on his return journey south to leave Captain Pedro de Larrandia, whom he had detached from the Santa Elena garrison, at Guale. Six soldiers were left at Guale where they began a small fort near the Indian settlements.¹² By the 28th of the month, the Adelantado reached San Mateo and found that there had been a second rebellion in the peninsular garrisons. This time, the uprising had been rapidly discovered and contained, and there was little for Menéndez to do but hear the legal appeals of the prisoners who were still alive. This time, the troubles had also begun in the garrison of Fort San Mateo.¹³ Dissension centered in the company of Captain Pedro Redroban, although soldiers from other companies were also involved. Unhappy with the land and their assignment in Florida, the soldiers had been brought to a state of tension by continual Indian raids and began to whisper of desertion. In the forts, there was talk of the treasure there was in the land of Carlos for any man to take. Redroban's sergeant, Pedro de Pando, and his cousin, Joaquin de Redroban, formed a party whose aim it was to go overland to Carlos. After making themselves rich, the rebels planned to make their way to New Spain and be forever freed of the

misery of service in Florida. More than 100 men banded together and set out, but had gone only a short distance when they were intercepted and halted by Pedro de Valdés. He promptly put the leaders of the party on trial. Gonzalo Villaroel arrested Joaquin de Redroban at San Mateo and his trial began August 13. On the 24th, Valdés issued a formal order that the man be hung for his "enormous and atrocious guilt." As Villaroel prepared to carry out the order, Redroban approached the court through his procurador to make a formal appeal to the Adelantado.

The time had come for Menéndez to grasp firmly the nettle of the Indian problem which his garrisons faced in the whole of the lower St. Johns. Throughout the year, the Spanish continued to suffer casualties from annoying Indian raids. Succinct marginal comments in the Florida ration lists indicate that many of the killed and wounded had been caught in ambush. When the Indians suddenly attacked with bows and arrows, the Spanish were unable quickly to return fire with their arquebuses, and the little skirmishes often ended with several Spanish dead left on the ground. Menéndez proposed to protect his men with padded cotton jackets (escupiles) which had been used in New Spain and Yucatan and further planned to augment his firepower with crossbows, which could come into action rapidly and cover the arquebusman while he prepared to fire his awkward weapon.

In contravention of his royal orders and contrary to his own expressed policy, Pedro Menéndez found himself forced to practice alliance politics with the Indians in order to lessen the attacks upon his men. The hostility of Saturiba and his allies, who occupied the lower St. Johns and the mouth of the St. Mary's River, made some action essential. The Adelantado chose to attempt to immobilize his opposition, and Menéndez prepared for a voyage up the St. Johns. Among the allies and enemies of Saturiba, still uneasy from the wars in the time of Laudonnière, he might be able to make profitable treaties. At the same time, the Adelantado could test his theory of a water route across the peninsula.

At the end of August, 1566, with three small craft and 100 men, Menéndez made his way upriver.¹⁴ Not 20 miles from San Mateo, he came to the village of Utina, who had once been captured by Laudonnière. That chief was most wary of entanglements with the Spanish, as he had already suffered considerably from involvement with Europeans, and he refused to treat with Menéndez. The expedition passed on southward, camping at nights under guard on river beaches on the cypress shoreline. The Spanish bypassed the towns of Chief Calabay, near the great double bend in the river near the present Palatka, traversed Lake George and found the river noticeably more narrow. Further on, they knew, lay the land of Mayaca.¹⁵

Menéndez met with no success in dealing with the Mayaca Indians. After finding the main village empty and deserted, the Spaniards advanced in their boats until they reached a narrow point in the river. There they were threatened by hostiles with bow and arrow and they found the waterway blocked with stakes. There was no negotiation with Chief Mayaca, neither had the water passage to the Gulf been found. There was nothing to do but to return the way they had come.

On the voyage down river, however, Menéndez realized some fruitful advantage from his expedition. After tentative but favorable contact with the Calabay chief, the Spaniards left some soldiers to begin the teaching of a simplified Gospel. This move stirred the jealousy of Saturiba and the interest of Utina and even of Mayaca. The Adelantado was finally able to send catechists and gifts to Utina and Mayaca.

When he returned to San Mateo, Pedro Menéndez was in time to preside over the appeal of the mutiny case against Joaquin Redroban. The case was heard aboard a ship anchored off the fort and was very brief, for the Adelantado simply noted that he busily occupied with the dispatch of his West Indies expedition and remanded the convicted man back to Sargento Mayor Villaroel. Redroban was probably hung; Valdés notes that three of the guilty were executed and three others sentenced to 10 years' galley service. A

continually widening circle of suspicion soon included Captain Pedro de Redroban. Although there seems no valid evidence that he was involved in the mutiny plot, Captain Redroban was arrested on September 12. The mutinies of 1566 had come to an end, but their unwholesome effects continued to be felt.

After his return to St. Augustine, Pedro Menéndez commissioned his experienced Piloto Mayor Gonzalo Gayón, to make a journey to Mayaca. Gayón was ordered to take a small ship down the east coast and treat with the chief for the ransom of French and Spanish captives reputedly in his power.¹⁶ Menéndez also sent Francisco de Reinoso, promoted to Captain, to establish a fort and colony at Carlos, near the other end of the supposed waterway. With him went 12 soldiers, six of them noblemen and six farmer-soldiers, the Indian heir to Chief Carlos and two interpreters. The mission of Reinoso and the others was to win the confidence of the chief, build a fort and begin the cultivation of the land.¹⁷

As he prepared the ships and men which were to embark with him on his anti-corsair expedition, Pedro Menéndez was saddened to learn of the unfortunate results of the voyage of the urca Pantecras. News was brought to St. Augustine that the relief ship had lost its way and put a small craft ashore to seek directions to St. Augustine. The boat, with Father Martinez, one of the Jesuit missionaries, aboard

was attacked by the Indians on September 29, 1566. The priest and three other men were killed, not far from San Mateo. Before their mission had fairly begun, the Jesuits had already obtained a martyr. The urca, unable to find the Florida ports, went on to Havana to unload ~~its~~ supplies.¹⁸

After establishing more firmly his system of government for the control of the Florida provinces, the Adelantado next filled out his scheme with more detailed regulations. The lessons of the mutinies on the Indian River, at St. Augustine, San Mateo and Santa Elena were not lost upon him. After due consideration by the cabildo in St. Augustine, Pedro Menéndez published seventeen ordinances for the governing of Florida. These regulations ran the gamut from military discipline, through religious instruction in the forts, to the powers and functions of the cabildos.¹⁹

By voice and trumpet, Menéndez had the ordinances proclaimed in the fort and city of St. Augustine and had them conveyed also to the other Spanish Florida settlements. The Adelantado prefaced his laws with a discourse on why previous attempts to settle Florida had been a dismal failure; he felt that poor discipline and lack of firm authority had doomed the other efforts of conquest and evangelization. Now, he said, victory had been gained over the French heretics and His Majesty had sent fifteen hundred troops to support his untiring efforts in the land. So that this enterprise, too, should not fail, the regulations had been established.

The punishments set in the ordinances for deviations from military order and discipline were harsh. Insubordination, blasphemy or fighting with sword or dagger were punished with time in the stocks, whipping, deprivation of rations, months at hard labor on the fortifications, by perpetual sentencing to the galleys or by death. Attendance at mass and the learning of the catechism was obligatory upon the garrison, on pain of punishment.

In Florida, the ancient Spanish municipal institutions were utilized as the means for both civil and military government. In each fort, the cabildo was to meet twice weekly to consider current business. Its membership would consist of the Governor, military captains, the royal treasury officials, the alcaldes, procurador, a representative of the clergy and the tenedor de bastimentos. The members would choose the alcalde, procurador, an alquacil and the alcaide of the public jail in annual elections. The whole body would deal with matters of community concern and legal matters, both civil and military. The clergy member was given a vote only in civil cases. Jurisdiction and authority were given to deal with legal cases and execute sentence (barring appeal by the convicted party) in cases of mutiny and sentences of ten thousand maravedís and less. During military emergencies, the cabildo called to deal with such situations should consist only of the Governor and Captains. Appeals taken from the legal

processes of the alcalde and cabildo would be to the Adelantado and thence to the Council of the Indies.

On October 20, 1566, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés sailed from St. Augustine with a sizeable force of ships and men on his anti-corsair voyage. The Adelantado had prepared his provinces for his absence by the appointment of regional lieutenants and that of an overall governor at Santa Elena. He had fleshed out the structure of the Florida government with ordinances regulating its governance. Menéndez had staffed and financed a supply network to furnish the garrisons and settlements with food and munitions, even if this at times functioned haltingly. He had prepared the ground in Florida and in Europe for the coming of a band of dedicated missionaries who would undertake the conversion of the Indians of Florida. Important initiatives in the exploration of his far flung territories had been undertaken or commissioned on both coasts and inland on the peninsula, north and westward from the base at Santa Elena, and northward to the Bahia de Santa Maria.

As soon as he left St. Augustine in the fall of 1566, the proprietor of Florida began a new relationship with the territories granted him by contract of the King. From this time forward until his death, Pedro Menéndez would lead a dual existence, vis-à-vis Florida. As Adelantado, he would continue to act as the directing spirit of the enterprise. Between his visits there, lieutenants would

govern the provinces in his name and in that of the King, while Menéndez sought preferment and profit elsewhere. The monies and benefits gained in this way would help support his efforts in Florida. The heightened menace of French attacks in the Indies, of which the Ribault and Laudonnière thrusts had been a part, furnished the rationale for his wider role. Menéndez' dual interests made heavy demands upon his time and energies, and often each separate area of his concerns would suffer from his momentary preoccupation with the other.

The first of these extra-Florida activities, the expedition to the Windward Islands, lasted from late October 1566 until the return of the Adelantado to Spain in May of the next year. Except as they might touch upon Florida, its details lie outside the scope of this work.²⁰ Suffice it to say that Pedro Menéndez and his chief lieutenant, Pedro de Valdés, passed systematically from point to point, fortifying the rim of the northern Caribbean against possible enemy attack and seeking French corsair ships. News of the French assault upon Madeira gave fresh impetus to his efforts. As he studied local forts and established garrisons in the major ports, Menéndez moved with his usual decisive rapidity. As they often had, these characteristics sometimes brought him into direct conflict with the jurisdiction of local officials.

When the Adelantado reached Santo Domingo and began to treat with the Audiencia there, he found that body willing enough to cooperate in matters of defense. The Audiencia wanted the troops he had brought, but suggested the Adelantado return to Florida. When Menéndez attempted to bring action against Captain Juan de San Vicente and other deserters from Florida who were living at Santo Domingo, he found three of the Oidores arrayed against him. Although San Vicente was indicted by the fiscal and was jailed, influence exerted by the three officials got him quickly freed.²¹

The problems of his Florida colonies were never completely out of Menéndez' mind. During his visit to Santo Domingo, he wrote the King, describing his Indies defense dispositions. The Asturian went on to remind his sovereign that supplies for Florida would continue to be an urgent necessity, and hinted to Philip II of a great secret, which would serve greatly to increase the King's patrimony. This must have been the discovery of the great northern water-passage, which he hoped his mission to Jacan would have found by that time. Menéndez told the King that he planned to re-visit Florida early in the spring of 1567, and would thereafter come to Spain with news of the momentous discovery.²²

By the first of the New Year, Pedro Menéndez had accomplished his main purpose in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and eastern Cuba: the establishment of garrisons in key

points. After leaving a small force in Santiago de Cuba in mid-January, the Adelantado moved west along the south shore of the island, heading to Havana. Pedro de Valdés had already arrived there with the larger ships and the remaining soldiery. Until his chief should arrive, it was up to Valdés to represent Menéndez and begin to prepare the defenses of Havana. On January 21, 1567, Valdés presented his credentials and displayed the King's order to Menéndez.²³ Governor Osorio and his cabildo coolly heard Valdés state that he had come with sizeable forces to strengthen Havana against enemy attack and proposed to build a watchtower and strong point at the Morro in Havana harbor.

The first to speak after Menéndez' lieutenant had made his presentation was Garcia Osorio. The Governor objected professionally to Valdés' fortification plans, but his strongest objections touched upon matters of jurisdiction. Osorio stressed the fact that he, as the King's Governor and Captain-General of Cuba, was the person responsible for defense in that island. The royal orders to Pedro Menéndez seemed to him a direct affront, and he proposed that the force of soldiers brought by Menéndez and Valdés should be given to him, and Menéndez should return to defend Florida, which was his own particular responsibility.

A vote was taken of the cabildo members on the question, and the majority backed the Governor. Even Juan de Hinestrosa, long a friend of Menéndez, cast his ballot for Garcia Osorio. In the new battle which was forming

between the Florida Adelantado and the Governor of Cuba, Pedro Menéndez had lost the first round.

Shortly afterwards, the Adelantado himself arrived in Havana and took charge of his affairs there. He paid off the Crown ships and sent them back to Spain. The Cuban port was now heavily occupied with the comings and goings of the supply ships of the Florida proprietor. From Spain itself, and from the Indies, from San Juan to Yucatan, they converged upon Havana and were sent on to the forts in Florida by Hernando de Baeza. Menéndez found the battered urca Pantecras, which had come the previous December with the surviving Jesuits, anchored at Havana. The valuable cargo which the ship had brought was intact, and was transferred formally to Menéndez and his agent. Pedro Menéndez then bought the urca, rechristened it Espiritu Santo, and put his own captain in charge. The large store of goods thus received was of vital importance to the Florida enterprise--it acted as a massive transfusion, renewing the flow of supplies. From the middle of February, 1567, until the last of that month, foodstuffs, munitions, cloth and apparel from the urca were parcelled out and sent in several directions.²⁴ By written authorization of Pedro Menéndez, Baeza allegedly sent six shiploads of cloth and foodstuffs to St. Augustine and Santa Elena. An auditor, following up the supposed deliveries, found that the Florida officials could not show receipt of all of the goods. In one case,

that of the patax San Christoval, the shipmaster was supposed to have received oil and vinegar from the urca's cargo, but he later swore that he had received nothing.

It is evident that Pedro Menéndez diverted much of the royal property to uses not intended by the King, and that he converted some of it to private use. Although Menendez continued to purchase and send large quantities of corn, cassava, and meat to Florida, a good bit of this was bought with the royal supplies, or with money obtained from their sale. Juan de Orduna, a servant of Pedro Menéndez, carried two hundred hats and a substantial amount of cloth from the urca to Yucatan to trade for corn, honey and chickens which was then transshipped to Florida.²⁵

Pedro Menéndez utilized the goods sent from Spain for the Florida garrisons to supply some of the soldiers he had posted in the Caribbean. The renamed urca was sent to Santo Domingo with one hundred pipes of four for the garrison, and Menéndez turned over a quantity of clothing to Baltasar de Barreda, whom he had named as captain of the company he left in Havana. The Adelantado issued thirty pipes of the royal wine and some of the oil and vinegar to his servant, Julian Garcia, for his own use. An audit made two years later resulted in the charge, already current at the Spanish Court, that Hernando de Baeza had openly sold a large quantity of goods from the Pantecras at public auction in Havana. To this charge Menéndez responded that if goods were sold

in Havana and Campeche, the proceeds of the sales were used to send things necessary for the supply of the Florida soldiers of the King.²⁶ As a matter of fact, it appears that the intermingling of royal and personal funds and goods was such that the Crown had virtually no control over the use of its property. This situation resulted in part from the structure of an adelantamiento, in which the contractor had such personal influence that his control of operations within his little kingdom was almost total.

Bolstered by the infusion of supplies and money resulting from the arrival of the Pantecras, Pedro Menéndez greatly expanded his shipments to Florida. In addition to the biscuit, wine, oil, vinegar, cloth and munitions directly unloaded from Pantecras, Baeza sent meat in cask, large amounts of corn, live chickens and hogs, and (in April, 1567) a shipload of horses and mares. For mounted defense, agricultural purposes, and breeding, these animals would strengthen the colonies.²⁷

The Adelantado, looking beyond the exhaustion of the supplies which had arrived with the urca, wrote the King on February tenth asking for another shipment. Estimating the royal troops then in Florida at nine hundred in number, Menéndez requested eight shiploads of goods, including two thousand pipes of wine and five hundred tons each of flour and biscuit. This, he believed, would last for eight months.²⁸

Among other actions he took to raise money for the Florida enterprise, Pedro Menéndez had arranged to ransom some of his noble prisoners in their native France. One of these, Pierre d'Uilly, had already been sent to Spain, and Menéndez awaited the ransom.²⁹ Although no records have survived to furnish proof of the allegations, Andres de Equino, the Florida auditor, charged that Menéndez and his lieutenants used Crown property to barter for gold and silver with the South Florida Indians. According to Garcia Osorio, quantities of this treasure had come into Havana from the north, and the royal percentage had been paid on none of it.³⁰

The quarrel between Garcia Osorio and Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had been diminished no whit by the coming of the Adelantado to Havana, but was moving toward a major confrontation. When it came, the conflict centered on the matter of jurisdiction over the royal troops Menéndez had brought to Havana, and featured Captains Baltasar de Barreda and Pedro de Redroban. Among the unfinished business before the Adelantado in Havana was the completion of the trial of Redroban for mutiny, which had begun in St. Augustine the previous fall. The Captain-engineer had been removed from command of his company, which had been given to Barreda and stationed in Havana. As Menéndez prepared to leave for Florida, he formally put Barreda in charge of these troops, under his command, not that of Osorio. The Governor immediately began secret negotiations with Pedro de Redroban, with

an eye to a possible merger of their interests, and the defeat of the Menéndez faction.

The Adelantado next undertook another voyage to the west coast of Florida, where he proposed to continue the effort to find the water passage which would link up the east and west coasts of the peninsula. The failure of previous expeditions from Carlos and up the St. Johns only encouraged another attempt. Pedro de Valdés was sent to St. Augustine with instructions to try again from that coast, and Hernando de Miranda preceded the Adelantado to the Gulf coast to begin the explorations there.³¹

As hostage for the good intentions of Chief Carlos, Captain Reinoso had sent Menéndez' "wife" Doña Antonia to Havana, where she had passed the winter. Now Pedro Menéndez planned to return her to her brother in Florida and at the same time establish more securely the garrison there. Some Indians from Tequesta, on the lower southeast coast, had also come to Havana, and Menéndez could take them there and pursue Spanish objectives in that place. Father Juan Rogel and Brother Francisco Villaroel would also go to Florida with the Adelantado to make the first Jesuit mission establishment in the Spanish Empire. On March first, a fleet of seven sails left Havana for Carlos, led by Menéndez in the new fast frigate El Águila. That vessel, which had been made to order in Havana, was commanded by Pedro Menéndez Márquez.

When he arrived at the Indian settlement, Menéndez saw at once that the fierce and intractable nature of Chief Carlos and his people had been little affected by all of his initiatives towards them. The surface amity which had prevailed when Carlos had given his sister to Menéndez and when he had released the Christian captives had largely dissolved. The return of Doña Antonia was no palliative to the situation, for she told her brother that the "marriage" to Pedro Menéndez was artificial and unfulfilled. The proposal which Menéndez next made puzzled and infuriated the Indian chieftain: The Adelantado urged reconciliation of the Calusa Indians with the Tocobaga nation, their hereditary enemies to the north. For the moment, however, Menéndez was able to persuade Carlos to come on an expedition to Tocobaga. It appears that Hernando Escalante also came, serving as interpreter.³²

After coasting northward along the shoreline of the Gulf for several days, the Spanish ships reached the entrance of Tampa Bay and had passed from one distinct culture-area into another one: the Tocobaga were related to the Timuquan grouping. Without being discovered by the Indians, the Spaniards entered Old Tampa Bay and approached the main village of the Tocobaga, located on the shores of Safety Harbor. Here Carlos showed that all of his instincts were intact, as he proposed to Menéndez that they attack the village, seeing that they had caught the enemy by surprise.

Patiently the Adelantado reiterated to Carlos that the mission on which they had come to Tocobaga was a peaceful one, but mollified Carlos, by promising that he would negotiate for the return of Calusa prisoners whom Tocobaga held.

After an initial meeting with the chieftain of Tocobaga, the Indian consulted with sub-chiefs and advisers from the surrounding country and finally agreed to a joint treaty with the Spanish and the Calusas. Tocobaga returned several prisoners to Carlos, and Menéndez left a garrison of thirty men headed by Captain García Martínez de Cos. Since the Adelantado had been unable to follow up the search for the supposed water route across the peninsula, Martínez' detachment could explore for the waterway, and begin to accustom the Indians of Tocobaga to the Catholic faith.

Events on the voyage back to Carlos and after the party returned there made it clear that Menéndez' attempted rapprochement between Indian groups had only exacerbated hostility to the Spanish. Although Doña Antonia remained with the Christians, it was evident that Menéndez' "marriage" with her had failed to tie the Indians more closely to the Spanish. Tension between two noble factions among the Calusas brought Indians opposing Carlos into contact with the Christians through the little community of Spaniards who had been prisoner there, and the news could reach the Spanish in time to learn of danger. For example, when Pedro Menéndez decided to settle his colony on another island apart from

that on which Carlos held his court, the chief offered canoes and men to help make the move. When the Spanish learned through their friendly grapevine that Carlos planned to overturn the canoes and drown the Spanish en route they used Menéndez' small boats instead. The fort-mission of San Antón de Padua had been born. In the prevailing atmosphere, Father Rogel was unable to preach directly to individual Indians, but had to confine himself to worship at the centrally located Cross.³³ It was not a promising beginning for the Jesuit mission, but Pedro Menéndez had no choice. He could not remain; news from Havana forced his immediate return there to deal with a serious challenge to his authority: Menéndez received word that Pedro de Redroban had escaped from custody and that García Osorio had arrested Baltasar de Barreda and had assumed control over the garrison Menéndez had left there. After reinforcing the Carlos fort with fifty soldiers, the Adelantado departed for Havana.

When Pedro Menéndez arrived in Havana in the last week of March, he found a conflict raging just short of armed combat. Baltasar de Barreda has escaped from confinement, and he and the Adelantado quickly reassumed control over the royal soldiery Menéndez had left there. Menéndez found out the hiding place of Pedro de Redroban and seized the rebel captain. On April 12, 1567, Redroban was sentenced to be beheaded in the town square of Havana, but he formally requested an appeal to the Council of the Indies. Pedro

Menéndez granted the request, and agreed to take Redroban with him to Spain so that his case could be heard in Madrid. The battle between two rival power-centers still continued in Havana, but Menéndez had maintained and augmented his own position in that city so important for his supply of Florida.³⁴

At this time, as the Adelantado prepared for one last visit to Florida before his voyage to Spain, Pedro Menéndez Marquéz' network of small supply craft was most active. In a report prepared at the end of March, 1567, Hernando de Baeza noted that 150 men and more than ten vessels were then involved in the effort. On March 25, he advised, the pataches Buenabentura and San Christoval had left for Campeche to load corn for Florida, while the patax San Mateo departed the same day for the Savanna of Basco Porcallo to load meat and cassava. The bergantín San Julian had already gone to Tequesta to return the Indians to their village, and the fregata Espiritu Santo was loading horses, mares and hogs for Florida.

The renamed urca, now also called Espiritu Santo, was still on its voyage to Santo Domingo, while yet another vessel by the same name had been lost off Havana while returning from Puerto de Plata with calves. Three ships, El Águila, a new shallop named Buenabentura, and the Sevilla were being prepared for Menéndez' planned voyage to Florida. Two more vessels, the patax San Antón and a large shallop were being outfitted to go to Campeche for corn.³⁵

The first stop made by the Adelantado on his way north was the Indian settlement located where the Miami River flows into Biscayne Bay. Here lived the Tequesta, and it was at this place that rebel Spaniards had been shipwrecked in 1566. Pedro Menéndez halted at Tequesta to establish formally the Spanish mission. Evidently the earlier Spanish presence there had encouraged the Indians to break to a degree from their vassalage to Carlos, so that the Adelantado was in a more favorable position in Tequesta than he had enjoyed on the west coast. Concord between the Spanish and the Indians progressed so well and so rapidly that Menéndez was able to leave Brother Villareal and a thirty-man company there to begin the erection of a fort and mission. When he departed Tequesta, Pedro Menéndez took with him three Indians, including the brother of the chief, to go with him to Spain.

As he had done the previous July, Pedro Menéndez made his landfall first at San Mateo. At the fort there, his district Governor Villaroel quickly brought the Adelantado up to date on occurrences in the vicinity of San Mateo since his departure. Another reconnaissance up the St. Johns, this time by Pedro de Valdés, had failed to yield the secrets of the water route from Mayaca to the Gulf. The soldiers at San Mateo experienced all of the unease of those within a besieged fortress; Indian raiders made any forays outside patiently unsafe. On the previous November 30, Captain Pedro de Larrandia and several of his men had been attacked

from ambush on their way to San Mateo from the fort at Guale, and killed. In counter-raids, Villaroel had been able to capture sixteen of Saturiba's warriors, including his son Emola. Using the Indian hostages to draw the interest of Saturiba, Pedro Menéndez arranged a face-to-face confrontation with the Timucuan chief. The meeting took place near the St. Johns bar, where the Adelantado anchored offshore while Saturiba remained back some distance from the beach. After some hours of fruitless parley, the Spanish suspected a plot to ambush their shore party and lure Menéndez to his death, while Saturiba refused to negotiate personally with the Spanish leader, and the meeting broke up in renewed mutual enmity. The uncertainty and hostility of the Timucuan in the vicinity of San Mateo would continue. Faced with continuing attacks upon his communications and sorts, Pedro Menéndez gave orders for the construction of a protective line of blockhouses from Matanzas to Guale. One of these, named Alicamini, was located near the place of the parley with Satiruba, on the north bank of the St. Johns.³⁶

Even though St. Augustine had been supplied reasonably well during the months since Menéndez' departure the previous October, the community and garrison had suffered the same uncertainties then current at San Mateo. Tensions between the faction of the Adelantado, his brother, and other Asturians and that of the captains who had come in July,

1566, with Sancho de Archiniega had flared up on several occasions.

This time, the trouble had begun the December before, after the cabildo had established a daily ration of one-quarter pound of bread per man. Captain Miguel de Enriquez, who had come to Florida with one of Archiniega's companies, objected to the decision of the cabildo, and said that he would appeal it to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. Witnesses testified that Enriquez had scoffed at the jurisdiction of the cabildo, and had offered obscene comments about its authority. Bartolomé Menéndez, whom his brother had left in charge as regional governor at St. Augustine, clashed with Enriquez on several occasions. The governor had intervened to punish one of the soldiers in Enriquez' company, whom he had apprehended giving cloth to a prostitute at the public fountain of St. Augustine. In another instance, Bartolomé Menéndez publicly rebuked the captain for the laxity of his men on the sentinel posts. His remarks upon that occasion are indicative of the tension in St. Augustine:

It is notorious that numerous French Lutherans have been expelled from these provinces, and the fort at San Mateo and other forts which they had occupied in the kingdom and jurisdiction of His Majesty . . . taken from them. It can now be expected that they may come and that they will come to revenge themselves for such great slaughter and destruction of their people. If this took place, it would be a great disservice to God Our Lord and to His Majesty, if we were found as careless and unprepared as we have been on the occasions when Captain Miguel Enriquez' sentinels were so careless.³⁷

Miguel Enriquez was arrested and charged with insubordination. Beginning April 27, 1567, Pedro Menéndez heard testimony from Enriquez and from those appearing against him. The officer was adjudged guilty, and sentenced to lose his command and have his salary reduced. Enriquez also appealed his sentence to the Council of the Indies.

In the first week of May, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés bid farewell to his brother and to the other captains and officials at St. Augustine, and set sail in El Águila and another small ship for Santa Elena. With him went the Indians from Tequesta, the officer prisoners, Pedro de Valdés, and a small force of soldiers and seaman. He also carried three of the Timucuan Indians, including one who had been christened Juan de Valdés, to go with him to the Spanish Court. Pedro de Bustinçury, the Vizcayan who had been captive of the Ais Indians and whom the French had taken to the Valois Court, went with the Indians as interpreter.³⁸

When he reached Santa Elena, Pedro Menéndez focused his attention upon the exploration and exploitation of the fertile continental areas of his domains and the discovery of a more rapid passage from Spain to New Spain and the Pacific. Menéndez therefore called upon Juan Pardo to report on his four-month journey deep inland, in which the energetic Captain had travelled more than five hundred miles and had reached the foot of the Appalachian Mountains. Pardo and his men had left Santa Elena on December 1, 1566,

and had seen traversed a great variety of terrain from the relatively warm seacoast to the snow-covered eminences of the Blue Ridge, all within the boundaries of the present state of South Carolina. At the sizeable Indian city called Joada near the mountains, Juan Pardo had founded a city called Cuenca, built Fort Joada and left a sergeant and garrison to man the fort. The Captain reported to Pedro Menéndez that he had found rich clay soils and heavy forest growth which promised great fertility. He also advised that the inland areas were watered and drained by several great rivers which could offer access for their development.

No trace had been found of the storied waterway which should lead to the Viceroyalty of New Spain or to the South Sea, but the Pardo exploration was an important initiative. It established in Menéndez' mind the fertility of the vast inland areas and their suitability for his own future agricultural enterprise. The first contact was made with the Indians, and many new tribes had been marked out for evangelization and conversion.

The Adelantado probably already knew that his Jacan expedition had failed. Instead of finding the homeland of Don Luis, it had landed near the Outer Banks of present North Carolina. After being discouraged by stormy fall weather, Pedro de Coronas and his men had returned directly to Spain, arriving in Seville by November 5, 1566. The

"Bahia de Santa Maria" and the water passage would have to await future explorations.³⁹

When he left Santa Elena for Spain on May 18, 1567, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had behind him more than eighteen months' labor in and for his new provinces of Florida. His short-run, military objective imposed by the presence of the Laudonnière garrison had been successful. The French fort had been taken and the reinforcing fleet of Jean Ribault destroyed.

The first actions had been costly, and not only to the French. Thanks largely to the work of Paul E. Hoffman, the cost of the Florida enterprise to the Spanish crown can be itemized rather precisely. To Hoffman's totals, this writer could add the sums paid directly to the Adelantado in conjunction with his contract. After making this adjustment, the royal cost at Cádiz, the expenses of the aborted expedition from Santo Domingo and the shipments made in the urca Pantecras in 1566 total about 108,000 ducats. In addition, some charges attributable to Florida accrued when Menéndez used the fleet ship Santa Catalina, its crew and supplies during the winter of 1565-66. As to the Archiniega expedition, which Hoffman has demonstrated to have cost more than 130,000 ducats, it is felt that only about half of its expense should be allocated to Florida. Many of the Archiniega ships and men were sent in 1566 to the West Indian islands under Menéndez' command to provide for their

defense. After making these adjustments, it appears that Philip II spent about 200,000 ducats directly on support of the Florida enterprise during its first phase--virtually all of the monies spent by the Crown for Indies defense during those years.⁴⁰

The direct "private" costs of the Florida conquest in its first phase can also be approximated. Menéndez' initial outfitting cost has already been estimated at 50,000 ducats. Menéndez had spent 10,400 ducats in 1566 for the purchase of supplies in Havana, for his Florida enterprise.⁴¹ He had also spent at least 7,000 ducats in other Cuban ports, and had expended additional sums in Yucatan, Santo Domingo, Puerto de Plata, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. Menéndez also expended some 7,000 ducats in Spain. His costs probably totalled more than 75,000 ducats in the first phase of conquest.

The goods and supplies bought by Pedro Menéndez and his agents had to be delivered and there was substantial cost involved in the operation of his fleet of small boats. Another kind of cost, related to these shipping routes, was the loss of ships and men that had steadily eroded the Menéndez forces throughout the first year of the Florida conquest.

Within less than two years after Menéndez' first expedition sailed from Cádiz, eleven ships had been lost to the enterprise of Florida.⁴² The sinking of these vessels, large and small, represented the loss of the greater part

of the marine assets of Menéndez and his coterie. To offset these damages, there was little in the way of income. Ransoms and booty from the Florida conquest did exist but were not appreciable. Profits from the small cargoes carried by Menéndez Marquéz could not approach the potential that San Pelayo would have represented in the rich New Spain or Tierra Firme trade. Faced with such losses, Pedro Menéndez had left Florida. His command of the Windward Islands expedition enabled him to sail at Royal cost. During his voyage to Spain, the Adelantado would endeavor to trade his deeds in Florida for royal recognition. The defeat and expulsion of the French colony of Laudonnière and Ribault would surely be rewarded by his sovereign, and soon.

Evaluation of the first phase in Florida also demonstrates that Pedro Menéndez' most vital contribution was that of acting as Captain-General and entrepreneur on-the-spot. It was his own presence and leadership that had defeated the French. The Crown exerted a more passive, supporting role in the Florida conflict of 1565-66. During its active stages, the resources of the Adelantado proved the more telling; much of the royal support was wasted or came too late to influence the outcome. Because of his slim financial reserves and due to the loss of many of his supplies and his largest ship, Pedro Menéndez and his men in Florida suffered many hardships and privations directly traceable to the single-minded way in which he had come to

the task of erasing the French colony. Menéndez can scarcely be faulted for the zeal he displayed in striking out straightaway for Florida to meet the French, but the cost of this decision was a heavy one. Once his victory had been won, short supplies forced the Adelantado to try to link up with his own missing forces, and those promised by the King.

When he left Florida, Pedro Menéndez removed his unifying and commanding presence from the scene. The men he left in charge of the separated garrisons had been unable to cope with the situations which arose. Indeed, it might have been impossible for any leader to deal with the independent-minded sixteenth-century Spanish soldiery in such circumstances. Men whose clothing and food supplies were low, fearful of death in a hostile land, might have rebelled in any event, but Menéndez' four-month absence seems to have been critical.

Once in Cuba, the Adelantado sought with all means at his command to supply his Florida enterprise. The expedients he employed were generally successful. The charge that Pedro Menéndez deserted his Florida responsibilities to go hunting corsairs begs the question; he actually spent little time in this; the sale of the two Portugese prizes yielded him some badly needed operating funds.

On the other hand, it does appear that the Adelantado could have taken some rapid measures to relieve Santa Lucia,

once news of the difficulties there reached him in Havana. Menéndez' presence in St. Augustine and San Mateo could have forestalled the March mutinies. Instead, he sailed first to Carlos.

Pedro Menéndez' funding arrangements are subject to the same criticisms which one might level against those of the Crown; they had proven insufficient to provide ample and continuous support for the Florida enterprise. In spite of losses and setbacks, however, Menéndez persisted in his efforts. By early 1567, he had set up a viable pipeline for the supply of Florida through Cuba, and other Caribbean areas, was preparing further groups of soldiers and settlers in Spain and had installed the first group of Jesuit missionaries. Menéndez left the Florida establishments in reasonably good condition. Fortified by the soldiery and supplies which had come in mid-summer of 1566, the garrisons had been extended north and south of the initial settlement. The Adelantado had founded cities at Santa Elena and St. Augustine, and had set up regional government under major lieutenants. In view of widespread Indian hostility in this critical phase of colonization, internal defense continued to be essential. The task of exploring the new lands had proceeded remarkably well in a short time. Reliable navigation routes had been discovered, linking the Florida settlements and tying them to the supply base at Havana. The coastal features, harbors and ports of a long shoreline had

been studied and recorded. Pedro Menendez had also discovered a short-cut for the New Spain fleets coming to Havana--the passage east of the Dry Tortugas, which would ever thereafter be in the official derroteros of the Carrera de Indias. He had taken formal legal possession of territories from the extreme south of the Florida peninsula to the North Carolina capes.

One may therefore evaluate the Florida conquest at the end of its first phase in early 1567. First, the immediate military objectives had been rather completely fulfilled by the expunging of the French forces. There remained, however, an uncertain quality to this victory. The Spanish had been unable to destroy French corsair power in the Indies, and new enemy incursions were expected momentarily at points along the long continental frontier which Pedro Menendez had to defend. It seemed the destiny of Florida never to be free of peril, always to be an enterprise endangered. The vital elements in the conquest of a land--the construction of an economy and a society--were in a critical stage. The essentials of Spanish settlement: the military presence, the municipal institutions, and the evangelizing Church were only tentatively established at a few outposts over a thousand miles of frontier. Profitable exploitation of the lands and native peoples of Florida through economically viable colonies was still to be realized. At great cost, the enterprise of Florida had been born, but its existence was indeed precarious.

NOTES

1. The King's letter is dated at Madrid on May 12, 1566, and has been reprinted in Lawson, "Letters of Menéndez," II, 296-300. The letter to Bartolomé Menéndez is found in "Bartolomé Menéndez con el Fiscal sobre sueldo, 1570," from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219. The King also granted to Pedro Menéndez Márquez a merced of three hundred ducats for the news he brought in dispatches from Florida. This is cited by Martín Menéndez de Avilés in a letter dated at Madrid on June 9, 1633, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 233.

2. The appointment of Diego Flores Valdés as Fleet General is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 8.

3. For a discussion and documentation of Fourquevaux' plaint and the reply of the Spanish King, see Eugene Lyon, "Captives of Florida," pp. 18-20.

4. The cost of Pantecras is described in items from A.G.I. Contaduría: 294, No. 2b, 6: 2-4; 304, No. 1, 102: 4-103: 1; 306, No. 2, 124: 1. These citations were kindly furnished by Paul E. Hoffman.

5. For the Florida Jesuit missions, the writer relies upon a body of materials from Jesuit archives published in three fine works. The first, in point of time, is Ruben Vargas Ugarte, "The First Jesuit Mission in Florida," U.S. Catholic Historical Society, Historical Records and Studies, XV (1935), 59-148. Next is Félix Zubillaga's La Florida, and the last is the work in which he published the documentation, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1946). The mission had begun with a request from Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Francisco de Borja, sent from Madrid in March, 1565, and reprinted in Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 1-4. Borja replied favorable to the Adelantado from Rome on May 12, 1565 (Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 6-8). Royal approval of the mission was given by Philip II in a letter sent to Diego Carrillo, Provincial of the Order, from Ucles on April 9, 1565 (Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 42-44). The voyages of Pedro de Bustiñury are described in a letter from the Casa to the Crown, Seville, February 17, 1568, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,168, in a payment to him before his journey in 1566 authorized in A.G.I. Contaduría 294, No. 2, Data 123: 1-124: 1.

6. Menéndez Marqués' voyage and the cargo of his ship are detailed in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, ramo 1.

7. The loss of Menéndez' patache is described in a letter from the Casa to the Crown, Seville, August 2, 1566, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167. Philip II chided Abalia for delaying the sailing of Menéndez' ships in a letter sent August 28, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967. The loss of San Pelayo is mentioned in "Memorial de los navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones que se perdieron el Adelantado . . . ," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

8. See the declaration of Estaban de las Alas, from the city of San Salvador, punta of Santa Elena, July 18, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection).

9. The abortive expedition to the land of Jacan has been depicted in an excellent monograph by Louis-Andre Vignerat, entitled "A Spanish Discovery of North Carolina in 1566," North Carolina Historical Review, XLVI, No. 4 (October, 1969), 398-414. The main primary source is A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 4 (Stetson Collection), dated August 1, 1566. The names of the soldiers assigned to the expedition are found in the ration list in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History).

10. Best source of information about the Santa Elena mutiny is the testimony before Governor Osorio of Cuba taken in Havana on July 19, 1566, from A.G.I. Justicia 999.

11. Nombramiento of Esteban de las Alas, Gobernador y Capitan-General," August, 1566, Santa Elena, from A.G.I. Contaduría 941, fol. 2 vto. (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History).

12. The names of the soldiers of Guale are found in the ration lists in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History), under the date of assignment of August 17, 1566.

13. Documentation of this mutiny is from "El Fiscal de sue Majestad con el Capitan Pedro de Redroban," A.G.I. Justicia 999. Pedro de Valdés describes the events in his letter to the King sent from St. Augustine on September 12, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection, incorrectly labeled as from Juan de Valdés).

14. The Adelantado analyzed the warfare methods of the Florida Indians and his suggested counter-measures in his letter to Philip II from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). A

typical action, related by Pedro de Valdés in his September 12 letter (see note 13 *supra*), ended in the death of three Spaniards in a cornfield ten miles from St. Augustine on September 7, 1566. Gonzalo Solís de Merás recounts the casualties in Indian raids in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, p. 196. Deaths of men by Indian action are listed in the marginal comments written upon the ration lists in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History). The writer disagrees with the chronology of the St. Johns expedition given by Solís de Merás in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 237-252, and repeated by Zubillaga, La Florida, p. 262, no. 23, in which they fix the date at July, 1566. The Valdés letter of September 12 fixes the limits of Menéndez' trip to Guale and Santa Elena as from August 1 to August 28; this is confirmed by the appearance of the Adelantado at the Redrobal appeal on September 13. On this point, Solís de Merás is not an eyewitness--he had already left for Spain.

15. The outline of the lands under direct or indirect control of Chief Mayaca can be roughly estimated by consulting two Spanish derroteros. The first is "Provanza hecha a pedimiento de Gonzalo de Gayón," from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection). Gayón was sent south in the fall of 1566 from St. Augustine to seek Mayaca from the seacoast, and stated that the villages near the coast owed allegiance to Mayaca. In the Mexía derrotero of 1605 (see n. 48, Chapter V), the explorer wrote that "Mayaca and its surrounding towns are on the San Mateo River (the St. Johns), three days' travel from Noco-roco on a poor road." Noco-roco was an Indian town located north of the Mosquito (Ponce de Leon) Inlet. See John W. Griffin and Hale G. Smith, "Noco-roco--A Timucua Village of 1605 Now in Tomoka State Park," Florida Historical Quarterly, XXVII, No. 4 (April, 1949), 340-361. This writer feels that a line drawn south of Lake George eastward to the seacoast and one from the Orlando metropolitan area to the Cape would probably define the northern and southern boundaries of the Mayaca culture.

16. From "Provanza hecha . . . Gonzalo de Gayón" (see n. 15 *supra*).

17. See Menéndez' letter to Philip II, St. Augustine, October 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). The soldiers assigned to Carlos are listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History).

18. The Adelantado described the loss of Father Martinez in a letter to Diego de Avellaneda written from St. Augustine on October 15, 1566, and reprinted in Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 89-99. Father Juan Rogel also

related the killing of the priest in his letters to Pedro Hernandez sent from Monte Christi on November 11, 1566, and reproduced in Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 99-128.

19. "Ordinances which the very illustrious Senor Pedro Menéndez, Governor and Captain-General of the land and the coast of the Provinces of Florida for His Majesty and Ade-lantado of them provided and instituted in these said provinces of Florida," n.d. (September, 1566), from A.G.I. Justicia 999.

20. An excellent account of the Windward Islands expedition of 1566-67 has been given at length by Paul E. Hoffman in "The Background and Development of Pedro Menéndez' Contribution to the Defense of the Spanish Indies," M.A. thesis (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1965).

21. This affair is related in "Probanza de Alonso de Grafeda," Santo Domingo, February 15, 1569, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 12.

22. See Pedro Menéndez to Crown, Santo Domingo, November 29, 1566, from Lawson, "Letters of Menéndez," II, 309-320.

23. The documentation of Valdés' appearance in Havana, dated January 21, 1567, also contains a copy of the March 21, 1566, Royal cedula to Menéndez about the Windward Islands expedition, and a copy of Menéndez' poder to Valdés, dated at Monte Christi on January 3, 1567. This material is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). Another copy is in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 5.

24. The controversial question of the distribution of goods from the urca Pantecras can be traced in several primary sources. Casa Factor Duarte's original list of goods aboard was received in Havana by Menéndez' representative, Juan de Hinestrosa on December 12, 1566; this is from A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History). In the same legajo is the body of material gathered by Andres de Equino for his audit of Baeza's books in 1569. More material on the audit is found in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 8. The ship movements can be followed in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174 and in "Despachos que se hicieron," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

25. The Orduna voyage is confirmed by Bishop Toral in a letter written at Merida, Yucatan on April 5, 1567, and found in Lawson, "Letters of Menéndez," II, 320-324.

26. See "Memorial of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to the Casa de Contratación," Madrid, September 21, 1567, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection).

27. The shipments are listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174, under the date of 1567.

28. The Adelantado's letter of February 10, 1567, dated at Havana, is found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection).

29. Menéndez had told Philip II of his plans to ransom d'Uilly in his letter of October 20, 1566, sent from St. Augustine, and from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). The arrival and imprisonment of the French noble in Seville was recounted in a letter from the Casa to the King sent from Seville on January 11, 1567, and from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167 (Stetson Collection).

30. See charge number 24 in the audit, from A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 8. Osorio's letter, dated simply "1567" at Havana, is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).

31. See Menéndez to Casa, Havana, February 12, 1567, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,101.

32. The writer bases this supposition on the fact that Hernando de Escalante is described as being conversant with the language of Tocobaga as well as that of Carlos. This statement is found opposite the name of Escalante in the distribution of cloth and weapons for the years 1566-1596 in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History).

33. Father Rogel depicts the situation at Carlos after the return of the Spanish from Tocobaga in April, 1567, in a letter to Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo sent from Havana on April 25, 1568, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 306-307.

34. The Redroban-Barreda case involving Pedro Menéndez and Garcia Osorio is developed in "El Señor Fiscal con Capitan Pedro de Redroban, 1567," from A.G.I. Justicia 999. It is also featured in the body of Osorio's residencia; the charges are itemized in "Traslado de la sentencia que se dio contra Garcia Osorio Gobernador y Capitan General desta Ysla de Cuba . . .," from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 99. The best narrative of the dispute is by Solís de Merás in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 230-232.

35. Data contained in Baeza's "Despachos que se hicieron," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A can be confirmed by comparing the ships and cargoes listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174.

36. The parley with Saturiba is narrated in Solís de Mera's, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 233-235.

37. Testimony of Bartolomé Menéndez from "La Florida, ano de 1567, El Señor Fiscal con Miguel Enriquez," A.G.I. Justicia 999.

38. Bustincury's return to Spain is mentioned in a letter from the Casa to the Crown, Seville, March 4, 1568, A.G.I. Contratación 5,168.

39. Record of the first journey of Captain Juan Pardo to the inland areas has survived in a report made at Santa Elena on July 11, 1567, by Francisco Martinez, a soldier on the expedition. This report has been reprinted by Ruidiaz in La Florida, pp. 474-480, and by Lawson in "Letters of Menéndez," II, 324-327. Payment to the friars and to Don Luis after their arrival at Seville from the ill-fated Jacan expedition are found in A.G.I. Contaduría 299; 3: 1, dated November 1, 1566.

40. Dr. Hoffman's most recent and explicit application of his research to expenditures in Florida by the Spanish Crown has been published as Paul E. Hoffman, "A Study of Defense Costs, 1565-1585: A Quantification of Florida History," Florida Historical Quarterly, LI, No. 4 (April, 1973), 401-422. In this article, Dr. Hoffman has listed the total Royal spending allocated to Florida defense costs for 1565-1568 as 208,401 ducats.

41. See Appendix V. In 1566 Pedro Menéndez had sent from Havana 505 loads of cassava, 854 fanegas of corn, 492 pumpkin-squashes, 26,700 lb. of sea-biscuit, 28 pipes of wine, 325 jugs of wine, 58 jugs of oil, 442 yards of cotton print cloth, 775 yards of coarse linen, 65,800 lb. of jerked beef, 27 calves, 600 chickens, 80 goats or sheep, 550 sows, and 47 hams. These items, extended at the prices given by the Havana officials, total 10,396 ducats as shown in A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174. A witness in Mexico in 1591 testified that Menéndez bought, over an uncertain period, 2,700 fanega of corn, 3,000 chickens, and beans, honey, was and hemp sandals from Yucatan; see Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 622.

42. The ship losses are detailed in "Memorial de los navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones que se perdieron el Adelantado . . .," from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ENTERPRISE RENEWED; CONCLUSIONS

In the fast fregata El Águila, the Menéndez party made a very rapid Atlantic voyage indeed, and reached the Azores in seventeen days. There Menéndez learned that Philip II might be going to the Netherlands to supervise military operations against the rebels. The Adelantado therefore decided to sail directly for the north coast of Spain to intercept his King and report on the Florida enterprise.

On June 29, the Florida party arrived off La Coruña and were forced by the presence of corsair ships to put into Vivero in Galicia. There the two prisoners, Enriquez and Redroban, were sent to Madrid under guard.¹ There Menéndez learned that the King was still at Court.

Pedro Menéndez was able to pass a few days in Avilés with his wife and other family before pressing on to the Court, where he arrived July 20, 1567. The two captives had arrived three days earlier.² The Florida Adelantado made a striking entrance into the presence of Philip II, accompanied by the six Florida Indians and preceded by his reputation of battle and victory, exploration and foundation. He found, however, a sovereign and Court preoccupied with

the events of an exciting spring and summer. The Spanish King had been pushed beyond his tolerance by the rebels in the Netherlands, and he had ordered the Duke of Alba to bring Spanish troops from Milan to enforce royal power in the Low Countries. While Calvinist Geneva held its breath and all Europe watched in fearful anticipation, the world's finest army marched overland directly to Antwerp. By mid-summer, the Spanish had begun a full-scale costly commitment in the Netherlands. The short but sharp actions against the Huguenot French in Florida, the wider-ranging expedition of Pedro Menéndez in the Caribbean, and the disciplining of the Netherlands were all seen by Philip as part of one war. Within Spain, tightening ideologies were also leading to disturbance. On November, 1566, a pragmatic had been adopted which required the Moriscos of eastern Andalusia to change their Moorish customs as a part of their complete Christianization. Philip II was fearful that connection between Moriscos and the Turkish enemy could lead to an invasion of Spain. After the new law was openly published on January 1, 1567, discontent began to grow among the Moriscos. Sooner or later, it was bound to result in open revolt.

The French representative at the Spanish Court, Ambassador Fourquevaux, had continued to press for action on the prisoners Pedro Menéndez had made in his Florida conquest. Philip's policy of the previous summer to release

the captives had been carried out slowly after continual pleas by the French Ambassador. The Sieur de Lys was freed after a long term in the Madrid jail. In May, Philip had also released eight other prisoners of the Florida French who had been brought to Seville.³ Still concerned with seeking some general recompense by the Spanish Crown for Menéndez' actions in Florida, Fourquevaux viewed the Ade-lantado's arrival at Court with interest and with malice. The Frenchman sought out Captain Miguel Enriquez, and pressed him for details of Menéndez' circumstances. The Spaniard, awaiting trial before the Council of the Indies on the appeal of his case from Menéndez' service, told the French Ambassador that the Spanish establishment in Florida was meager. He said, moreover, that Pedro Menéndez had come in part to defend himself against charges that he had permitted many men to die of hunger and that he had embezzled royal goods and sold them at auction in Havana. Forquevaux passed word of his confidences with Enriquez to his own royal master.⁴

Prior to the arrival of Pedro Menéndez at Madrid, the King has already begun to act upon his request for a new royal supply expedition for Florida. In May, the Crown had sent along to Seville Menéndez' order list for new supplies for the royal troops in the adelantamiento. In mid-June, Philip II sent another letter to the Casa, advising that he had cut the asking for wine for Florida

from two thousand to twenty pipes, but had otherwise approved the supply list. On June 23, the trade officials replied that they had only 12,000 ducats available for such expenditure, and that it was already too late to send the goods in the New Spain convoy, for it was due to sail the next day. They suggested instead a shipment in a large shallow-draft urca direct to the Florida ports.⁵

When he had completed the formalities of his appearance before Philip II, Pedro Menéndez was ordered by the King to report by written memorandum to the Council of the Indies. The Adelantado did so, narrating the history of his defeat of Jean Ribault and Rene de Laudonnière, the far-reaching explorations which had been made in Florida, and the forts and cities he had founded there. Menéndez went on to give his considered opinion on the state of defense of the Caribbean Indies against the forces threatening the Empire there.⁶ After he made his report, it appeared that Pedro Menéndez had faced down his detractors for the moment, and his return became a triumph.

After his initial duties had been completed, the Adelantado inquired about the status of arrangements for the supply of the royal soldiers in Florida, and was taken aback to learn that nothing had yet been sent. The forts had only about three months' supply left when he had sailed, and the summer was now far advanced; thus it appeared that his own network might again have to bear the full burden

of sustaining both the royal and private soldiery. Menéndez pressed the King to speed up the provisioning and dispatch of the ships which were to go to Florida, but also objected strongly to the diminished amount of wine which was to be sent. Menéndez proposed, and the King passed along to the Casa, the suggestion that the supplies could be loaded on one of Menéndez' own ships which Pedro del Castillo was then loading to go to Florida.⁷

After he had made report of his services in Florida, Pedro Menéndez naturally expected some substantial royal reward for his deeds. His expectations, and the actions he took to bring these hopes to fruition, took two distinct channels. First, Menéndez pressed for appointment to salaried office of high distinction and other mercedes from his sovereign.

The second course of action taken by Pedro Menéndez was most illustrative of the nature of his position as a private conqueror. In September, 1567, he filed suit against the Spanish Crown, seeking recompense for heavy expenditures and losses in the conquest of Florida. This action was not a suit between parties, but rather one between an individual subject of Castile and the royal patrimony, defended by the Crown Fiscal. It was the duty of the Fiscal to keep charge of the asientos and capitulaciones of the Indies Adelantados, and allege and charge individuals freely where the interest of his King was at stake.⁸ The legalism

of Spanish life and the niceties of the relationship between Philip II and his vassals is evidenced by the fact that the Crowns prepared to reward Menéndez for his services in Florida at the same time that the lawsuit over the contract was being argued.

The body of testimony, allegations and documents which make up this lawsuit remains the best single primary source extant about the contract with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés for the conquest of Florida.⁹ The material included covers some seventy-five years. The corpus of the case begun by Menéndez in 1567 also includes a wide variety of biographical, geographical, and financial data about the Menéndez years in Florida.

The main line taken by Menéndez in his case was to attempt to prove that he had over-performed his contract for Florida, and to list and itemize his losses in the conquest, thus demonstrating overwhelming personal loss and damage in the effort. To this end, Pedro Menéndez and his attorney put on record plea after plea to prove their case. On September 22, they filed a list of the ships with which Menéndez had sailed from Cádiz two years before.¹⁰ On October 16, the Adelantado and his associates testified that the Florida expedition had carried, in fact, many more men than Francisco Duarte had showed in his muster in June, 1565.¹¹ There was added material describing the addition of the Luna contingent at Cádiz and the men and ships taken to

Florida from Avilés, Gijón, and Santander.¹² Now Menéndez was ready to demonstrate his concrete losses in the enterprise of Florida. He filed a memorial describing the eleven vessels lost in the effort up to the time of his departure. He also detailed the performance of his network of small supply ships which had served Florida in 1566-67 from Havana and other points in the Caribbean.¹³

Pedro Menéndez had not as yet decided upon the amount of money or other considerations which he might finally ask in recompense for his efforts and losses. His decision upon that point in the late fall of 1567 was also related to the benefits which the Crown was then in the process of granting to Menéndez. Also involved, as matters of his pride and prestige, were the Enriquez and Redroban cases, and the case of Captain Parra, which Menéndez had furthered. The latter two suits, of course, concerned Garcia Osorio, against whom Pedro Menéndez was determined to gain satisfaction.

Although the Adelantado's position in disciplining the two captains who had served in Florida was not upheld (both were given token fines and freed), the evidence presented against Osorio in the Redroban and Parra cases found its mark.¹⁴ On October 24, 1567, Philip II issued a cedula naming Pedro Menéndez de Avilés Governor and Captain-General of Cuba, with no prejudice to his Florida titles. Menéndez would also have the right to serve in absentia through

lieutenants as he had done in Florida. Osorio would have to undergo residencia at the hands of his hated rival, and had still to answer the charges being developed in the Parra case.¹⁵

Of far more importance to Pedro Menéndez was the appointment which next came to him. On November 2, 1567, Philip II granted Menéndez the office, title, salary and privileges of Captain-General of a new Royal Armada which was to act as the main line of Caribbean and fleet defense. Menéndez' long past services and his most recent efforts in Florida and the Caribbean thus received substantial recognition. In addition to salary, the new Captain-General would receive the King's fifth share of any prizes taken as well as his own share of the other four-fifths.¹⁶ The twelve ships of his armada would be of his own design, and were to be built in Vizcaya under Menéndez' supervision by a close associate, Juan Martinez de Recalde. In prize money, paid appointments for a host of friends and followers, and the chance for profits through contraband, Pedro Menéndez stood to gain greatly from his appointment. In a sense, the Captain-Generalcy of the Royal Armada offered the conquerors of Florida an escape hatch and a safety valve for the pressures of financial insolvency which they faced. The royal appointment came none too soon; the next month Menéndez was embargoed by his creditors for debt in Seville.¹⁷

The honors poured upon Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had not yet ceased. Philip II began the formalities connected with the granting of an encomienda in the military order of Santiago to Menéndez. Soon it was announced that Menéndez had been granted the title and revenues of the Comendador of Santa Cruz de la Zarza, a property of the order located at Campos, near Palencia in Castile. It carried an annual revenue, which would help bolster the sagging finances of the Adelantado.¹⁸

Philip II also took steps to revise the Menéndez contract so as to make its trade privileges conform to the actual state of the ships which Menéndez now possessed. On October 6, the Crown ruled that the section of the asiento which granted Menéndez licenses for two 600-ton galleons be changed to allow for three 400-ton vessels. Another cedula sent the same day approved the change of the size of Menéndez' shallop licenses from fifty to eighty tons apiece. Menéndez now moved through Pedro del Castillo to send a galleon into the Indies trade.¹⁹

As the Florida Adelantado moved from triumph to triumph, enlarging notably his sphere of influence and gathering the visible tokens of royal favor, his case over Florida losses and expenses continued. The documents he had presented in evidence and the entire status of his contract with the King were subjected to careful review by the chief auditors of the realm. The accountants issued a lengthy analysis of

the case on October 22, 1567, setting forth all of the pertinent facts but making no conclusions. Lists were appended detailing the costs of the Crown and the Adelantado at Cádiz. After placing Factor Duarte's original 1565 muster at Cádiz of record, the Fiscal challenged Pedro Menéndez' contention that he had in truth carried five hundred more men than Duarte had showed. Since the muster Menéndez claimed to have made at the Canary Island had been destroyed when the St. Augustine fort had been burned, it was difficult for the Adelantado to prove his case.

Now Pedro Menéndez asked the Crown for 25,000 ducats for the value of San Pelayo, a sum for the aviso he had sent Philip II in October, 1565, and payment for what he had over-spent in Florida. Altogether, his askings were for more than 50,000 ducats. On February 9, 1568, the Council of the Indies passed its definitive sentence in the case. Menéndez was to receive 500 ducats for the aviso San Miguel, sent with Captain Diego Flores Valdés and lost in the Azores, and six reales per ton charter-fee for San Pelayo during the four and one-half months she served in the Florida enterprise, altogether some 3,500 ducats. As for the rest, the Council left it up to Philip II.²⁰ Shortly, the King granted a merced to Pedro Menéndez of 10,000 ducats for his services and losses in the enterprise of Florida. The Adelantado made arrangements in Seville for a fellow Asturian, Diego de Valdés, who served as aide to the Archbishop of Seville,

to collect the 2,000 ducats of the merced which was to be paid by the Casa.²¹ The other claims Pedro Menéndez had made had not been finally settled by this payment, and the case of 1567-68 would be taken up again at a later date. Other minor requests for reimbursement--for the pay of Roelas' men Menéndez took from Havana and for supplies he furnished for the royal troops in Florida--would also be continued by the Adelantado and his attorneys.²²

It was apparent that Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had gained greatly as a result of his trip to Spain. In the face of much rumor and some fact about his misappropriations and carelessness in the Florida conquest, the Adelantado had received evidence of royal favor. The concrete realization of cash sums from the benefits and offices he had received would be somewhat slower in coming. It is evident, however, that Castillo had by now received the back charter-fees due Menéndez from 1563, and that the Adelantado now had been voted those from the 1565 voyage. With more supplies coming to Florida, and with the forthcoming collection of salaries and mercedes, the worst time seemed to be past. Best of all, the gaining of the fleet and Cuba offices would open many doors for Pedro Menéndez and his associates. Legal and illegal sources of funds would now become available, if properly exploited. His private trade could continue, and the grand design for the settlement of Florida could now proceed.

Most particularly, Menéndez could now begin to carry out the population of Florida with settlers and their families--that key to conquest without which the adelantamiento could never prosper. It was common knowledge at Court that the settlement of Florida was to be accomplished during 1568.²³ The previous year, Menéndez had contracted with one Hernan Perez, a Portugese, to bring from the Azores two hundred farmers and their families. The arrangement fell through, for Perez and Pedro Menéndez disagreed and became bitter enemies.²⁴ Now, however, the Adelantado could go ahead with his plan, using instead settlers from the province of Toledo, in Castile. Under individual contracts with each settler family, Menéndez agreed that their passage and freight would be paid for them. Upon arrival, the Adelantado would grant them lands for farms and pastures. Within two years, he contracted to furnish each farmer twelve cows and a bull, two oxen for plowing, two mares, a dozen sheep, goats, hogs, and chickens. He agreed to give the farmers vine-shoots for their own vineyards. For each family, Menéndez would build a house, furnish a shepherd boy, and give one male and one female slave. Pedro Menéndez also hoped that merchants, learning of the richness of the Florida lands, would invest enough to create large stock-raising haciendas and sugar-mills, sizeable vineyards and grain-fields. After ten years, he assured Philip II, the Crown would receive fine profits from such a land.²⁵ The

gathering of the settlers in Toledo began, and Pedro del Castillo began to prepare to receive them in Cádiz to arrange for their passage overseas to Florida.²⁶

Meanwhile, the royal agencies had finally begun to prepare the Florida supply shipment which had been discussed since the previous summer. After repeated orders from Philip II, the Casa de Contratación selected and began to stock two urcas for the Florida voyage.²⁷ Once the winter had begun, the sailing was deferred until early spring.

Also to be sent in the urcas to Florida would be a number of persons returning to the provinces as well as a heavy reinforcement of the Jesuit Florida mission, led by Father Juan Bautista de Segura. The Indians who had come to Spain with Pedro Menéndez and their interpreter would also board one of the vessels, as would Menéndez' new lieutenant Governor of Cuba, Dr. Zayas. Diego de Miranda would return on the same ship to serve Pedro Menéndez in Cuba.²⁸

It was, for Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, a matter of practical urgency and personal conscience that the Jesuit mission in Florida go ahead with all possible speed. Upon his return to Spain, the Adelantado had pressed his monarch and the high officials of the Jesuit Order for further missionaries. It was evident, by the fall of 1567, that Menéndez was exerting his influence so that a new contingent of Jesuits might be approved and sent to Florida with the relief ships.²⁹

For their part, the Jesuits appreciated the sincere religious zeal of the Adelantado and were cognizant of his power and influence at the Spanish Court.³⁰ There were, however, obstacles to the Florida mission which Menéndez had to overcome. Widespread deprecation of Florida as a place of sterile soil and hostile Indians had come to Spain and was current at the Court. The news of the death of Father Martinez could cut both ways; the dangers of Florida might dishearten the timid, but the possibility of martyrdom might encourage those of fervent faith. In an attempt to overcome any hesitations which the Jesuits might have, Pedro Menéndez appeared at their college in Seville on December 16, 1567. There he described the religious efforts in Florida to date, and outlined his plan to establish a Jesuit college in Havana. In Cuba, the Adelantado declared, the children of Indian leaders from Florida would be taught the Spanish language and the tenets of Christianity. They might also serve there as hostages for the safety of missionaries and soldiers at the posts of Florida.³¹

Menéndez had delineated his design for the conversion of the Florida Indians in considerable detail; this he conveyed to the General of the Jesuit Order at about the same time. From this plan it is evident that the post at Havana was to be only one of several regional colleges which were to deal with the vast areas of continental Florida, as missionaries arrived and were assigned to new areas.

Menéndez included in his design the promising new fields opened up by the Pardo journey and a series of planned settlements on the Gulf Coast route to New Spain.³²

In a moving ceremony on January, 1568, in the great Cathedral at Seville, the five Florida Indians were baptized in the Roman Catholic faith in the presence of the Adelantado and the Royal Officials of the House of Trade. This baptism helped to dramatize the expectation that thousands of others would follow, and that the men going shortly to Florida would be the means for the gaining of many souls, to the glory of God.³³

Loaded with supplies for Florida, the royal expedition left Sanlúcar de Barrameda on April 10, 1568. The cost to the Crown had been more than 30,000 ducats.³⁴ This time the relief vessels would be going to a land in which established cities had been founded, and means of supply were functioning well. Hopefully, the work of mission could proceed upon the foundations already well laid.

On the nineteenth of June, 1568, the convoy of two urcas dropped anchor in the port of St. Augustine. The ships had been guided directly to Florida by Gonzalo de Gayón, who then formally turned over the cargoes aboard to the Governor and Alcade at St. Augustine.³⁵ The foodstuffs, clothing and munitions were sufficient to relieve the immediate needs of the garrisons.

Father Segura, newly arrived at the mission field placed in his charge, met with Governor Bartolomé Menéndez and Chaplain Mendoza Grajales to gain first-hand impressions and increase his knowledge of Florida. He was told that Father Rogel, who had recently come from the South Florida missions, was still on his voyage to Santa Elena and Guale and would shortly return to report to Segura. In the meantime, it was easy to determine that the St. Augustine garrison was almost demoralized. The Spanish were still in a state of shock: less than two months before, the French had landed, made common cause with hostile Indians, and taken and burned Fort San Mateo! As the Jesuits learned about the disaster, it became clear to them that its roots lay deeper in the past. The two main causes of the loss of San Mateo seemed to lie in the nature of Menéndez' undisciplined soldiery and in the continued hostility of major components of the Timucuan Indians to the Spanish.

Soon after the departure of Pedro Menéndez, yet another mutiny plot had been uncovered at St. Augustine. Five ringleaders had confessed under torture and had been executed.³⁶ Even among the inner circle of Menéndez' faithful Asturians, moreover, dissent and argument had flourished during his absence. Martin de Argüelles and Bartolomé Menéndez had come almost to blows, and Esteban de las Alas had found it necessary to intervene and confine the two men until they could be reconciled. Under such circumstances,

it was indeed difficult to maintain adequate discipline and to keep proper guard over the posts of Florida.

In the summer of 1567, the tensions between the Spanish garrisons and the Indians of Saturiba and his allies reached a climax. The Timucuan chief had joined with the Indians of the Nocoroco-Mayaca area and with those of Potano (located near the great Alachua savanna) to wage war upon Utina. Although it was something which the Adelantado of Florida had sought to avoid, the Spanish again found themselves playing out a role opposite to that which Rene de Laudonnière had played. The enemies of the French had, perforce, become friends to the Spanish, and Indians who had allied with Laudonnière were now firmly united against the Spaniards. In August, 1567, Captain Pedro de Andrada marched his company of eighty men deep into the interior of the peninsula to attack the stronghold of the Potanos. While passing a heavily wooded hammock, the Spanish company was attacked from ambush by a sizeable force of Indians. A cloud of arrows struck the soldiers, and Captain Andrada and many of his men died. Circumstances were now ripe for the very eventuality which Pedro Menéndez and Philip II had so strongly feared--the union of a French invader with hostile Florida Indians.³⁷

It was left for a Gascon nobleman, Dominique de Gourgues, to mount a French expedition of national revenge for the death of Jean Ribault and the other Florida French

in 1567-1568. Although his voyage exhibited some of the characteristics of a normal corsair journey, its leisurely course to the Cape Verde Islands and westward to the Windward Islands led de Gourgues at last to Florida.³⁸

Spanish and French sources agree that the three ships and two small craft of Dominique de Gourgues arrived off the St. Augustine bar on the afternoon of Good Friday, 1568.³⁹ The Spanish were already somewhat on edge due to the touchy Indian situation. On the last of March, at dawn, a force of four hundred Timucuans had assaulted San Mateo, forced one side of the fortress, and withdrawn after wounding several Spaniards. Now, at St. Augustine, the Spanish fired two cannon shots to mark the port, if the sails were those of friendly ships. If they proved to be those of the enemy, they would be warned that they would be met there with gunfire. The vessels sheered off, and turned their course northward. Esteban de las Alas, who was ill of fever at St. Augustine, sent warning of the strange ships to his garrison at San Mateo, together with reinforcements.

When de Gourgues anchored his ships in the mouth of the St. Mary's, he was greeted by Indians whose unfriendly aspect soon turned to joy when they learned that the strangers were Frenchmen. Shortly, Chief Saturiba himself arrived to parley with Dominique de Gourgues. His enmity towards the Spanish and liberal gifts from de Gourgues sealed a bargain: the Spanish forts would be assaulted and destroyed. Intelligence

provided by the Indians and confirmed by Pierre de Bré, a young Frenchman who had found refuge with Saturiba, gave de Gourgues a good understanding of the Spanish dispositions.

Crossing with his Indian allies in two small boats, the French leader took a hundred arquebusiers to the two small blockhouses which the Spanish had built on the opposite banks of the St. Johns river mouth. First one, then the other fort was taken and burned. There is substantial discrepancy between the opposing accounts as to the strength of the Spanish garrisons and the actions which ensued at the little stockades. It is, however, evident that some of the Spanish got away to St. Augustine, and some few escaped to give the warning to San Mateo.

At that fort, the news inspired little but overwhelming fear. Instead of preparing to repel the enemy, and perhaps to withstand a long siege, the Spanish soldiers were panic-stricken. They grossly overestimated the number of the French forces, decided to flee, and began to cook up rations and get their possessions together. At dawn of April 25, the men began to slip out of the fort, leaving the guns unspiked and the artillery ammunition intact. None of their officers' orders had any effect--safety was their primary aim. They skulked through the thick woods, trying to find their way to St. Augustine. Some were killed or captured by the Indians. Later, a loyal captain returned to the fort with a few men, and remained long enough to spike the guns.

When the French came against San Mateo, they took it without opposition. Two captives who had been caught by the Indians in their headlong fight were hung outside the fort. Dominique de Gourgues retraced his steps to the ships in the St. Mary's; he was richer by the gaining of some nine bronze artillery pieces and other lesser prizes. Bidding farewell to the Indians of Saturiba and Tacatacuru, the Frenchmen left Florida to return to Europe.

An expedition from St. Augustine had the melancholy duty of visiting the burned forts and burying the dead. It found eight men hanging from trees near the two destroyed blockhouses, and two more outside the shell of Fort San Mateo. A fire accidentally set by the joyous Indians of Saturiba had gutted the buildings inside the fort, and all the artillery was gone. The Spanish began the customary task of assessing the blame for the loss of the forts. Esteban de las Alas gave it as his opinion that, of one hundred twenty men in San Mateo, only a dozen or so would be free of the stigma of cowardice in the face of the enemy. A hearing was held, and the trial of the guilty began. The Spanish were determined to punish the Indians who had aided the French, and also decided to build a strong outpost at the island of Tacatacuru to prevent further attacks by way of the hostile Indian communities near the St. Mary's.

The French triumph at the scene of their earlier disaster was as cheaply won as had been Menéndez' own assault

upon Fort Caroline. Their chief gain was in the satisfaction of a deep need for national revenge, for the capture of an empty fort and the hanging of a few men was scarcely more than a symbolic victory. The de Gourgues raid did not succeed in dislodging the Spanish from their foothold in Florida. In spite of this blow, the garrisons would remain. For their part, the Spanish had even less reason to boast of their performance in the action. The defense system erected and maintained at great cost and effort by the King and the Adelantado of Florida had utterly failed its first test. If this were the way in which the dominions of the King would be defended, and the manner in which the settlers now coming to Florida would be protected, it augured ill for the future of the enterprise.

After learning of the debacle of San Mateo, the new Jesuit Vice-Provincial and his missionaries were struck afresh by the dangers and difficulties of their chosen field. Within a few days of their arrival, Juan Rogel arrived from Santa Elena to report to his superior and fellows. Father Rogel quickly brought the Jesuits up to date on the missions of South Florida and on possibilities for evangelization among the Indians of Guale, Orista and in the uplands west and north of Santa Elena.

The tale Juan Rogel had to tell of events at the fort missions of San Anton in Carlos, at Tequesta and Tocobaga was one of struggle and disaster. At Carlos, the main

station of the Jesuit, the tension between Spaniard and Indian had risen after the departure of Pedro Menéndez in the spring of 1657. At last, the Spanish were like men besieged in their little blockhouse--they dared not leave it without armed guard. Rogel, who had helped mediate between the opposing forces, left for Havana in early April, 1567. Shortly after his departure, Carlos moved his women and treasure to another island, called in his subordinate chieftains and prepared to massacre the Christians. After he learned of this, Captain Reinoso called Chief Carlos to him near the fort, and killed him outright.⁴⁰

The new chief, named Philip by the Spanish, was a man who had held a valid claim to the throne of the Indian kingdom. After the death of Carlos, Philip summoned the sub-chiefs of the surrounding Calusa towns to swear homage to him, and to bring their usual gifts of women to the new King. Philip was now the accepted leader of the Calusa, and the Spanish could make a fresh beginning in that land.

Upon his return from Cuba with Pedro Menéndez Márquez, Father Rogel went directly to the tiny settlement the Ade-lantado had made in Tocobaga. There he found the garrison in good health and spirits. Chief Tocobaga and some of his principal nobles attended the Mass celebrated by the priest, but it was rumored that the chief was displeased at the possibility that the images in the Indian temple would be burned by the Spaniards. If that occurred, the interpreters

told Rogel, the Chief himself and his family had sworn to perish in the same fire.

When the Spanish returned to Carlos, Pedro Menéndez Marquez confirmed Philip as chief, as a vassal of the King of Spain. Father Rogel then began in earnest to converse with the Calusa chief, recognizing that to win his conversion was a vital first step in the Christianization of his people. For six months, Rogel labored persuasively with Philip. As his mission moved from the shallow first stage of teaching the Indian children and a few adults the basic prayers and the adoration of the Cross, the real difficulties began.

It now became clear that the Indians might be willing to accept the Christian God as a coequal or even superior deity in their pantheon, but that claims for exclusivity on behalf of God would meet dogged opposition. The Catholic doctrines of the afterlife, moreover, conflicted directly with the Indian view of a three-fold soul of the dead which became, after transmigration, a nullity. The harsh condemnation by the Jesuit of strong cultural traditions, such as the sacrifice of children, the practice of sodomy, and polygamy for the chiefs, also raised a strong reaction on the part of Philip. Although the Calusa chief recognized the power of the written theology of the Christians, he persisted in his old ceremonies, while continuing to pray before the Cross. For his part, Juan Rogel was determined to baptize Philip only when he truly reached the point of

full understanding and acceptance of Christian doctrine. The Jesuit also vowed to deface and burn the Indians' idols and free Philip and all of his people forever from the heathen rites of their worship.⁴¹

From Brother Villareal in Tequesta, Rogel heard that the Indians on Biscayne Bay seemed more tractable and submissive than those of Carlos. Even so, the work of evangelization went very slowly in Tequesta. The chief permitted the Jesuit to catechize the children in the main house, where older Indians were often present, although they took no part in the prayers. After many months of work, only one old dying woman had accepted baptism. The Tequestas, who were seasonal gatherers and moved their residence to the island keys in Biscayne Bay during the winter, had little to spare from their meager store of food. Indeed, the presence of the Spanish garrison began to be a troublesome burden, as the soldiers at times abused the Indians.⁴²

At the beginning of December, 1567, Juan Rogel had again made a trip to Havana to seek a more full and reliable supply for the South Florida garrisons from Juan de Hinestrosa and Hernando de Baeza in Havana. Shortly after the first of January, 1568, the Jesuit missionary returned to Florida with Pedro Menéndez Márquez and three small craft. Again, the Spaniards directed their vessels first to the middle west coast of the peninsula, and approached the village of Tocobaga. There, they beheld an eerie spectacle. The

Indian town was completely deserted, and nothing was found except the bodies of two dead Spanish soldiers. After further search, they learned that all twenty-four of the garrison had been killed by the Indians. Outraged, and unable to find anyone to punish, Menéndez Márquez burned Tocobaga and returned to Carlos.⁴³

On April 4, 1568, a small boat came into the harbor of Carlos with Brother Villareal and eighteen soldiers, the survivors of the garrison at Tequesta. Menéndez Márquez had rescued them after the Indians had murdered four and surrounded the other men in their wooden fort. The immediate reason for the hostile acts of the Indians was the killing by the soldiers of a principal native leader. Shortly after the arrival of the survivors, Rogel and Villareal went to Havana. The priest from Carlos then sailed north with one of Menéndez' supply vessels to meet eventually with his fellow Jesuits.

Juan Rogel had much to tell the new company of missionaries from Spain about the northern settlements and forts established by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. He had first stopped in Guale, and was impressed, as the other Spaniards had been the year before, by the mild nature of the Indians. Rogel noted that twenty-three affiliated chieftains in and around Guale spoke a common language, which was understood for a good distance inland. When he arrived in Santa Elena, Father Rogel was immediately struck by the similarities of

the farmland nearby to that of Spain. Wheat, grapes, and a kind of wild olive grew well there, and the priest had seen a thriving vineyard at Santa Elena itself. At the time of his stay at Santa Elena, Captain Juan Pardo had just returned from his second lengthy journey inland. He discussed his discoveries with the Jesuit, and shared his insights about the continental reaches of Spanish Florida with him.

Juan Pardo had left garrisons on his first journey inland, but instead of maintaining peaceful relationships with the Indians, the soldiers left in the forts had waged war upon the natives. In the fall of 1567, Pardo made a second inland journey of exploration. After renewing his garrisons at Guatari and Joada, the Spanish captain pressed on through the cool lands to the westward. Skirting the south end of the mountain chain, he crossed extreme northern Georgia and entered present-day Alabama. Crossing the upper reaches of the Tennessee, Chatahoochee and Coosa rivers, the captain noted the well-watered, fertile nature of the land. At the great Indian town of Cosa or Cossa, Juan Pardo again crossed the track of Hernando de Soto. Pardo continued on for seven more days until he came to Trascaluza, which to him marked the western boundary of Menéndez' land of Florida. From here, he maintained, it was only nine to eleven days' travel to New Spain--only about a hundred miles. Actually, more than a thousand miles stretched between northern Alabama and the closest

point in Nueva Galicia or the nearest coastal settlement in Panuco. Menéndez' chief geographic error--the foreshortening of continental distances--was thus continued.

After the end of his second continental trip, Juan Pardo sent reinforcements to his settlements at Guatari and Joadá. By the time Father Rogel reached Santa Elena in June, 1568, news had already reached the seacoast that many Spanish soldiers had been massacred by Indians at the inland forts.⁴⁴

As the one man who was in an unusually good position to survey the entire colonization effort of Pedro Menéndez from the Florida West Coast all the way to Santa Elena, Juan Rogel is a valuable witness for the historian. In July, 1568, he gave the General of the Jesuit Order his frank opinion of the state of the enterprise of evangelization in Florida.⁴⁵

Father Rogel thought he could discern one major obstacle which had impeded the religious mission in Florida--one thing which he believed had led to the many Indian uprisings in the two years immediately past. In his opinion, it was the behavior of the Spanish soldiers which had outraged the natives in every area of occupation. They had demanded food from the Indians, beaten and killed natives and abused their women. The Spaniards had been, he asserted, overbearing, cruel and harsh; this treatment had been the proximate cause of the loss of Santa Lucia, the troubles at Tocobaga, Carlos,

Tequesta, and the reason for the Indian attacks upon Fort Joada and other inland blockhouses. While the priest prayed for restraint of the licentious soldiery, he could also see one great hope for the Jesuit mission with the Florida Indians. If, he said, married settlers came in numbers, the land could be secured and the Gospel might then be preached in an atmosphere of community instead of one of lust and bloodshed.

What Juan Rogel could not see as clearly, or perhaps could not admit to his superior, was that the strict inculcation of Christian doctrine also posed a threat to the Indian cultures. Under the influence of the charisma of Pedro Menéndez' driving personality and exposed to the power and technology of European civilization, the Indians had taken the first steps to Christianization. The exclusive acceptance of Catholicism by the Indians would not be as lightly imposed, however. Elimination of the old rites, ceremonies and beliefs would imply a thoroughgoing change in Indian life. As they sensed, it would, in fact, mean the total alteration of their culture. The enforcement of such change only would be accomplished through heavy and consistent pressure by the Spanish over a period of time.

The framework in which Castilian religious and social values could best be instilled in the Indians was, as Rogel had stated, one of successful Spanish colonization, the only means by which the enterprise of Florida could succeed

as that of greater population. As the first three years of the Florida asiento neared its end, the greater part of the effort of settlement--the population of the provinces--had still to be accomplished. Adelantado, missionary and soldier all saw this to be the most important task.

To support the colonization of Florida, feverish activities were going forward in Spain in the face of some difficulty and opposition. While Pedro Menéndez de Avilés dedicated his remarkable energies to the construction and outfitting of his fleet of fast new ships in Vizcaya, his deputy Castillo continued to labor in Cádiz for the enterprise of Florida.⁴⁶ He had dispatched a caravel and galleon in the winter of 1567-1568, and had encountered a degree of obstruction by the Casa officials in Seville.⁴⁷

As the Crown moved slowly to pay the men who had served in the Archiniega expedition to Florida, the King made a ruling which favored Pedro Menéndez. Philip II agreed to pay the pilots who had gone on the original journey to Florida, even though the Casa de Contratación had disputed the payment.⁴⁸ The King wrote the Royal Officials of Cuba, asking that they pay the two hundred soldiers

Pedro Menéndez had left in Havana, so that their support would not become a charge upon the Adelantado.⁴⁹ There continued, however, a strong reaction against the privileges and benefits the King had granted to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. Unfavorable reports on Florida continued to arrive from the Indies.⁵⁰ The ruling by the Council of the Indies for Captains Redroban and Enriquez was a setback for the Adelantado who had sentenced them. With characteristic conservatism and concern for the rights of the Crown, Philip II shortly took another step to offset some of the power which he had given to Pedro Menéndez. In view of the accusations, the King determined to reassert royal control over the Crown Treasury in Florida, and on May 23, 1568, he named Francisco de Esquivel as Treasurer of Florida. Evidently the monarch also thought of removing the Accountant whom Menéndez had named.⁵¹

It was the controversy over the embarking of Pedro Menéndez' two hundred colonists, however, which led to the major determination the Crown next made about the adelantamiento of Florida. Pedro del Castillo asked permission of the Casa representative in Cádiz, Antonio Abalia, to load the urca Salvadora with the large body of married settlers intended for Florida. Even though Menéndez' trade privileges had not expired, the three-year term of the asiento had ended at the end of June, 1568. The Casa alleged, however, that since the term had then passed in which the Adelantado was

to have taken five hundred settlers to Florida, the ships could not be sent.⁵²

On August 23, 1568, the King granted specific permission for the ship with its colonists to sail to Florida. Three weeks later the order was followed up with a more detailed command to the royal trade representative in Cádiz. The two hundred should immediately go, and Menéndez would also have permission to embark other settlers direct from the Canary Islands to Florida.⁵³ Philip II had effectively renewed the Menéndez contract. The King had also made a key decision to aid his Florida Adelantado to continue his population effort in Florida. As an intermediate stage between the haphazard means of supply previously used to support for royal troops in Florida and a full-fledged subsidy, the King had agreed to provide regular support for a minimum royal garrison of one hundred fifty men. This would promote stability in royal support for Florida, and would help regularize the financial requirements of both parties.⁵⁴ There would now be means to encourage the effort of population, upon which the future of the enterprise of Florida would depend. Both parties to the adelantamiento of Florida were deeply committed to the continuation of their mutual enterprise. Their expectations to date had led them into great expense but remained, as yet, unrealized.

Conclusions

Study of the background and events of the initial Florida conquest of 1565-1568 discloses that it was accomplished by a conquest entrepreneur, or Adelantado. The founding of Spanish Florida thus fitted into a long tradition in which much of Spanish expansion was done through Royal surrogates, who underwrote the pacification and settlement of new lands in return for license to exploit them and the granting of titles, monopolies, land-grants and revenues. Philip II, caught between the urgencies of his dynastic policies and his limited resources, granted adelantamientos upon a number of occasions and promulgated Royal ordinances in 1563 defining the place of private conquerors in Spanish expansion.

After the collapse of Spanish-French negotiations over New World spheres of influence following the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, the Spanish monarch learned of the French settlement at Port Royal. He ordered a punitive expedition to sail against the intruders and licensed Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón as Adelantado for the settlement of the North American mainland. Neither of these efforts succeeded, but the French vacated Port Royal of their own volition, only to be succeeded by another Huguenot colony which established itself in Florida and built Fort Caroline. Deserters from that garrison went a-corsairing in the West Indies, and their capture and confessions eventually resulted in the sending

of very tardy word of the French incursion to Spain.

Meanwhile, the Asturian seaman Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had risen, through ability and influence, to be a minor power in the Indies trade and a major Crown official in the fleet system. He soon came into direct conflict with the merchants of Seville and the Casa de Contratación over jurisdiction. After his conviction in 1563 and 1564 upon charges of smuggling and conflict of interest, Menéndez escaped his imprisonment in Seville and finally succeeded in having all charges against him annulled by the Council of the Indies. He then signed an asiento, or contract, with Philip II for the conquest and settlement of Florida.

Lamentably, historians have concentrated upon the striking events of Fort Caroline and Matanzas and thus upon the purely diplomatic and military aspects of the Florida conquest. This has resulted in general disregard of the fact that the Menéndez contract was signed before knowledge of Rene de Laudonnière's fort on the River May. It was only then that the dual nature of the enterprise of Florida began, as the Crown added troops, supplies and munitions to Menéndez' own effort. Even though Royal aid continued on a sporadic basis and resulted in 1568 in the King's guarantee of payment for a minimum number of soldiers, Menéndez' private government continued to control Florida and undergird its support during the entire period. The very nature of an adelantamiento, such as that in Florida, rendered Crown control over the use of Royal resources virtually impossible.

Pedro Menéndez had to buy or lease ships, hire seamen and soldiers and purchase supplies for his expeditions to Florida; he was required to encourage and support settlers, and had to maintain his establishment for the term of his contract. Examination of the resources of the Adelantado for the conquest discloses that he utilized all the cash, loans and credit he could obtain in order to fulfill his obligations. Menéndez' origin, as a product of the north-of-Spain contra-corsario culture and his relationship to its great noble families, insured that his Florida conquest was not to be a solitary effort, but a regional enterprise. Manpower, associates in leadership and funds for Florida came from a matrix of fellow-norteños, whose commercial and political reach extended to the south of Spain and to the Indies. The Adelantado executed a contract with Pedro del Castillo of Cádiz, making him his surrogate, and erected a structure of powers-of-attorney which enabled him to tap commercial revenues and maintain his effort in Florida. The events of the conquest tested Menéndez' resources to the utmost. His decision to proceed directly to Florida from Puerto Rico in 1565 made his victory possible but cost heavily in ships, lives and money. After Royal aid promised to Menéndez in the Indies failed to materialize, the Adelantado had great difficulty providing for the garrisons in Florida. The conquest also seriously reduced his private income potential through the destruction of many of his ships, and Menéndez

underwent great tribulations with the unruly contract soldiers, whether those sent by the King or his own men. Their mutinies and rebellions cost Menéndez dear, and their treatment of the natives undermined his Indian policies.

In spite of obstacles, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and his norteño conquest group had achieved partial success in the realization of their Florida conquest design. Their continental exploration had reached the Appalachians and Chesapeake Bay while forts and missions had been built from the peninsular Gulf coast around the southeast cape north to Santa Elena. In spite of slow progress in converting the Indians, dedicated Jesuits persisted in their Florida mission in keeping with Menéndez' coherent plan for areal mission centers. Despite the soldiers' mutinies, Pedro Menéndez had imposed a detailed system for local and regional government upon his provinces. He made his establishments in complete accordance with ancient Castilian municipal institutions, which provided for the means of government, justice and extension into the land under Spanish law. Menéndez had created cities whose cabildos would hopefully govern communities where settlers, soldiers and missionaries could build a society that would include and instruct the native peoples. He made arrangements to bring hundreds of settlers to Florida, with whom he would share the costs and benefits of their establishment. Noble and commoner alike shared expectations of a land which would prosper in local

self-sufficiency and in the production of hides and sugar for export. They also hoped that Florida would profit through discovery of a water passage to New Spain and the Pacific, and that naval stores and shipbuilding would flourish there. The Adelantado himself planned a large domain in the fertile lands north and west of Santa Elena, which might support the title of Marquis, such as Cortés had enjoyed.

At the end of the first phase of the Florida conquest in summer, 1568, Pedro Menéndez had been personally rewarded for his services in Florida by profitable offices, a bonus, and additional revenues. The King had also agreed to support a minimum Florida garrison of one hundred fifty men from fleet funds, while Meneéndez' trade privileges were extended in return for his continuation of the efforts of colonization. In spite of the expulsion of the French at great cost to both contracting parties, a bare foothold had been gained in Florida. The small number and wide dispersal of Spanish forces made real penetration and exploitation of the land impossible. Successful evangelization of the Indians and the creation of prosperous colonies was not yet realized. It had become ominously clear that only sizeable Spanish population, supported by military force, could provide the matrix for a true pacification of the vast territory of Florida and its native peoples. The tasks of conquest had just fairly begun.

NOTES

1. See the certificate of custody, Graviel de Ayala, in Vivero, Galicia, July 2, 1567, from A.G.I. Justicia 999.

2. The notification of receipt of the prisoners, dated at Madrid on July 17, 1567, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219.

3. The King's order of release was directed to the Casa from Madrid on May 19, 1657, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967. Royal policy toward the French prisoners is discussed by Eugene Lyon in "Captives of Florida," pp. 17-20.

4. See Fourquevaux to Charles IX, Madrid, n.d. (1567), from "Lettres et Papiers d'Etat de Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel, La Floride Française, p. 450.

5. Philip's letters of May 24, 1567, and June 13, 1567, were both sent from Madrid, and are found in A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection). The reply of the Casa came from Seville on June 23, 1567, and is from A.G.I. Contratación 5,167.

6. Apart from the letters of Fourquevaux, the best description of Pedro Menéndez' arrival at the Court is from Solís de Meras, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, pp. 241-245. The Solís de Meras narrative ends after that portrayal.

7. Menéndez describes his discomfiture at learning of the delay in the Florida supply in a memorial to the Casa dated at Madrid on September 21, 1567. The King sent his suggestion about using one of Menéndez' ships to the Casa from El Pardo on August 13, 1567. Both documents come from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection).

8. An excellent description of the powers and duties of the Royal Fiscal is found in "Powers of the Fiscal," from "Códice de Leyes," September 24, 1570, reprinted in D.I., XVI, 431-435.

9. The case is in a single legajo--A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A. Although the manuscript inventario for the Escribanía de Cámara section of the Archive of the Indies

lists eighteen piezas in the legajo, only nine are now present in the bundle. Microfilm of the legajo is now in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. The writer believes the material so rich that he associates with it the Solís de Merás narrative, and that it may in fact have contained the "missing relacion" from which both the Solís de Merás and Barrientos works were taken. See the cogent summary of parallels between the two narratives by Lyle N. McAlister in his Introduction, esp. xxi and xxii. (Solís de Merás, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés). It may be that the arrangement of papers for the Menéndez lawsuit against the Crown also paralleled the materials contained in the Revillagigedo archive. The asiento copy in Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A is an original, signed by Philip II.

10. "Información sumaria hecho en Cádiz por Pedro del Castillo," September 22, 1567, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

11. "Información ante Alcalde," Madrid, October 16, 1567, A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

12. The Luna soldiery is enumerated in "Requerimiento de Luna a Castillo que le de para los fletes y costa de los soldados"; the northern effort is discussed in "La lista que hizo el [sic] de las Alas en Avilés de 257 personas," "Visita y registro de los navios y gente en Gijón, and Visita y registro del navio Espiritu Santo," all of which are from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

13. As previously cited, the ship losses are itemized in "Memorial de los navios cargados de bástimentos y municiones que se perdieron el Adelantado . . . ," while the supply sailings were listed in "Despachos que se hicieron . . . ," both from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A.

14. The end of the Enriquez case is documented under the date of August 24, 1567, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219. The Parra case, which continued until 1570, is detailed in part in A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 952. Pedro de Redroban's appeal was finally successful; see the Cedula to the Casa of August 2, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967 (Stetson Collection).

15. The Menéndez appointment as Governor of Cuba of October 24, 1567, is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115. The Adelantado named Diego de Miranda as secretary for the Osorio residencia on February 2, 1568, at Madrid; see A.H.P., Protocolo 521, Escribanía of Diego Rodriguez. It appears that Garcia Osorio had already been suspended from his office when the Menéndez appointment was made; on August 30, 1567, Philip II wrote from Madrid to Don Diego de Santillan as "our Governor of the island of Cuba," ordering him to

punish Osorio for his actions against Barreda. This is from a letter in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 1,122.

16. The cedula of appointment on November 2, 1567, is found, among other places, in A.G.I. Contaduría 454, No. 3. Menéndez' arrangement to receive the Royal fifth of all prizes as well as his usual share is discussed in a cedula to the Casa sent from El Escorial on November 5, 1570; from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 24.

17. The embargo is described by the Casa officials in a letter to the King dated at Seville on December 24, 1567, and found in A.G.I. Contaduría 5,167.

18. The income of the encomienda was at least 200 ducats per year, for Menéndez later pledged that sum from the revenues of Santa Cruz to Hernando de Miranda as part dowry for his daughter Catalina. See the dower agreement dated at Avilés on March 27, 1574, from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 153-A.

19. See Crown to Casa, Madrid, October 6, 1567, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220. The shallop tonnage change is from a Royal letter to Pedro Menéndez dated at Madrid on the same day, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. The dispatch of the galleon is described in a communication dated May 15, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.

20. The sentence is from A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A, and is dated at Madrid on February 9, 1568.

21. The poder of Pedro Menéndez to Diego de Valdés is found in A.C.R., legajo 2, No. 3, A7a (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History). It bears the date "1568." The merced of 10,000 ducats was granted on April 11, 1568, by a cedula in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967 (Stetson Collection).

22. Persuaded by Menéndez, the King wrote the Royal Officials of Havana from Madrid on February 2, 1568, and asked them to itemize the cost to Pedro Menéndez of the supplies he had shipped to Florida from Havana. This letter is from A.G.I. Contaduría 1,174.

23. The Baron Fourquevaux advised Charles IX that Menéndez was to leave in the winter of 1567-1568 with 1,500 young married men and their families to make a massive effort to settle Florida. The letter was dated at Madrid on September 12, 1567, and was reprinted in "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel, La Floride Française, p. 452.

24. Menéndez describes the agreement with Perez in his letter to the King from St. Augustine dated October 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). The rupture with Perez is evident in the letter Perez wrote on November 28, 1567, from Santo Domingo to the King, castigating Menéndez for selling Royal property and accusing the Adelantado of attempting to ruin him. The letter is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).

25. See Pedro Menéndez to Crown, St. Augustine, October 20, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection) for the Adelantado's plan for the settlers and his arrangement for them.

26. The collection of the settlers from Toledo in early 1568 is described in material found with an order of July 26, 1568, before the Casa representative in Cádiz, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.

27. The Royal orders were sent to the Casa on August 13, 28 and 30 of 1567; Philip II sent the Menéndez Memorial of September 21 with another dispatch to Seville on October 1, 1567, and sent yet another letter there on October 15, 1567. These are from A.G.I. Contratación 5,012 (Stetson Collection). Other letters from the King to the Casa were sent on November 3, 4, and 18; these are in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967 (Stetson Collection).

28. The Casa de Contratación acknowledged the King's order authorizing the Indians to sail on the relief ships in a letter sent from Seville on February 17, 1568, from A.G.I. Contratación 5,168. From the same legajo, on March 4, 1568, the approval for the passage of Miranda and "Pedro de Balcortoi--the Vizcaino who came with the Indians" was given. Payment of freight for the Indians and their interpreter is listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 299; 53: 2 and 53: 2 vto. Dr. Zayas later wrote a letter (from Seville, August 29, 1569) to the Crown telling of his voyage on one of the urcas of 1568. His letter is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,221.

29. Menéndez' influence in obtaining the Royal letters of authorization for the missionaries was mentioned in a letter from Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo to Francisco de Morja, now General of the Jesuit Order. The letter, dated September 25, 1567, has been reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 204-205.

30. Both points of view are expressed in a letter from Pedro de Saavedra to the General of the Order, written from Madrid on October 10, 1567, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 206-207.

31. The Menéndez visit is detailed in a third-person narrative entitled "Anonymous Relation of a visit which Pedro Menéndez made to the Florida Missionaries in Spain," dated December 16, 1567, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 214-218.

32. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to Francisco de Borja, Madrid, January 18, 1568, in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 228-234.

33. The baptism is described by Felix Zubillaga in La Florida, p. 313.

34. The departure is mentioned in a letter from Gonzalo de Alamo to Francisco de Borja, sent from Havana on November 17, 1568, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 349. Crown costs for the urcas are summarized in A.G.I. Contaduría 299, No. 2, 533; No. 5-B, 11-2. The writer is indebted to Dr. Paul E. Hoffman for this citation.

35. The date of arrival is given by Father Antonio Sedeño in a letter to Francisco Borja dated at Havana November 17, 1568; in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 351. The order of Gonzalo Gayón to Martin de Argüelles, Alcalde, is dated at St. Augustine June 22, 1568, from A.G.I. Contratación 58.

36. Francisco López de Mendoza Grajales recounts the mutiny in his letter to Pedro Menendez, written from St. Augustine on August 6, 1567, and reprinted in Lawson, "Letters of Menéndez," II, 328-332. The hanging of one of the mutineers, Alonso López de Yepes on June 1, 1567, is mentioned in a marginal note opposite his name on the ration list for 1566-67 in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History).

37. The Andrada expedition is recounted briefly by Chaplain Mendoza Grajales in his August 7, 1567, letter; see n. 36 supra. The death of the Captain and his men is mentioned in the ration list marginal comments in A.G.I. Contaduría 941. In 1569, Andrada's wife, Doña Constanza, received a 500-ducat merced from the King after pleading her case before the Council of the Indies. The matter was heard before the Council in Madrid on January 27, 1569, and the case is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.

38. The basic source for the De Gourgues expedition is "La Reprinse de la Floride par le capitaine Gourgues," published in translation (Jeannette Thurber Connor) and reprinted in Charles E. Bennett in Settlement of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968), pp. 202-

226. According to the narrative, the Frenchmen left Europe on August 22, 1567, and reached Florida by way of Dominica, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo.

39. The first Spanish description of the De Gourgues raid is a report from Esteban de las Alas, probably addressed to Juan de Hinestrosa in Havana, and dated May 9, 1568, at St. Augustine. It is from A.G.I. Patronato 254, No. 2, ramo 1 (Stetson Collection), and is mis-dated 1569 on the cover sheet. The loss of San Mateo is narrated at length in the body of the legal case against the Spanish soldiers charged with its loss. This is from A.G.I. Justicia 998 (Stetson Collection).

40. Juan Rogel describes the death of Chief Carlos and events at Tocobaga and Tequesta in a letter to Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo dated at Havana April 25, 1568, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 274-311.

41. The religious differences between Philip and Father Rogel are outlined in the priest's letter to Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo, cited in n. 40 supra.

42. See Brother Villareal's letter to Juan Rogel, dated at Tequesta on January 23, 1568, from Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 235-240.

43. The voyage to Tocobaga and the subsequent flight of the Spanish from Tequesta is discussed by Rogel in a letter to Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo dated at Havana on April 25, 1568, in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 274-311. Menéndez Márquez and other witnesses testified to events at the two missions in "Daños de los Indios de la Florida," in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 20 (Stetson Collection).

44. The second Pardo journey inland evidently endured from September 1, 1567, to March, 1568. The account which has survived is that taken by Juan de la Vandra at Santa Elena on January 23, 1569. The writer found a copy of this in A.G.I. Contratación 58. It has been reprinted by Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 465-473, and by Lawson in "Letters of Menéndez," II, 345-351. The deaths of several of the soldiers left in the inland forts are mentioned in the 1566-67 ration list in A.G.I. Contaduría 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History), fol. 5-9 vto.

45. Juan Rogel to Francisco de Borja, Havana, July 25, 1568; in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 317-328.

46. The Adelantado describes his preoccupation with the construction of the Guard Fleet Galibrazas in his letter to the King from Santander on May 12, 1568; from Lawson, "Letters of Menéndez," II, 336-345.

47. A January dispute over the dispatch of a galleon was heard before Antonio de Abalia in Cádiz on May 15, 1568; this is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.

48. Calculation of the pay due each man was made in A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B. The payment of Sancho de Archiniega is listed in A.G.I. Contaduría 299; 12: 7. The payment of Gonzalo de Gayón and the other pilots was recorded in the same legajo at 38: 4 and 2.

49. The cedula is dated February 2, 1568 at Madrid, and is found in A.G.I. Contaduria 548.

50. See the letter from Hernan Perez to the King sent from Santo Domingo on November 28, 1567, and from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).

51. Esquivel's appointment was dated at Madrid on May 23, 1568, and is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220. The Adelantado complained of the removal of his own people from their offices in his letter to Philip II dated at Santander on May 12, 1568, and reprinted in Lawson, "Letters of Menéndez," II, 336-345.

52. Pedro del Castillo, in attempting to load the shallop Nuestra Señora de la Consolación and a caravel to carry the settlers and supplies to Florida, ran into opposition from Antonio de Abalia, representative of the Casa in Cádiz. Abalia swore that many Portuguese people were illegally aboard the ships. See "Informacion ante Abalia," Cádiz, July 26, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. Pedro Menéndez discussed the dispute and complained to the King about Abalia in a letter, n.d. (August, 1568), from the same legajo. The Casa alleged that the actions of Abalia had been justified because the term of Menéndez' asiento had expired; the King referred to this charge and ordered that the Casa let the ships and settlers go, in his letter to Seville sent from El Escorial on August 22, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967.

53. The King admitted that Menéndez had carried Portuguese on his vessels, but extended the Adelantado's trade privileges and ordered that the violations be overlooked. This is contained in a letter from Philip II to Abalia, sent from El Pardo on August 17, 1568, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967. A copy is also in A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673.

54. The cedula of July 15, 1568, is cited and summarized in a later Royal order of June 17, 1570, found in A.G.I. Contaduría 548.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

"Agreement between Dr. Vazquez of the Council in the name of the King, with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés,"
March 15, 1565.

--A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 3.
in Stetson Collection, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History,
University of Florida.

That which is agreed between Dr. Vazquez of the Council of His Majesty and in his name as party of the first part and Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Caballero of the Order of Santiago of the other is as follows:

First, that the said Pedro Menéndez obliges himself that within the coming month of May, he will have ready and equipped to sail in Sanlúcar de Barrameda or Puerto de Santa Maria or Cádiz, to go with the first (good) weather, six shallops, each one of fifty tons, more or less, and four fast zabras, with their oars, artillery, arms and munitions, loaded with supplies and put in condition for war.

Item--He will carry five hundred men, one hundred farmers, one hundred sailors and the rest men and officers of sea and war, and among these there will be at least two clerics and other persons, skilled in stonecutting, carpentry, and

farriers, blacksmiths and surgeons, all with their arms, arquebuses, crossbows, helmets and shields and with the other offensive and defensive arms that might seem fitting for the expedition.

Item--He will have ready within the same time-period his galleon named San Pelayo, which is of more than six hundred tons, new from its first voyage, which he will load and freight for any part of the Indies which he might wish. One-half or two-thirds of the cargo he may carry and the rest should be left vacant in order to carry in it up to three hundred men of the said five hundred, and some food and supplies which might be needed, as far as Dominica or Cape Tiburón or San Antonio, as he might deem best (which is seventy leagues from Havana, more or less, and about the same distance from Florida), because the said shallops cannot carry the said people, since they are small ships and not covered. They would sicken and die with too much sun and the heavy rain-squalls which there are in the said parts. Neither can they carry the supplies which are needed for these people for such a long journey. Having arrived as it has been said, at Dominica or some other place which seems best to him, he will transfer the people from the said galleon to the said shallops and the said galleon will go on its voyage. He (will go) with the said shallops and zabras, with the said five hundred men, supplied and prepared

for war, as has been stated, to the Coast of Florida. There he is obliged to see and discover places which seem to him the best and most commodious, sailing along the coasts by sea and discovering and investigating by land, seeking the best site for a port and settlement and arranging to seek information. If there are on the said coast or land some corsair settlers or any other nations not subject to His Majesty, arrange to throw them out by the best means possible, which seem best to him. Take the land of the said Florida for His Majesty and in his royal name, attempting to bring its natives to the obedience of His Majesty. He will explore from the Ancones and bay of St. Joseph, which is in the western region of Florida to the Cabeza de los Mártires, which are in twenty-five degrees, and from there to Terranova, which is at fifty to sixty degrees of east-west, and all the coast north-south, to see and discover the ports and currents, rocks, shoals and inlets which might be in the said coast, marking and noting them as precisely as he can by their latitudes and bearings, in order that the secret of the coast and ports which are in it might be known and understood. This year he will do what he can and the rest within the three years for which he is obligated in this said asiento, and of all he shall bring testimony.

Item--He shall carry the necessary supplies for the said expedition for the five hundred men for one year, which year shall be counted from (the time) when the people are in the ships, ready to depart.

Item--That from the day when he sets sail, in the three years immediately following, he will put into the said coast and land of Florida up to five hundred men who might be settlers in it, of which two hundred shall be married and at least one hundred and the rest shall be farmers and officials, so that the land may be cultivated with more ease. They shall be religiously clean, and not of the prohibited (ones).

Item--With the said people, he shall build and populate in the said three years two or three towns in the places and ports which seem to him the best. In each one (there shall be) at least one hundred vecinos, and there should be in each one one great house of stone, adobe or wood, in accordance with the fitness and disposition of the land. (Each should have) its moat and draw-bridge, as strong as it could be made in accordance with the weather and lay of the land. Thus, if it be necessary, the vecinos could be gathered within it and sheltered from the dangers which might threaten from Indians, corsairs or other people.

Item--He will place, within the said time, among the number of the said people that he is obliged to bring at least ten or twelve religious of the order which seems best to him--persons who might be of good life and example. (He shall bring) four others of the Society of Jesus, in order that the preaching of the Gospel might take place in the said land, and in order that the Indians might be converted to our Holy Catholic faith and to the obedience of His Majesty.

Item--He shall place, within the said time, in the said land, one hundred horses and mares, two hundred calves, four hundred hogs, four hundred sheep, some goats and all the other livestock which seems fitting to him.

Item--He shall endeavor, in every way possible to carry out the said discovery and conquest in all peace, friendship and Christianity. The governing of the people in his charge shall be accomplished through Christian treatment, insofar as he can provide it, so that, in all things, Our Lord and His Majesty might be served, conforming to the instructions which might be given to him, which is that which is usually given to those who go to make similar settlements.

Item--He shall attempt to place, within the said three years, five hundred slaves for his service and for that of the people, in order that the towns might be built with more facility and the land might be cultivated. (They

shall) plant sugar cane for the sugar-works which shall be made, and to build the said sugar-works.

Item--Since, upon the coasts of Vizcaya, Asturias and Galicia there are shallops and zabras more serviceable than those of Andalucia and the same applies to skilled carpenters, blacksmiths, stone-cutters, and farmers, it is understood that the part of this armada and people which depart from those places may go directly to the Canary Islands without coming to the city of Sanlúcar or to Cádiz, being first visited before the Justice or person whom His Majesty might name in the port.

Item--It is agreed that the said armada which he must take out (as has been said) must first be visited by one of the officials, in accordance with the customary regulation, in order to see if he goes with the order (perscribed by) and in compliance with the said asiento.

Item--He must give valid and sufficient bond that he will return to His Majesty 15,000 ducats of which he has made him merced, if he is not prepared to sail with the first favorable weather by the end of May, and if he does not have readied all which he is obliged to carry for the said period of time, in conformity with this asiento. He shall give the bond in this Court or in the city of Seville, with submission to the royal Council of the Indies and to the other Justices of His Majesty.

In order to aid in the great expenses and labors which the said Pedro Menéndez must undergo in the discovery and settlement, that which is offered on behalf of His Majesty is as follows:

First, that there must at present be given and paid to him 15,000 ducats.

Item--That His Majesty must give authority to the said Pedro Menéndez so that he might be able to give repartamientos to the said settlers of lands and estates in the said land for their plantations, farms and livestock-breeding, in accordance with the qualifications of each and what seems best to him, without prejudice to the Indians.

Item--That His Majesty must give him five hundred slave licenses, free of all duties, with which they might be enabled to be taken to the said land, registered for it and for no other place.

Item--That he must be given the title of Governor and Captain-General of the said coast and land of Florida for all his life and for that of a son or son-in-law, with 2,000 ducats of salary, which he must have from the benefices and profits of His Majesty coming from the said land, and in no other manner.

Item--That he must be given the title of adelantado of the said land, for himself and for his heirs in perpetuity.

Item--If His Majesty establishes an Audiencia Real in the said territory, he must be given the title of Alguacil Mayor of the said Audiencia for himself and his heirs and successors in perpetuity.

Item--That His Majesty gives him in the said land, for himself and for his heirs in perpetuity, twenty-five square leagues in one or two locations (as he might wish it), which may be good land and in a place which might seem good to him--conveniently located, without prejudice to the Indians. With regard to the title of Marquis of the said land, which he asks be given to him, it is agreed that, the expedition being finished, and that which is contained in the asiento being complied with, His Majesty may make him the merced which would be fitting, in conformity with his services.

Item--Of fifteen parts, he must be given one of all the profits of mines, gold and silver, precious stones, pearls and benefices which His Majesty might have in the said lands and provinces perpetually, for himself and for his heirs and successors, from which it is understood that the costs have been taken.

Item--He must be given two fisheries which he may select, one of pearls and the other of fish, for himself and for his heirs and successors in perpetuity.

Item--In the first ten years, the vecinos and settlers of the said land of Florida will not pay any almojarifazgo on the necessary supplies and provisions for their persons and houses.

Item--In the said first ten years, His Majesty need not be paid more than one-tenth of the gold and silver, pearls and (precious) stones which might be found and discovered in the said land, which said ten years shall begin to be counted from the day when the first smelting is done.

Item--That, when the said Pedro Menéndez absents himself from the said land, he may name and leave a deputy (who shall have in everything the same authority as himself) for as long as he wishes in order to come to these kingdoms and navigate in the Indies; this deputy whom he may name should be one who has the necessary qualities for the post.

Item--That in all the said three years that he must comply with this asiento, he need not pay any duties of almojari-fazgo or of the galleys, or of any other things, whether of impositions upon ships or supplies, of arms or munitions, of barter with the Indians nor of any kind of good or drink. For all the above, he does not have to pay anything, as has been said; it is understood that this refers to items which are carried for Florida.

Item--That from the day he departs from these kingdoms, he may bring in the Indies navigation in any one year for a term of six years, two galleons of five to six hundred tons and two pataches of from one hundred fifty to two hundred tons, armed and equipped with artillery. They may sail as merchant or armada ships, within or outside of fleets, as might seem best to him. He may send them to any part or parts of the Indies which he might wish, together or singly, but they cannot go loaded with any merchandise except food and drink. Of the goods which he may carry and bring, and freight-revenues, and of the ships, he may not be required to pay avería for any armada or for galleys; this benefit is given him in aid of the costs and labors which he must experience in the said settlement and provision of it. Upon return from the Indies, he may bring (any) merchandise which he wishes free of averías, as it has been said, but he may not bring gold or silver, pearls or precious stones, except monies which belong to him and may be his own, and that which comes from freight-revenues from the galleons and pataches, of which he does not have to pay avería as it has been said.

Item--That for the period of six years, he may take from these kingdoms and from any part of them to the islands of Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cuba and to Florida, and from those parts to these, six shallops and four zabras. (These may) sail together or singly, within or outside of fleets

for the trade and commerce of the said Florida and to comply with the said asiento, and to carry there what seems best to him and may be needed for the people who may be in the said Florida. If he might wish to discharge some goods of eating and drinking which the said shallops and zabras carry in the said islands, he may do it, so that in place of those goods they may load livestock and things necessary for the said Florida. If some shallop or zabra should be left in those parts or might be lost, he may bring others in its place. The said six years must run from the month of June, 1566. The masters and pilots who go in these ships must be natives, but may serve as masters and pilots even though they may not have been examined.

Item--That all (the ships) which he might take with the galleons, zabras and pataches during the time of the said six years from the corsairs should be his or his heirs'. Also, whatever prize might be taken from them--all the above to be without prejudice to the tercio (one-third Crown interest).

Item--It is agreed that, during the said six-year term, no-one may in any detain or embargo for His Majesty's service any of the said galleons, pataches, shallops or zabras, in these kingdoms or in the Indies. If for some urgent and necessary reason any of the said ships may be embargoed, he

may put others in their places, of the same tonnage. As long as the said six years might not have passed, he may bring them, in conformity with this said asiento all of the time for which they have been detained or embargoed. The officials of the Casa de Contratación of Seville or of Cádiz, or any other justices of these kingdoms or of the Indies where the said ships might arrive shall give him all favor for the rapid and good dispatch of them. They shall give the registries with all brevity, in order that they shall not be detained; they shall give all favor and aid to the captains and officials who sail in them.

Item--If God should carry off the said Pedro Menéndez before the end of the said three years in such a manner that he might not have been able to comply with his part of that which is contained in this said capitulación, that the person whom he shall name and designate may comply with it. In the event that no such person has been named, the person who inherits his estate may comply with it in order to enjoy all the mercedes contained in this said capitulación.

Item--That these said shallops and zabras which are to go during the said six years, as has been said, do not have to pay any averías on what they carry for the first time, when they leave on their voyage to Florida. When, however, during the said six-year term, they bring things from the said Florida or the islands, or if they take some things from

this kindom (whether supplies of food and drink or other necessary things for the said Florida), in such case they must pay the averías, which are divided up for the galleys which cruise this coast of the west of Spain, of which Don Álvaro de Bazán is Captain-General. They must also pay the averías of the armada which goes to the Indies, if the said shallops and zabras go in convoy with them. If, however, the shallops and zabras navigate by themselves, and do not go in convoy with the said armada which goes to the Indies, they do not have to pay the avería of the said armada which goes to the Indies.

Item--With regard to the notaries public who must be carried (aboard ship)--insofar as the two galleons and the two pataches are concerned, the regulation shall be observed. Insofar as the six shallops and four zabras are concerned, however, for all of them together there shall not be named for His Majesty more than one notary, in consideration of the fact that they are the ships of the said Pedro Menéndez and that he must bear the cost personally of all the arms, artillery, munitions, supplies and other things which they carry and must carry. They are, moreover, small ships and of small cargo, and for each one to carry its own notary public would cost him very much.

Item--His Majesty must give him the title of Captain-General, in proper form, of this entire armada and the ships and people who go in it.

Item--Let all the above be given to the said Pedro Menéndez--the titles, cedulas and provisions in the necessary form for that which has been given above with the favor which befits its, and of this asiento in order that one (copy) might remain in the possession of His Majesty and he shall carry the other one. Done in the town of Madrid, March 15, 1565.

(rubrica)

Dr. Vazquez

(rubrica)

P^o Menéndez

APPENDIX II - A COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS OF VARIOUS SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ASIENOS

Item	Lucas V. de Ayllón Florida June, 1523	Pánfilo de Narvaez Florida December, 1526	Hernando de Soto Florida April, 1537	Lucas V. de Ayllón Florida June, 1563
Stated purpose of the effort	"Populate the land and build forts."	Populate and Christianize.	"Conquer, pacify and populate 200 leagues of coast."	"Population conversion and instruction of <u>naturales</u> ."
Required effort and duration	"Arm ships at your own cost."	Build three forts. Put in 200 men in two sites in one year; bring horses, other livestock from Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba.	Take 500 men with supplies for 18 months.	Take three caravels and 250 men (100 married) 6 months' supplies, 8 Dominicans, 100 calves, 100 horses/mares; 200 sheep. Plant sugar cane, caña fistula, vines and olives. 3,000 ducat performance bond.
Required founding of towns and forts	"Build forts."	Found three forts	Build "three stone forts at own expense."	Build two towns.
Governmental powers; duration	General government; 1 life	General government; military authority; 1 life	General government; military authority; 1 life	General government; military authority; 1 life

Pedro Menéndez de Avilés Florida March, 1565	Captain Pedro de Silva Omagua October, 1568	Juan Ortiz de Zárate Rio de la Plata July, 1569	Diego de Artiega Costa Rica December, 1573
Conversion of the Indians to the holy Faith; conquest, exploration and population.		"Discovery, conquest and population; pacify the Indians."	"Discover and populate at your cost."
Take, with one year's supplies, 500 men, of which 100 farmers, 100 sailors and rest skilled men-of-war. Must, within three years, place a total of 500 settlers, including skilled tradesmen. 10-12 religious and four add. Jesuits. 100 horses, mares; 200 calves; 400 hogs; 400 sheep. Take galeass <u>San Pelayo</u> .	Take 500 men, or which 400 men of war and 100 farmers; four ships, six clerics.	Take four ships at his cost; 500 men, of which 200 farmers and skilled men; 4,000 cows; 4,000 sheep; 500 goats; 300 mares and horses.	Must spend 20,000 ducats; arm three ships, of about 400 tons, "well-provisioned," with 200 men, 100 of whom married, with supplies for one year. Must go with fleet. Survey and discover. 1,000 cows; 1,500 sheep; 500 hogs and goats; 100 horses and mares. 10,000-ducats performance bond.
Establish two or three fortified towns.		Found one or two Spanish towns; build three stone forts.	Build forts in three sites.
General government- 2 lives Military authority- 2 lives		General government- 2 lives Military authority-apparently 1 life	General government-2 lives Military authority-2 lives

APPENDIX II (continued)

Item	Lucas V. de Ayllón Florida June, 1523	Pánfilo de Narvaez Florida December, 1526	Hernando de Soto Florida April, 1537	Lucas V. de Ayllón Florida June, 1563
Titles and offices promised	<u>Adelantado</u> Governor- 1 life <u>Alguacil</u> Lieut.- fort	<u>Adelantado</u> Governor- 1 life Capt.-Gen.- 1 life <u>Alguacil</u> <u>Mayor</u> -perpetual 3 Fort cmdrs.	<u>Adelantado</u> Governor- 1 life Capt.-Gen.- 1 life Governor/Cuba 1 Fort lieut.	<u>Adelantado</u> Governor- 1 life Capt.-Gen.- 1 life <u>Alguacil</u> <u>Mayor</u>
Salaries	Governor- 365,000 <u>maravedis</u> . Lieut.- 100,000 <u>maravedis</u> .	Governor- 150,000 <u>maravedis</u> . Fort Cmdr.- 70,000 <u>maravedis</u> .	Governor- 1,500 ducats salary; 500 ducats ayuda de costa; Lieut.- 100,00 <u>maravedis</u> .	Governor- 1,000 ducats.
Tax Exemptions; their duration.	No <u>almojarifazgo</u> - 1 life. No <u>diezmo</u> of precious metals or other duties.	No <u>almojarifazgo</u> - 1 life on Florida materials; for <u>vecinos</u> , 5 yrs. <u>Quinto</u> reduced to 10%, 3 yrs. No salt tax, 5 yrs.	No royal payments on gold; 6 yrs.; no <u>almojarifazgo</u> for <u>vecinos</u> , 6 yrs; pay 50% on items from sepulchers; keep 5/6 Indian loot.	No <u>almojari-fazgo</u> 10 yrs.; Florida materials; <u>Quinto</u> reduced to 10% for 10 yrs.
Land-grants and land-privileges	15 leagues squared-can "divide lands and waters."	10 leagues, squared.	12 leagues, squared.	15 leagues, squared; may "divide lands and estates."


Pedro Menendez de Aviles Florida March, 1565	Captain Pedro de Silva Omagua October, 1568	Juan Ortiz de Zárate Rio de la Plata July, 1569	Deigo de Artiega Costa Rica December, 1573
<u>Adelantado</u> , perpetual Governor/Capt.-Gen.- 2 lives <u>Alquacil Mayor</u> , per- petual Marquis		<u>Adelantado</u> , per- petual Governor-2 lives Capt.-Gen. and <u>Justicia Mayor</u> - app. 1 life. Lieut.-3 forts Marquis	Governor-2 lives Capt.-Gen.-2 lives <u>Alquacil Mayor</u> - 2 lives Lieut.-3 forts.
Governor-2,000 ducats, from profits		Governor-2,000 ducats; Fort Lt., 100,000 <u>maravedis</u> .	Governor-2,000 ducats; from profits.
No <u>almojarifazgo</u> for all in Florida; 10 yrs. <u>Quinto</u> reducee to 10% for 10 yrs. after 1st smelt. No <u>averia</u> -larger ships, or smaller if out of fleets. No <u>almojarifazgo</u> for Menendez for 3 yrs.;		No <u>alcabala</u> - 20 yrs. No <u>almojari- fazgo</u> -10 yrs.	For Artiega, no <u>almojari- fazgo</u> on first voyage. For settlers, no <u>almojarifazgo</u> or <u>alcabala</u> for 20 yrs.
25 leagues squared; may "divide lands and estates."			

APPENDIX II (continued)


Item	Lucas V. de Ayllón Florida June, 1523	Fánfilo de Narvaez Florida December, 1526	Hernando de Soto Florida April, 1537	Lucas V. de Ayllón Florida June, 1563
Trade Privileges	Six-year monopoly on Florida trade.			
<u>Encomienda, repartamiento, and Indian tribute</u>	"No <u>encomienda</u> ."		"You may make <u>encomiendas</u> ."	No <u>encomiendas</u>
Slave licenses			50, free of duties; later 50 more	8, pay duties.
Other Economic Privileges	1/15 of profits; 500-ducat subsidy to raise silk 2 fisheries.	4% of royal profits, in perpetuity.		1/15 of profits. 500-ducats in <u>jueros</u> ; 2 fisheries; use Indian tribute for pensions
Royal aid promised	500-ducat silk subsidy.			
<u>Citation of asiento</u>	A.G.I. <u>Indiferente General</u> 415.	A.G.I. <u>Indiferente General</u> 415 and <u>Contratación</u> 3,309 D.I., VIII, 224-245.	A.G.I. <u>Indiferente General</u> 415.	A.G.I. <u>Contratación</u> 3,309.

Pedro Menéndez de Avilés Florida March, 1565	Captain Pedro de Silva Omagua October, 1568	Juan Ortiz de Zárate Rio de la Plata July, 1569	Diego de Artiega Costa Rica December, 1573
License for two galleons, two <u>pataches</u> ; 6 yrs. in Indies trade; only slight limitation of cargo; no <u>averia</u> ; out-of-fleet priv. License six shallows, four <u>zabras</u> , 6 yrs. after con- quest year; tied loosely to Florida; no <u>escribanos</u> each vessel; out-of-fleet privilege.		Two ships a year licensed, free of <u>almo- jarifazgo</u> .	Two ship licenses to Costa Rica and to other parts for Costa Rica provisions.
No mention in <u>asiento</u> ; refers to <u>Ordenanzas</u> .		One <u>reparta- miento</u>	May grant two- life <u>encomien- das</u> in country; three-life in new cities. Two-life <u>repartamientos</u> .
500, free of all duties		100	20
1/15 of profits, per- petual. Two fisheries, one of fish and one or pearls.			Two fisheries
15,000 ducat <u>merced</u> , if sailed prior May 31, 1565.			
See Chapter 5, supra, footnote 1.	A.G.I. <u>Indif- erente General</u> 1,220.	A.G.I. <u>Indif- erente General</u> 415	A.G.I. <u>Indif- erente General</u> 415.

APPENDIX III--GENEALOGY OF THE ENTERPRISE OF FLORIDA



A R A N G O



KEY:

M = Marriage

* = Official in the Enterprise of Florida

- - - = Connection not fully known

APPENDIX IV--CROWN COSTS IN THE CÁDIZ EXPEDITION, 1565

Supplies and Munitions	17,381 ducats
<u>Merced</u> paid to the <u>Adelantado</u>	15,000
Payment to Pedro Menéndez in recompense for loss of <u>Tierra Firme</u> voyage	2,000
Payment to Pedro Menéndez on account of <u>sueldo</u> , 1562-1563 ships	3,000
	<hr/>
Total	37,381 ducats

Sources: A.G.I. Contratación 4,989-A
A.G.I. Contratación 4,680
A.G.I. Contratación 5,167
A.G.I. Contaduría 310-B

APPENDIX V--ESTIMATED COSTS OF PEDRO MENÉNDEZ DE AVILÉS IN
THE 1565 FLORIDA EXPEDITIONS

Supplies and Munitions Purchased

Cádiz	14,000 ducats
Avilés	5,000
Santander	2,800
Gijón	2,200
Cádiz (Luna ship)	50
600 Arquebuses	<u>1,070</u>

Subtotal 25,120 ducats

Pay Advances

Officers and Mariners

Cádiz	1,460 ducats
North Coast	250

Soldiers

Cádiz	1,984
Avilés	1,000
Gijón	268
Santander	<u>400</u>

Subtotal 5,362 ducats

Ship Purchase and Charter; outfitting

Purchase three small craft; two ships	13,000 ducats
<u>San Pelayo</u> work	4,000
Charter <u>San Antonio</u>	3,000
Charter two caravels	250
Charter <u>Virtudes</u>	<u>85</u>

Subtotal 20,335 ducats

TOTAL 50,817 ducats

Sources: A.G.I. Escribanía de Cámara 1,024-A
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Eugene Lyon was born in Miami, Florida, on April 9, 1929, and educated there. After obtaining a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Florida in 1951, he served in the Korean War as a naval quartermaster. After he obtained the M.S. from the University of Denver in 1953, he served eight years in the field of municipal administration. After some years, Lyon re-entered the University of Florida for graduate study in History. He is married to the former Dorothy Mathews of Plymouth, Florida, and they have four children. For sixteen years, the Lyons have resided in Vero Beach.


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L. N. McAlister, Chairman
Professor of History

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Professor of History


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Associate Professor of History

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1973


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